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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores EU-China relations from the perspective of identity. The research question 
is how, and to what extent, does identity influence the relationship? Dominant theoretical 
approaches in analysing this relations make mistakes by taking the actors’ interests as given. 
In contrast, this thesis applies a constructivist approach and argues that interests are constructed 
by actors’ identities. The hypothesis of this research is that it is identity which plays a decisive 
role in the EU-China relationship. The concept of identity mainly consists of two elements: 
type identity and role identity. Type identity explains the inner qualities of the actors, and 
contributes to understand the actors’ characteristics, preferences, and the way they perceive 
others. Role identity outlines the dynamics between the actors, and illustrates their behavioural 
patterns in the relevant dynamics. Through these functions, identity defines the interests of the 
actors and thereby shapes their behaviour in these interactions.  
In order to build a comprehensive understanding of the EU’s and China’s sophisticated 
mechanism in decision-making, the thesis begins by discussing the EU’s and China’s nature as 
international actors. In spite of the complexity of the their institutions and internal actors, the 
thesis argues that it is valid to study their relationship at the EU level.  
By laying out the type identities of the EU and China from the four aspects of political regime, 
strategies, values and economies, the thesis establishes the inner qualities of the two actors, and 
shows what kind of powers they are in these realms. The findings are critical to understand the 
actors’ preferences and cognitive model. Through a historical overview of the bilateral 
relationship from 1975 to 2012, the thesis explores the EU and China’s role identities, and 
illustrates how the relationship has been changed as a result of variations of the role identities.  
The case study focuses on the arms embargo negotiation that had taken place between 2003 
and 2005. The case study demonstrates a clash among multiple identities, and shows how the 
identities determined the process and the results of the negotiation, which verifies the decisive 
influence of identity in the interaction among actors. This research contributes to providing a 
distinct perspective to studies of EU-China relations by applying identity in the analysis. It 
presents an alternative perspective from which to analyse EU-China relations by focusing on 
‘what the actors are’ and ‘what they are in each other’s eyes’. Moreover, it makes a major 
contribution to studies of EU-China relations by consulting and explaining considerable 
Chinese language materials in a way that has not been done previously. 
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Introduction 
 
Overview 
This thesis explores the EU-China relationship from the perspective of identity, which is 
employed as a constructivist concept to analyse the nature of EU-China relations. In 
constructivism, identity is ‘a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and 
behavioural dispositions’,1  which defines the actors’ interests and shapes their behaviour. 
Specifically, there are two kinds of identities that are applied within the thesis. One is type 
identity, which both demonstrates the inner characteristics of the actors; and also explains the 
actors’ preferences and the way they perceive others. The other is role identity, which 
constructs a pair of correlative relations within which there are relevant dynamics and certain 
behavioural patterns that will be followed by the actors. Examining identities contributes to the 
exploration of the actor’s genuine interests and helps us to understand the way in which actors 
behave in their interaction with others.  
 
Since the EU features as a supranational entity, it is necessary to fully explore its mechanism 
of policy-making and to understand the relations among its institutions and member states. 
Hence, this thesis begins by discussing the EU’s nature as an international actor, and deems it 
necessary to examine diverse competences of actors within the EU. To match the discussion 
on the EU’s features, this thesis will also explore China’s nature as an international actor and 
interlocutor for the EU in particular. On this basis, this thesis explores different ‘type identities’ 
of the EU and China from the perspectives of political regime, strategy, value and economy. 
The findings demonstrate the instinctive qualities and the self-cognitions of these two actors, 
which are crucial in understanding the scope of their preferences and cognitive mode. Role 
identity is another major identity that is explored in this thesis. An examination will be made 
from the perspective of a historical overview between the years 1975 to 2012, focusing on the 
role identities of the EU and China in five phases. In each phase, the role identity is formed in 
different ways, and it also constructs different dynamics and establishes relevant behavioural 
patterns. As a result, the relationship changes along with the variations of the role identities. 
This historical analysis is not merely looking back in time, but can also be used as a long-term 
                                                 
1 Alexander Wendt, Social theory of international politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 224. 
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historically based case study that shows the influence of the role of identities on the 
development of bilateral relationships.  
 
There is, of course, a need to examine a specific case study to show how the relationship is 
influenced by identities. On the basis of the exploration of both type identities and role 
identities, it is necessary to examine them together to see how they function to impact on the 
relationship. To accomplish this, this thesis deploys the arms embargo negotiations between 
the EU and China as a relevant case study to examine the influence of identities on the 
relationship. Between 2003 and 2005, China and the EU were engaged in negotiations for the 
possibility of the EU lifting the arms embargo on China. This case study is particularly relevant 
as the arms embargo negotiations enabled the identities of the EU and China to be closely 
examined, as well as their identities in a broader context involving the US. Through an 
examination of this case study, the resulting findings illustrate how identities (both type and 
role identities) can influence the actors’ behaviour and their relationship. 
 
The time period for this research begins in 1975, which was the year when the EC and China 
first established diplomatic relations. It ends in 2012, which means the issues that happened 
after this time will not be considered in this thesis. Therefore, events after 2012, such as UK 
voting to leave the EU in 2016, and the impact and consequences of this event on the economy 
and EU’s values, 2  are not included in the analysis of this thesis. This also applies to events in 
China post 2012, such as China’s second policy paper on the EU, which was issued in 2014 
and aimed to deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership.3 This thesis does include China’s 
policy paper on the EU, but focuses on the policy paper which was issued in 2003 not the latest 
version in 2014. 
 
                                                 
2 See for example, Matthew J. Goodwin and Oliver Heath, “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: 
An Aggregate‐level Analysis of the Result”, The Political Quarterly 87, no. 3 (2016): 323-332. 
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China's Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the 
China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation, 2 April 2014, 
available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wjzcs/t1143406.shtml, accessed 25 June 2017. 
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The Core Argument 
The scope of this thesis is to explore the influence of identity on the EU-China relations. My 
interest in working on this project stems from the disappointing nature of the mutual 
communication between the EU and China, because these two actors dealt with each other 
without genuinely knowing each other. As a result, each actor put overwhelming expectations 
and criticisms on each other (this will be demonstrated in chapter 5, especially in section 5.3.3 
and 5.3.4), which is not constructive in the development of a healthy relationship. Moreover, 
the ignorance of the actors’ identity and its impact on the formation of interests exists in both 
empirical policy-making process and studies in academia. Some scholars assess EU-China 
relations without exploring the actors’ genuine interests, and thus produce misleading 
conclusions/predictions on the development of the bilateral relationship. As will be shown 
through an analysis on Chinese language sources in chapter 6, a number of Chinese scholars 
overestimated the EU’s willingness and capacity to promote the multipolarity in the 
international system and balance the US. However, without understanding the EU’s various 
identities, their perceptions were proved somehow mistaken, as the EU was not as enthusiastic 
as China in building a multipolar world, and in the case of arms embargo, the EU did not lift 
the embargo as Chinese government and scholars expected. 
 
It is this kind of misperception of the actors’ properties that led me to study the identities of the 
EU and China. Given the complex qualities of the EU and China as actors, it is highly important 
to explore their identities in order to understand the development of their relationship. As will 
be demonstrated in chapter 1, the EU is a hybrid entity consisting of various institutions and 
member states. Therefore, it is important to examine the actors and their competences inside 
the EU so that we can fully understand the EU’s capacity and motivation in making policies. 
With regard to China, it is not as unitary as some assumes in terms of foreign policy making, 
and it is difficult to understand its persistence on certain discourses (e.g. democracy and human 
rights with Chinese characteristics) without understanding how it perceives its own culture. 
Therefore, instead of looking from the perspective of the structure of the international system, 
this thesis applies a constructivist approach, which examines the individual actor’s identities 
and perceptions. This thesis focuses on the actor’s self-understanding of its inner characteristics 
(type identity) and the perception of others (role identity). To this extent, identity is a form of 
ideas, which as constructivism suggests, poses critical impacts on defining the actor’s interest, 
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and thereby shaping its behaviour. This thesis examines the specific identities of the EU and 
China, and explores their impacts on their bilateral relationship.  
 
Context of studies on EU-China relations 
It has been more than four decades since the EU and China established their diplomatic 
relationship in 1975. This relationship across Eurasia has evolved to be one of the most 
significant relationships in the world. Both actors have significant influence in relative regional 
relations. Bilaterally, the EU is China’s largest trade partner and China is the EU’s second 
largest trade partner. Both actors have built considerable and effective institutions in trade, 
political dialogue and cultural communication, and also established a comprehensive strategic 
partnership in 2003. 
 
The EU-China relations have drawn substantial academic attention. Scholars have applied 
diverse theories and approaches in analysing this relationship. As will be shown in chapter 3, 
the dominant approaches include realism, liberalism and the English School. Realists mainly 
analyse the relationship from the perspective of structural realism and relative gains. For 
instance, the approach of structural realism explains the reasons for the engagements between 
the EU and China that had taken place in the context of the transformation of the international 
system after the end of Cold War.4 The relative gains perspective is used to analyse the disputes 
between the EU and China in terms of trade and technological collaboration.5 Other approaches 
such as classical realism and neo-classical realism are also applied in studies of EU-China 
relations. Whilst realist approaches offer insights into understanding the relationship in the 
framework of the international structure, they neglect the function of the actor’s ideas and their 
perceptions of the international system, which could have larger influence in the formation of 
the actor’s interests. 
 
                                                 
4 See for examples, David Shambaugh, “China and Europe: the emerging axis”, Current History 103, no. 674 
(2004): 243.; Gustaaf Geeraerts, “China, the EU, and the New Multipolarity”, European Review 19, no. 1 
(2011): 57-67; Wu Baiyi, “后冷战国际体系变动与中欧关系 (The Post-Cold War System Change and the 
Sino-EU Relations)”, Chinese Journal of European Studies 5, (2005):1-16;  
5 See for examples, Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, “Geoeconomic Relations Between the EU and China: The Lessons 
From the EU Weapon Embargo and From Galileo”, Geopolitics 19, no. 1 (2014): 40-65; Wang Gungwu, “The 
China effect in anxious Europe”, Asia Europe Journal 10, no. 4 (2012): 335-340.  
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Liberal approaches have been mainly employed to explain the mechanisms of cooperation 
between the EU and China.6 It is believed that the absolute gains lie in the foundation of 
bilateral cooperation, and mutual benefits (particularly in economic cooperation) are the factor 
that drives the development of their relationship. Notwithstanding, it is argued in chapter 3 that 
what matters is what the actors believe. Progress in relations is made only if these two actors 
both believe in the principle of absolute gain, so that cooperation could be established, 
otherwise the asymmetry in ideas would be an obstacle for the collaboration. Moreover, 
neoliberal believes that international organisations can play an active role in spreading norms 
in their interactions with others.7 The EU had indeed implemented policies which attempted to 
change China’s political norms gradually through economic interactions and norms diffusion,8 
but the outcomes of such attempts were not as satisfactory as the EU expected.9 It is therefore 
argued in chapter 3 that it is misleading to talk about the effectiveness of socialisation without 
examining to what extent actors are willing to accept it. 
 
The English School approach is perceived as a middle path in International Relations (IR) 
theory. As an approach that focuses on order, morality and values, it has been applied in 
analysing the issues concerning norms such as human rights, sovereignty, and climate change. 
By emphasising the function of ideas, the English School has provided a distinct perspective 
which stands in contrast to the other two dominant approaches. The constructivist approach is 
similar to the English School approach in terms of that they both emphasize on the function of 
ideas. Moreover, the constructivist approach applied in this thesis provides an additional value 
in the sense that it further examines the intersubjective perceptions between the EU and China, 
which reflect the changes in the nature of the bilateral relationship. 
 
This thesis acknowledges that conventional theories do have value in addressing EU-China 
relations. As stated above, realism, liberalism and the English School have all provided 
                                                 
6 See for example, Carol M. Glen, and Richard C. Murgo, “EU-China relations: balancing political challenges 
with economic opportunities”, Asia Europe Journal 5, no. 3 (2007): 331-344; Feng Zhongping, “中欧战略伙伴
关系两支柱 (The two pillars of the Sino-EU Strategic partnership)”, World Affairs 22, (2006): 66. 
7 Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink, “International norm dynamics and political change”, International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917. 
8 European Commission, A long term policy for China-Europe relations. COM (1995) 279 final. 
9 John Fox, and François Godement, A power audit of EU-China relation (London: European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2009), 19-31. 
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excellent insights in understanding cooperation and conflicts in EU-China relations. 
Nevertheless, as will be specifically discussed in chapter 3, they also have certain kind of 
imperfections in explaining the nature of the relationship. Whilst recognising the contribution 
of the conventional theories, this thesis will employ a constructivist approach, in which it will 
take an in-depth investigation of the EU and China’s own inner characteristics and their 
perceptions of each other.  
 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that identity plays a decisive role in influencing the EU-China 
relations. As mentioned above and will be discussed in chapter 3, other approaches assume that 
the structure or the institutions of the international system determine the actors’ behaviours. 
However, this thesis suggests that it is primarily identity which determines the actors’ 
behaviours. The most significant difference between this constructivist approach and other 
approaches is that it assumes that interest should not be taken for granted, but is something that 
needs to be conceived and recognised by the actors. Therefore, in order to understand the nature 
of a relationship, it is needed to know what the actors’ genuine interest is. The content of the 
actors’ interests is shaped by their ideas and perceptions, which are ultimately determined by 
their identities.  
 
Research Question 
“How does identity influence EU-China relations?” This is the central research question around 
which this thesis revolves. Since this thesis assumes that identity plays a decisive role in the 
development of EU-China relations, then the central research question is to test this hypothesis 
by examining the ways in which identity influences EU-China relations. In order to address the 
central research question, this thesis needs to answer three sub-questions that are related to the 
central research question. 
 
1. What is the EU? What is China?  
In order to analyse identities of the EU and China, it is important to understand what the EU 
and China are, specifically, what features do they have to be international actors. To answer 
this question, the thesis first needs to explore the nature of the EU and China as international 
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actors. To avoid oversimplifying their qualities and considering them as unitary entities, this 
thesis explores their inner mechanisms in policy-making, and also the various preferences and 
interests within them.  
 
‘What is the EU’ is not a simple question to answer as the EU is a hybrid that consists of diverse 
actors. The EU is not Europe, which is a geographic conception that consists of EU member 
states and other nation states. It can neither be purely represented by individual institutions (the 
Council, the Parliament, the Commission or DGs, etc.), nor its powerful member states such as 
Germany or France. When we analyse the EU, we need to understand who is speaking for it. 
The institutions and individual member states within the EU have their own initiatives and 
interests, which sometimes are not consistent. In order to understand the EU’s identity, it is 
necessary to draw a clear picture of its inside mechanisms. To answer the first sub-question, 
chapter 1 will explore the nature of the EU as an international actor, and discuss the EU’s 
competences in policy-making. On that basis, it will then establish that it is still valid to explore 
identities at the EU level. 
 
To answer ‘what China is’, it might seem to make intuitive sense to consider China as a unitary 
actor on the international stage. However, China’s foreign policy-making is much more 
complicated. It is true that the country is ruled by a single party, but this does not mean that 
there is only one interest and objective that forms its foreign policy, and that all actors are 
aligned behind this goal. To answer this question, chapter 2 will demonstrate the plurality both 
in the decision-making processes and, in the way that various Chinese actors behave in the 
international arena.   
 
2. What is identity in the constructivist context? 
Identity is the core concept to be discussed in this thesis. Hence, it is extremely important to 
clarify what identity means in a constructivist context, and how will it be applied into the study 
of EU-China relations. Identity is a concept borrowed from sociology by constructivists. But, 
in contrast to the way it has been employed in sociology and the approach of Foreign Policy 
Analysis, it will be defined in a constructivist manner and in an (IR) context in chapter 3, which 
will also introduce the key elements of identity, namely type identity and role identity.  
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Furthermore, chapters 4 and 5 will respectively give explicit explanations to the nature of type 
identity and role identity, and show how it will be applied in the analysis of this thesis. 
 
3. What are the functions of identities? 
The functions of identities explain how identities influence the development of then EU-China 
relationship. The answer to this question follows an analytical logic that will be illustrated in 
Figure 9 in chapter 5. To briefly describe it, an actor’s identity defines its interest, and thereby, 
shapes its behaviour mode. Following this logic, chapter 5 particularly explores how EU-China 
relationship changed as their identities altered. It also provides a link to the core argument that 
the actors’ interests should not be taken for granted, but need to be recognised and conceived 
by actors. Furthermore, the function of type identity and role identity will be analysed together 
in a single case study of the arms embargo negotiations. Associated with an investigation of 
numerous Chinese language literatures, this thesis will give an answer to the research question 
and prove the hypothesis.  
 
Methodology 
The main methods employed by the thesis are documentary analysis and interviews. 
 
1. Documentary Analysis 
This major method constitutes a rigorous investigation and analysis on considerable Chinese 
language literatures on EU-China relations. In order to achieve an extensive understanding of 
the Chinese views on the EU, China and their relationship, this thesis has collected 176 Chinese 
language literatures from China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), which is the 
largest database for Chinese academic resources. The author has mainly selected articles with 
title and key words of a) ‘EU-China relations’, b) ‘EU-US relations’, which also includes key 
words such as ‘US’, ‘EU/European Union’ and transatlantic relations, but articles refer to 
particular ‘transatlantic relations’ between the UK and US have been filtered out. and c) 
‘China-US relations’, there is a much larger number (about 2775) of articles under this search, 
but many of them are not relevant to the EU. Only 13 articles have been selected as they also 
have ‘EU’ or ‘European Union’ in their key words. In the process of collecting, the author has 
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filtered out irrelevant articles which are non-academic materials (e.g., conference reviews, non-
academic magazine articles, and media reports), and which discuss specific topics that are not 
this chapter’s focus (e.g., details on trade negotiation and technological cooperation). 
 
In order to develop a clear understanding of Chinese perceptions of the EU and the US, this 
thesis will take a qualitative analysis of the content of these Chinese literatures. It will highlight 
the identified key words (e.g., ‘multipolarity’, ‘EU-US breach’, ‘US opposition’ and so on) and 
calculate their percentages, which can show the extent to which China perceived the EU as a 
partner or something else. In a context that is dominated by English language research, 
consulting such a large number of literatures from another language has not been done before 
in studies of EU-China relations, hence it makes a unique contribution to the scholarship. 
 
The official documents and speeches made by Chinese leaders and officials can be accessed 
from governmental websites (for instance, the State Council Information Office of the People’s 
Republic of China, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China) and 
official media such as People’s Daily and Xinhua (along with the online versions). These 
documents provide the materials for understanding Chinese political discourse and the self-
perception of the Chinese government. 
 
Yet it would be biased to just focus on Chinese materials. The thesis is also based on substantial 
investigations of EU documents. In order to analyse the EU/EC’s competences and 
mechanisms, the thesis has examined the treaties from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of 
Lisbon. In order to follow the EU’s policies on China, this thesis has studied six versions of 
the EU’s policy papers on China from 1995 to 2006. By interpreting the key words and tracking 
the adaptations of the documents, this thesis has demonstrated the EU’s perception of itself and 
China, which lays the foundation for understanding the dynamics and developments of the 
EU’s policies on China.  
 
2. Interviews 
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Semi-structured interviews are applied as a complementary method to acquire information that 
cannot be accessed from documents or literature. I have conducted interviews in Beijing, 
Brussels and the UK. The interviewees in Beijing are Europeanists based in universities and 
research institutions, among whom there are some who have access to China’s European policy 
circle. The key interviewee in Brussels was at the time an official in position in the European 
External Action Service. The key interviewee in the UK was also a high-ranked official of the 
EU who participated in the EU’s foreign policy-making system. Due to the interviewees’ 
request, their detailed information has been kept confidential. During the interview process, the 
participants were informed of my research content and were aware of the questions it sought 
to tackle. All the interviews were conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines that are 
required in academic research. The information obtained from the interviews supports and acts 
as evidence for the arguments I make in this thesis.  
 
Scientific Contribution 
On the basis of recognising the conventional theories’ contribution in studies of EU-China 
relations, this thesis critiques the imperfections of dominant approaches employed in this realm 
and provides a constructivist approach. The constructivist approach is not merely a middle path 
between realism and liberalism, but also seeks to correct misperceptions and to reveal the 
genuine qualities and ideas of actors. From the investigation of the relevant literatures, 
especially those written in the Chinese language, it appears that the prevailing conclusions—
which are mostly drawn from the perspective of the structure of the international system—have 
taken the actors’ interests and motivations for granted, but the reality tells a different story in 
contrast to those conclusions. Therefore, by exploring the actors’ identities, this thesis 
examines how the interests are conceived by actors, and then demonstrates what the actors 
really want from each other. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis seeks to provide an alternative theoretical approach in terms of IR. It 
argues that the conclusions of scholars often reflect the authors’ own discourses and 
expectations. For example, and as will be illustrated in chapter 6, when Chinese scholars talked 
about multilateralism, they tended to interpret it in having multipolar dimensions, and ‘hoped’ 
that the EU could be a potential pole to balance the US. They arrived at such conclusions by 
assuming what the EU should do, or talking about what they hope the EU might do, but they 
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failed to understand what the EU really wanted to do. Therefore, without genuinely 
understanding the actor’s ideas and perceptions, studies might make mistaken conclusions on 
the actor’s interests. In light of this, the intersubjectivity of the constructivist approach can 
provide researchers with an alternative perspective from which to analyse the actor’s interest, 
and its relationship with others. In contrast with the large-scale of application of realist and 
liberal approaches in studies of EU-China relations, the presence of a constructivist approach 
in this area is not as prominent. By applying the identity element to the case of the arms 
embargo negotiation between the EU and China, this thesis demonstrates the validity of the 
constructivist approach in empirical research, and it expands the scope in which constructivism 
can be applied.10 
 
Moreover, as mentioned in the methodology section, this thesis introduces and interprets a 
large corpus of Chinese language literature. In doing so, it provides access to substantial 
materials for understanding Chinese perceptions of the EU. This has not been done before in 
other researchers’ work, and can be considered as a unique contribution of this thesis. The 
empirical contribution of this thesis is that it bridges the gaps between the two sides’ 
perceptions of each other. As stated at the beginning, the trigger for this research was the 
realisation that the communication between the EU and China is asymmetric, as they are 
engaging without understanding the inner qualities of each other. By exploring the identities 
of these two actors, this thesis offers in-depth interpretations of their specific characteristics, 
and by comparing them in the same domain, it demonstrates the connections and differences 
between the two, which serves to close the gaps on perceptions. 
 
Outline of the Chapters 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters. The introductory chapter outlines the overall scope 
of this thesis and the context of the studies on EU-China relations. It identifies the gaps in 
current academic literatures and empirical realities, and establishes the core argument, the 
                                                 
10 Social Constructivism has already been applied in the studies of European politics, see for example, Maja 
Zehfuss, Constructivism in international relations: the politics of reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Jeffrey T. Checkel and Andrew Moravcsik, “A constructivist research program in EU studies?”, 
European Union Politics 2, no. 2 (2001): 219-249. What is said above means a further expansion of its current 
scope. 
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hypothesis and the research questions of the thesis. On this basis, it lays the signposts where 
the argument will be made and which questions will be answered.  
 
Chapter 1 discusses the EU’s nature as an actor. By illustrating the complexity of the EU in 
terms of institutions and internal actors, it indicates the need to analyse the EU’s mechanism 
and competences. The discussions take place in foreign and security policies and international 
trade, which are the two major areas where the EU engages others on the international stage. 
In each area, the chapter explores the competences of the institutions and the initiatives of 
member states. At the end of chapter 1, it is established that despite the diverse actors and 
various competences, it is still valid to analyse the relationship at the EU level. 
 
Chapter 2 aims to match the previous chapter on the nature of the EU as an international actor, 
and focuses on the nature of China as an international actor and, particularly, an interlocutor 
for the EU. In contrast to an intuitive perception of China as a unitary actor, this chapter argues 
that China’s foreign policy-making is much more complicated. In doing so, it identifies various 
actors and their competences in China’s foreign policy-making system. Moreover, this chapter 
explores the evolving features in China’s nature as an international actor, and addresses the 
challenges posed in analytical terms by the evolution of its nature. 
 
Chapter 3 establishes the theoretical basis for this thesis. This Chapter critiques the dominant 
approaches in existing studies of EU-China relations. Specifically, it reviews how realism, the 
English School and liberalism have been applied in studies of EU-China relations, and also 
identifies the shortcomings of these approaches in this area. On that basis, Chapter 2 explicitly 
demonstrates the essential elements of constructivism, and particularly explains the concept of 
identity. Furthermore, it lays out the salience of employing a constructivist approach in research 
on EU-China relations. 
 
Chapter 4 explores the EU and China’s type identity. It firstly establishes the definition of type 
identity which is used to analyse the actor’s inner characteristics. Chapter 3 also explains how 
type identity is generated and the function of it. It indicates that type identity is a reflection of 
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self-understanding, it shows the actor’s preferences and shapes the way it conceives the other 
actors. Subsequently, it examines their inner characteristics from four aspects of political 
regimes, strategies, values and economies. Respectively, in terms of political regimes, China 
conceives itself as a democracy with its own characteristics; the EU is a entity with multilevel 
democracy. In regards to strategies, China is a rising power that is pursuing the adaptation of 
norms; whilst the EU is a normative power with civilian means. In terms of values, China is an 
Eastern culture with Westphalian norms; on the other hand, the EU is a Western entity with 
post-modern characteristics. The characteristics of the two clash intensively in this aspect. 
Economically, China is a ‘skinny giant’ with the characteristics of a rapidly growing economy; 
the EU is a developed economy which is capable of wielding its economic clout to promote its 
normative programmes. The work within chapter 3 draws a comprehensive picture of what the 
EU and China are, and lays the foundation for the following analysis of their role identities.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the EU and China’s role identity. At the beginning, it introduces the 
notion of role identity, and explains the function of role identity in the relationship of identity-
interest-behaviour. Within this framework, this chapter is mainly a historical review of the 
development of the bilateral relationship from 1975 to 2012. The review is composed of five 
phases, and the role identities vary from one phase to another, which will be specifically 
demonstrated in this chapter. The review of the EU-China relations proves the validity of the 
design on the relations between identity, interest and behaviour. 
 
Chapter 6 explores the case study of the arms embargo negotiation. Building on the last two 
chapters, this chapter combines type identity and role identity together, and applies them in a 
single case study. The reason for choosing the arms embargo negotiations as the central case 
to study is that it demonstrates multiple identities of the EU and China. The negotiations took 
place between 2003 and 2005, which was the time when their role identities transformed from 
a friendly atmosphere to a critical one. It showed how those type identities—especially those 
in strategies, values and economies—influenced the actors’ behaviours. Furthermore, it 
involved a third and important actor, namely the US. Accordingly, the role identities in the 
triangle relationship posed significant impacts on the defining of interests and forming of 
behaviours. The purpose of the case study is to test the hypothesis that identity plays the 
decisive role for each actor in the EU-China relationship. 
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Chapter 1. The Nature of the EU as an Actor 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In an attempt to study the EU-China relationship from the perspective of identities, it is self-
evidently necessary to identify the relevant actors before commencing the associated 
systematic analysis. It is immediately apparent that a certain degree of asymmetry exists in 
terms of these two actors’ identities: China, on the one hand, is a sovereign state with exclusive 
competences to perform on the international stage;11 the EU, on the other, cannot be defined as 
a ‘nation-state’ due to its intergovernmental and supranational characteristics.12 This therefore 
raises the following questions: 1) If the EU is not a ‘nation-state’, then what is its status or 
typology in its relations with China? 2) Why is it valid to explore the bilateral relationship at 
the EU level? Along with the development of the EU, scholars interpret it as either a regional 
power, promoting the progress of Europe and neighbouring areas,13 or an inter-regional power, 
bridging communications between different regions,14 or a global power, participating in world 
affairs.15 However, while each of these viewpoints is fully supported by abundant evidence, 
they do not answer Henry Kissinger’s famous question about a ‘European phone number’. 
Despite its supranational characteristics, observers have doubts over its ability to be considered 
                                                 
11 The conception and properties of “sovereignty” have numerous definitions, here we use it to distinguish the 
quality of China as a state against that of EU as a supranational entity. The standards applied here quotes from 
the definitions of sovereignty in Stephen D. Krasner’s book “Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy”, especially 
based on the definitions of international legal sovereignty and domestic sovereignty. See Stephen D. Krasner, 
Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3-4. 
12 A de facto knowledge, explanations see Vivien A. Schmidt, “The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in 
a Regional State?” Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 5 (2004): 975-997; Tobias Lock, “Why the 
European Union is Not a State: Some Critical Remarks,” European Constitutional Law Review 5, no. 3 (2009): 
407–420. 
13 Kristi Raik, “The EU as a Regional Power: Extended Governance and Historical Responsibility”, in A 
Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs, eds. Hartmut Mayer and Henri Vogt 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2006), 76-97. 
14 Michael Smith, “Beyond the comfort zone: internal crisis and external challenge in the European Union”s 
response to rising powers,” International Affairs 89, no.3 (2013): 653-671; Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, 
eds., The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2012). 
15 Natalia Chaban, Ole Elgström, Serena Kelly and Lai Suet Yi, “Images of the EU beyond its Borders: Issue-
Specific and Regional Perceptions of European Union Power and Leadership,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 51, no.3 (2013). 433-451; Frederik Söderbaum and Luk van Langenhove, eds., The EU as a global 
player: the politics of interregionalism (Abingdon; London: Routledge, 2006). 
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an independent actor,16 and if it is not, then ‘who speaks for Europe’17 becomes the primary 
question. 
 
Firstly, it is necessary to be cautious when we raise the notion of ‘Europe’. Rather than the 
‘EU’, Europe is a vague conception with larger geographical extent, including other countries 
that are not member states of the European Union itself. Since this study focuses on the 
relationship between China and the EU, then a clear line should be drawn to abstract the 
concept of the EU from the larger conception of Europe. Furthermore, a clear distinction should 
be made between the EU and a number of other organisations within the European region, for 
instance NATO, which is often highlighted in regional crisis management. Moreover, a number 
of statements or modes of behaviour that are conducted by the core member states (e.g., France, 
the UK and Germany) should not be confused with the ‘voice of the EU’. Additionally, and 
more importantly, the existence of these leading member states and numerous institutions 
within the EU enhances the associated complexity, which leaves observers to deal with a tricky 
task of distinguishing what actually constitutes the EU and what does not. 
 
Taking into account these caveats, this chapter is designed to explore the nature of the EU as 
an actor. Within the ambit of this research, the ‘EU’ here refers to the ‘European Union’, which 
means that this relationship is analysed at the EU level. In order to establish a clear analytical 
framework for the EU-China relationship, a comprehensive and precise understanding of the 
EU is required from the outset. This chapter aims to explore the diverse actors within the EU 
and, in order to do so, it will give a detailed overview of the competences and coherences 
(which have or have not developed) in different realms of the EU. In doing so, this chapter 
aims to abstract the EU from the complex map of Europe, and establish the fact that in spite of 
the various actors within the EU itself, it is still valid to analyse it at the EU level. 
 
                                                 
16 Filippo Andreatta, “The European Union’s International Relations: A Theoretical View”, in International 
Relations and the European Union, eds. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 38. 
17 Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the 
EU,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no.3 (1999): 477-501. 
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1.2 The EU as a Hybrid Entity 
Although the EU has existed for more than six decades since the European Coal and Steel 
Community was established by six European countries in 1951, the rest of the world has 
remained somewhat confused when engaging with it. A series of treaties have been ratified and 
implemented to improve the performance of EU, but the enlargement and the reform of its 
institutions has led to an even greater conceptual gap between what the EU is and what it should 
be. Sometimes, third parties confuse the EU with its core member states or inner institutions; 
whatever the sub-EU actors do, the EU takes the associated credit or, indeed, blame. For 
instance, during the Libyan crisis, NATO’s intervention, as led by France and the UK, went 
beyond the initial aim of civilian protection and promoted regime change within the country. 
Chinese observers focused their blame on the ‘EU’, and criticised its ‘ideological/value-based 
hegemony’.18 However, on the EU side, it is also argued that the EU (not NATO) did not take 
responsibility for the intervention and, more importantly, the opportunity to develop its military 
power and apply it to an event which perfectly fits with an imagined ‘scenario’ in order to wield 
its military power (if such exists).19 This asymmetry of knowledge urges us to explore the true 
faces of the EU. 
 
The EU has been conceptualised as a hybrid entity20, which has many actors within it: member 
states, the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union 
(also known as the Council or the Council of Ministers), the European Commission and the 
Directorates-Generals (DGs). Faced with such a complicated entity, it is not at all hard to 
understand why third parties find difficult to gain a clear understanding of ‘what is the EU?’ 
 
                                                 
18 Tian Dewen, “西方意识形态霸权与利比亚战争 (Western Ideological Hegemony and The Libyan Crisis),” 
Chinese Journal of European Studies 3, (2011): 26-28; He Gang, “欧盟对外干预政策研究——以利比亚剧变
为例 (On EU Foreign Intervention Policy——A Case Study of the Upheaval in Libya),” Journal of International 
Relations 6 (2013): 106-118. 
19 EU affairs, “EU criticised over lack of action on Libya; urged to look at nuclear power”, European Parliament 
News, 16 March 2011, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/20110316STO15690/html/EU-criticised-over-lack-of-
action-on-Libya-urged-to-look-at-nuclear-power, accessed 28 July 2013; Jolyon Howorth, “The Lisbon Treaty, 
CSDP and the EU as a security actor,” in The EU’s Foreign Policy: What kind of power and diplomatic action?, 
eds. Mario Telò and Frederik Ponjaert (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), 72. 
20 Christopher Hill, The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1996), 2. 
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‘What is the EU?’ should be the first question asked before analysing any other aspects of this 
entity.21 To answer it, some research has been undertaken at several levels, namely the regional, 
state and non-state.22 Similarly, a number of scholars have set two axes, namely the horizontal 
and the vertical dimensions, by which to analyse the EU’s foreign policy. The horizontal 
dimension focuses on the competences among the institutions of the EU, whilst the vertical 
dimension highlights the relations between the EU and its member states, who maintain their 
sovereignties to a certain extent.23 There are also some analyses based on the actors within the 
‘foreign policy-cycle’, exploring the subtle relations between these sub-actors and their 
influence on EU policies.24 The actor-oriented perspective also includes the ‘principle-agent’ 
framework, as designed to analyse the relationship between the institutions in the policy-
making procedure.25 It is important to be aware of these perspectives, as this chapter will focus 
on the coherences and competitions among the institutions and member states. 
 
The reason for focusing on the institutions and the member states is that the EU’s complexity 
is embodied in its relationship with member states and the relations amongst its institutions. 
Unlike nation states, the EU consists of 28 member states that are legislatively sovereign with 
their own national interests, which inevitably creates competition between them. Unlike a 
nation state, the EU does not have the legitimate power to compel its member states to follow 
a single agreement in every aspects of external policies. In light of this, it is necessary to clarify 
where the interest comes from (the EU itself or the member states) and where/whether the EU 
has the competence to perform its authority.  
 
To look through the blurred lenses of the EU, it is necessary to examine its competences in 
different policy realms. In its specific relationship with China, the interaction is more 
prominent in the fields of foreign policy and commercial trade, so the following section will 
                                                 
21 Shaun Breslin, “The EU and Asia Within an Evolving Global Order: What is Europe? Where is Asia?”, East 
Asia: An International Journal 27, no.1 (2010): 1-13. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Christian Lequesne, “The European External Action Service: Can a New Improve the Coherence of the EU 
Foreign Policy?” in The EU’s Foreign Policy: What kind of power and diplomatic action?, eds. Mario Telò and 
Frederik Ponjaert (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), 81. 
24 Caterina Carta, “The EEAS and EU executive actors within the foreign policy-cycle”, in The EU’s Foreign 
Policy: What kind of power and diplomatic action?, eds. Mario Telò and Frederik Ponjaert (Surrey: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2013), 87-103. 
25 M. Shawn Reichert and Bernadette M. E. Jungblut, “European Union External Trade Policy: Multilevel 
Principal–Agent Relationships”, Policy Studies Journal 35, no.3 (2007): 395-418 
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explore the competence of the institutions and member states in these two areas, and then 
establish the validity to study EU-China relations at the EU level. 
 
1.3 Competences in Foreign and Security Policies 
The EU has been praised for its achievements in establishing such a giant regional entity, 
however, at the same time it is criticised for its lack of coherence and consistency. To some 
extent, its obvious shortcomings can be attributed to its massive achievements. Along with its 
enlargement, it has become an entity with 28 member states, and accordingly one could hardly 
expect it to construct a completely consistent policy, let alone do so amid the tangled 
institutions at the EU level. 
 
1.3.1 Institutions 
In terms of the institutions, even though the Lisbon Treaty applied a series of reforms and 
oversaw the adoption of new agencies, the EU nevertheless became even more complicated 
and ‘crowded’ from a bureaucratic perspective.26 Following the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, two new positions have been created to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the EU’s foreign and security policy: the President of the European Council, and the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the HR). Strictly speaking, the HR 
position was expanded rather than innovated, as Javier Solana had been the predecessor to this 
position since the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force. With the ratification of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the HR has been given additional resources with his or her position as a Vice-President 
of the European Commission and President of the Council of Foreign Ministers. 
 
The appointment of the President of the European Council revealed the member states’ desire 
to maintain integration at an acceptable level, one which would not interfere with their own 
sovereignty and national interests to an too great extent.27 Since his or her responsibility mainly 
                                                 
26 Carta, “The EEAS and EU executive actors within the foreign policy-cycle”, 87; Mario Telò, “The EU: a 
civilian power’s diplomatic action after the Lisbon Treaty. Bridging internal complexity and international 
convergence”, in The EU’s Foreign Policy: What kind of power and diplomatic action? eds. Mario Telò and 
Frederik Ponjaert (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), 34-38. 
27 Tony Barber, “The Appointments of Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 48 (2010): 55-56.  
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rests with the general affairs of EU’s development (as assisted by the General Affairs Council), 
their function in foreign affairs is to ‘ensure the external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning its common foreign and security policy’28. In this regard, the President of the 
European Council faces a certain challenge: according to the Lisbon Treaty, the President 
seems to have an overlapping competence with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy. As stated in the Treaty:  
 
The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that 
capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to 
the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy29. [emphasis added] 
 
This statement left observers confused about 1) the criteria of the President’s capacity, and 2) 
to what extent his behaviour should prejudice the power of the High Representative. These 
questions will be discussed later, together with the actual competence of the HR, in more detail. 
 
The HR position is also associated with the position of Vice President of the Commission, and 
was therefore designed to be ‘double-hatted’. Some scholars further argue that there is a third 
‘hat’, namely that of the President of Foreign Affairs Council.30 According to the duties of the 
various positions, the HR has at least three expected roles and functions: 1) an initiator and 
‘watchdog’31 of the EU’s external policies; 2) an agent of the EU on the international stage; 
and 3) a bridge connecting the inner institutions, allocated in the area of foreign and security 
policy. 
 
                                                 
28 Article 15 (6), Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European 
Union, 26 October 2012, C 326/13. 
29 Article 9B (6), The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, Official Journal of the European Union, 17 December 2007, C 306. 
30 Wolfang Wessels and Franziska Bopp, “The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty: 
Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead? CEPS Challenge Paper No. 10, 23 June 2008.” (2008): 16. 
31 Ibid., 13. 
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Regarding the first role, the HR is required to propose initiatives and ‘ensure implementation 
of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council’.32   Before proposing 
initiatives, the HR is required to consult the European Parliament and obtain the consent of the 
European Commission, 33 which means the HR does not have exclusive power in the realm of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Meanwhile, the HR is not alone in monitoring foreign 
policies, as the Political and Security Committee (PSC) has been designed to execute the same 
task, which is to ‘monitor the implementation of agreed policies’, where the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) expressly emphasised that this be ‘without prejudice to the powers of 
the High Representative’.34 How, then, to divide the competences? Does the PSC act on its 
own initiative, or is it an assistant of the HR? 
 
Concerning the second role, we prefer to define the HR as one of the agents, rather than the 
only agent of the EU on the international stage. The TEU indicated the need for three actors to 
ensure the external representation of the Union. One is the Commission, whose competence is 
relatively clear as it represents the EU in all subjects, with the exception of the CFSP.35 Within 
the CFSP, as mentioned above, the President of the European Council and the HR are both 
responsible for ensuring the EU’s external representation. These overlapping competences 
could be explored by comparing the corresponding hierarchy in interactions with third parties. 
For instance, before the meeting of the then President Herman van Rompuy and the then 
Chinese President Hu Jintao in May 2011, the then HR, Catherine Ashton, had met previously 
with Dai Bingguo, who then was a State Councillor and the director of the Office of Foreign 
Affairs of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China (CPC), to prepare for the 
presidential-level meeting. It is important to note that, as we shall see in chapter 2, Dai was not 
the foreign minister, but was in fact highly-ranked in the Chinese political hierarchy and, 
accordingly, had greater powers in foreign affairs. This cannot be exactly grafted into the 
relationship between the HR and the foreign ministers of the EU member states, but this 
example does help to explain the distinction in terms of external representation between the 
President and HR: the President is more of a symbol or figurehead, whilst the HR is a detailed 
executor. 
                                                 
32 Article 27, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., Article 38. 
35 Ibid., Article 17 (1). 
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For the third role, with the his or her multiple positions in Commission and the Council, the 
HR can act as a bridge to pool resources together to ensure discipline in EU’s foreign actions 
and increase the consistency and efficiency in the EU’s foreign policy of them. However, more 
positions mean that the HR has to answer more institutions. In terms of the appointment and 
resignation of the HR, the European Council, the President of the Commission and the 
Parliament all have the power to choose a candidate for this position.36 Therefore, the HR is 
responsible for nearly all the institutions involved in foreign affairs, and is also responsible for 
chairing the Foreign Affairs Council to promote the CFSP. As a Vice-President of the 
Commission, the provisions of the TEU also stipulate the HR’s responsibilities coordinate the 
different external competences between the Commission and the CFSP. In this instance, the 
HR faces a particular problem: how much power should be delegated from the Commission? 
The fact of institutional transaction indicates a complicated picture: the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), which has been designed to assist the HR, consists of ‘officials from 
relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission’.37 
Under this provision, the former Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) was 
merged into the EEAS, leaving some mandates outside the CFSP to the Commission’s new 
DG, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), a department that allows the Commission 
to retain its capabilities in external affairs. This new service works alongside the EEAS and 
plays a key role in managing the operational expenditure of external actions. Here, we do not 
intend to analyse whether there would be competition or coherence within institutional co-
operation, but this does nevertheless illustrate a sophisticated pattern of distribution of 
competences. 
 
While the EU and its foreign policies have received considerable criticism about its general 
lack of coherence, some scholars have defended the EU on this issue. Lequesne argued that 
this kind of criticism is based on the hypothesis that the EU is, or should be, a centralised state-
styled sovereignty, comparing the EU’s multilateral institutions with the nation-state’s 
governance, in the sense in which the EU would evidently be questioned as a defective polity 
lacking consistency, but with extensive competence. Furthermore, he added that even in the 
                                                 
36 Ibid., Article 17(6), Article 17(8), Article 18 (1). 
37 Ibid., Article 27(3). 
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governance of a nation-state, competence is to some degree shared and bargaining exists 
between foreign ministers and other departments or subnational governments.38 Therefore, the 
coherence and the consistency of the EU should not be over-expected or over-required. Since 
such incoherence and inconsistency is common in individual states, the EU does not deserve 
excessive criticism in terms of this particular shortcoming. Coherence is the ultimate goal, 
though at the same time this should not overwhelm the EU under its associated pressure.39 
 
1.3.2 Member States 
The institutional reform brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon was intended to enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, it was also intended to 
increase the coherence and consistency of the member states, which is another factor that is 
critical to the improvement of the EU’s external capabilities. The Lisbon Treaty envisaged that 
there were two actors responsible for implementing the CFSP in practice: one is the HR, and 
the other is member states.40 Problems arise in that while the HR is legally obligated to the EU, 
1) to what extent are the member states duty-bound to fulfil their contribution to the CFSP? 
and 2) to what extent are they willing to do so? 
 
To ensure that member states will comply with the EU’s policies and support its actions, the 
EU has set a series of provisions in the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) to define the positions and obligations of its member states.41 Meanwhile, the 
treaties also state that member states retain those competences that have not been ‘conferred 
upon the Union in the Treaties’,42 which leaves member states a large political space within 
which to wield their autonomy. What then is the scope of the conferred competences? If we 
look into the provisions of the TFEU, in which are listed the EU’s competences, we will find 
                                                 
38 Christian Lequesne, “The European External Action Service: Can a New Improve the Coherence of the EU 
Foreign Policy?” 80. 
39 Hartmut Mayer, “The Challenge of Coherence and Consistency in EU foreign Policy”, in The EU’s Foreign 
Policy: What kind of power and diplomatic action?, eds. Mario Telò and Frederik Ponjaert (Surrey: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2013), 108. 
40 Article 24(1), 26(3), Treaty on European Union. 
41 Article 4, 24(3), 42(3), Treaty on European Union; ‘Part Six, Title iii”, Enhanced Cooperation, Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on Functioning European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 26 October 
2012, C 326/47. 
42 Article 4(1), 5(2), Treaty on European Union. 
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that the treaty grants the EU the prerogative ‘to define and implement a common foreign and 
security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy’.43  
 
However, according to Carta, competence can be categorised into four types: 1) exclusive 
competence, which is attributed to the EU only and where the member states do not have 
autonomy; 2) collective competence, where intergovernmental coordination is applied; 3) 
mixed (shared) competence, where EU and member states cooperate in a complementary way; 
and 4) competence of exclusive pertinence of the member states, which applies to member 
states only.44 The TEU has assigned national security into the fourth competence, as the TEU 
leaves it ‘the sole responsibility of each Member State’.45 Although defined as one of the EU’s 
competences, the CFSP is neither included in its exclusive competences nor shared 
competences.46 Moreover, it is not a policy that merely performs at the intergovernmental level, 
but also concerns both the EU (along with its institutions) and member states. Thus, further 
exploration is needed to describe the specific decision-making process of the CFSP defined in 
the TEU. 
 
The TEU states that decisions of the CFSP are taken unanimously by the European Council 
and the Council of the European Union,47 by which member states can retain their autonomy 
and sovereignties in foreign affairs. Despite the fact that certain exceptions, where qualified 
majority voting will apply, have been listed,48 member states still have option to avoid the 
enforcement of qualified majority voting by abstaining or declaring it is for vital and stated 
reasons. 49  Although Article 31 of TEU also empowers the HR and European Council to 
propose a qualified majority, the proposal made by the HR needs to be initiated by the European 
Council, and the way in which the European Council adopts a decision is still by unanimity,50 
thereby still allowing the preferences of individual member states to potentially override the 
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EU’s initiatives. Based on these provisions, some scholars have concluded that the decision-
making process of CFSP remains unanimous.51 
 
The TEU has defined the least requirement for member states, which is that ‘they shall refrain 
from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its 
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations’.52 But the definition of the EU’s 
‘interests’ should also be in accordance with that of member states, which is the ‘common 
interests’. So that refraining from causing prejudice to the Union’s interests means that 
complying with the EU’s decisions would not prejudice the sovereign interests of member 
states. 
 
Consequently, despite the responsibility and obligations to the EU, national interest remains 
one of the most important conditions that member states take into account when forming their 
foreign policies. National preferences can be compromised to some degree, but cannot be over-
diminished, ignored or even excluded in the formulation of a collective policy. With the same 
significance, sovereign autonomy is another decisive factor, together with some related 
national traditions (e.g., the UK’s transatlantic alliance), which stands prior to delegating 
foreign policy power to the EU.53 
 
The second question is, how willing member states are to fulfil their contribution to the 
progress of the CFSP. To some extent, member states seem to enjoy this currently fragmented 
framework of cooperation. 54  Outside this framework, they could establish bilateral 
relationships with third countries to pursue their national interests; within it, this framework 
can be used as a platform to facilitate their interests. Member states are quite shrewd at 
maintaining the delicate balance between delegating powers to the EU and absorbing interests 
from it. While participating in the cooperation of the Union, member states use the EU (or the 
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CFSP specifically) as their ‘agent’ in order to provide collective protection, realise their 
respective interests, and increase their individual international influence. 55  However, it is 
difficult for the EU to satisfy the demands of all member states, thus it will face competitions 
associated with diverse national interests or preferences. Furthermore, the unanimous decision-
making process of the CFSP is not sufficiently effective to allow the construction of a highly 
consistent foreign policy or action, whereby member states may choose to practice outside the 
framework of the CFSP, or else, pursue their preferences in other organisations. For example, 
in the Libyan Crisis, France, the UK and other states chose to operate under the framework of 
NATO. 
 
The end of the Cold War and the turning of the US strategic priorities to Asia-Pacific and the 
Middle East are important, which has left the EU with the space to establish its own defence 
framework and wield its own military power. However, in such an ‘archetypical scenario’56 as 
the Libyan crisis, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) allowed few 
effective functions during the entire period. Although the intervention operation was led by 
France and the UK, along with a few other EU member states, but as mentioned above, this 
particular operation actually proceeded under the aegis of NATO.  
 
The EU did claim that the CSDP – or to take an even further step, a common Union defence 
policy – should not prejudice member states’ own policies regarding this subject, and should 
respect their obligations to NATO (specifically mentioned).57 However, obligation is one thing 
but initiative is another. France and the UK did not choose to operate under the EU’s framework, 
but rather NATO’s. Furthermore, the presence of Norway (a nation that is not an EU member 
state) and the backup provided by the US amply demonstrated that NATO remains the 
dominant military institution in the European area and is also still seen as being effective and 
efficient, in contrast with the ‘embryonic’ CSDP. 
 
                                                 
55 Christopher Hill, The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, 12; Wolfang Wessels and Franziska Bopp, “The 
Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty: Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead?” 4. 
56 Jolyon Howorth, “The Lisbon Treaty, CSDP and the EU as a security actor”, 72. 
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As a consequence, it is reasonable to give the HR an excuse for inefficiency; in the area of 
security and defence issues, the EU’s capability mainly rests on the support of its member states. 
The incoherence among member states not only affects the consistency of EU security and 
defence policies but also directly leads to an inefficient and incapable EU military power. A 
simple observation of the security orientation of member states illustrates the divisions within 
the EU in the sense of its foreign and security policy. France has been promoting its cooperation 
with the EU in a relatively consistent way. Following Gaullist principles, France has 
constructed its international role on the basis of maintaining its sovereignty and independence. 
However, with the ambition to be a global power, France cannot act alone without the support 
of an alliance or an organised group of other nations. Therefore, the EU offers an appropriate 
framework within which France might be able to implement its policies and extend its influence. 
While endeavouring to shape the EU’s policy in a French way, Paris branded its European 
policy as being autonomous. On the international stage, France attempted to reduce US 
influence on the EU, and further prevented a diminution of its own sovereignty by pooling its 
power within the EU. Consequently, France may be considered as ‘uploading’ rather than 
‘downloading’ policies in its participation with the EU, whereby the EU is treated purely as a 
tool through which to realise Paris’s priorities.58  
 
However, some scholars argue that France’s attitude could lead to a dilemma: while cherishing 
its sovereignty in cooperation with the EU, France is sticking to an intergovernmental pattern, 
but an effective and efficient EU can hardly be expected in an intergovernmental paradigm.59 
Although it is commonly believed that France has taken a more pragmatic and flexible 
approach in its EU policy, it has still not changed its intergovernmental characteristics. The 
normalisation of its relationship with NATO has also enabled Paris to achieve closer ties with 
those ‘Atlanticist’ states and has embedded multilateral cooperation in a more extended context. 
However, this adaptation does not make require any particular degree of genuine contribution 
to the EU. The roles of France and NATO were highly apparent during the Libyan Crisis, but 
the EU’s voice was marginal. Nonetheless, re-entering NATO did help France to establish 
improved defence and security cooperation with the UK in 2010. However, whilst sharing a 
common sense of cooperation, Paris and London did not share the same agenda: the British 
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government claimed that this cooperation was independent of the EU but the French 
government, by contrast, claimed that this bilateral cooperation would contribute to reinforcing 
the multilateral cooperation of the CSDP in the longer term. This meant France had not 
abandoned its aspiration to establish a strong EU, but was now moving towards a more 
pragmatic approach to achieving this. To sum up, France is willing to further integrate the EU, 
but in terms of the way it intends to achieving this, Paris is still pursing an intergovernmental 
manner instead of setting a series of effective institutions to make a collective policy at the EU 
level. 
 
The UK presents a relatively contradictory attitude towards the EU’s foreign and security 
policy. While signing the declaration with France, in which the UK stressed its willingness to 
promote ‘closer co-operation and complementarity between the EU and NATO’,60 London 
actually holds a relatively biased view of these two organisations. NATO is the pillar, and first 
choice, of the UK’s defence and security policy, whilst the EU, specifically the CSDP, is a 
complementary actor which can only function where NATO cannot, or in the extreme, where 
NATO chooses not to intervene and leaves space for the EU.61 
 
For decades, the UK has presented a rather two-faced approach to the process of implementing 
the CSDP; while it has actively proposed a number of initiatives for the EU’s defence and 
security policy since St. Malo in 1998, it has also isolated itself from other member states by 
slowing progress towards deeper and further cooperation. For instance, an uncompromising 
attitude on the issue of setting the EU’s operational headquarters left the UK opposing the 
member states who proposed it.62 Furthermore, while establishing bilateral co-operation in the 
defence and security realm, the UK does not share common purpose with France. The UK 
prefers to pool and share defence resources in a bilateral manner rather than a multilateral 
within the EU. In contrast, France’s clear intention is to draw the UK into helping to facilitate 
such cooperation within the framework of the EU.63  
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The contradictory approach by the UK has resulted in a paradox in the EU’s defence and 
security policy. On the one hand, the UK is willing to strengthen the capability of the CDSP in 
order to relieve the burden on NATO, especially at a time when the US is turning its focus 
away from Europe and which draws away a part of NATO’s strategic powers. On the other 
hand, it fears that the growth of the CDSP may undermine its national preferences and 
autonomy.64 Therefore, a comfortable middle for the UK is to establish bilateral cooperation 
with a strong state outside the framework of the EU. With its shared interests in the realm of 
defence and a comparable military capability, France seemed to be the only option. 
Consequently, initiating such bilateral cooperation with its negative attitude towards Brussels, 
the UK presents the EU with a paradox: the UK is an obstacle to the CSDP but the CSDP 
cannot work without it.65 David Cameron, the then Prime Minister of the UK, expressed the 
possibility of rethinking the UK’s commitment to EU membership, which cast a shadow over 
the future of the UK-EU relationship, the consequences and influence of which are not yet clear 
but the impatience and frustration with the EU has been openly shown.66 
 
Germany, as a core economic actor in the EU, differs from France and the UK in terms of 
foreign and security policy. Germany did not participate (but was not entirely excluded) in the 
Franco-British defence co-operation and, according to observers, it also did not feel any 
pressure, or indeed the necessity, to involve itself in this regard.67  Berlin has extensively 
criticised by its partners for its abstention from military action and its relatively low defence 
expenditure (€33.5 million in 2010, 1.34% of GDP, compared with the UK’s €43.4 million, or 
2.56% of GDP, and France’s €39. 2 million, or 2.01% of GDP).68 
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Germany is distinct from its partners in the sense of its unwillingness to use military force in 
the global arena, which was made entirely apparent during the Libyan crisis, in Afghanistan, 
and also in Iraq. Some scholars attribute this perspective to its strategic culture,69 whilst others 
attribute this to its identity as a civilian power.70 However, if we examine this situation from 
the EU’s perspective, the criticism and blame about Germany’s abstention lie outwith of the 
scope of the EU, lying rather within the purview of NATO or the UN. In the realm of the EU’s 
foreign and security policy, Germany has been promoting the development of the CSDP since 
the enactment of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. Unlike its EU partners who are 
enthusiastic in implementing its actions, Germany has been seen as active in establishing an 
effective multilateral institution for defence cooperation.71 Therefore, Berlin would like to pool 
and share interests with Paris and London on the basis of institutional cooperation in Brussels, 
but does not want to be involved in military operations outside of Europe. In comparison with 
its low-profile in foreign and security policy, Germany is more enthusiastic in its role of a core 
economic state in the EU, thereby wielding its influence as a civilian power. 
 
1.3.3 Summary 
The EU has made considerable effort in terms of the development of its foreign and security 
policy. The improvement apparent in past treaties clearly demonstrates the EU’s determination 
to establish an effective common foreign policy. The lack of consistency in implementing a 
collective foreign policy could undermine the EU’s collective identity but, as observed above, 
despite the competition and complexity within the EU, it has had a degree of success in 
constructing the identity of an ‘EU’ on the international stage. The EU has been increasingly 
recognised as an independent actor rather than a simple collection, and coalition, of member 
states. The validity of the EU as an international actor will be discussed later in section 1.5. 
Here, however, this illustration of diverse actors’ competences is not to point to the failure of 
the EU’s efforts at building collective policy, but rather is intended to demonstrate the EU’s 
complexity in making policies. For example, it needs to take into account diverse member 
states’ interests when making a policy, and it requires complicated procedures to put policies 
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into effect. Such a sophisticated nature of the EU will be further discussed in the analysis of 
the arms embargo in chapter 6, as it will explain why the embargo was not lifted. 
 
1.4 Competence in International Trade 
The EU’s external trade relations are undertaken within the framework of the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP). In contrast with its policies in foreign and security areas, the EU 
has an integrated policy in the realm of trade, not only because it has a relatively long history 
of such since it was established in 1957, but also due to the evolution brought by the treaties. 
The EU’s trade policy is at the core of the Union’s function and gives the EU a ‘single voice’ 
with which to address the rest of the world. Regardless, this single voice needs to be constructed 
and the appropriate compromises adopted among the EU institutions and member states before 
it can be implemented. 
 
Therefore, prior to the analysis of the EU’s trade policy on the global stage, a study of the EU’s 
inner procedures is required, along with the interests and preferences that influence EU policy. 
This section will first demonstrate the EU’s competence in trade by reviewing the treaties, and 
will then explore the policy-making process in trade policy at the institutional level. Then it 
will analyse the economic interests shared by member states and the competition amongst them. 
 
1.4.1 Institutions 
As one of the most integrated policies of the EU, the CCP is often described as a typical 
‘principal-agent’ model, which essentially consists of two levels: the first is the member states 
(principals)-EU (agent), and the second is the Council (principals)-the Commission (agent).72 
The first level concerns the competences that have, or have not, been delegated to the EU, 
whilst the second refers to the relationship between the Council and the Commission (with the 
European Parliament also involved). 
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In terms of the member states-EU model, as mentioned in section 1.3.2 there are different types 
of competences that can be seen in the analysis of the relationship between the EU and its 
member states. The first level of principal-agent concerns the differences between the exclusive 
and mixed competences. The former implies that member states entirely delegate their power 
in commercial actions to the EU and act collectively at the EU level. The latter means that they 
maintain the ultimate right to ratify concluded negotiations within their national parliament. 
This diversity depends on the scope of trade, which has been expanded by various EU treaties 
from the Rome Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
When the CCP was first established by the Treaty of Rome (officially known as the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community) in Article 113, it granted the European 
Economic Community exclusive competences in the fields of tariffs, trade agreements and the 
uniform implementation of trade policy, in which decisions are made by a qualified majority 
voting in the Council.73 The provisions related to the CCP had not been changed for some 
considerable time until the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. During this period, 
the world and EU itself underwent dramatic changes: the Cold War ended, and the world 
entered an era of globalization. Moreover, the enlargement of the Community expanded the 
scope of trade as more member states joined, increasing the necessity to clarify the EU’s 
competence in trade.  
 
In this context, the EU reinforced its competence in international trade. The Amsterdam Treaty 
included a statement that the EU’s exclusive competences could cover the area of trade in 
service and intellectual property on the basis of unanimity in the Council.74 Even though the 
EU extended its competence, it was exercised in a unanimous way, which meant it still 
represented a compromise on the part of the EU and its member states. However, it was also 
provided a degree of preparation for its next stage of expansion.  
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In the Nice Treaty, a substantial number of trade competences were included in the provisions. 
‘Trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property’ was included into the 
EU’s exclusive competence (with exceptions that require unanimity in some conditions).75 
Moreover, this treaty also defined the scope of competences in specific fields, for instance the 
EU and member states share mixed competences in terms of ‘cultural and audio-visual services, 
educational services, social, and human health services’. Thus, member states were able to 
maintain the final decision to ratify the agreements related to their sensitive, individual 
concerns. In addition, the treaty also provides the space for the Council to extend exclusive 
competences into other aspects of intellectual property which are not otherwise mentioned in 
the former provision. The above shows that the EU’s competences in trade have expanded 
considerably. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty summarised the previous provisions and added foreign direct investment to 
the EU’s exclusive competences76, which further grew the EU’s competences. Moreover, the 
Lisbon Treaty increased the power of the European Parliament in the its policy-making 
procedure, which leads this discussion to the relationships among the EU institutions, as per 
below. 
 
The second level of the ‘principal-agent’ model concerns the relationship among the EU 
institutions. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament obtained increased 
power within the CCP. The provision clearly states that ‘The European Parliament and the 
Council’ shall implement the CCP through the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (formerly 
known as the ‘co-decision procedure’),77 which gives the Parliament the same position as a co-
legislator with the Council.78 Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty granted the Parliament the right not 
only to be informed when concluding the agreements, but also to be ‘regularly informed’ about 
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the negotiation procedures.79 Formerly, the Parliament was passively informed by the end of 
the negotiation. In comparison, the Lisbon Treaty grants the Parliament increased powers to 
become involved in the process of trade and provides it with the information to monitor the 
Commission and negotiation proceedings.  
 
Some scholars argue that the co-legislator position and receiving the same information do not 
necessarily mean that the Parliament has equal influence and power as the Commission and the 
Council does in the trade policy.80 However, in comparison with the marginal role prior to the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament has gained considerable power and authority to have an impact 
on the decision-making process. In addition, the change of wording also reflects the 
transformation of the Parliament’s role. The word ‘assent’ in the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (TEC) was replaced by ‘consent’ in the TFEU. Although the words are 
both used to describe the agreement from the Parliament that is required in trade policy, the 
former ‘assent’ is a passive power, which leaves the Parliament fewer options in making 
decisions. In contrast, the latter ‘consent’ is relatively active, providing the Parliament with 
increased initiative to participate in the procedure, and more space to choose when to agree. 
 
Along with the larger role of the Parliament, the framework of the policy-making process has 
also been enlarged. In order to understand the institutional functions involved in this procedure, 
we will select the main institutions involved in policy-making and illustrate the interactions 
between them. The main three institutions in trade policy are the Council, the Parliament and 
the Commission. The former two act in the role of legislators, whilst the latter has the obligation 
of agenda planner and negotiator in the practical exercise of negotiating. There are specific 
departments or committees within these three institutions that engage in the process of trade 
policy-making.  
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In the Commission, the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) is responsible for setting the 
agenda of the negotiations and shaping the content of agreements. As regulated by the treaties, 
the Commission also needs to co-operate with a special committee in the Council,81 the Trade 
Policy Committee (TPC), which takes directives from the Council and monitors the process of 
negotiations. The Commission is also obligated to regularly report to the TPC and the 
Parliament. Within the Parliament, there is the International Trade Committee (INTA), which 
is the main actor in trade policy making and evaluating the agreements. 
 
To open a negotiation, the Commission makes a recommendation to the Council to request 
‘negotiating directives’. The Council will set out the ‘general objectives’ and authorise the 
Commission to open negotiations. The negotiating team is led by DG Trade, which will attempt 
to draft an agreement that meets the objectives set by the Council. DG Trade regularly reports 
to the Trade Policy Committee and the Parliament during this process, and will also consult the 
TPC and the Parliament to gain feedback that will be taken into account during the negotiations. 
When the ‘draft text’ of the agreement has been formed, it will be sent to the Council and the 
Parliament to conclude the agreement. In concluding negotiations, the Council has the authority 
to sign and conclude the agreement, but needs to consult the Parliament before so to gain their 
consent. When the agreement is sent to the Parliament, the agreement will first be discussed 
and evaluated by the INTA, and then the Parliament will make a final decision on the agreement 
in a plenary session.82 After obtaining the consent from the Parliament, the Council may 
officially conclude the agreement. Based on the understanding of the EU’s distribution of 
competences, the negotiation procedure as a whole can be illustrated as per the figure below. 
 
During this procedure, the Council reaches its decision via a qualified majority vote (QMV), 
except where unanimity is required by the provisions. For instance, when the agreement relates 
to the ‘protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’, 83  unanimity is required. 
Additionally, in the case of ‘mixed competences’, member states also retain the right to ratify 
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appropriate agreements through their own constitutions so that they can protect their particular 
interests in specific fields. 
 
Figure 1. The competences of the EU’s institutions 
 
The Council (TPC)                                                                  The Parliament (INTA) 
sets the objectives/monitors 
 
authorizes/             recommends/ 
concludes               reports 
 
The Commission (DG Trade) 
negotiates and shapes the content 
 
During this procedure, the Council reaches its decision via a qualified majority vote (QMV), 
except where unanimity is required by the provisions. For instance, when the agreement relates 
to the ‘protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’, 84  unanimity is required. 
Additionally, in the case of ‘mixed competences’, member states also retain the right to ratify 
appropriate agreements through their own constitutions so that they can protect their particular 
interests in specific fields. 
 
The trade policy-making procedure is effectively a process of bargaining between institutions. 
The increased power of the Parliament makes trade policy more complicated not only at the 
procedure level but also relating to the content as well. The Parliament’s involvement leads to 
greater concerns over the issues of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and so on.85 These 
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concerns can place a certain pressure on the Commission, which has to take such issues into 
account when shaping the content of the agreement. Besides, as mentioned above, when the 
agreement relates to these normative issues, the Council should act unanimously, which means 
sensitive trading – for instance military arms trade – would be banned if the Commission were 
unable to obtain consent from those member states who were sensitive to trade in such areas. 
For instance, as will be discussed in chapter 6, the Nordic countries insisted that China’s human 
rights record was not sufficiently good to justify resuming arms sales from the EU to China. 
 
In terms of the actors who could participate in the trade policy-making procedure, the 
Parliament’s new role, as granted by the Lisbon Treaty, gave NGOs or the lobbyists greater 
power to influence trade policy through the Parliament.86 Furthermore, trade policy may be 
connected with the policies in the fields of agriculture, environment, development and other 
areas. Therefore, different DGs, Committees within the EU, certain NGOs outside the EU, may 
all participate in the trade negotiation process. The diverse identities of the participants bring 
various interests of their own. As a consequence, if we want to clearly understand the process 
of trade negotiations, it is necessary to distinguish where the interests come from and who the 
sources of such interests are.  
 
1.4.2 Member States 
While the EU has adopted a relatively integrated commercial policy, there are 28 member states 
in the EU who, given their individual conditions and different economic capacities, have 
different priorities in terms of international trade. Thus, inevitably, there can be a degree of 
competition among them in this regard, so it becomes necessary to review their various 
preferences in order to understand the inner momentum of EU trade policy.  
 
The EU member states have diverse prior dimensions in international trade, and thus there are 
also various fields where they compete with each other. In general, Germany is the largest state 
in extra-EU trade, accounting for 23.4% of the total EU-27 trade in 2010; this was followed by 
the UK which accounted for 12.3%; then Italy (10.8%), the Netherlands (10.7%) and France 
(10.5%), each of whom had similar percentages. Whilst Germany accounted for more in 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
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general external trade than the UK and Italy combined, but in specific areas of trade other states 
might take a leading role. For instance, the Netherlands dominated the energy products market. 
There are also some situations in which certain states might compete over the same product, or 
one is the main exporter of some product of which another is the main importer, which might 
result in tension or even conflict between ‘producers’ and ‘retailers’.87 The main states’ shares 
in extra-EU trade are listed in the tables below, which gives an indication of the dimensions of 
the interests among the member states and their competition within the EU. 
 
Table 1. Exports share (%) in EU-27 (selected member states) in 2010 
 
 BE DE ES FR IT NL UK 
total 6.2 28.1 4.5 11.4 10.7 7.3 10.5 
Food, drink and 
tobacco 
4.7 13.2 6.7 19.5 9.5 13.7 8.4 
Raw materials 6.1 14.6 7.1 6.5 7.0 13.6 12.0 
Energy products 9.8 5.9 10.4 8.2 12.2 20.2 13.8 
Chemicals 12.5 23.8 4.3 12.5 6.4 6.2 11.5 
Machinery and 
transport 
equipment 
2.7 37.4 3.1 11.5 9.8 6.1 10.0 
Other 
manufactured 
goods 
7.6 24.9 4.8 10.0 15.6 4.2 10.1 
Source: External and intra-EU trade: A statistical yearbook, Date 1958-2010. (2011 edition), 
Eurostat, European Commission. 
                                                 
87 Peter Nedergaard, “European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005: A 
Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations?” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 9, no.1 
(2009): 17–47. 
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Table 2. Imports share (%) in EU-27 (selected member states) in 2010 
 
 BE DE ES FR IT NL UK 
total 6.0 19.4 6.7 9.7 11.0 13.8 13.6 
Food, drink and 
tobacco 
6.7 15.3 9.5 9.2 8.8 16.4 14.6 
Raw materials 6.7 17.3 9.9 6.8 12.1 17.6 9.7 
Energy products 3.1 14.5 9.9 11.1 16.1 13.1 9.6 
Chemicals 13.3 17.8 6.9 11.3 10.2 12.1 12.2 
Machinery and 
transport 
equipment 
4.2 24.0 3.9 8.8 6.6 16.2 15.1 
Other 
manufactured 
goods 
8.4 20.4 5.8 9.8 11.5 10.9 17.0 
Source: External and intra-EU trade: A statistical yearbook, Date 1958-2010. (2011 edition), 
Eurostat, European Commission. 
 
The products are categorised according to the Standard International Trade Classification, 
Revision 4.88 Tables 1 and 2 above reports data for the seven states which account for the 
majority of extra-EU trade, from which we will form a comparison from three perspectives. 
 
First, we find that some states dominate the trade in particular areas. For instance, in exports, 
France had relatively larger amounts in terms of food, drink and tobacco; the Netherlands led 
                                                 
88 United Nations Statistic Division, “Standard International Trade Classification, Rev.4”, United Nations, 
available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=28, accessed 3 December 2013. 
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in the realm of energy products by 20.2%; Germany dominated the chemicals, machinery and 
transport equipment markets, and indeed other manufactured goods, with relatively obvious 
advantages. Germany also accounted for the majority of export in raw materials, but the gap 
between Germany and its followers in this regard was not as large as those for the former three 
product areas. 
 
Second, as can be seen in the area of raw materials in Table 1, Germany, the Netherlands and 
the UK had similar percentages in terms of exports, which suggests that these member states 
might compete in this realm. It can also be noticed that Germany and the Netherlands had a 
close percentage in trade in food, drink and tobacco. Belgium and France had the same 
proportion of chemicals exports. The competition between France, Italy and the UK in terms 
of exports in machinery and transport equipment is also demonstrated by the figures in Table 
1. 
 
Third, through a comparison of the two tables in terms of exports and imports, we find that 
certain particular products, namely those which are the main export commodities of certain 
states, happen to be the main import commodities of other states. For instance, in energy 
products exports, the Netherlands accounted for 20.3%, whilst Germany only accounted for 
5.9%. In terms of imports, Germany had the second-largest proportion in trade at 14.5%. A 
similar example can be found in the trade of machinery and transport equipment, in which the 
positions of Germany and Netherlands are reversed. This could cause a certain tension between 
the so-called ‘producers’ and ‘retailers’ as a given product that a state relies on for its exports 
might well be the exact one that another state wants to import. Thus, restrictions on the import 
of this kind of product might benefit the producer but harm the retailer.  
 
We cannot judge this relationship solely from the shared percentage at the EU level, but also 
need to explore the proportion such products in the nation state’s external trade. If the product 
only accounts for a small amount of the state’s extra trade, then its restriction will not 
significantly affect the basis of the entire trade amount. For instance, the UK accounted for 
14.6% of the import of food, drink and tobacco, which is a relatively large amount in contrast 
to other member states at the EU level. In 2010, the UK’s imports in this area amounted to 
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€39,115 million, but the total import amount was €445,874 million, which means the UK’s 
imports only accounted for 8.8% of the entire trade in these products.89 This is not to suggest 
that 8.8% is a small amount or that the trade in this area is not important, but through the table 
below, we can infer that it will affect the UK more in the area of machinery and transport 
equipment than in that of food, drink and tobacco. Similarly, restrictions on machinery and 
transport equipment might cause more damage to Germany than to Belgium since the former 
accounted for 36.1% and the latter accounted for only 12.7%. 
 
Table 3. Trade share (%) of products by nation-state in 2010 
 BE DE ES FR IT NL UK 
Food, drink and 
tobacco 
7.4 7.0 9.4 8.0 8.3 8.7 8.8 
Raw materials 4.6 4.5 5.0 2.8 5.0 5.3 2.8 
Energy products 13.8 11.8 17.9 13.6 18.5 18.8 10.7 
Chemicals 18.8 13.4 14.5 14.0 13.7 11.3 12.0 
Machinery and 
transport 
equipment 
23.4 36.1 29.1 34.1 27.8 31.7 34.2 
Other 
manufactured 
goods 
24.2 25.3 23.6 27.0 25.5 21.2 25.5 
Source: EU trade by Member State, partner and product group (ext_go_lti_ext), Eurostat, 
accessed 4 December 2013. 
 
To illustrate this conflict of interests among member states, and to further connect this section 
to our main topic - EU-China relations - we will use the case of the photovoltaic dispute 
                                                 
89 EU trade by Member State, partner and product group (ext_go_lti_ext), Eurostat, accessed 4 December 2013. 
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between the EU and China to explore the various dimensions of interest amongst member states 
in terms of international trade. 
 
This trade dispute concerned crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and their key components. 
On 25 July 2012, on behalf of some other producers, a company called EU ProSun lodged a 
complaint to the European Commission, stating that the products imported from China had 
been ‘dumped’ and caused ‘material injury to the Union’s industry’.90 The price of these 
Chinese products was 88% lower than the ‘fair value’ in the EU market, which had a 
‘significant negative effect’ on the European producers.91 An investigation was launched two 
months later after the complaint was lodged. During this two-month period, China invested a 
lot of effort in preventing this investigation, including accepting the complaint against its solar 
products and announcing a bilateral agreement with Germany about resolving the dispute by 
negotiation rather than imposing provisional duties.  
 
After the launch of the investigation, China sent a delegation to Berlin, Paris and Brussels to 
negotiate the dispute. Meanwhile, the European Commission evaluated the interests of all 
parties, including ‘exporting producers, Union producers, importers and suppliers of 
components such as silicon, installers’. There was a certain division among these parties in 
terms of their attitudes towards Chinese solar products. On the one hand, retailers who sold 
Chinese photovoltaic products and the companies who installed solar panel were naturally 
resistant to the provisional duties, as this would lead to massive job losses in their sectors.  
Additionally, the provisional duties could also harm the companies selling raw materials and 
production facilities to China. Therefore, the Commission’s decision could affect not only the 
photovoltaic industry, but also the upstream and downstream branches. On the other hand, the 
photovoltaic producers – again quite naturally – insisted on the provisional duties being 
imposed, as this would secure 25,000 jobs in solar production. Furthermore, it would protect 
                                                 
90 European Commission, “Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of crystalline 
silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells and wafers) originating in the People's Republic of 
China ((2012/C 269/04)”, Official Journal of the European Union, 6 September 2012, C269/5. 
91 Delegation of the European Union to China, “EU imposes provisional anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese solar 
panels”, European Commission, 4 June 2013, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/20130605_en.htm, accessed 5 
December 2013. 
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the EU’s photovoltaic industry and ensure a fair market. Resisting this dissenting voice, the 
Commission itself believed that job losses would be much less than the estimated 25,000, and 
could further be recreated, along with alternative imports from other countries.92  
 
Considering the prospect that the provisional duties might lead to a trade war between the EU 
and China, thereby having negative impacts on both sides, a number of voices advocated 
negotiation rather than implementing anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. In terms of 
member states, Germany was the first to oppose the Commission. According to China’s official 
media, Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and Economy Minister, Philipp Rösler, both 
stated their concerns about a trade war and their standpoint on the negotiations.93 However, 
photovoltaic products are included in the trade of goods, which is categorised as being part of 
the EU’s exclusive competence, and therefore one individual member state’s interests were not 
sufficient to affect the EU’s final decision in this regard as it was made by a qualified majority 
vote in the Council.  
 
The definitive measures set the duty at 11.8% from 6 June until 6 August 2013, followed by a 
duty at 47.6% in the next stage.94 From China’s perspective, the measures might cause huge 
damage to China’s own photovoltaic industry and would inevitably lead to a trade war with the 
EU. However, both sides kept open to the possibility of a further round of negotiations, and 
after weeks of bargaining, a price undertaking replaced the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
duties. Both China and the EU compromised at an acceptable level in an amicable manner. 
This case reflects the fact that there were various interest groups within the EU. 
 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 Xinhua, “德国批评欧盟对中国太阳能电池板征收反倾销税 (Germany criticized EU’s anti-dumping duties 
on China’s solar panel)”, GOV.CN, available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-06/05/content_2419430.htm, 
accessed 8 December 2013.  
94 Delegation of the European Union to China, “Commissioner De Gucht: “We found an amicable solution in 
the EU-China solar panels case that will lead to a new market equilibrium at sustainable prices’”, European 
Commission, 27 July 2013, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/20130729_en.htm, accessed 8 
December 2013. 
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1.4.3 Summary 
The EU, as an entity, is becoming increasingly complicated as it evolves; the increased power 
of the Parliament has not only added a co-legislator, but also more actors who can influence 
the policy-making process. The enlargement of the EU increased the member states’ interest 
dimension. Although the EU’s trade policy remains relatively integrated, the complexity of the 
bargaining between institutions and member states cannot be neglected. In terms of the 
institutions, the three main actors – the Council, the Commission and the Parliament – are, 
respectively, independent institutions, where each have their own preferences in the policy-
making process. In order to get a clear view of understanding the trade policy at the EU level, 
it is needed to consider all these three institutions’ interests. 
 
The situation amongst member states is even more complicated than that of the institutions 
because, as sovereign states, they retain powers over national trade. Despite the fact that the 
EU has extended the content of exclusive competence in trade, member states can still establish 
bilateral trade relationships with third countries. In light of this, we should note the fact that a 
bilateral commercial relationship cannot be mistaken as a barometer of the relationship with 
the EU, especially when the bilateral trade relationships with individual nation-states can be 
affected by political disputes. We should therefore focus on the macroscopic view at the EU 
level.  
 
1.5 Validity at the EU Level 
The above sections have explored the complicated relations among the institutions and member 
states, and also demonstrated the EU’s competences in principal areas. This section will 
establish why it is still valid to study the EU’s external relations, particularly, EU-China 
relations, at the EU level. Since there are various actors within the EU who are entitled to wield 
power to address their own preferences, one might ask why the EU, as a supranational entity 
consisting of these actors, can be identified as a valid international actor that can both impose 
constraints on its internal actors and also have the right to engage with external actors. Or, in 
other words, why should it be reasonable to identify the EU as a legal international actor and a 
valid counterpart in the relationship with China? Why should we look at the EU level? 
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The above can be explained from two perspectives: first, the EU itself has a legal personality, 
which means it could be considered a valid actor in bilateral relationships; second, the EU is a 
different and distinct power to its member states, therefore it is meaningful to explore the 
bilateral relationship at the EU level. 
 
The issue of legal personality is an extensive subject concerning international law, and there 
are also various arguments regarding the EU’s legal personality.95 This thesis does not intend 
to explore this issue too deeply, and will do so only the extent required to explain the validity 
of taking the EU as an international actor. To have an international legal personality, an 
organisation must meet certain conditions, both internally and externally. Scholars have 
explained these conditions in several similar ways. Some indicate that legal personality can be 
obtained if the organisation is capable of acting both ‘vis-à-vis to its own member states and 
vis-à-vis other international legal persons’;96 the former indicates that the organisation can 
perform independently ‘under international law and as such accepted by all members’,97 whilst 
the latter means the organisation ‘is acknowledged by other participants in the international 
system’.98 Some also set three criteria to have international legal personality:  
 
‘A permanent association of States equipped with organs;  
A distinction in terms of legal powers and purposes between the organization and its 
member states; and 
The existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane’.99 
 
                                                 
95 See for example, R. Leal-Arcas “EU legal personality in foreign policy”, Boston University International Law 
Journal 24, (2006): 24-165; Philippe De Schoutheete and Sami Andoura. “The legal personality of the European 
Union”, Studia Diplomatica 60, no.1 (2007): 233; Koehler, Kateryna. “European foreign policy after Lisbon: 
strengthening the EU as an international actor”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs 4, no.1 (2010): 57.  
96 Ramses A. Wessel, “Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 5 
(2000): 509-510. 
97 Julija Brsakoska Bazerkoska, “The Legal Personality of the EU”, Iustinianus Primus Law Review 2, no.1 
(2011): 4. 
98 Christopher Lord, “Legitimate and Democratic? The EU’s international role”, in International relations and 
the European Union, eds. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 129. 
99 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 649. 
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If we examine the EU according to these criteria, the first has obviously been met; the second 
criterion will be explored later in the second perspective of the EU as a different power from 
its member states; and the third relates to the EU’s external operational capability. Although 
the criteria do not mention internal support from member states, we can surmise that legal 
personality can be obtained at two levels: the internal (domestic) level and the external 
(international) level, which we will discuss below. 
 
At the internal level, the easiest and most straightforward way to obtain legal personality is to 
stipulate it in a treaty. After a long period of evolution, the Lisbon Treaty finally stated that 
‘the Union shall have legal personality’,100 which put an end to the various debates or doubts 
as to whether the EU had an implicit legal personality. The Treaty clearly granted the EU legal 
personality, and further put certain limitations on it via Declaration 24 in stating that the EU 
could not act ‘beyond the competences conferred on it by the member states’.101 This provision 
implies that although the EU’s legal personality is limited in some regards, member states do 
entrust the EU with rights to conduct affairs in many aspects, in which a qualified majority 
vote applies. 
 
To have a legal personality, an organisation needs to be capable of imposing constraints on its 
member states. The qualified majority vote in the Council represents further proof that the EU 
has the power to constrain member states in its policy-making. Member states are bound to 
comply with the EU’s decision if the qualified majority vote is valid. Moreover, the Council 
itself is a legal institute of the EU, so voting by member states in the Council implies that they 
are willing to delegate their sovereignties to the EU. 
 
If we explore a little further, as a supranational polity, the EU needs to gain its legal personality 
from another level - its citizens. The Parliament is now the main institution that directly 
connects the EU and its citizens, though it was previously only a marginal actor. After the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament gained considerable power, and thus became the co-legislator in 
                                                 
100 Article 46 A, The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community. 
101 “24. Declaration concerning the legal personality of the European Union”, Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference, Official Journal of the European Union, 17 December 2007, C306/2. 
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the ordinary legislative procedure. This means the public are represented at the EU level and 
can actually influence the process of policy-making. This grants the EU legal personality from 
another perspective. 
 
At the external level, the basic criterion by which an organisation obtains its legal personality 
is that of being recognised by other legal international actors. The EU has been widely 
recognised in international society, and indeed has 139 delegations worldwide. In addition, the 
EU has been recognised by other international organisations as well. For instance, it has been 
an official member of the WTO since 1995; and the EU is also a UN observer even though it 
does not have the right to vote, but as the only non-state participant, it has been involved in a 
large number of UN-related issues.  
 
In terms of communicating and forming contracts with third parties, the Commission and the 
Council are the two main institutions in the negotiation and conclusion of agreements with 
other international actors. Since it was established, the EC/EU has not stopped wielding its 
power in the attempt to influence other actors across the world. The measures include trade 
agreements, financial aid, economic sanctions, leadership communication and so on. The EU 
has demonstrated that, beyond being recognised by international actors, it can also in turn 
influence the world itself. Such examples of the EU’s influence have demonstrated that it has 
a legal personality, and therefore we can take it as a legal international actor.  
 
If we take a further look at the EU’s type identity – a concept which will be explored in detail 
in chapter 4—that is what kind of power is the EU? We find that it is a different kind of power 
to its member states. On the one hand, large states, such as France, the UK and Germany, and 
to some extent Italy and Spain, have extensive military power, which implies they can 
implement ‘hard’ policies in certain situations. On the other hand, small states are not capable 
of imposing effective influence on great powers. In contrast to these member states, the EU is 
not equipped with military means, but is capable of influencing other powers with its resources. 
Furthermore, as an unprecedented highly-organised polity itself, the EU has a certain degree 
of soft power that other global powers do not have. 
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Then what kind of power is the EU? It has been argued that the EU can be described by two 
‘oversimplified’ arguments.102 Realists argue that the EU is unqualified to be an actor due to 
its inconsistent structure and the fact that it is incapable of implementing physical power. Some 
scholars describe the EU as a cosmopolitan with normative power.103 However, the capability 
to implement these principles should be questioned.104 Telò claimed that the EU is an incipient 
civilian power, which could use its material resources to influence others.105 This form of 
definition also conforms to Manners’ classification of military/civilian/normative power,106 
with Tocci illustrating that the EU is not always a genuine, normative power in light of its 
behaviour in specific affairs.107 To sum up, the EU could be conceptualised as a normative 
power with civilian means: it intends to disseminate its norms to other international actors, but 
in a civilian manner. The analysis of the EU’s type identity as a normative power will be fully 
discussed in chapter 3. The argument here are only intended to indicate that the EU is different 
to its member states. 
 
The EU is indeed a distinct power in contrast with its member states; therefore, from the 
perspective of identity, we cannot identify the EU as a simple combination of its member states, 
because their preferences will be conducted in a different way at the EU level. This is why it is 
necessary to emphasise the importance of analysis at the EU level – China’s relationship with 
the EU is different to its bilateral relationships with individual EU member states. In order to 
understand the EU-China relationship, it is necessary to study the characteristics of the EU 
itself at the supranational level. 
 
                                                 
102 Mario Telò, “The EU: a civilian power’s diplomatic action after the Lisbon Treaty. Bridging internal 
complexity and international convergence”, 39. 
103 Erik O. Eriksen, “The EU-A Cosmopolitan Polity?” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no.2 (2006): 252-
69; Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies 
40, no.2 (2002): 252 
104 Christopher Hill, “The capability‐expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe's international role,” Journal 
of Common Market Studies 31, no.3 (1993): 305-28. 
105 Mario Telò, “The EU: a civilian power’s diplomatic action after the Lisbon Treaty. Bridging internal 
complexity and international convergence”, 39. 
106 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, 240. 
107 Nathalie Tocci, “The EU as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor”, in Who is a Normative Foreign Policy 
Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners, eds. Nathalie Tocci, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2008), 24-25. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the nature of the EU as an actor. The EU is a hybrid entity 
comprising multiple actors, various of whom have different competences and interests. Without 
clarifying what these actually are, research into the EU would be misdirected by its complicated 
procedures and diverse interests. Therefore, before analysing the relationship between the EU 
and China, it was vital to conduct a thorough, prior exploration of the EU. In doing so, this 
chapter has attempted to clarify the EU’s relationship with its member states, illustrate the 
institutions’ competences, and show the convergence and divergence among member states. 
The work will contribute to our subsequent understanding of the EU’s mechanisms and build 
a solid basis for the analysis of the EU-China relations in the following chapters. 
 
To achieve this purpose, this chapter has demonstrated the competences of the EU (and its 
institutions) and revealed the preferences of the member states in their participation with the 
EU. The focus of the work was based on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Common Commercial Policy. The former is the area where the EU strives to build a coherent 
policy, and the latter is where the EU has a relatively integrated policy. Furthermore, both areas 
are the main spheres in which the EU engages with China. 
 
In the section describing foreign and security policies, this chapter focused on the powers and 
responsibilities of the High Representative and the President of the European Council. Through 
examining these two positions, the analysis was further expanded to other institutions such as 
the PSC, the EEAS and FPI. The result of the examination gave a complex picture of the CFSP 
in which there are overlapping responsibilities and competitive powers among these 
institutions. This section also examined the EU’s competence and the autonomy of its member 
states to make foreign policy, showing that in terms of foreign and security policies, the EU’s 
competence is still limited, as its member states currently prefer to retain their sovereign 
positions in sensitive areas. 
 
In the section on international trade, in which the EU has a relatively consistent policy, this 
chapter reviewed the evolution of the treaties that granted the EU increasingly exclusive 
competence in this regard. Furthermore, this section illustrated the procedural relations among 
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the institutions of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament (and also the relations 
among the Committees under the structure of the main institutions). By analysing the data on 
trade conducted by EU member states, the competing interests of member states was 
highlighted. Moreover, the case study into the disputes on the photovoltaic trade demonstrated 
the diverse preferences of individual member states. This section indicated that even in the 
areas of trade which have the most consistent policies, there is still a certain divergence between 
the various actors within the EU. 
 
After illustrating the multiple actors in the EU and the divergence between them, the following 
section confirmed the validity of considering the EU as an international actor. The analysis of 
the validity was conducted from two perspectives: the internal dimension explored the EU’s 
legal personality and its legitimacy to be considered a supranational polity, whilst the external 
dimension reviewed the EU’s role in international society. From each of these dimensions, one 
can conclude that the EU should be, and indeed has been, recognised as a valid international 
actor. By further exploring the EU’s type identity as a normative power, this chapter argued 
that the EU is a distinct international actor in relation to its member states, and that this 
relationship has different qualities at the EU level. Therefore, it is indeed meaningful to study 
EU-China relations at the EU level. 
 
Before analysing the identities of the EU and China, confirmation was required that the EU is 
a valid actor which is eligible to have an identity. By examining the institutions and member 
states within the EU, this chapter confirmed the pertinence of the EU’s legal personality, and 
established the basis for studying EU’s identities in further research. From a different 
perspective, despite recognising the validity of considering the EU as an international actor, 
we cannot ignore the various actors within the EU and the diverse interests that are attached to 
them, and it is extremely important to clarify who is acting, and in whose interests they are 
doing so.  
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Chapter 2 China’s Nature as an International Actor 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the complex mechanisms of EU institutions, and demonstrated 
the various initiatives of the EU and its member states. On this basis, it argued that it is valid 
to consider the EU as an international actor. Given the fact that this thesis focuses on the 
relationship between the EU and China, it is equally necessary and important to explore 
China’s nature as an international actor and an interlocutor for the EU. To this end, it is 
required to look through China’s bureaucratic structure and find out its evolving nature as an 
international actor.  
 
Chapter 1 illustrated the numerous diversities within the EU. As a supranational entity, it is 
understandable that the EU would have multiple dimensions in terms of its initiatives and 
interests. When we look at China, it might seem to make intuitive sense to consider China to 
be a unitary state actor, or even one where policy is driven by the paramount leader. The 
truth, however, is much more complicated than that. The preferences and objectives of the 
central party state leadership are clearly very important, but this does not mean that there is 
only one interest and objective underlying China’s foreign policy, and that all actors are 
aligned behind this single goal. There is bounded plurality both in the decision-making 
processes and, in the way that various Chinese actors behave in the international arena. In 
light of this, the first and most important task for this chapter is to identify actors and their 
competences in China’s foreign policy making. 
 
The second task of this chapter is to explore China’s evolving nature as an international actor. 
Undoubtedly, China has experienced dramatic social and economic changes in the past few 
decades, and its role in the international society has changed accordingly. Meanwhile, the 
transformation of China’s nature has resulted in certain impacts on the quality of the EU-
China relationship. As will be discussed in chapter 5, this relationship changes along with the 
variations of the EU and China’s role identities. This chapter, however, intends to explore the 
impacting factors in the evolution of China’s nature as an international actor.  
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2.2 Actors and Competences in China’s Foreign Policy 
Chapter 1 illustrated the diverse actors, and their competences, within the EU. Therefore, it is 
equally necessary to reveal the mechanism of China’s foreign policy making. Specifically, 
the questions to be addressed in this section is: who are the actors in China’s foreign policy 
making, and what are their competences? 
 
It is well known that the Chinese political regime is a single party system. As will be shown 
in section 4.3.1, the Communist Party of China (CPC) enjoys an exclusive leadership, and 
thus has supreme power to define foreign policies. But does it mean that China’s foreign 
policy making is dictatorial in nature?  
 
This section argues that China’s foreign policy making is much more complicated; it has 
multiple actors with diverse interests. In order to understand the mechanism of foreign policy 
making and the competences of each of its actors, this section describes the structure of 
China’s foreign policy making as taking the form of a pyramid. At the top is the Politburo 
Standing Committee of the CPC, which decides the strategic dimensions of China’s 
diplomacy. It stands at the top of the system, and thus has the most extensive power but the 
smallest size.  
Figure 2. The structure of China’s foreign policy making 
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In the middle is the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (CFAC), formerly known as the 
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), which consists of ministers or directors from 
multiple departments. It is a supra-ministerial organ that is in charge of consultation and 
coordination among the relevant departments. It is assisted by the Office of Foreign Affairs, 
which serves as a bridge to transmit directions and proposals between the top and bottom of 
the structure. Apart from this vertical function, the CFAC and the Office of Foreign Affairs 
also plays a role of coordinator amongst departments at the horizontal level. This function is 
critical in the sense that China’s diplomacy has two systems. On the one hand, is the party 
system, consisting of the departments under the Central Committee of the CPC, such as the 
International Department (formerly named the International Liaison Department), and the 
Publicity Department.108 On the other hand, is the state system, consisting of departments 
under the State Council, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, 
the National Development and Reform Commission, and so forth. On some occasions, the 
competences of the two systems merge, overlap and even conflict with each other. The 
existence of the CFAC coordinates these two systems by blurring the boundaries between the 
two. The divisions between the two systems are rather indistinct in the CFAC, as it consists 
of members from both systems.  
 
The bottom section consists of the diverse organs mentioned in the previous paragraph. They 
are the executive actors who form the basis of implementing foreign policies, and are also 
capable of uploading their initiatives, proposals and interests to the top level through channels 
such as the Office of Foreign Affairs. The actors at this level have different roles and 
competences, and their various influences on foreign policy are not necessarily equal. 
Departments involved in the CFAC - such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the International Department - are closer to the core 
of the policy making circle, and have sufficient access to directly affect policy making. 
Compared to these departments, provinces and state-owned enterprises have different impacts 
on policy making, as their interests are mainly commercial or limited to the local level. With 
regards to think tanks, despite the rise of their importance, they have a relatively marginal 
                                                 
108 It is also known as the Propaganda Department, but it is named “the Publicity Department” on its official 
website, available at http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8223996.html, accessed 8 March 2018. 
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impact on policy making as they can only influence it in an indirect manner.109 Following 
such a pyramidical structure, this section will illustrate the roles of these actors and their 
competences in the process of China’s foreign policy making. A number of studies quoted 
above demonstrate the structure of China’s foreign policy making as a “core-margins” 
format,110 but here I believe the vertical dimension is very important, because the hierarchy 
has great implications in China’s political system. 
 
2.2.1 Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, the Leading Power 
In the Party-State system, the CPC has the power to define China’s foreign policy. In the 
hierarchical structure of the Party, the Central Committee is, according to the Party 
Constitution, the highest leading body. The Constitution also clearly states that ‘only the 
Central Committee of the Party has the power to make decisions on major national 
policies’.111 In practice, the Central Committee vest its power in the Political Bureau when 
the Committee is not in session, which is most of the time.112 The Political Bureau comprises 
a group of members who hold leadership positions in major departments, agencies and 
provinces. Hence the Political Bureau consists of those most powerful people in China who 
have the power to discuss national affairs and policies. At the top of the structure is the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, which determines the strategic dimensions of 
foreign policy and makes final decisions on diplomatic matters. At the very top, the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee is the leader of the Party, and who also assumes the posts 
of the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission (CMC), which makes him the paramount leader who enjoys the 
ultimate power in China’s political system. 
 
                                                 
109 Wang Cungang, “当今中国的外交政策: 谁在制定? 谁在影响?——基于国内行为体的视角 (Foreign 
policy in Contemporary China: who is making it? Who is influencing?—a perspective from the domestic 
actors)”, Foreign Affairs Review 2, (2012): 1-18; Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “Research institutions and 
academia,” in New Foreign Policy Actors in China (Solna: Stockholm International Peach Rearch Institute, 
2010), 34-40. 
110 Ibid, for example. 
111 Article 10(3) and 16, “Full text of Constitution of Communist Party of China”, available at 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725945.htm, accessed 8 March 2018. 
112 The Central Committee only normally meets in full plenary session once a year (though sometimes twice) for 
around four days each time. 
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The Standing Committee usually consists of 7-9 people. The principal members hold the 
positions of the General Secretary of the Party (the head of the Party), the Premier (the head 
of the State Council), the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress (the head of the parliamentary body), the Chairman of the National Committee of 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (the head of the political advisory 
body and the alliance of various parties), and the First Secretary of the Secretariat of the 
Central Committee of the CPC (the principal secretary of the executive body of the Political 
Bureau). In different generations of the leadership, it contains positions such as the Secretary 
of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC (the head of the internal 
discipline control body), the Director of the External Propaganda Leading Small Group (the 
official who is actually in charge of the Party’s publicity), the Secretary of the Central 
Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the CPC (the head of the enforcement authorities), 
the Vice President of the PRC, the First Vice Premier and the First Vice Chairman of the 
CMC.113 
 
As we can see, the Standing Committee’s power covers all the areas of the Chinese political 
system. The preferences and objectives of the Standing Committee will be put into the 
Political Report at the National Congress of the CPC, and will be seen as the guiding 
principles for future diplomatic work. In this sense, the Standing Committee of the Political 
Bureau outlines the nature of China’s foreign policy; it sets the overall objectives and the 
directions for all other foreign policy activity.   
 
2.2.2 The CFAC and the Office of Foreign Affairs, the Coordinator 
In the middle of the Chinese diplomatic structure, the CFAC and its executive body, the 
Office of Foreign Affairs, play the role of coordinator. Before introducing the CFAC and the 
Office of Foreign Affairs, it is essential to note the system of China’s foreign policy making, 
                                                 
113 In different sessions, the numbers and positions of the Standing Committee members could vary. Specific 
details on these members’ names and positions can be found via these three links below, “The CPC’S organs 
and leaderships in each session (1st-17th)”, CNTV, available at 
http://news.cntv.cn/special/lijielingdao/shiqida/index.shtml; “Profiles of the 18th Central Committee of the 
CPC”, Xinhua Net, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/18/n/2012/1115/c350826-19590370.html; “Profiles of 
the 19th Central Committee of the CPC”, Xinhua Net, available at 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/25/c_1121856249.htm, accessed 10 March 2018. 
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and the nature of its diplomacy, which explains why the CFAC and the Office of Foreign 
Affairs are middle level functional coordinators. 
 
China’s foreign policy, as discussed above, has diversified considerably since the reform and 
opening up in 1978. The scope of diplomacy is no longer confined to security and politics but 
has expanded to the realms of commerce, climate change, energy, culture, and so on. The 
expansion of the scope of its foreign policy means that China’s international interactions 
require input from multiple fields of expertise, and therefore has drawn various departments 
into the process of foreign policy making.  
 
As a Party-State, China’s diplomacy has a party system and a state system. The two systems 
have separate departments and respective competences, but meanwhile, the division between 
these two systems is somewhat indistinct. There are overlapping competences between the 
two, and there are inter-departmental staff appointments.114 The CFAC is the very organ that 
blurs the boundary between the two systems, and the bridge that coordinates various 
departments. 
 
To understand the CFAC’s role as a coordinator, it is important to consider the composition 
of its staff. It is chaired by the President, and the Vice President or the Premier is the deputy 
head. Exact names of other members are normally hidden from being exposed by the media, 
but according to open resources, the rest of the members include, the State Councillor who is 
in charge of foreign affairs, ministers and directors from the MFA, the MOFCOM, the 
Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, 
the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the State Council Information Office, the Taiwan 
Affairs Office, the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, the International Department, the 
Publicity Department, and the CMC.115 In March 2018, the CPC reformed several organs of 
                                                 
114 For example, Dai Bingguo was the Minister of the International Department from 1997 to 2003, then he was 
appointed the Deputy Minister of the MFA from 2003 to 2008. This inter-departmental appointment gave him 
rich diplomatic experiences in dealing with various kinds of countries. After 2008, he became the State 
Councillor who was in charge of foreign affairs. This kind of experience can also be found in careers of other 
Chinese diplomats such as Ji Pengfei, Song Tao and numerous ambassadors.  
115 Gong Li, Men Honghua and Sun Dongfang, “中国外交决策机制变迁研究 (1949-2009年) (China’s 
Diplomatic Decision-making Mechanism: Changes and Evolution since 1949)”, World Economics and Politics 
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the Central Committee. The former FALSG was re-designated as the CFAC, and the 
associated official report revealed a few of the names of individuals on the Commission. Xi 
remained the head of the Commission, the Premier Li Keqiang took over the position of 
deputy head, and the Vice-President Wang Qishan was named as a member of the 
Commission.116 
 
As we can see, the CFAC comprises members from both the party system and the state 
system. The International Department, the Publicity Department, and the CMC are organs in 
the party system, whilst the others are organs of the State Council. They all have different 
competences in their own domains, but in the CFAC the division between the two systems is 
rather indistinct – they work together to ensure that foreign policy is coherent. 
 
Based on the discussion above, the CFAC’s function can be summarised as comprising two 
major roles. First, the diversity of its staff composition means that the CFAC covers nearly all 
the major aspects of the foreign affairs. Hence it is able to consult various departments and 
integrate the relevant expertise into a comprehensive foreign policy.117 The CFAC provides a 
platform for the ministers to upload their preferences and initiatives, which could be 
coordinated at a supra-ministerial level. Second, the members of the group are all leaders in 
their respective departments, which means they have the power to download foreign policy 
from the top level and oversee its implementation. Their authorities ensure that the policies 
from the central leading circles can be successfully transmitted down in a vertical dimension.  
 
Whilst the CFAC assembles the top leaders from various departments, its nature is more that 
of a joint committee, and it needs to be assisted to do specific jobs. Built on this purpose, the 
                                                 
11, (2009): 53; Wang Cungang, “当今中国的外交政策: 谁在制定? 谁在影响?——基于国内行为体的视角 
(Foreign policy in Contemporary China: who is making it? Who is influencing?—a perspective from the 
domestic actors)”, 4-5; Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups”, China Leadership 
Monitor, 26 Fall 2008:8-10. 
116 Xinhua, “Xi stresses centralized, unified leadership of CPC Central Committee over foreign affairs”, 15 May 
2018, available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/15/c_137181045.htm, accessed 20 May 2018. 
117 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “The Communist Party of China”, in New Foreign Policy Actors in China, 
5-7. 
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Office of Foreign Affairs is the direct executive organ of the CFAC. As a coordinator, the 
Office of Foreign Affairs’ competences include:118 
 
a) To investigate the international situation, study major issues in foreign policies and 
diplomatic managements, and propose appropriate advice in these regards. 
b) To organise meetings for the CFAC, and carry out the decisions made at such meetings 
by coordinating with other organs. 
c) To draft and amend the nationwide ordinance in terms of foreign affairs on behalf of 
the Central Committee, and to examine the foreign policies made by other organs of 
the Party, the State Council and local governments.  
d) To process the requests and reports on foreign affairs, which are made by other organs 
of the Party, the State Council and local governments, and deliver them to the CFAC 
and the State Council.  
e) To undertake other mandates given by the CFAC and the State Council.  
 
Similar to the CFAC, this Office also functions vertically and horizontally. First, it works as 
an information provider for the decision makers by filtering domestic messages and 
observing international circumstances. Second, it deals with nearly all the domestic actors 
who participate in foreign affairs. As the office of the CFAC, it represents a highly 
convenient means by which to communicate across diverse departments, and as a ‘delegate’ 
of the Central Committee, it has the capacity and authority to coordinate these actors.  
 
Officially, the Office of Foreign Affairs is a department directly under the Central 
Committee.119 However, as shown by the last two competences above, it answers to both the 
CFAC and the State Council. An important reason for this is that the Director of this Office - 
Yang Jiechi (2013–2018), preceded by Dai Bingguo (2005–2013) - has a dual identity; he is a 
member of the Central Committee and, simultaneously, a State Councillor. These two 
                                                 
118 China Internet Information Center, “The Office of Foreign Affairs and its competences”, available at 
http://www.china.com.cn/cpc/2011-04/15/content_22369387.htm, accessed 14 March 2018. 
119People's Daily Online, “The departments under the CPC Central Committee”, available at 
http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8223996.html, accessed 15 March 2018. 
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identities make the person in this post the closest assistant to the paramount leader,120 and 
ranks higher than ministers, so he has the authority to supervise foreign affairs at a supra-
ministerial level. 121 
 
2.2.3 Influential Actors in Foreign Policy Making 
Beneath the CFAC and the Office of Foreign Affairs, influential actors in China’s foreign 
policy making can be divided into three categories: 
a) The ministries and departments in the central government and the Party, in addition to 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). They have close access to the foreign policy-
making circle, and sometimes are the policy makers themselves.   
b) The local governments and state-owned enterprises. Under the reform and opening 
policy, many local governments have developed their international competences, and 
established relations with foreign actors. Driven by the ‘Going out’ strategy, state-
owned enterprises have developed overseas interests in their engagement with the world. 
They have particular interests and initiatives in foreign affairs. 
c) Think tanks. They have increasing influence in contemporary China, but compared to 
the actors above, their roles in policy making are relatively marginal.  
 
2.2.3.1 Ministries, Departments, and the PLA 
 
The Party System 
The International Department is the prominent organ that runs interactions and build relations 
with political parties in other countries. Conventionally, it plays an important role in China’s 
interactions with the Communist countries such as North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. Today, 
the scope of the CPC’s party diplomacy has expanded from Communist parties to friendly 
parties in developing countries, Socialist parties and Capitalist parties in developed 
                                                 
120 Wang Cungang, “当今中国的外交政策:谁在制定?谁在影响?——基于国内行为体的视角 (Foreign policy 
in Contemporary China: who is making it? Who is influencing?—a perspective from the domestic actors)”, 5-6. 
121 Since the 13th National People’s Congress, Foreign Minister Wang Yi has replaced Yang Jiechi as the State 
Councillor. But Yang remains as the Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs and still enjoys a close tie with 
the paramount leader. 
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countries.122 Remarkably, it has established relations with more than 600 parties and 
organizations in more than 160 countries.123 The inter-party relations has become an 
important component of China’s diplomacy, and the International Department has become a 
vital channel between the CPC and other parties. 
 
Along with China’s growing involvement in the world, greater importance has been attached 
to external propaganda for the purposes of strengthening China’s ‘soft power’ and improving 
its image. In light of this, the External Publicity Group of the Central Committee (re-
designated as the External Publicity Office of the Central Committee in 1993) was 
established on 8 April 1980 by the Publicity Department of the CPC; thus, it is an organ 
within the party system.124 In 1991, it was merged with the State Council Information Office, 
which is an organ within the state system. The two organs here are an excellent example of 
the blurred nature of the boundary between the party and state systems. Because they are 
actually identical in terms of competences and organizations, they share the same 
responsibilities and staff, and the Director of the State Council Information Office is also 
usually the Deputy Director of the Publicity Department.125 It is called ‘one institution with 
two names’ in Chinese political discourse,126 this single organ belongs to both the Central 
Committee and the State Council, but only differs depending on when it is propagating the 
party’s information, or the government’s.  
 
                                                 
122 Wang Cungang, “当今中国的外交政策:谁在制定?谁在影响?——基于国内行为体的视角 (Foreign policy 
in Contemporary China: who is making it? Who is influencing?—a perspective from the domestic actors)”, 6. 
123 See the Department Profile at http://www.idcpc.org.cn/gywb/wbjj/, accessed 12 March 2018. 
124 State Commission Office of Public Sectors Reform, “Historical Summary of the CPC Central Committee 
organs”, Chinese Institutional Organization Net, available at 
http://www.scopsr.gov.cn/zlzx/zlzxlsyg/201203/t20120323_35157_7.html, accessed 13 March 2018. 
125 It is believed that the director of the External Propaganda Office/ State Council Information Office reports to 
the director of the Leading Small Group on Propaganda and Ideological Work, who is conventionally a member 
of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. See David Shambaugh, “China's propaganda system: 
Institutions, processes and efficacy”, The China Journal 57, (2007): pp.25-58. Please note, the Leading Small 
Group on Propaganda and Ideological Work is NOT the External Propaganda Group of the Central Committee, 
the former takes control of the general propaganda works on both internal and external scopes. Considering the 
ranks and power of the director, it is at a higher level comparing to the External Propaganda Group, but it is 
often mistaken by researchers. 
126 China Internet Information Center, “State Bureaus administered by Ministries or Commissions”, available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/leadership/2013-03/11/content_28206251.htm, accessed 13 March 2018.  
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The State System 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The principle department in the diplomatic system is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 
It acts as the executive body to implement foreign policies, and deals with government to 
government diplomatic interactions. It is argued by some observers that the MFA’s power in 
China’s diplomatic system has declined in last few administrations because the Foreign 
Minister’s rank in China’s political hierarchy has been declining.127 In the early period of the 
PRC, the post of Foreign Minister was held by prestigious leaders such as Zhou Enlai (the 
Premier) and Chen Yi (Vice Premier and Vice President of the CMC), and the succeeding 
Foreign Ministers all held concurrent positions as the Vice Premier or the State Councillor 
until 1998. After that, the Foreign Minister did not concurrently hold any supra-ministerial 
position, and became subordinate to the Vice Premier or the State Councillor.128  
 
The explanation for the elevation of a higher ‘supervisor’ above the MFA lies in the 
expanded scope of China’s international activities. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, the nature 
of China’s international relations has fundamentally changed, and the priority of the 
country’s strategy has switched to economic development. Consequently, ‘low politics’, such 
as commerce, culture, climate change and so on, have increasingly occupied the foreign 
affairs bureaucracy’s agenda. Thus, it needs a supra-ministerial supervisor to coordinate 
various interests. 
 
The increased number of departments in the foreign policy-making process has diluted the 
MFA’s influence. In order to keep foreign policies professional, the policy-making process 
needs to be associated other departments and make full use of their expertise in specific areas. 
                                                 
127 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “The State Council”, in New Foreign Policy Actors in China, 8; Wang 
Cungang, “当今中国的外交政策:谁在制定?谁在影响?——基于国内行为体的视角 (Foreign policy in 
Contemporary China: who is making it? Who is influencing?—a perspective from the domestic actors)”, 7. 
128 For example, the four Foreign Ministers after 1998, Tang Jiaxuan (1998-2003), Li Zhaoxing (2003-2007), 
Yang Jiechi (2007-2013) and Wang Yi (2013-2018) are all under the leadership of the then Vice Premier or 
State Councillor, Qian Qichen (1998-2003, Vice Premier), Tang Jiaxuan (2003-2008, promoted as the State 
Councillor after resigned from the Foreign Minister), Dai Bingguo (2008-2013, State Councillor) and Yang 
Jiechi (2013-2018, promoted as the State Councillor after resigned from the Foreign Minister). But a new 
adaptation in the protocol is that Wang Yi has been promoted as the State Councillor while he is still the Foreign 
Minister at the 13th National People’s Congress, see the report at http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2018-
03/19/content_5275477.htm, assessed 19 March 2018. It might suggest that the MFA has been again granted 
more power to perform and coordinate.  
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Meanwhile, nearly all the ministries in the State Council have their own agencies to address 
particular international affairs.129 Therefore, it is almost inevitable that there is competition or 
conflict among diverse dimensions of their various interests. Furthermore, when a case is 
critical to the national strategy and requires specific expertise, another department will stand 
out and have a greater say in this issue. Correspondingly, the MFA will have to abdicate their 
leading position and play a secondary role. For instance, it was noticed that in the Climate 
Summits, the Chinese delegation was led by the NDRC, whose officers were the head and the 
chief negotiator of the delegation, and the MFA officials only played a limited role as 
delegation members.130  
 
The Ministry of Commerce 
Along with China’s economic development and commercial activities at the global stage, the 
role of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has become increasingly important in China’s 
foreign policy making. It is responsible for formulating strategies of international trade and 
economic cooperation, negotiating trade and economic issues with international actors, 
supervising inward and outward investments, and administering China’s foreign aid to other 
regions.131  
 
Given its competences in shaping trade policies, the appearance of the MOFCOM in China’s 
foreign economic activities is becoming increasingly evident. The MOFCOM is the 
prominent negotiator in issues such as foreign anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard 
investigations. In addition to resolving trade disputes, it also has its own international and 
regional departments dealing with economic cooperation and research. There are, for 
example, the Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs, Department of 
European Affairs, Department of Asian Affairs, Department of American and Oceanian 
Affairs, and so forth. Apart from their duties to establish bilateral and regional economic 
                                                 
129 Gong Li, Men Honghua and Sun Dongfang, “中国外交决策机制变迁研究 (1949-2009年) (China’s 
Diplomatic Decision-making Mechanism: Changes and Evolution since 1949)”, p.52. 
130 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “The State Council”, in New Foreign Policy Actors in China, 8-9; Wang 
Cungang, “当今中国的外交政策:谁在制定?谁在影响?——基于国内行为体的视角 (Foreign policy in 
Contemporary China: who is making it? Who is influencing?—a perspective from the domestic actors)”, 8. 
131 See the MOFCOM’s mission at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mission2010.shtml, accessed 22 
March 2018. 
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cooperation, they are also responsible for conducting economic and commercial relations 
with countries who have not established diplomatic relations with China.132 Hence they play 
an important role in bridging relationships between China and those countries. More 
importantly, this is an area where the MOFCOM can function, but the official foreign affairs 
channel has limited power, thus making the MOFCOM a distinct actor in China’s foreign 
policy making. 
 
It is a major actor in many areas where is not only related to Chinese interests, but also 
connected with world economic interests. For instance, it is a powerful actor in determining 
China’s currency exchange rate policy,133 and a major department managing China’s outward 
investment around the world.134 It also plays a significant role in China’s strategies towards 
Africa. Along with the Export–Import Bank of China, the MOFCOM provides grants, 
concessional loans, and operates investments in African countries.135 These forms of 
economic cooperation and aid have largely defined the content of China-Africa relations. In 
this relationship, the MOFCOM has more competences and resources to define and 
implement policies and programmes, and it is therefore believed that the MOFCOM’s 
influence that of the MFA in building the China-Africa relationship.136  
 
To sum up, the MOFCOM is one of the most crucial actors in shaping China’s commercial 
policy and economic cooperation. Considering the overriding importance of the economy in 
China’s national strategy, the MOFCOM represents an influential power in the circle of 
China’s foreign policy making. In the case of EU-China relations, the MOFCOM plays a 
critical role in negotiating agreements, ensuring cooperation and resolving commercial 
conflicts. 
 
                                                 
132 See the department’s functions at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/departments/ozs2/, accessed 24 March 2018. 
133 David A. Steinberg and Shih C. Victor. “Interest group influence in authoritarian states: The political 
determinants of Chinese exchange rate policy”, Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 11 (2012): 1405-1434. 
134 Luo Yadong, Xue Qiuzhi, and Han Binjie, “How emerging market governments promote outward FDI: 
Experience from China”, Journal of world business 45, no. 1 (2010): 68-79. 
135 Deborah Brautigam, “Chinese development aid in Africa: What, where, why, and how much”, in Jane Golley 
and Ligang Song (eds.), Rising China: global challenges and opportunities, 2011, ANU E Press, p.204. 
136 Lucy Corkin, “Redefining Foreign Policy Impulses toward Africa: The Roles of the MFA, the MOFCOM 
and China Exim Bank”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40, no. 4 (2011): 61-90. 
 
 63 
 
The National Development and Reform Commission 
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is a body that manages 
strategies for China’s macroeconomic developments. Its functions range from regulating the 
medium- and long-term national economy to monitoring domestic and social 
developments.137 When foreign affairs are connected with the nation’s economic matters or 
development layouts, the NDRC has the authority to involve itself in this process and have a 
significant impact on the associated decisions. For example, and as has already been noted 
above, the NDRC headed China’s negotiation on climate change, as this issue concerned 
domestic energy emission and the utilization of resources. It also has its own Department of 
Climate Change and Department of International Cooperation to deal with international 
actors regarding climate change issues.  
 
Under Xi’s government, the NDRC implemented a set of new responsibilities in terms of the 
planning and implementation of the Belt and Road initiative, along with other departments.138 
The chairman of the NDRC is also the Director of the Office of the Belt and Road Initiative 
Leading Small Group.139  
 
Furthermore, the NDRC has the power to administrator inward and outward investment by 
defining the measures and areas that are appropriate and accessible for the investment to go 
into. For example, in December 2017, the NDRC issued the Administrative Measures for 
Overseas Investments by Enterprises, which tightened the Chinese outbound investment by 
restricting investments in specific countries and domains.140 In coordination with the 
MOFCOM, the NDRC issued the Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for 
Foreign Investment Access, which (re)defined the domains the foreign capitals could gain 
access to.141 In terms of China’s economic actives and relations at the international level, the 
                                                 
137 See the NDRC’s main functions at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/, accessed 2 April 2018. 
138 See the Chinese version of the Department of International Cooperation’s main function at 
http://wss.ndrc.gov.cn/jgsz/, accessed 2 April 2018. The English version is available at 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfdic/, but the new functions have not been added into the English text.  
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NDRC is a key actor who has the power to set grand strategic policies and guidance for other 
departments.  
 
Other Agencies 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) has been having an increasing impact on China’s foreign 
policy. As the central bank, it has the authority to set the rules for China’s monetary policies 
and financial markets.142 The Renminbi exchange rate has huge implications for China’s 
export-oriented economy, as well as China’s trade with other international economies. 
Therefore, the appreciation of the Renminbi has frequently been targeted as a topic in China’s 
diplomacy with others, and the PBC’s policies in this regard are critical to shaping China’s 
international economic relations. However, these decisions are not dictated by the PBC alone 
as it still faces pressure from other departments. For example, the PBC and the MOFCOM 
held opposing positions on exchange rate reform, with the PBC preferring a looser grip whilst 
MOFCOM argued for the status quo.143  
 
The PBC, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), are the key actors in 
the realm of the foreign exchange reserves. The former PBC governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, 
advocated the super-sovereign reserve currency and the re-distribution of the Special 
Drawing Right (SDR).144 In the following years, the Chinese government promoted the 
internationalisation of the Renminbi and, in 2016, the Renminbi finally joined the SDR, 
which is seen as a big step on its path to internationalisation. Despite this, the road to achieve 
the Renminbi’s internationalisation will not be easy as the PBC faces opposing voices from 
bodies with relatively conservative stances, such as the Ministry of Finance, the NDRC, state 
commercial banks and various state-owned enterprises.145 Nevertheless, the PBC (and the 
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un.org/chn/zt/g20_london/t554936.htm, accessed 5 April 2018. 
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SAFE) has contributed significantly to China’s monetary diplomacy and made a number of 
achievements in regional monetary cooperation in East Asia.146  
 
With the rise of China’s attention on the establishment of its soft power, greater importance 
has become attached to cultural diplomacy in recent years. The Ministry of Culture and the 
Ministry of Education are the major actors in promoting the cultural diplomacy. Led by the 
Ministry of Culture, a series of Chinese Cultural Years have taken place around the world. 
For instance, there were China-France Cultural Year Exchange from 2003 to 2005, the 
Chinese Cultural Year in Germany in 2012, in the UK in 2015, and in Mexico in 2017.  
 
Affiliated with the Ministry of Education, the Hanban is an agency to promote the Chinese 
language across the world, and is also known as the headquarters of the worldwide Confucius 
Institutes, which are responsible for providing Chinese language teaching and introducing 
Chinese culture worldwide. While the Confucius Institutes have made China’s profile more 
apparent in the world, some of them have also drawn criticism on the grounds that they are 
agents of China’s propaganda and affect academic freedom in recipient countries.147 For this 
chapter, whether they are positively received or not is somewhat irrelevant; what matters is 
that they have become firm parts of China’s diplomacy. They have supplemented the 
channels of China’s public diplomacy,148 and those ministries behind them have risen as 
important actors in China’s foreign policy making process.  
 
The PLA 
The role of the military in China’s foreign policy making is hotly debated. As a part of ‘high 
politics’, military security is certainly an important topic in foreign policy. In the early stages 
of the PRC, many of its diplomats had originally served in the military forces. The first three 
Foreign Ministers (including Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Ji Pengfei) had long military 
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backgrounds. Furthermore, there were 11 ‘general ambassadors’, who had been selected from 
the military, and transformed into ambassadors.149  
 
Observers debate the military’s role in the foreign policy making as they focus on the PLA’s 
presence in the power system, namely the Political Bureau. Many have noticed that the PLA 
has lost its seats in the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau since 1997 when Admiral 
Liu Huaqing retired,150 indicating that the PLA’s influence in foreign policy making has 
begun to decline. However, if we take a review back to the late 20th century, after the chaos 
of the Cultural Revolution, the regime was far from being stable, and there is no such 
convention at the time that the Standing Committee had to contain a military member.151 In 
fact, the number of military leaders in the Political Bureau was quite stable since 1987. There 
are at least two military representatives – normally the two Vice-Chairmen of the CMC – in 
the Political Bureau, guaranteeing the existence of the channels that allow for the upload of 
military-related interests. Moreover, the General Secretary of the CPC is also the Chairman 
of the CMC, where this overlapping identity enables him to coordinate the interests of the 
state and the military. 
 
The influence of the PLA on foreign policy is issues-based rather than holistic; they generally 
only become involved when the issue is relevant to national security or military affairs. It is 
believed that some voices from the military tend to make assertive propositions for a hard-
line policy on grand strategies and territorial disputes,152 especially on the Taiwan Strait 
issues, where the PLA represents the possibility of the use of military force against Taiwan’s 
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independence. Regarding Taiwan, the issuing of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) in 2005 was 
seen as a result of the military’s hard-line stance on Taiwan.153  
 
In 2003, the PLA issued the Regulations on Political Work, which emphasised three forms of 
warfare, namely media warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare.154 Legal warfare, as 
interpreted by Chinese military scholars and the US Office of the Secretary of Defense, was 
to use domestic and international law to expose the antagonist’s illegal actions and to claim 
the legal high ground, which could then be applied to obtain international support to 
compress the opponent’s operational space.155 The ASL was thereby considered a 
consequence of the legal warfare and an instrument employed by China to deter Taiwan’s 
move towards independence. The influence of the Anti-Secession Law had gone beyond the 
Taiwan Strait and raised concern amongst Western powers. It made the US more vigilant 
with regards to China’s regional policies, and complicated the EU’s decision on lifting the 
arms embargo on China. As will be shown in chapter 6, from 2003 to 2005, China had made 
considerable effort to persuade the EU to lift the embargo. The time at which the ASL was 
adopted was coincident with the moment when the EU had been almost convinced to lift the 
embargo, with consequence that the decision was then postponed. This case shows that 
China’s foreign policy is not unitary; on the contrary, it has multiple actors and multifaceted 
dimensions and sometimes, as this case reveals, one dimension takes priority over, or at least 
conflicts with, others. Regarding the details of the arms embargo issue, the US’s attitude and 
the EU’s hesitation will be further discussed in the case study in chapter 6. What is important 
here is that military decisions can have significant impacts on China’s foreign policy and 
international relations.  
 
To some extent, the PLA is also an autonomous actor in foreign affairs, as it has its own  
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Office for International Military Cooperation to manage military exchanges and cooperation. 
When the PLA engages with public and international military representatives, these proceed 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense (MOD). In fact, the MOD is merely a 
department of the State Council, and has no authority to lead the army. The leading power 
remains within the grip of the CMC. The CFAC provides the platform for military leaders 
and civil bureaucrats to discuss foreign affairs and coordinate their interests. 
 
2.2.3.2 State-owned Enterprises and Local Governments 
State-owned Enterprises 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been encouraged by the ‘Going out’ strategy and 
accordingly have expanded their interests to the worldwide stage. The expansion of SOEs has 
drawn considerable debate as to their roles in China’s foreign policy and international 
relations. To some observers, being owned by the state implies that the SOEs are directed and 
controlled by the party-state, that they are the arms of the government and shoulder the 
mission to implement the country’s geo-economic policies.156 It has been observed that 
various Chinese energy companies, especially oil and gas companies, have developed their 
business in countries with abundant natural resources, though outside the Middle East in 
places such as Sudan, Angola and Venezuela. Their investments in these areas have increased 
channels for China’s supply of resources and have thereby enhanced China’s energy security. 
 
However, others argue that the party-state’s control over the SOEs are exaggerated,157 and 
SOEs are autonomous actors who are driven mainly by market and economic interests.158 
This profit-oriented motivation could generate the SOEs’ own interests, which might even 
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conflict with national principles.159 To this extent, SOEs are in part corporatized and 
independent from Beijing’s directives. 
 
In fact, SOEs sometimes play the role of pioneers in China’s going out strategy, as they build 
up diplomatic relations on the basis of trade in natural resources.160 On some occasions, 
however, SOEs’ investments go to countries with unstable regimes, and in turn investments 
in those environments require diplomatic assistance to maintain or develop their businesses. 
To this extent, analysts note that China’s diplomacy has been somehow ‘kidnapped’ by the 
SOEs’ overseas investments.161 In the Sudanese Darfur Crisis, China had to consider the 
investment that had been projected in the region by the China National Petroleum 
Corporation, and this became one of the reasons for China’s reluctance to interfere in the first 
place.162 Again, in light of Chinese national oil companies’ intense investment in Iran, China 
used its diplomatic resources to exclude energy trade from the sanctions imposed on Iran by 
the UN in 2010. This evidence illustrates how China’s foreign policies have indeed been 
influenced by the activities of SOEs. 
 
According to Chinese diplomats, China initially held a ‘business is business’ attitude towards 
its overseas trade.163 However, they soon found that commercial interests were inevitably 
entangled with political elements, thereby affecting China’s international relations. Based on 
the business is business stance, Chinese SOEs’ investments in Africa were driven by 
economic interests, and dealt with regions which could produce profits, regardless of the 
associated political regimes or societal status. Meanwhile, business activities were aligned 
with the Chinese government’s principle of ‘non-interference’. Unlike the Western powers, 
China’s investments, as well as its aid to relevant countries, were not bound by political 
conditions such as promoting human rights and democracy. ‘Not being like the West’ was an 
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appealing feature to some African regimes, especially to those considered ‘rogue countries’ 
by the West. It saved Chinese companies the associated ‘political costs’ (negotiating about 
political conditions), and granted them privileged access to African countries’ energy 
markets. However, the ‘political costs’ were not eliminated but rather transferred to other 
realms such as China’s image and reputation. The so-called ‘Chinese model’ – particularly in 
conducting investments without conditions – was accused of undermining the West’s efforts 
to build African countries with neoliberal norms164 and, in turn, undermined Chinese efforts 
to be seen a responsible player in the eyes of Western countries.  
 
Furthermore, the disputes over the SOEs’ behaviour can influence the health of the bilateral 
relationship, especially in relationships that are largely shaped by economic relations, such as 
the EU-China relationship. The EU’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations into 
Chinese photovoltaic enterprises have damaged the interests of Chinese photovoltaic 
companies as well as European photovoltaic retailers. Moreover, the resistance to Chinese 
enterprises’ overseas operations, mergers and acquisitions are not only for economic reasons, 
but are often attributed to ‘security reasons’.165 In this regard, two Chinese 
telecommunications companies, Huawei and ZTE, have frequently been targeted as risks to 
US and UK security.166 Under these circumstances, the MOFCOM or the MFA need to 
become involved and resolve the associated disputes. 
 
It was demonstrated above that SOEs can have significant impacts on China’s foreign policy, 
but it is important to avoid understanding their roles from only a single dimension. On the 
one hand, the SOEs use China’s diplomatic resources to protect their own profitabilities; on 
the other hand, they are the arms of the Chinese government in terms of implementing the 
country’s strategies. Chinese national oil companies’ investments in Africa are not merely 
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profit-seeking activities, but have ultimately served national goals, as they have broadened 
China’s energy supply channels and enhanced its energy security.167  
 
Additionally, the central government retains control over the SOEs through the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). The 
SASAC oversees the operation of 96 SOEs.168 Besides managing regulations and supervising 
the capital gains, the SASAC (along with the Organization Department of the CPC) has the 
ultimate power to appoint the executives of these SOEs,169 which ensures that the highest 
decision making levels of these enterprises are under the control of the Central Committee of 
the CPC and the State Council. Apart from national SOEs, local SOEs are also major 
investors in each province, and are themselves controlled by local SASACs. 
 
Local Government 
As in a unitary country, diplomatic competence supposedly belongs to the central 
government. However, there is a trend in China, particularly after the reform and opening up, 
that local governments actively participate in engagements with the external world. Actors 
such as provinces and cities contribute to the country’s foreign relations and economic 
activity at the subnational level. 
 
The reason for mentioning the reform and open policy is that it provides two prerequisites 
through which to facilitate local governments’ engagements with actors outside their 
territorial boundaries. The first prerequisite is the decentralisation of power from central 
government to local authorities. Local governments’ powers were strengthened in the process 
of reform and were formally supported by the Constitution in 1982, which encouraged local 
authorities to fully implement their initiative and enthusiasm, and also granted greater 
responsibilities to their own regional economies, finances, welfare and, even to a limited 
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extent, legislature.170 Meanwhile, local authorities have also been granted greater fiscal 
freedom, such as the competence to formulate budgets and attract foreign direct investment, 
which has enhanced local governments’ administrative powers and financial autonomy in 
law.171  
 
The second prerequisite is the internationalisation/globalisation in the process of opening up. 
Lowering the barriers for international trade has provided considerable opportunities for local 
governments to pursue their own economic interests. In particular, the establishment of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have opened channels for local governments to connect with 
the world. The interactions between the SEZs and external economies have demonstrated a 
tight linkage between foreign direct investments and trade, and therefore strengthened local 
governments’ financial autonomy in practice,172 which has spurred other provinces and cities 
to imitate.  
 
Local governments’ participation in foreign affairs mainly focuses on low politics such as 
economic cooperation. However, given the significance of economic development within 
China’s political agenda, local governments’ economic activities at the subnational level 
could also shape the country’s diplomacy and strategy. In fact, various provinces have used 
their geographical advantages to contribute substantially to sub-regional cooperation.  
 
For instance, the south-west provinces have played a significant role in China’s cooperation 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Yunnan has actively participated 
in the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program (GMS), where it was the 
co-decision maker and the executive on China’s side.173 Its neighbour province, Guangxi, 
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also joined the GMS and competed with Yunnan in the program. In addition, Guangxi also 
played a similar role in the Pan-Beibu (Tonkin) Gulf Economic Cooperation initiative.174 The 
north-east provinces, Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, have carried out vast programs under 
the China-Russia cooperation program.175 Even prior the Belt and Road Initiative, Kashi 
(Kashgar) in Xinjiang established the latest SEZ in 2010, which was intended to tighten the 
connections, and facilitate trade, with Central Asian countries. In 2015, Xinjiang was defined 
as the ‘core area’ of the Belt and Road Initiative, which further promoted Xinjiang’s 
cooperation with Central Asia in terms of infrastructure, transportation and electricity grid 
construction.176 Fujian used its geo-economic advantage to build a very profound economic 
relationship across the Taiwan Strait. These activities, as conducted by the provinces, have 
promoted China’s cooperation with neighbouring countries to a remarkable extent.  
 
At the city level, Chinese cities have built numerous city-to-city partnerships with cities 
around the world. Taking Europe, for example, between 1979 and 2018 they established 654 
pairs of friendship cities (or the so-called sister city relations).177 This vast network has 
carried out large-scope staff exchanges, and has brought cities closer in their cooperation in 
the realms of tourism, education, agriculture and service. In 2012, China and the EU launched 
the EU-China Urbanisation Partnership that aimed to achieve sustainable urban development. 
Between 2013 and 2016, 30 Chinese cities have built partnerships with European cities and 
implemented concrete projects.178 These partnerships have deepened EU-China relations at 
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the microlevel between cities, but eventually these concrete projects could contribute to 
consolidating the relationship at a higher level.  
 
Local governments could have an impact on foreign policy making by lobbying through inner 
formal institutions such as the National People’s Congress and the National Congress of the 
CPC. Observers indicate that some provincial leaders have considerable potential for 
ascension within the CPC’s political hierarchy, and most of the members in the last two 
Standing Committees of the Political Bureau have had experience in local governance.179 For 
example, in the 18th Committee, all the seven members have had provincial experiences. This 
implies that the local leaders have a certain kind of informal channels through which to 
impose their personal influences in the making of foreign policy. 
 
It is widely believed that local governments’ foreign activities have promoted China’s 
internationalisation, have boosted the country’s cooperation with neighbouring countries, and 
have also consolidated connections with regions such as Europe, Africa, and so forth.180 Most 
importantly, the involvement of local governments has contributed to a ‘more liberal foreign 
economic policy’, which in turn contributes to a more interdependent and stable relationship 
with other countries.181 Even though local governments’ activities mainly focus on economic 
issues, the consequences of their behaviour have clear political implications. On the one 
hand, preserving the long-term development of local economies requires the central 
government to adopt a relatively cooperative, rather than confrontational, foreign policy 
when it concerns the local governments’ economic security.182 On the other hand, local 
governments comply with the principle interests of the country, as they still need political 
authorisation and sometimes financial support to pursue their own initiatives. So, when the 
city-city relationship is incompatible with the national interests, the local government is 
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obliged to put the national interests first. For example, the Nanjing government severed its 
friendship city relationship with Nagoya, Japan, due to Nagoya’s Mayor, Takashi Kawamura, 
making misleading comments about the Nanking Massacre.183 
 
2.2.3.3 Think Tanks 
Think tanks are having an increasing impact on the government’s foreign policy making. The 
most influential think tanks are directed by central agencies.184 For example, the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science (CASS) is a ministerial research organ that is directly subordinate 
to the State Council. It has various institutions that work on specific realms of international 
relations and foreign affairs. The Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC (also 
referred to as the Chinese Academy of Governance since 2018) is an institute that lies 
directly under the Party; it mainly studies Communism and Chinese politics, and is 
responsible for training officials for the Party. The China Institute of International Studies 
(CIIS) is a think tank supervised by the MFA, as is the China Foreign Affairs University. The 
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) are affiliated with the 
Ministry of State Security. Outside Beijing, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies is 
the most influential think tank under the direction of the Shanghai government. Through the 
channels connected with the governments, these think tanks can provide policy analysis and 
recommendations to policy makers. 
 
There are three main approaches through which think tanks can influence the process of 
policy making. First, think tanks can influence top leaders through the Political Bureau 
collective study sessions. The Political Bureau collective study sessions is an institution that 
invites scholars to give lectures to members in the Political Bureau. Since December 2002, 
there have been 127 sessions, almost one session per month. The lectures cover various 
aspects of China’s development. Among them, there were six sessions that specifically 
                                                 
183 Pang Hurui, “外交部: 支持南京’断交’决定 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports Nanjing’s decision to 
sever the relationship)”, 新京报 (The Beijing News), February 23, 2012, available at 
http://yuqing.people.com.cn/GB/210124/17202583.html, accessed 24 April 2018. 
184 Chen Yuchuan, “可影响高层决策 中国十大”智库”首次公开亮相 (Influencing top-level policy, China 
reveals top ten think tanks)”, 人民网(People's Daily Online), available at 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1037/5019209.html, accessed 24 April 2018. 
 
 76 
 
referred to foreign affairs,185 whilst other sessions were related to comparative studies of the 
world and China with regards to financial governance, military development, climate change, 
urbanisation, education, agriculture, and so forth. These lectures are given by experts from 
diverse think tanks and universities, their huge influences in respect domains make their 
arguments extremely convincing to the top leaders. 
 
Second, in addition to the lectures, think tanks and scholars can also shape foreign policy 
through consultation and discussion conferences. The governmental department that carries 
the majority of this responsibility is the MFA, which establishes policy communities to 
provide platforms for scholars to discuss foreign policy at the official level. The Foreign 
Policy Advisory Group and the Public Diplomacy Advisory Panel are two communities that 
are organised by the MFA which have enlisted top-level scholars in China such as Qin 
Yaqing, Qu Xing and Yang Jiemian.186 The Policy Planning Department of the MFA is the 
particular department that studies the international relations and proposes foreign policies. A 
number of Chinese scholars claim to have been consulted by this department before foreign 
policies are drafted.187 Indeed, two of the interviewees in this thesis have worked in Renmin 
University and the CICIR, and have been consulted about policies regarding the EU. 
 
Third, there are extensive personal networks that exist between diplomats and scholars in 
international studies. Staff exchanges between the diplomatic system and academia are not 
rare, particularly in MFA-affiliated institutes, such as the China Foreign Affairs University 
and the CIIS. Numerous academics have been dispatched to embassies around the world, and 
then return to academic institutes to continue their research careers. As opposed to scholars 
who focus on academic work, these retired diplomats have gained extensive diplomatic 
                                                 
185 They were “G20 summit and the reform of global governance system” on 27 September 2016; “The pattern 
and institution of the global governance” on 12 October 2015; “Persisting on the peaceful development” on 28 
January 2013; “Promoting the opening policy and securing the national economy” on 28 September 2007; 
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186 Qin Yaqing is the President of China Foreign Affairs University, Qu Xing was the President of the CIIS, and 
Yang Jiemian was the President of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. 
187 Wang Yizhou, “中国外交影响因子探析 (Factor Analysis in China’s Diplomacy)”, World Economics and 
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experience, and can use this experience and their networks to not only give advice, but to 
some extent ‘direct’ the drafting of foreign policies.188  
 
Moreover, observers indicate that think tanks seem to be able to contribute to China’s 
diplomacy from the outside the governmental system.189 Most of these kinds of think tanks 
are sponsored by civilians and claim to be independent of the government, such as the Centre 
for China and Globalization, the Charhar Institute, and the Pangoal Institution. In spite of 
claiming to independent, they actively work for the government by training officials, carrying 
out research projects and making policy recommendations. They are particularly sensitive to 
the hottest topics in China’s political discourse. For instance, all the three think tanks (others 
include the China Silk Road iValley Research Institute, One Belt and One Road 100 Forum, 
the China Center for Contemporary World Studies, etc.) have joined the think tank 
association for the Belt and Road Initiative,190 and have organised a number of conferences to 
discuss relevant themes. By debating and disseminating China’s national strategies with 
worldwide researchers and observers, Chinese think tanks have made a considerable 
contribution to China’s public diplomacy at the non-governmental level.191  
 
In addition to providing policy advice, think tank members can shape China’s political 
discourse. Once their suggestions have been accepted by the government, they would then be 
able to define the discourse at that time. For example, Zheng Bijian, the former Vice 
Principle of the Party School of the Central Committee, proposed ‘China’s peaceful rise’ in 
2003. Due to the debates raised by the concept of ‘China’s rise’, this was changed to ‘China’s 
peaceful development’ in 2004. Nevertheless, this notion became the main diplomatic 
principle under Hu Jintao’s government. Furthermore, as will be shown in section 4.3.2.1, the 
                                                 
188 Sun Zhe, “中国外交思想库：参与决策的角色分析 (The Think Tanks and the Making of Chinese Foreign 
Policy)”, Fudan Journal (Social Science) 4, (2004): 98-104. 
189 Quansheng Zhao, “Policy-making processes of Chinese foreign policy: The role of policy communities and 
think tanks”, in Handbook of China’s International Relations, ed. Shaun Breslin (London: Routledge, 2010), 
29-30; Pascal Abb, “China's Foreign Policy Think Tanks: Institutional Evolution and Changing Roles”, Journal 
of Contemporary China 24, no. 93 (2015): 531-553. 
190 Zhang Lin, “一带一路智库合作联盟成立 (The establishment of the association of think tanks for the Belt 
and Road initiative)”, 中国网(China Internet Information Center), 8 April 2015, available at 
http://www.china.com.cn/opinion/think/2015-04/08/content_35268485.htm, accessed 29 April 2018. 
191 Ke Yinbin, “中国智库如何实现公共外交功能 (How does Chinese think tanks function at the realm of 
public diplomacy)”, 澎湃(The Paper), 12 February 2015, available at 
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1302869, accessed 29 April 2018. 
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academic discussion of ‘hide brightness, nourish obscurity’ and ‘active conduct’ around 2012 
re-shaped China’s foreign policy principles at the beginning of Xi Jinping’s regime.  
 
It is important to understand think tanks’ influence in China’s foreign policy making due to 
their deep connections (official and semi-official) with national departments. While think 
tanks might sometimes be closely related to the political system in other countries, their 
connections in the Chinese case mean that they should not really be thought of as 
independent, outside participants in foreign policy debates; rather, they are very much 
insiders. They are not merely able to upload their opinions as demonstrated above but can 
also download information from the top via their interactions with national departments. 
Accordingly, they get to glimpse the attitudes of policy makers and are very sensitive to the 
political atmosphere. As a result, their research output could reflect these attitudes and 
intelligence, and to some extent their opinions could correspond with the government’s 
policies. This is implication extremely important to the methodology of this thesis, as 
Chinese think tanks’ idea will be explicitly studied in more detail in chapter 6, whereby I will 
consult 141 Chinese language materials on EU-China relations. By analysing their content 
and specific wording, chapter 6 is designed to evaluate the Chinese scholars’ perceptions of 
the EU and the bilateral relationship at that time. 
 
2.3 The Evolving Nature of China as an International Actor 
By examining the actors and their competences in China’s diplomatic system, this chapter 
demonstrates China’s evolving nature as an international actor. Despite the unitary political 
regime, China’s diplomatic policy making is not as simple as one might imagine. In fact, it is 
a rather complicated system with multifaceted dimensions of interests. This section will 
analyse how China has evolved into such a complex form. 
 
The evolution of China as an international actor occurred over a long time span, which can be 
attributed to the dramatic transformation of both global and domestic environments. Since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the period to date has witnessed the 
formation and collapse of the bipolar world, and also the reformation and opening up of 
China itself. The fact that China still maintains a one-party rule system notwithstanding, this 
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system is actually less unitary than it used to be. It has adapted to the changes demanded by 
both internal and external contexts, and has increased the complexity of its foreign policy 
making. 
 
2.3.1 The External Transformation 
The biggest changes in the last few decades were the end of the Cold War and the 
development of Globalisation. For China, these changes implied a transition in the political 
agenda from one of high politics to low politics. Back in Mao’s era, China was facing severe 
national security issues, with the very survival of the People’s Republic at stake. Not 
surprisingly, the priorities set in China’s the foreign policy were geared towards the defence 
of its national security.  
 
Under Deng Xiaoping, China’s principal strategy was to achieve the country’s 
modernisation.192 Hence the basis of foreign policy changed to the need to build a peaceful 
environment for China’s economic development.193 Meanwhile, China had established 
diplomatic relations with the US and its allies, which consequently reduced the threat from 
the West and significantly expanded the extent of China’s diplomatic relations. In the late 
1980s, China restored its relations with the Soviet Union and thus eliminated the security 
threat on the north. Consequently, the existential challenges to the state that had existed under 
Mao disappeared. 
 
To some extent, the end of the Cold War provided an atmosphere in which the rivalries 
between the two blocks were diminished. Even though China still encountered some military 
confrontations in Yugoslavia, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, it did not let these 
incidents slow the momentum of its economic development. Furthermore, along with the 
momentum of the Globalisation and China’s increasing involvement in the international 
                                                 
192 Database of the National Congress of the CPC, “中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报
(Bulletin of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC)”, 人民网 (People's Daily 
Online), available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65371/4441902.html#.  
193 Jisi Wang. "China's search for a grand strategy: A rising great power finds its way." Foreign Affairs (2011): 
68-79; David Shambaugh, “China engages Asia: reshaping the regional order”, International security 29, no. 3 
(2005): 64-99. 
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society, the nature of China’s international relations fundamentally changed. Its diplomatic 
agendas had gone beyond high politics such as security and become increasingly linked with 
commerce, energy, culture, education, climate change, and so forth.194 
 
The transition from high politics to low politics has diluted the emphasises on security and 
military issues, and created a larger sphere for China to take part in. These new domains, due 
to their specific expertise, require participation from particular departments to generate new 
agendas for China’s politics. For instance, entering the WTO was once a priority task on the 
list. It required the support and collaboration of multiple departments, and could have taken 
up a large amount of the national administrative resources. Other issues – such as 
international trade, foreign investment and climate change – had also gone beyond the 
competence of the MFA, and needed trans-departmental collaboration to achieve the 
associated goals. The emergence of these low political topics generated a push from the 
outside to diversify the actors in China’s foreign policy making. 
 
2.3.2 The Internal Reform 
Two of the major reforms in foreign policy making have been the decentralisation of the 
power system and the requirement for specific expertise. Decentralisation has fundamentally 
altered the situation in China in the sense that the paramount leader holds absolute authority 
in the making of foreign policies, and the need for professional knowledge has invited 
various departments into the making of foreign policies. 
 
It is necessary to look back in order to understand the process of decentralisation of the power 
system. In the era of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader used to play a 
decisive role in the formation of foreign policy. Under their leadership, foreign policy was 
largely based on the leader’s judgement of the world environment and domestic needs, and 
                                                 
194 David Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign Policy and Security Policy in an Era of Reform, (California: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 4; Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s foreign-and security-policy decision-
making processes under Hu Jintao”, 63-97; Gong Li, Men Honghua and Sun Dongfang, “中国外交决策机制变
迁研究 (1949-2009年) (China’s Diplomatic Decision-making Mechanism: Changes and Evolution since 
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their decisions usually shaped the strategic dimensions of China’s diplomacy. For instance, 
Mao evaluated the atmosphere of the Cold War, and accordingly decided to implement the 
‘lean to one side’ policy, allying China with the Soviet Union.195 Between 1949 and 1966, 
Mao and Zhou Enlai (sometimes including Liu Shaoqi) were the highest foreign policy 
makers in China’s diplomacy. 196 Specifically, Mao was the top leader who had the power to 
make any final decision that might be required, whilst Zhou was the Premier and Foreign 
Minister who had the executive power. Zhou told the ambassadors that ‘every little thing 
matters in diplomacy (waijiao wu xiaoshi 外交无小事)’, and emphasised the requirement 
that any diplomatic decisions must be reported to him and gain his instruction. If necessary, 
he would report to Mao and gain his permission before any given foreign policy was 
executed.197 To this extent, China’s foreign policy making was then strictly centralised and 
concentrated under the authority of its top leaders. 
 
In the decade following 1966, the Cultural Revolution in China paralysed its diplomatic 
system. Since 1978, China had gradually restored order within its administration and started 
implementing its reform and opening policy. In the early 1980s, based on domestic needs for 
economic development, and the observation that the tension relating to the Cold War was 
rapidly declining, Deng made ‘hide brightness, nourish obscurity (tao guang yang hui 韬光养
晦)’ the principle of China’s foreign policy. The foreign policy making under Deng Xiaoping 
still had the characteristics of centralisation, but also gradually became more democratic and 
institutionalised. For instance, disagreements were allowed to be voiced in the discussion 
among top leaders, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) started to set up a number of 
institutions such as the Spokesman Institution.198  
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Under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s administration, China’s foreign policy making 
experienced two major changes. First, the policy making process had been decentralised. It 
has been indicated that the Chinese political characteristics changed from those of ‘strongman 
politics’ to ‘ordinary-man politics.’ 199 Whilst the paramount leader still enjoyed the highest 
rank and held formal power as the General Secretary of the Party, he no longer held the same 
informal influence as Mao and Deng. Therefore, the foreign policies were not solely 
determined by the paramount leader himself, but were rather achieved through consensus at 
the top level (mainly consisting of the members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the 
CPC). 200 Furthermore, a series of bureaucracies were established in accordance to the new 
political atmosphere, within which the rise of the leading small groups played a significant 
role in producing and coordinating foreign policy. As demonstrated in section 2.2.2, members 
of the CFAC come from diverse departments. Various origins of interests make the process 
of decision making more complicated, which is further difficult to determine the foreign 
policy by only a single person or only one interest group. 
 
Second, following the reform and opening policy, economic development and modernisation 
has become the priority of the national strategy. As mentioned above, foreign policies were 
also expanded and combined with the diverse interests of various actors, such as the 
MOFCOM, the NDRC, the PBC, the SAFE, the PLA, local governments, and state-owned 
enterprises. In addition to the economic and security domains, the Ministry of Culture and the 
Ministry of Education also played an active role in China’s engagement in the world, 
particularly in relations between the EU and China, and were principle actors in the events 
such as the Year of Chinese Culture, and the establishment of the Confucius Institutions. 
From the perspective of the institutions, it has become entirely normal that foreign policy 
making is no longer the exclusive domain of the paramount leaders or the MFA, but rather is 
a common agenda in which multiple actors can become, and indeed are, involved.  
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2.4 Conclusion: The Implications for EU-China Relations 
In the association to the demonstration of the EU’s complex nature as an international actor, 
this chapter has shown that China is also complicated in the sense of the formation of its 
foreign policies. The reason for studying the nature of the actors is to avoid oversimplifying 
them as unitary entities. In fact, they have multiple levels to their decision-making processes, 
and at each level there are various actors who could wield diverse competences to achieve 
their respective goals. In the EU, there are organs such as the Council, the Commission and 
the Parliament who have certain powers to shape EU policies. Meanwhile, at the sub-level, 
member states are able to maintain a certain degree of sovereignty across a wide range of 
policies.  
 
Whilst perhaps not having the same level of complexity as the EU, Chinese foreign policy 
making is nevertheless both complex and diverse. Crucially, far more being recognised by 
external observers who often still assume a single Chinese interest, this chapter has shown the 
plurality in China’s foreign policy-making system, and demonstrated the fact that there are 
various actors and interests within the system. 
 
As will be shown in chapter 5, the EU-China relationship is becoming more mature in the 
process of its development. One sign of this maturity is that cooperation has been achieved 
across multitudinous domains. From commerce to climate change, from tourism to 
agriculture, the EU and China are now connected by multiple ties at diverse levels. The more 
strongly they are connected, the more difficult it will be for their relationship to be broken 
off. Again, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5, when the two are in dispute over human 
rights, cooperation in trade might still support the pillar of their relationship at the same time. 
When they face commercial conflicts, the needs for cooperation in terms of long-vision 
strategy might function to repair the rift. To sum up, the EU and China have built a range of 
connections that cover high politics to low politics, and have established communications 
both at the top level and the subordinate levels. The relationship is complicated because it is 
built on two actors who are themselves highly complex in nature. 
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework: Constructivism and the 
Dominant Research Approaches Towards EU-China Relations 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is designed to establish the theoretical framework for this thesis, and provide a 
clear basis for the discussion of identities in following chapters. This chapter aims to 
demonstrate the nature and claims of conventional theories in studies of EU-China relations, 
and further to show the value added by a constructivist approach. Specifically, this chapter will 
discuss how the conventional theories – namely realism, liberalism and the English School – 
have been applied in analysing EU-China relations. I will first expound the essential features 
of the conventional theories, and second will demonstrate their applications in studies of EU-
China relations. Thirdly, whilst recognising the contribution of these dominant theories in 
addressing EU-China relations, I will also indicate their shortcomings in explaining the 
relationship. On that basis, I will then introduce the essence of constructivism, and then explain 
the benefits of applying a constructivist approach in studies of EU-China relations. 
 
Studies of EU-China relations mainly focus on two levels, the first one being the EU and China 
in the context of the evolving structure of the international system. From this perspective, the 
EU and China have gone through bipolarity and unipolarity, and now live in a system that is 
debatably going to be multipolar. At this level, the research analyses how the EU and China 
are influenced by the transformation of the international system. For instance, scholars consider 
what the implications of the end of the Cold War were on EU-China relations;201 and what does 
a rising China mean to the world and how should the EU deal with it?202 Similarly, from 
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China’s perspective, some scholars are interested in how the EU could be a new pole to balance 
the power of the US.203  
 
The second level focuses on EU-China relations at the bilateral level. Along with the deepening 
and broadening of the bilateral relationship, the studies on the EU and China have also 
expanded. The literature covers the various aspects of economies,204 environmental issues,205 
energy issues,206 human rights,207 security,208 and so forth. It analyses the cooperation in, and 
challenges of, the bilateral relationship and discusses the various factors that have implications 
in this regard.  
 
Realism and liberalism dominate the analytical approaches to EU-China relations. As 
mentioned above, neorealists study how the relationship develops in the international system, 
whilst neoliberal scholars study the interdependent status of the relationship. However, the two 
dominant approaches face a common problem: they take the international system and the actors’ 
interests as given, and neglect the function of identities in the shaping of those actors’ interests. 
The lack of awareness of the actors’ identities is the critical factor that results in the 
misunderstanding of interests. Defining the interests of the actors from the perspective of the 
international system is somehow fragmentary; sometimes, as in the cases of the EU and China, 
it could even be misleading209.  
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Therefore, this thesis aims to conduct an in-depth investigation of the EU’s and China’s 
identities. Constructivism argues that interests are not taken for granted, but shaped by 
perceptions. By applying the constructivist approach, I will explore the inner characteristics of 
the EU and China, and demonstrate the roles that are perceived and constructed in their 
interactions. In doing so, this thesis will give a comprehensive description of their identities, 
and consequently provide a thorough understanding of what their real interests are and how 
they are constructed. The first step, then, is to introduce the dominant theoretical approaches 
in EU-China relations in more detail, and give a detailed explanation of the benefits of a 
constructivist approach. 
 
3.2 Main Theoretical Approaches 
3.2.1 Realism 
In its long period of development, realism has generated many approaches in international 
relations studies, but in this chapter we will only refer to those which are most often used to 
analyse EU-China relations, namely classical realism, neorealism and neo-classical realism. As 
other realist approaches are not part of the mainstream analysis of the relationship – offensive 
realism, hegemonic stability theory and so on – their (potential) salience will not be discussed 
in this chapter. 
 
3.2.1.1 Classical Realism 
Realism is based on the assumption that the international system is anarchic. Without a central 
authority to regulate the actors’ behaviours in the system, states pursue their individual national 
interests for power and security. For this purpose, states choose power balancing as the main 
means by which to secure their interests. In light of this, realism does not seem to be an 
appropriate way in which to examine EU-China relations, because the EU and China are not 
engaged in geopolitical disputes, and are not conflicting with each other in terms of security.210 
                                                 
210 David Shambaugh, “China and Europe: the emerging axis”, 246; Feng Zhongping, “Promoting Deeper 
Development of EU-China Relations”, in The International Politics of EU-China Relations, eds. David Kerr and 
Zhou Fei (New York: Oxford University Press the British Academy, 2007), 267–80. 
 87 
 
Thus, there are no mutual concerns about security at the bilateral level, and neither do they 
need to balance each other’s ‘hard’ power. 
 
Furthermore, if we take an overview of the assumptions of classic realism, we will be able to 
find some points to test whether classical realism is applicable in studies of EU-China relations. 
Based on Thucydidies’ History of the Peloponnesian War, scholars have drawn four 
assumptions to establish the essences of classical realism.211 The first assumption is that states 
are the principle actors, where there are various definitions of ‘state’ in international politics.212 
For realists, the essence is sovereignty, which consists of internal authority and external 
legitimacy. By this logic, a state is able to exercise absolute governance domestically and can 
behave independently on the international stage. From this perspective, as noted in the 
discussion in chapter 1, the EU cannot be regarded as an international relations actor. Even 
though the Lisbon Treaty expanded the EU’s competences in many areas, member states still 
retain their sovereignty in certain areas, and the EU can only exercise its power in a unanimous 
manner, which means the EU does not have absolute governance over its member states. So, 
strictly speaking, the EU is different from conventional actors such as nation-states who have 
complete internal authority. Although the previous chapter argued that the EU has a legal 
personality and legal legitimacy in international society, to realists, it remains fundamentally a 
different type of actor from the states that are the building blocks of the realist approach. From 
a realist perspective, states join the EU merely because it suits them; the EU is considered an 
instrument which is ‘significant only to the extent that they allow states to pursue their own 
interests’ rather than having an interest akin to a state’s in its own right. It is both a forum of 
interstate interaction and also a vehicle through which states articulate and promote their 
interests and power, rather than an actor itself.213 Consequently, as one party of the bilateral 
relationship with China, the EU cannot be treated as a valid actor in classical realism. 
 
The second and third assumptions can be combined. Classical realists believe that states are 
‘unitary’ and ‘rational’ actors, and they act with one voice and prioritise national interests over 
other preferences. If we examine the EU from this perspective, it is not qualified to be an actor. 
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Although the European Commission can conduct various actions within international affairs, 
the Council and the Parliament also have the legitimacy to represent the EU externally. As for 
‘prioritised’ interests, and as once again shown in chapter 1, although the EU has progressively 
gained increasingly exclusive powers, its interests originate from multiple dimensions 
(including, but not limited to, the interests of individual nation states).  
 
The fourth assumption is that as states focus on power, their cooperation is based on similar 
interests in terms of security. However, the current environment surrounding the international 
society has changed; even though security concerns remain important, they no longer are the 
sole priority of national strategies or, in a number of cases, even the most important one. More 
importantly, the EU and China do not have significant security tensions with each other, or 
more correctly, traditional security tensions. Hence, the security related assumption of realism 
has little to no relevance to the EU-China bilateral relationship. 
 
There are certain arguments stating that the EU is trying to effectively influence China in order 
to prevent the damage likely to arise due to China’s dramatic rise within the international 
system. 214  There are also analyses debating the impacts of China’s rise and the EU’s 
response.215 Rather than remaining confined to a relatively narrow perspective between the EU 
and China, the literature embeds their relationship within a global context which concerns 
world order and the international system, and this perspective leads us to the fields of 
neorealism. 
 
3.2.1.2 Neorealism 
Among neorealists, there are two main contributions that could be applied to studies of EU-
China relations: Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism and Joseph Grieco’s contribution to 
relative and absolute gains. These two approaches have been widely applied in studying EU-
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China relations. Structural realism has been employed to explain the development of the EU-
China relationship in the context of a post-bipolar world, whilst the perspective of relative and 
absolute gains has mainly been used to test the EU’s and China’s strategic partnership, as 
established in 2003. 
 
Structural Realism 
In structural realism, in contrast to the unit level (i.e., looking at the actions and interactions of 
the relevant actors) explanation of classical realism, Waltz argues that states are similar units 
in terms of pursuing their interests, there is no differentiation in function between different 
units.216 As such, Waltz turns to a structured approach in which the structure of the international 
system is the core explanatory factor, which goes beyond the level of states and human 
nature.217 The structure is determined by international anarchy and the distribution of states’ 
capabilities. The structure creates a compass with states in it and constrains states’ behaviour, 
and therefore determines the outcomes of international relations.218 
 
In studies of EU-China relations, neorealists focus on these two actors’ positions and their 
influence in the ‘multipolar world’. There remains, though, some degree of caution in referring 
to a ‘multipolar’ order as there is disagreement over whether this order is still in the process of 
emerging, or is already a concrete fact. Waltz argues that the international system is determined 
by numbers of great powers. Furthermore, the number and the definition of ‘great powers’ 
depends on the distribution of capabilities.219 China is a rising power experiencing a dramatic 
economic expansion, and the EU is the largest economy in the world. Both actors have gained, 
and are gaining, further capabilities. These capabilities, as defined by Waltz, are the ‘size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political 
stability and competence’.220 But, he also points out, ‘power is estimated by comparing the 
capabilities of a number of units. Although capabilities are attributes of units, the distribution 
of capabilities across units is not… [it] is a system-wide concept’.221 Consequently, we cannot 
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assert that the international system has changed because of the dramatic changes of the EU and 
China, even if there is a momentum of transition. Here we do not intend to dig too deep into 
the changing system, but instead focus on the writings that study EU-China relations via this 
approach. 
 
Scholars tend to analyse China’s and the EU’s positions and influence in the context of a 
multipolar world. They place the EU-China relationship into a changing structure of 
international politics and explore the functions of the two actors within this system. 222 
Furthermore, they also show a certain interest in placing EU-China relations into a broader 
context which involves the US. Chen Zhimin argued that the US is a crucial factor in shaping 
EU-China relations. The US’s position, as the only world superpower, and its policies towards 
the EU and China are influential in the development of EU-China relations.223 On the other 
hand, EU-China relations are important to the US as well. For the US, the EU is its transatlantic 
partner and China is becoming its biggest competitor, if not a threat. Thus, the relationship 
between these two actors could have a significant impact on the US’s position or even the 
distribution of capabilities, thereby leading to the transformation of the international structure. 
In comparison with the studies on the bilateral relationship between the EU and China in a 
multipolar system, we can find more research on the triangular relationship between the US, 
the EU and China. 
 
Ever since David Shambaugh proposed the notion of an ‘emerging axis’ between the EU and 
China,224 numerous scholars have joined the discussion regarding the triangular relationship 
and examined the authenticity of this axis. Such work tends to assess the influence of China’s 
rise on EU-China relations, and then discuss the rational pattern for transatlantic strategy, and 
finally make a summary of, or suggestions about this trilateral relationship. The way to analyse 
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this relationship comprehensively is to build a triangular model and to explore the impact of 
the bilateral relationship (sub-level) on the trilateral relations.225 
 
To sum up, we need to give credit to structural realism because this approach gives us a clear 
view of how the EU-China relationship has developed within, and been influenced by, the 
international system. It explains a potential motivation for the EU and China to come closer 
together in a post-bipolar system, and gives insights to the understanding EU-China relations 
beyond the bilateral (for instance, the triangular relationship with the US, or the multipolar 
system of international relations).  
 
However, it has a number of imperfections and analytical gaps as it makes the assumption that 
the units in this system are similar. This unit-alike approach over-simplifies the complexities 
of the relationship. For example, the EU is a different international actor (unit) compared with 
the normal nation-state; as shown in chapters 1 and 2, its institutional function is different from 
China’s centrally governed system. Furthermore, the EU’s preferences in promoting European 
norms also differ from China’s principle of preventing interventions from others and 
maintaining its sovereignty intact. Therefore, the assumption of the structural level does not 
perfectly fit with the detailed qualities of the EU-China relationship. In another sense, it ignores 
the subjectivities of actors, the concepts, values and norms of these two actors which can also 
have a significant impact on their relationship. We will explore this impact in more detail in 
the section devoted to constructivism below. 
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Relative Gains 
The other group of neorealist scholarship focuses on the relative and absolute gains. Before 
Joseph Grieco joined the third debate between neorealism and neoliberalism, Waltz stated that 
cooperating states are more concerned about how benefits will be divided. States are more 
concerned with ‘who will gain more’ rather than ‘will both of us gain’, because one party 
worries that the other would use an asymmetric gain to take advantage of it.226 Grieco attributes 
this obstacle of cooperation to the anarchic nature of the international system in which ‘states 
fear for their survival as independent actors’.227 Inappropriate division of gains may create a 
relatively stronger competitor, or enemy, who could eventually threaten its independence in 
certain circumstances. 
 
If we review EU-China relations, we can find similar fears, or at least concerns, on the EU’s 
side. Scholars have noticed the increasing deficit in bilateral trade and the increasing scale of 
foreign direct investment from China to the European states, and they started to examine how 
uneven gains will affect the strategic partnership.228 These studies show that although China is 
advocating a ‘win-win’ situation,229 the EU still believes that China is gaining relatively greater 
benefits, which would place the EU in a relatively weaker position in their bilateral relationship. 
Hence, the EU’s concerns about the relative gains have imposed negative impacts on the 
strategic relationship and resulted in several conflicts in the interactions between these two 
actors. 
 
However, if we take a more comprehensive view of the relationship, we find that cooperation 
remains the overwhelming theme for the EU and China. The issue of relative gains, although 
it has drawn practical and academic attention, is not, after all, such an obstacle to the way of 
development. Both sides need to tackle it, certainly, but there is no evidence suggesting that 
cooperation will end due to this kind of issue. Therefore, the relative gain approach provides a 
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valid perspective in certain areas, but it needs a broader perspective if this thesis is to make a 
more comprehensive study of EU-China relations. 
 
3.2.1.3 Neoclassical Realism 
Neoclassical realism makes the attempt to bridge the gap between the structural level and unit 
level by adding domestic and individual factors into its analytic approach.230 Neoclassical 
realists acknowledge the importance of structural factors, but consider these factors to be 
‘systemic incentives’, which are independent variables, and which can only influence foreign 
policy if they are translated through internal factors as defined as intervening variables.231 
‘Different types of states possess different capacities to translate the various elements of 
national power into state power and foreign policy’.232 In contrast to Waltz’s assumption, 
neoclassical realists argue that states are not similar units with similar functions. 
This kind of approach somehow resolves the problems of structural realism as it highlights the 
different types of actors and the functions within it. It is particularly useful in the cases of 
understanding an actor such as the EU, which has a highly complicated inner institutional 
structure. Scholars examine how the external incentives can be transferred into the EU’s 
foreign policy through its policy-making process, and how the EU’s internal dynamics 
influence the formation of its external policies, such as its policies towards China.233 In a 
reverse way, scholars also analyse China’s domestic structure and demands, and how they can 
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influence its foreign policies.234 Furthermore, research into the influences of mutual domestic 
motivations on the bilateral relationship can also be found in studies of EU-China relations235. 
 
Neoclassical realism offers a subtler perspective from which to analyse EU-China relations, 
considering the EU’s complicated institutions and China’s obscure political regime.236 It is 
important to focus on both the unit level and the structural level. However, focusing purely on 
the domestic institution, leadership and the state-society relationship is not sufficient. The 
argument in this thesis is that there are cultural factors that are also important in the formation 
of foreign policy: identities, values, norms and principles can influence the states’ preferences. 
Hence the need to adopt a constructivist, rather than neoclassical realist, approach to fully 
understand the nature of the relationship. 
 
3.2.1.4 Summary 
In the application of realist approaches, structural realism explains why the EU and China 
started to draw closer to each as the international system changed in the post-Cold War era. 
The idea of relative gains explains why disputes have increased in bilateral trade. However, 
realists might face the risks of underestimating – if not simplifying – the complexity of EU-
China relations. Merely looking at the relationship from the perspective of the structure of the 
international system, but not clearly understanding the actors’ perceptions of the international 
society, will lead the analyst to misleading conclusions. As mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, and as will be discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5, there are a good number of 
analyses of the EU-China strategic relations that have been shown to be defective, and some 
policies which are considered to have been incorrectly implemented. Therefore, examining the 
actors’ perceptions of the world and each other is critically important to understanding of the 
genuine interests of the EU and China, and this is the exact domain where the constructivist 
approach excels. 
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3.2.2 English School 
The crucial difference between the English School and realism is the former’s core concept of 
‘international society’. As conceptualised by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, the notion of 
international society implies that states are not only a series of calculative factors in a system, 
but can also conduct dialogue and consent to common rules and institutions, and maintain these 
arrangements by recognising their common interests. 237  Following this logic, the English 
School has its particular interpretations of international society. 
 
First, the English School believes that to a certain extent, order exists in an anarchic 
international society. Order does not simply result ‘from power and the balance of power, but 
also from the acceptance of rules and institutional arrangements.’238 This does not imply that 
the material elements that are emphasised by realists are not valued by the English School, but 
that the latter is trying to find a middle way between the philosophies of Hobbes and Grotius. 
By fully taking into account the Grotian understanding of international law, the English School 
has a different understanding of rationalism compared to realists: in the English School, 
‘rationalism refers to the rules, laws, and institutional arrangements states have established to 
provide some degree of order to an anarchic international society’.239 As a result, the English 
School attributes a societal characteristic to the international system: although the system is 
anarchical, it is associated with an order which transforms it into an international society. 
 
Second, by taking the Kantian idealist or revolutionist into account, the English School 
emphasises the importance of ethics and morality. Here, there is a debate within the English 
School about the ‘thin morality’ versus ‘thick morality’ between ‘pluralists’ and ‘solidarists’. 
For pluralists, cooperation is based on a ‘thin morality’ that is accepted by states that share 
‘certain minimum purposes’ or mutual interests and thereby establish a framework of 
international order;240 for solidarists, ‘humanity is one’. International society is a certain kind 
                                                 
237 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 1. 
238 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory, p.243. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), 
p.100. 
 
 96 
 
of human community,241 and as such it ‘has a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules, and 
institutions among states, which make it capable to enforce universalist ethics’.242  
 
This debate is still constrained within the sphere of international society, which means states 
remain the major actors in this approach. However, along with the consequences of 
globalisation, the foundation of the pluralists’ assumption has been challenged. For instance, 
non-state actors have been attributed a place in global affairs and national boundaries have 
been increasingly blurred, which means the extent of ‘minimum purposes’ has been expanded 
to include not only the ‘recognition of sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention’243, but 
also human rights, international aids, arms control, climate change, and so forth. 
 
Following these new conceptualisations, Barry Buzan rethought the English School. In his 
work From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of 
Globalisation, he conducted a conceptual transformation from international society to world 
society,244 which closes the gap between the ‘pluralist’ (self-interested states) and ‘solidarist’ 
(cosmopolitan world) debate. It provides a relatively comprehensive view to include both states 
and non-state actors, and contributes to a conceptualisation of globalisation in the English 
School.245 
 
As a ‘via media’246 in international relations theory, the English School is extremely helpful in 
understanding the ethical issues associated with international relations, especially those of 
order, justice, sovereignty and human rights. Thus, it is particularly functional in studies of EU-
China relations since these two actors have been involved in topics such as human rights, 
climate change, and humanitarian intervention. In almost 40 years of engagement between the 
EU and China, they have achieved mutually accepted norms to some extent, but in some realms, 
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they still do not share the same norms and values and this has become a relatively significant 
factor in delaying the progress of EU-China relations.247  
 
The EU, as a normative power, has the willingness to promote its cosmopolitan values to others, 
especially in relation to China. Its early stage policy was considered to be a certain kind of 
‘constructive engagement’, which tried to ‘help’ China with its domestic democratic change 
and social transformation. However, it turned out that there is a huge gap between the reality 
in present day China and the expectations of the EU.248 Consequently, scholars have begun to 
suspect the policies, and indicate that it is just this kind of policy that has resulted in a ‘strategic 
disconnect’ with China.249 Furthermore, scholars have started to focus on the moral and ethical 
divergences between the EU and China, and are attempting to find out why the EU’s normative 
policy did not work well in China.250 
 
Among those normative disputes, the one about human rights has always been a complicated 
and controversial issue in EU-China relations. Scholars have examined this thorny problem 
from the perspective of norms and values that both sides hold. 251  They believe that the 
divergent norms on sovereignty and values on human rights are the main reasons why the EU 
and China keep debating this topic and cannot achieve an agreement to resolve it.252 
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Climate change and global financial governance are also two areas where the English School 
approach has been applied.253 What we should be aware of is that the perspectives on these 
topics need to be differentiated. Some of these perspectives refer to institutions and 
mechanisms in cooperation dealing with issues such as climate change, but what the English 
School focuses on are the original drives to the cooperation, which are the shared norms and 
values that contribute to the collective actions that establish the ‘order’ of global governance. 
 
The English School provides researchers a ‘middle’ way to study EU-China relations. It also 
offers more space and flexibility to analyse the motivation and the variable factors in the EU-
China relationship. Its perspective on morality and ethics tallies with the identities of the EU 
and China: as a normative power, a part of the EU’s policies are norms-oriented, and its unique 
values partly contribute to its distinct characteristics and position in the world. China, as a 
rising power, is also careful about its moral reputation, and has expressed its willingness to 
build on common norms in international affairs such as climate change, financial governance 
and regional security cooperation. Therefore, there is evidence to support the argument of the 
English School, suggesting that other topics could be analysed from its perspective. In addition 
to the subjective elements provided by the English School, however, it is necessary to analyse 
EU-China relations from an inter-subjective perspective. In studying the bilateral relationship, 
it needs to explore the function of both sides’ ideas and perceptions and to understand how one 
actor’s ideas could affect the other’s. Hence a constructivist approach, which provides such an 
inter-subjective perspective, is needed. 
 
3.2.3 Liberalism 
In the case of EU-China relations, liberalism could be the main explanatory approach, since 
the EU and China have largely promoted this relationship on the basis of economic cooperation 
and global governance. Generally, liberalism believes that good human nature, democratic 
domestic regime, institutional construction or collective actions can moderate or eliminate war, 
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injustice, and inequality. This theory also covers the realm from pursuing peace to achieving 
cooperation. Of course, the issue of a war between the EU and China will not be discussed in 
this chapter, as this topic has not been analysed in this specific relationship from a liberal 
perspective. What really matters here is how liberalism explains the mechanisms in the bilateral 
cooperation and their impacts on EU-China relations. In this section, I will discuss classical 
liberalism, harmony of interests, liberal idealism, and neoliberal institutionalism to see how 
they have been applied in studies of EU-China relations. Generally, liberalism is functional in 
explaining how cooperation promotes EU-China relations. However, it has its limits in 
explaining the conflicts in terms of norms and other societal issues that appear in cooperation, 
and ultimately this is what constructivism is good at. 
 
3.2.3.1 Classical Liberalism 
To some extent, liberalism has been labelled as pluralist. In its view, states, non-states and 
transnational actors are all influential actors in world politics. But if we trace back to the 
traditions of liberal ontology, it is individuals who constitute the ‘most important unit of 
analyses’254 in liberal theories. Influenced by the thoughts rooted in the Age of Enlightenment, 
liberals advocate the liberty and rights of individuals, and in contrast they believe that state 
authority should be restrained as it is given by the people and the influence of the state should 
accordingly be minimal or limited.255  
 
The argument posited by liberalism is based on the assumption that human nature is good and, 
most importantly, that individuals are rational and capable of calculating the costs and benefits 
of their behaviour and able to choose the best options for their actions. This might sound like 
the type of action motivated by self-interest, and its application could result in a Hobbesian 
‘jungle’ scenario. But, because liberals assume that human nature is good, the collaboration 
between individuals can achieve an outcome that addresses the collective good. 256  So, 
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eventually, public opinion can positively impact governmental policies, which would clearly 
be a consensus that is beneficial for the public.257 
 
Furthermore, liberals do not constrain themselves at the domestic level, but embed this point 
of view into the international scene. Influenced by Stoicism, liberals of the Enlightenment share 
a cosmopolitan perspective of the understandings of international relations. At the domestic 
level, especially in a democratic republic, individuals have successfully constructed a political 
regime of law, and a regulatory system to protect individuals’ property and peace. At the 
international level, liberals also propose that this framework be embedded among states. In 
general, it is understood to be a ‘domestic analogy’258 which grants states similar characteristics 
as individuals. Liberals ‘see a further parallel between individuals and sovereign states’, and 
logically deduce that the institutional organisation and rule of law can be applied in 
international relations.259 In this sphere, Kant was renowned for his ‘perpetual peace’. Unlike 
the pure idealists, Kant did not deny the importance of states, nor did he merely focus on 
individuals; in contrast, by realising that states remained the main political entities in an 
international anarchy, he proposed a federation among states. Meanwhile, he also emphasised 
that this type of federation requires these states to be constitutional republics and democratic. 
This kind of thought complies with the argument that the public (individuals) make rational 
decisions and thus maintain a peaceful and harmonious federation.260 
 
Kant proposed a solution for peace from a political perspective, whilst Richard Cobden 
contributed to the liberal school of thought from the economic perspective. As associated with 
the spirit of individualism and rationalism, Cobden argued that free trade is an effective means 
of keeping peace and bringing benefits to all participants. He explained his argument from 
three perspectives: first, from a mercantilist perspective, he saw free trade as an alternative to 
war in terms of pursuing commercial interests; second, from a rationalism perspective, free 
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trade and the profits gained from it could be terminated by war, and hence the fear of losing 
these profits constrains the state’s intentions to engage in war; and third, from an individualism 
perspective, he believed that this has an incidental effect on free trade, ‘contact and 
communication among people would expand’, and would lead to more friendly relationships 
among people.261 Furthermore, Cobden asserted that free trade ‘brings mutual gains to all the 
players irrespective of their size or the nature of their economies’ and denied that ‘free trade 
among countries at different stages of development would lead to relations of dominance and 
subservience’,262  which would subsequently be disagreed with and argued against by the 
neorealists. 
 
In terms of studies of EU-China relations, how do we evaluate classical liberalism, and how 
does it fit with this specific relationship? Centuries ago, the primary task for liberals was to 
establish theories that could avoid wars and achieve peace. In the contemporary era, although 
war and peace is not the first concern of the EU or China, the insights of individualism and free 
trade are still instructive to studies: promoting free trade is seen as a mean of encouraging 
China’s integration into international society.263  
 
However, we need to realise the particularity of EU-China relations and be aware of the fact 
that some of the classical liberal views do not fit the characteristics of this relationship. Kant’s 
federation of states assumes that states need to be democratic republics, or at the very least they 
should be the same type of state. However, the EU is neither a nation state nor shares the same 
regime as China, so we need to undertake an in-depth study to its identity and to find out why 
cooperation and peace can be achieved. Furthermore, the asymmetries of different regimes can 
potentially hinder the achievement of free trade, and policies in pursuit of free trade did not 
bring peace and harmony, but war and conflict. In the history of the relationship between 
Europe and China, the Opium Wars evidenced the fact that free trade (or the means to achieve 
it) between two unequally developed countries did not bring peace, but only injustice and 
conflict. At present, the disputes over textiles also show that free trade cannot easily be carried 
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out between two economies with different regimes. Therefore, in terms of analysing the 
specific relations between the EU and China, classical liberalism does not provide a helpful 
theoretical framework. 
 
3.2.3.2 The Harmony of Interests and Liberal Idealism 
The legacy of classical traditions inspired liberal theorists in later ages. Among those traditions, 
harmony of interests and liberal idealism are the most relevant approaches in studies of EU-
China relations. 
 
Harmony of Interests 
Based on the assumption that individuals are rational actors, liberals assert that the harmony of 
interests among individuals can lead to a potential harmony of interests among states.264 As 
stated above, even if individuals are self-interested, they can achieve public good within a 
national/domestic sphere. With this logic, and another logic of ‘domestic analogy’, liberals 
deduce that by sharing similar characteristics with individuals, states are capable of achieving 
a harmony of interests in the international realm. This deduction can also be found in Cobden’s 
arguments above, the interest in gaining wealth and the rational decision to avoid war can be 
considered two pillars of the theory of ‘harmony of interests’. However, this idealist view is 
challenged by the experience of the First World War; although there were diverse explanations 
for the reasons behind the war, the fact is that, empirically, it buried the notion of ‘harmony of 
interests’. The highly connected economic ties seemed helpless to prevent the onset of war. 
 
Liberal Idealism 
The First World War did not only give liberals the opportunity to criticise realist notions such 
as ‘power’ and ‘the balance of power’, but also urged them to rethink and develop liberal 
thoughts. The broken ‘harmony of interests’ reminded liberals that more things are required to 
secure the peace. ‘Consciously devised machinery’265 was a crucial notion of liberal idealism 
in the aftermath of the First World War. The core idea was to create an international authority 
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to regulate the behaviour of states on the basis of international law and justice. This idea was 
advocated by Woodrow Wilson in his famous ‘fourteen pointes’ and fulfilled by the 
establishment of the League of Nations. The purpose was to construct ‘collective security’ 
through international organisations and instruments. To some extent, this idealistic approach 
reflected Kant’s thoughts on the notion of federation of states, as he wrote in his second 
definitive article:  
 
Every state, for the sake of its own security, may - and ought to - demand that its neighbour 
should submit itself to conditions, similar to those of civil society where the right of every 
individual is guaranteed. This would give rise to a federation of nations.266 
 
However, liberal idealism was ended along with the collapse of the League of Nations and the 
catastrophe of the Second World War. In the review of this theoretical approach, scholars 
argued that despite the innovation of institutions, idealism inherited the beliefs of nineteenth-
century liberalism, and formed their ideas on the basis of domestic analogy.267 Liberal idealists 
still believed that the way to constrain the use of force among individuals at the domestic level 
could be achieved at the international level by eliminating war among states.268 However, as 
EH Carr argued, nineteenth-century liberalism was already outdated by the onset of the 
twentieth century. The way to protect an individual’s liberty and to secure societal peace was 
inadequate in the following century, let alone the way in which to achieve peace in the 
international arena.269 Another characteristic of liberal idealism is that it relies on rhetorical 
morality and the belief that human nature is inherently good.270 However, as Carr indicated, 
the states in the League of Nations were self-interested and had double standards regarding 
morality, so that they could ensure their victories were closer to their core interests than the 
obligation to defend justice.271 
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3.2.3.3 Neoliberalism 
In certain conditions, neoliberalism has been seen as the equal to neoliberal institutionalism, 
but before coming to neoliberal institutionalism, we need to briefly introduce several theories 
such as integration functionalism/neo-functionalism, transnationalism, the notions of 
interdependence and complex interdependence, since they all contributed, as intellectual 
precursors, to the establishment of neoliberal institutionalism. 
 
Integration functionalism developed as a theory along with the economic rebuilding of Western 
Europe in the post-war era. Functionalism believes that as interactions among states increase, 
interstate cooperation becomes increasingly necessary. Such cooperation in one field could 
lead to cooperation in others, and this makes states more integrated in their involvement in 
cooperation.272 Functionalism was supported by the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the development of the European Economic Community. Originally, 
functionalism mainly focused on low political areas such as science and the economy. Along 
with the expansion of European integration, Ernst Haas and his neo-functionalism included 
political issues and claimed that integration requires political elites to realise that collaboration 
is in their self-interest.273  
 
Transnationalism provides a wider insight on actors and the paradigm in global interactions. 
Liberals noticed the increasing significance of non-governmental actors in international affairs, 
arguing that the interactions among individuals and organisations across national boundaries 
can also influence international relations. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane defined 
transnational interactions as ‘the movement of tangible or intangible items across state 
boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental 
organization’274. They singled out transnational interaction from the state-centric paradigm, in 
which governments are the paramount agencies in interstate politics. Alternatively, in 
transnational interactions, individuals and organisations can ‘play direct roles vis-à-vis foreign 
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governments or foreign societies and thus by pass their own governments’.275 This new pattern 
of world politics, associated with the actors (governments, intergovernmental organisations, 
multinational enterprises, nongovernmental organisations, domestic organisations, individuals, 
etc.) within it, has created a world like a ‘cobweb’ 276 , and increased sensitivity among 
societies.277 
 
Moreover, the idea that international organisations (IOs) and international nongovernmental 
organisations (INGOs) are significant actors in the international system entails that they be able 
to diffuse norms (e.g., human rights, development, democracy, gender equality, and so forth) 
in the international system.278 Given their active roles in the engagement with other states, the 
IOs and INGOs are good transmitters of norms, and also capable of teaching norms to other 
actors by socialising them.279 The process of socialisation would make the other actors accept 
and internalise these norms,280 and thereby change their behaviour and character.281 Therefore, 
this is also considered a critical reason for the EU to engage with China, through which the EU 
hopes to integrate China into the international community and (initially at least) engender 
domestic liberal change within China.282  
 
International transactions brought about the interconnectedness between states, yet Keohane 
and Nye thought it is not sufficient to generalise the characteristics of transnational interactions. 
Therefore, they introduced the notion of ‘costly effects’ to differentiate interdependence from 
interconnectedness. In the volume Power and Interdependence, they defined interdependence 
as ‘situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different 
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countries’.283 There are two dimensions of interdependence in transactions: sensitivity and 
vulnerability. Sensitivity refers to the ‘degrees of responsiveness’ of an actor, meaning how 
fast and easy would it be to be affected by other actors’ changes. Vulnerability involves the 
‘relative availability and costliness of the alternatives’, which means how many options an 
actor has to cope with any changes and how much would it suffer for the costs.284 
 
Complex interdependence is a core concept that presents an alternative type of world politics 
in contrast to that of realism. There are three assumptions of complex interdependence through 
which to challenge realism and construct a neoliberal scenario. The first assumption is that 
world politics is becoming increasingly pluralistic. There are ‘multiple channels’ (interstate, 
trans-governmental, transnational) within global interactions. Furthermore, the obscure 
distinctions between domestic and diplomatic issues, and the involvement of various domestic 
departments and international organisations are both reasons to describe world politics as 
pluralistic. The second assumption states that there is an ‘absence of hierarchy among issues’. 
The third assumption says that, in conditions of complex interdependence, the importance of 
military force as a national tool among states has declined.285 
 
Based on these intellectual precursors, neoliberal institutionalist scholars argue that 
international cooperation can be achieved by ‘institutions’, which are defined as ‘persistent and 
connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and 
shape expectations.’286 Neoliberal institutionalists do not agree with classical liberalism as to 
the roots of international cooperation, because they believe that cooperation comes from 
nations’ self-interests rather than inherently good human nature. Another difference between 
classical liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism is that the latter, sharing the same 
assumption as neorealism, believes that states are key actors in world politics. Furthermore, 
neoliberal institutionalism shares another assumption with neorealism, namely that the 
international system is anarchic, but it challenges neorealism on the grounds that despite 
conditions of anarchy, cooperation can be achieved if states have mutual interests or reciprocity, 
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and the function of institutions is to govern the anarchic system and rationalize the behaviour 
of states. For neoliberalism, the priority of states is to collaborate to maximize their absolute 
gains through cooperation. States prioritise absolute gains over relative gains, which is a point 
of divergence between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.  
 
Neoliberalism provides an insight to analyse cooperation in an anarchic world, but this theory 
itself also adds a further condition to cooperation as it recognises that cooperation can be 
achieved in areas where states share reciprocal interests.287 Where, then, do interests come from? 
How do actors recognise their own interests and mutual interests? In this thesis, I argue that 
interests arise from identities and can be perceived along with the realisation of identities. In 
terms of absolute gains and relative gains, neorealists see the rationality of relative gains in 
US-Soviet relations. In contrast, neoliberals see the rationality of absolute gains in US-Japan 
relations or in the integration of the EU. Therefore, various actors with distinct identities have 
different relations. Furthermore, as Keohane and Nye acknowledged, neoliberal 
institutionalism is an ideal type, which only applies for some countries and issues under quite 
specific conditions.288  
 
3.2.3.4 Summary 
In studies of EU-China relations, neoliberalist theory helps to explain the mechanism by which 
the cooperation between two actors can be established, and demonstrates how cooperation 
creates a form of interdependence between them. However, neoliberalism has neglected the 
function of ideas in cooperation, and thus is incapable of explaining the conflicts in EU-China 
relations. For example, in explaining the mechanism for cooperation, neoliberals believe that 
absolute gains is a significant factor in prompting cooperation, but I argue that it actually 
depends on what the actors believe. If they both believe in absolute gains, then collaboration is 
feasible, but if one chooses to prioritise relative gains over absolute gains, then there will be 
conflicts in cooperation. This is exemplified by the EU’s attitude towards the trade deficits and 
concerns over China’s investment in Africa.  
 
                                                 
287 John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations 
214. 
288 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 24. 
 108 
 
Moreover, liberals (not only neoliberals) believe that, through collaboration between the EU 
and China, China could be socialised into the international community by the diffusion of 
norms. However, the reality of the situation does not fully comply with the theory. Despite the 
fact that China is socialised in some respects,289 it is still not as socialised as the EU expect in 
terms of respecting human rights, democracy, and so forth. It reminds us that when we examine 
the degree of socialisation, we cannot ignore a given actor’s willingness to be socialised. The 
institutions of cooperation do not automatically teach the actor what to do. Norms need to be 
internalised through the willingness of the actor.290 The degree of willingness depends on the 
actor’s perception of its identity within the international community as well as the actor’s 
perception of the community itself, which determines the extent to which the actor accepts the 
norms of the community and the intentions they have with regards to joining it. Therefore, to 
study their identities and their roles in international society, it is necessary to apply the 
constructivist approach, which provides the perspective to study the actors’ inner 
characteristics, and the way they perceive each other. 
 
3.3. Constructivism 
The above sections have considered the dominant theories, and their contributions and 
imperfections, in studies of EU-China relations. In this section, I will establish the theoretical 
framework of this thesis by introducing the basic assumptions and essentials of social 
constructivism. I will then explain the functions of type identity and role identity to indicate 
how they will be applied in the analytical structure of EU-China relations. 
 
3.3.1 Essence of Social Constructivism 
Constructivism is not considered a substantive IR theory, but rather a social theory with 
different theoretical approaches. In this thesis, I do not intend to follow post-modernism, nor 
do I want to draw this topic into a philosophical approach in which I would question the 
possibility of knowledge. Neither a discursive nor linguistic perspective will be discussed in 
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this section. In this thesis, I intend to examine EU-China relations from a social constructivist 
perspective. Social constructivism lies in the ‘middle ground’ between rationalism and 
reflectivism.291 The ontology of social constructivism is ‘social’ and ‘constructionist’. It argues 
that states are related to each other through ideas, and ideas define who and what states are.292 
It also has an inter-subjective epistemology, meaning that a norm is not only claimed by one 
actor, but is also acknowledged by the others. In the combination of the ontology and 
epistemology, the main characteristics that differentiate constructivism from other 
conventional theories are two-fold. One is its emphasis on the functions of ideas, norms, 
institutions and identities, whilst the other is the interplay between agents and structures.  
 
The emphasis on ideas follows the intellectual legacy of Max Weber. He argued that people 
‘are cultural beings endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude toward 
the world and to lend it significance’293, meaning that human actions can be value-based. In 
contrast with rationalism’s claim that national action is a consequence of the rational 
calculation of costs and benefits, constructivists follow the logic of appropriateness. 
Constructivists believe that an actor’s actions depend on principles that are shared with others 
(norms, ideas or institutions), self-beliefs, constitutional or regulatory conventions, all of which 
can have significant impacts on national behaviour.294 This is similar to the claim made by the 
English School, and even that of neoliberalism, but neoliberals ultimately focus on material 
interests, whilst constructivists emphasise the social construction of the national actions, 
implying that states do what is appropriate to their identities and cultural context.295 
 
Constructivism takes an inter-subjective view of international society. As Alexander Wendt 
argued, ‘anarchy is what states make of it’.296 In contrast to the mechanism of neorealism’s 
claim that structure has a decisive impact on agents, constructivists claim that agents and 
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structures are mutually constructed. Structure provides an external environment for states to 
recognise identities and define/redefine interests, while states can also influence structure or 
even transform it. In this sense, international society does not pre-exist but is constructed, and 
the institutional rules of society are the outcomes of the socialisation of states. In the same 
sense, actors (both states and non-state actors) are not naturally born, but produced; and 
interests are not granted, but defined. This kind of intersubjective relationship does not merely 
exist between agents and structures, but also between agents themselves, because a 
comprehensive understanding of one’s identity needs the functions of others. The 
comprehension of the two characteristics of the constructivist approach helps to understand the 
concept of identity discussed below.  
 
Identity is a core concept of social constructivism. It is generated in the process of socialisation 
into international society. In this process, actors recognise their own qualities and perceive 
others’ characteristics. In the interactions between them, actors can generate a particular role 
from which actors will gain an appropriate dimension through which to conduct their 
behaviours. Furthermore, the nature of the role is associated with social components such as 
ideas, norms or perceptions. In the process of socialisation, identity answers the question of 
‘who am I’, and it will be the guideline by which to define interests (what do I want) and, 
thereby, direct actions (what should I do).297  
 
Identity has two qualities: subjective and intersubjective, both of which contribute to the 
construction of identity.298 The subjective quality describes the part of self-understanding by 
which actors realise their corporate identities and type identities. The intersubjective quality 
describes the part of interaction, by which actors recognise each other’s role identities and 
construct a collective identity under certain conditions. The international environment 
functions as the external factor on which to attach external social characteristics and qualities 
on identities. 
 
                                                 
297 The relations between identity, interest and behaviour will be discussed in section 5.2.2.2 in chapter 5. 
298 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 224. 
 
 111 
 
Identity is also changeable along with the transformation of international society. It changes 
while the structure or the components (social relationships, rules, norms, institutions, and so 
on) within it change, thereby leading to a variation of interests. 299  However, there is a 
difference between constructivism and neorealism. The former argues that the external 
transformation (changes of international structure) do not directly change the pattern of 
national behaviour; instead, this depends on how it changes the actors’ identities.300 Moreover, 
as stated above, due to the intersubjectivity of international society, interactions between actors 
can also change the social qualities of the international structure. 
 
The relationship between identity and interest is that interests need to be realised on the basis 
of identity construction, which implies that actors can only know what they want after realising 
who they are. While the importance of material interests is not neglected, they are ideal-
oriented due to the subjectivity of constructivism. Material interests are not directly given by 
the international system, but rather need to be realised by actors. Besides, interests have 
different forms, as will be discussed in the next chapter, and the EU is, to some extent, a 
normative actor. Normative interest is considered an important form of interest in the EU’s 
perception. So, interests will not only be material, but can also be ideal. 
 
In this thesis, we focus mainly on type identity and role identity, which will be explained in 
detail in the following two chapters. To briefly introduced these concepts here, however, type 
identity is a self-understanding of actors’ own characteristics. It helps to understand the cultural 
qualities and characteristics of actors, and moulds actors’ roles, and designs their behavioural 
patterns. The following chapter will explore the four types of identities of the EU and China, 
and will demonstrate their qualities, their views of world politics, and how they make their 
policies. Chapter 5 will then explain that role identity is a property that is constructed through 
the interactions between actors. It reflects the theme of the environment they live in, and is 
shaped by actors’ perceptions of each other. Chapter 5 will also explore the historical context 
and attempt to examine how their role identities have changed with the transformation of 
international society. In the process of dealing with others, actors will construct a 
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corresponding identity to the others, as will the others. The interaction between the two can 
influence the micro-bilateral social structure, which is also associated with the macro-
international structure and, together, they will in turn re-influence the construction of role 
identities. 
 
In order to bridge the type identity and role identity together, we must recognise that there is 
also intersubjectivity between type identity and role identity. The former can influence the 
process of recognition of others’ role identities. Since the inner quality is influential to the 
actors’ perception, the later, in a reverse way, can also change the type identity by changing 
the inner qualities of actors. During the Cold War, the role identities between the US and Soviet 
Union changed at times due to relatively minor changes of type identities, and eventually a 
huge transformation of type identities occurred due to the influences of role identities. 
Therefore, we can assume that type identity is relatively stable and the process of 
transformation of type identity is relatively long. In contrast, role identity changes rapidly and 
reflects the short-term relationship between two actors. We will also test this assumption in the 
following chapters. 
 
3.3.2 Saliency of a Constructivist Approach 
On the basis of critiques of other theoretical approaches, this section explains the benefits of 
applying the constructivist approach. By supplying a subjective and intersubjective perspective, 
the constructivist approach should help to establish an understanding of the EU’s and China’s 
genuine characteristics and ideas.  
 
First, this approach drives us to conduct an in-depth investigation of the EU’s and China’s ideas. 
For example, how do they recognise themselves, how do they perceive others, and what do 
they want to obtain from each other? Indeed, conventional theories can provide insights in 
understanding EU-China relations, and many of them have been successfully applied in the 
analysis of this relationship. For instance, they have demonstrated the EU’s and China’s grand 
strategies in global politics, and they have also explained the two actors’ motivations and 
interactions in their cooperation. To some extent, their approaches are valid in the sense that 
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an actor’s interest is given by the international system, and its behaviour is determined by the 
structure or the institution.  
 
But beyond that, this thesis asks a simple but very important question: what do they genuinely 
want from each other? This question cannot be answered simply by discussing the structure of 
the international system or debating the cooperation institutions because this might 
underestimate the complexity of the EU and China. As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, the EU 
and China are complicated actors with multifaceted inner actors and sophisticated policy-
making processes, so it would be misleading to summarise their interests from one perspective. 
What do they want from each other actually asks what their interests in holding the relationship 
are, and in order to answer this question, the preceding task is to determine who they are. By 
examining their inner characteristics and perceptions of each other, a constructivist approach 
can help to explore what kind of roles they have in this relationship, and what they really want 
from each other. 
 
Second, it provides a subtle view. Relationships are dynamic in the development of 
international relations, and if we take a structural realist view then the EU and China have only 
experienced one large structural shift since 1975. However, as will be illustrated in chapter 5, 
the EU-China relationship has experienced a number of dramatic changes over time. Therefore, 
instead of focusing on grand changes at the macro-level, a constructivist perspective can 
contribute by detecting detailed influences that are imposed by the transformation of the 
international system on individual actors. In a study of a bilateral relationship, such a 
perspective is helpful in taking a closer view of the actor themselves and their counterpart. 
 
Third, it provides an alternative perspective from which to study EU-China relations. 
Conventional theories have dominated studies of EU-China relations, but the application of the 
constructivist approach in this realm is not that common, and this thesis intends to fill the 
associated lacuna by showing the utility of the constructivist approach in studies of EU-China 
relations. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter gave a thorough review of the dominant theoretical approaches in studies of EU-
China relations. By demonstrating the nature and claims of realism, liberalism and the English 
School, this chapter recognised that these conventional theories do have value in address EU-
China relations. Despite their contribution, this chapter indicated that, to some extent, they have 
imperfections in understand the specific relationship between the EU and China. On this basis, 
this chapter propounded the essence of constructivism, and introduced the value added by a 
constructivist approach in studying EU-China relations. In doing so, this chapter established 
the theoretical framework for the thesis, and provided the basis for the analysis of identities in 
following chapters. 
 
To summarise, structural realism offers an insight in explaining the engagement of the EU and 
China under the transition of the international system in the post-Cold War era. The theory of 
relative gains also contributes by explaining the conflicts inherent to bilateral trade. However, 
because it emphasises the actor’s material power, it is incapable of understanding the EU’s 
nature as a valid actor in the international system. Furthermore, focusing merely on the 
international system results in the realists overlooking the actors’ real interests. Because the 
actors are not the subordinate products of the international system, but are rather active 
participants who can also construct the system, their interests are not purely determined by the 
international system but also by their self-understandings and their perceptions of other actors. 
In light of this, defining the actors’ interests from a neorealist perspective could result in 
misleading conclusions, and this is why it is important to take a constructivist approach to 
understand actors’ perceptions and identities in international society. 
 
Liberalism is functional in interpreting the mechanisms of cooperation between the EU and 
China. It also explains the EU’s interests in promoting trade with China, which is not only 
aimed at absolute gains, but also the diffusion of norms associated with trade and other 
economic interactions. However, cooperation is not just based on material profits, but on the 
perceptions of them. Collaboration is not always successful if the conceptions are asymmetric. 
This chapter argues that if one side decides to evaluate the bilateral trade from the perspective 
of relative gains, then the cooperation will collapse into conflict. Or, if one side does not accept 
the norms and thus refuses to internalise them into its policies, then it would be difficult for the 
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socialisation to progress. Therefore, it is first necessary to explore the actors’ inner 
characteristics and conceptions, which are determined by the qualities of their identities. 
 
To some extent, the English School has provided an effective approach to understanding the 
perceptions and ideas of the EU and China. However, in addition to understanding their 
subjective conceptions, it is also necessary to study how conceptions influence each other, 
which is to analyse the intersubjective engagement between the actors. This will be discussed 
in terms of ‘role identity’ in chapter 5. 
 
Constructivism is different from other theoretical approaches as it emphasises the ideas and 
intersubjectivity in international society. Identity is an intersubjective notion consisting of ideas, 
norms and perceptions. Specifically, ideas are the subjective products of the actor and norms 
are the common principles of the community that the actor participates in, while perceptions 
are the intersubjective concepts that are generated in the interactions between actors and the 
community, or even among the actors themselves. This chapter argued that identity answers 
the question ‘who am I’ in that only by realising the identity of itself will the actor be able to 
define its interests and shape its behaviour. I have briefly introduced the notion of type identity 
and role identity. Type identity will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, which will 
demonstrate the inner characteristics of the EU and China. Role identity will be thoroughly 
analysed in chapter 5, which will focus on their intersubjective interactions, and how their 
perceptions of each other can influence the relationship.  
 
Whilst recognising the values of conventional theories in the study of EU-China relations, this 
chapter has highlighted the salience of the constructivist approach. Instead of saying what the 
EU and China will do in the international system (realism), or what they should do in an 
interdependent system (liberalism), this research focuses on what they want to do. By 
conducting an in-depth investigation of their identities, this research will explore the genuine 
interests of each actor and determine what drives them to behave in their particular manners 
the interactions between them. In doing so, it provides an alternative perspective to 
understanding the EU-China relationship. 
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Chapter 4. Type Identities of the EU and China: Four Categories 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 has established the theoretical structure, and explained the benefits of a constructivist 
approach for EU-China relations. Specifically, it introduced the notion of type identity and role 
identity, and showed how they would contribute to the analysis of the bilateral relationship and 
behaviours. This chapter aims to define the EU and China’s type identities, and show how these 
identities contribute to an understanding of the actors’ preferences and policies. It will first 
clarify the definition of type identity by demonstrating its key elements, which are the actor’s 
inner characteristics, and the process through which to realise them. It will then illustrate the 
functions of type identity, which will contribute to our understanding of the formation of the 
actor’s interest and perception. On the basis of the discussion about type identity, this chapter 
will explore the EU’s and China’s type identities from four perspectives, namely that political 
regime, strategy, value and economy. 
 
Type identity refers to actors’ intrinsic characteristics that are generated by self-understanding 
and inner-construction. The process of realising and identifying these characteristics makes the 
actor recognise what it is and how it is different from others, and these kinds of identities help 
us understand how their roles in the international society have been constructed, how their 
preferences have been defined, and how their policies have been formed and conducted 
accordingly.  
 
One actor can have diverse type identities. In the cases of the EU and China, I will categorize 
these into four aspects:  
from the perspective of political regime, China is a nation- state with its own democratic 
model, and the EU is a supranational organisation with a multilevel democracy;  
from a strategic perspective, China is a rising power pursuing both pragmatic and 
normative interests, and the EU is a normative power, but with civilian needs and means;  
from the perspective of values, China is an Eastern country with Westphalian norms, but 
the EU is a Western entity with post-modern characteristics;  
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from an economic perspective, China is a huge economy, but still a developing country 
that has a series of domestic problems, whilst the EU is a developed economy, which 
provides it with the ‘clout’ to spread its norms.  
These asymmetrical type identities have constructed quite disparate patterns of behaviour 
between the two actors, and demonstrate quite clearly how the EU and China differ from each 
other in terms of international interventions, regional policies, policy making and human rights. 
This is the aim of this chapter and, based on this understanding, it will lead us to the next 
chapter, which will consider the role identities in the interaction between the EU and China, 
and their likely behaviours in this regard. 
 
4.2. The Definition of Type Identity 
Although I have introduced the notion of type identity whilst establishing the theoretical 
framework in chapter 3, it has not yet been explained in detail. Therefore, before proceeding 
to the four categories of the EU and China’s type identities, this section is designed to give a 
specific definition of type identity and show how it will be applied within the research into EU-
China relations. 
 
4.2.1 The Construction of Type Identity 
In addition to the existence of an actor, it has cultural characteristics in the process of 
socialisation. These characteristics can be recognised by the actor itself and other actors in their 
interaction. At the level of civil society, type identity refers to ‘labels applied to persons who 
share … some characteristic or characteristics’.301 These labels of characteristics constitute the 
cultural content of the persons’ properties, and specifically develop the question of ‘who they 
are’ to ‘what sort of people they are’?302 An analogy can be made in the domain of international 
relations. For instance, we can recognise a state by its name or flag, but if we want to understand 
what kind of country it is, we then must focus on its cultural labels and national characteristics: 
                                                 
301 James Fearon. “What is identity (As we now use the word)?”, November 3, 1999, p. 17. Available online at 
https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/What-is-
Identity-as-we-now-use-the-word-.pdf. (accessed 9 November 2014). 
302 Dominic Abrams and Michael Hogg, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and 
Group Processes (London: Routledge, 1988), 2. 
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is it a Communist country or a Capitalist country? Is it an American state or an Arabic state? 
Is it a democratic regime or authoritarian?  
 
These characteristics construct nations’ type identities from two perspectives. On the one hand, 
states realise what sort of state they are, and which categories they belong to. On the other hand, 
through this affiliation with particular categories, states also realise how they are different from 
others. This is a mutual process: self-identification leads to group differentiation, and the 
quality of the group in turn helps states to strengthen their impression of the identification. 
 
Then what kinds of characteristics can underlie type identities? Wendt argues that ‘only those 
that have social content or meaning’ can count as type identities,303 and that these ‘social 
content or meaning’ arise from ‘membership rules’.304 Membership rules consist of labels that 
demonstrate actors’ qualities, and accordingly generate certain kinds of behaviour that might 
be expected of them. For individuals, these labels could be ethnicity, sex, age group, or class; 
for states, they could be economy, political regime, political geography, strategic culture, and 
so forth.  
 
What we should keep in mind is the ontology of constructivism. Membership rules are not 
predetermined, but rather inter-subjectively constructed during a long process of socialisation. 
In light of this, the content of the rules has a cultural dimension and historical context. For 
instance, in terms of cultural dimension, it is meaningless to describe both China and the US 
as countries with large territories unless we consider what societal implications of the large 
territories for the countries actually are. These include the governance modes that cover the 
whole land, the geopolitics for the defence strategies, the border policies, the strategies to 
exploit resources within these territories, and so forth. Similarly, it is meaningless to say that 
Mongolia is an inland country and Japan is an island nation unless we take the appropriate 
geopolitical strategies into account (the strategies in developing maritime forces). The point is 
that, type identities are composed by those characteristics that have social and cultural 
meanings.  
                                                 
303 Alexander Wendt. Social Theory of International Politics, 226. 
304 Ibid.   
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If we accept the idea that type identity involves membership rules, we are assuming that the 
actor is not isolated, but associated with others. However, in this situation, the function of 
‘others’ is similar to a comparative example, which enables the actor to recognise itself and 
allocate itself into the correct category. In light of this, ‘others’ do not have a decisive influence 
on the constitution of type identity. In fact, ‘the characteristics that underlie type identities are 
at base intrinsic to actors’,305 they exist whether or not ‘others’ recognise them.  
 
Since the construction of type identity is based on these intrinsic characteristics, then type 
identity is a certain kind of self-understanding that reflects these inner characteristics. It 
answers the question ‘what am I’ or ‘what sort of person I am’, and draws an image for the 
actor to present itself to the external world. 
 
4.2.2 The function of type identity 
Type identity represents the actor’s inner qualities, but these qualities do not directly answer 
the question as to why the actor takes certain kinds of actions. Then, how does type identity 
function as part of the explanation of the actor’s behaviour? Based on the understanding of its 
construction, we can assume that type identity has three functions. Firstly, type identity is 
associated with certain patterns of behaviour. Secondly, type identity helps to realise and define 
any genuine interests. Thirdly, type identity influences the actor’s perception towards others, 
thereby impacting on the construction of role identity. 
 
In the sense of the first function, type identity functions as a link between international 
socialisation and behaviour. When an actor is associated with a particular social membership, 
its behaviour would be labelled with appropriate membership rules and it conforms to follow 
these rules to maintain its membership; in the other way round, it joins this category because 
                                                 
305 Ibid. 
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its actions are in accord with the associated rules. For instance, China joined the Communist 
bloc because the CPC took control of it.306 
 
Some constructivist scholars call these membership rules ‘norms’, which ‘are collective 
expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity’.307 Following such norms is the 
means by which to maintain the validity of its identity, and accordingly it conforms with the 
inner qualities/characteristics to do so. The reasons for following such norms are various. 
Fearon listed several reasons, basically summarised as to establish and improve the 
communications and interactions within the category, to avoid sanctions or isolation, and a 
willingness or natural and historical inclination to follow norms.308 In short, it is in their own 
interests to socialize themselves into the category/membership. 
 
The first function explains the actor’s behaviour at the level of social categorisation. However, 
within the category, various actors have diverse patterns of behaviour, and therefore functions 
at the level of actors need to be specified, which leads to the second function. Type identity 
answers ‘who am I’, and only on that basis can actors realise their interests. But it should be 
noted that interests are not generated from the answer to ‘who am I’, and neither are they 
directly connected with it, but rather need to be realised by the actors. Therefore, we argue that 
it is type identity that plays a crucial role in helping actors realise what they actually need, and 
what are the genuine interests that lie in their core identities and conform to their true 
characteristics.  
 
From the perspective of social psychology, apart from the need to survive and other instinctual 
drives, individuals can realise other needs in the process of socialisation. Living within a 
society, individuals develop a personality structure of ‘ego’, which generates or modifies their 
personal needs in accord with their reality and social structure. This ‘ego’ helps individuals 
consciously recognise their position in society and make sense of their desires.  
                                                 
306 Based on the “Lean to One side” policy, China chose to join the communist bloc and stand on the rival side 
against the Capitalism bloc. More analysis, see Ding Ming, “Post-War International Relations and the Formation 
of the ‘Lean to One Side’ Policy”. 
307 Peter Katzenstein, eds., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 54. 
308 James Fearon. “What is identity (As we now use the word)?”, 28-29. 
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It would be farfetched to equate national type identity with personal ego, but it does make sense 
to apply an analogy at the level of international society, since a state can have a collective 
identity within itself, thereby constructing an identity while participating in the process of 
socialisation. International actors can realise their distinctiveness from ‘nationhood’ and 
‘statehood’, 309  and, moreover, the inner characteristics can attach diverse values and 
preferences to actors, with these aspects constituting the contents of type identities. With these 
connotations of type identities, actors can realise and define their interests, and only by these 
connotations can their interests match their genuine needs and conform to their characteristics. 
This influences the realisation of interests, and together with the first function, shows how type 
identity affects actors’ general behaviour. 
 
The third function of type identity is that it impacts on the perceptions of others. Basically, type 
identity is intrinsic, and exogenous, to other actors. However, since it is constructed in the 
process of socialisation, its cultural and societal qualities make it impossible to be isolated from 
others, and enables it to exert an influence on interactions with others. In fact, during the 
construction process of type identity, it is associated with others, functioning as a comparative 
example for an actor to differentiate and categorize itself into a certain group. This kind of 
association does not only contribute to the construction of type identity, but also affects the 
actor in terms of how to think about others, because when the actor takes others as comparative 
examples, they already have some conceptual image of these others, and these images will be 
processed by attached subjective values and the consciousness of the actor. These subjective 
values and consciousness are based on the inner characteristics that the actor has, and 
accordingly conform to its type identity. For instance, after the government was established, 
one of the reasons that China leant towards the Soviet Union was because China itself was one 
of the Communist countries. 
 
This third question is critically important as it contributes to understanding the linkages 
between type identity and role identity. Constructivists believe that the cognitions of actors are 
subjective. An actor with certain kinds of type identity will attach its subjective conscious to 
                                                 
309 Peter Katzenstein, eds., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 59. 
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its cognitions, which affects its perceptions of others. It can construct an imaged role identity 
of these others, and this identity is supposed to have connections with its consciousness whose 
roots are in its type identity. But it would be wrong to blur the functions of type identity and 
role identity, as we still need to draw a clear line between these two kinds of identities; type 
identity still functions as a label to reflect the inner characteristics of the actor, and role identity 
remains its major functions in any interactions, though it should be noted that the former does 
influence the construction of the later.  
 
4.2.3 The Application to the study of EU-China relations 
This entire chapter will explain how to apply type identity to the analysis of EU-China relations, 
but this section is designed to answer the question as to why the four categories of political 
regimes, strategies, values and economies have been chosen. An international actor has diverse 
type identities, and EU-China relations cover various aspects of interactions. Thus these four 
categories have been chosen because they can help to sketch an outline of the two actors, and 
can reflect both the prospective essentials of cooperation and the possible problems that might 
originate from their type identities. 
 
In the development of EU-China relations, they have had a ‘honeymoon’ period where both 
enjoyed the benefits from cooperation, but also suffered a time when their relationship was 
affected by tensions.310 How, then, did this relationship develop in this manner? What are the 
intrinsic or internal factors that made it fluctuate in this manner? What are the drives to 
cooperation and what are the origins of conflicts? 
 
These questions lead us to explore the inner characteristics of the EU and China. The reason I 
chose these four categories is that, on the one hand, we can discover certain shared 
characteristics that constitute the basics of their cooperation. On the other hand, we can uncover 
the differences in their qualities that can lead to debate or even conflict. These four terms cover 
the main aspects of the two actors’ characteristics, especially those that can significantly 
                                                 
310 For instance, their relationship was in a harmonious atmosphere between 1993 and 2004, but had a crisis 
after the Tiananmen events in 1989. See further discussion in this regard in the following chapter. 
 123 
 
influence the construction of their identities (not only type identities but also role identities, as 
argued above). 
 
In terms of political regimes, the EU is a supranational polity with multilevel democracy. 
Despite the competitions and conflicts among its member states, the EU endeavours to 
construct coherent policies (as discussed in the first chapter). China, on the other hand, has a 
different political regime; it is a nation-state with a highly centralized system of government 
that claims to adhere to socialist principles, and holds different understandings of democracy 
and sovereignty from those that dominate in Europe. These kinds of different understandings 
fall in the category of values, where we still need to remain aware that these differences are 
related to the political regimes. But what they have in common is that both are accused of a 
lack of democracy (here, the EU as a whole), and they are building their democracy in their 
own ways. 
 
In terms of strategies, the EU and China represent two emerging powers on the world stage. 
China is regarded as a rising power (or a risen power, as some might argue311). In spite of its 
‘hide brightness, nourish obscurity’ policy (tao guang yang hui 韬光养晦),312 it actually never 
disguised its willingness to become a strong country. What worries the world is that what China 
has not revealed, and what it would be after successfully becoming a strong country. To fulfil 
the ‘Chinese dream’313, it pursues material interests to become a global power, and also tries to 
find a normative way to rise as a great power.  
 
The EU is described as a normative power because of its efforts to promote the norms of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. However, this does not mean that material 
interests are not important for the EU, indeed, material interests used to form the basis of its 
                                                 
311 Nadège Rolland, China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road 
Initiative. (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 121-150. 
312 Chen Dingding, and Wang Jianwei, "Lying low no more? China's new thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui 
strategy." China: An International Journal 9, no. 02 (2011): 195-216; Camilla TN. Sørensen,"The Significance 
of Xi Jinping's" Chinese Dream" for Chinese Foreign Policy: From" Tao Guang Yang Hui" to" Fen Fa You 
Wei"." Journal of China and International Relations 3, no. 1 (2015): 53-73. 
313 Wang Zheng. "The Chinese dream: Concept and context." Journal of Chinese Political Science 19, no. 1 
(2014): 1-13. 
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integration, and always lie at the core of the EU’s policies.314 This has become increasingly 
important since the debt crisis of 2009. In the exploration of their type identity from a strategic 
perspective, we find that both the EU and China pursue material and normative interests, and 
this similarity naturally leads to both the cooperation, and the competition, between these two 
actors. 
 
In terms of values, these contain a large variety of content, and the EU and China have various 
conflicting ideas in this area. This chapter mainly focus on the notions of sovereignty, 
democracy and human rights. As mentioned above, the EU is an integrated supranational entity, 
therefore its perspective of sovereignty has developed beyond Westphalian norms. China, 
however, is still exerting itself in order to defend its national sovereignty. Although China 
claims to have a democratic regime, the standards of its democracy certainly differs from that 
of the West. Furthermore, human rights is one of the hottest topics in EU-China bilateral 
dialogues, where the two sides often clash because their different understandings of human 
rights, which can be attributed to the two sides’ historical cultural and contemporary 
developments. 
 
In terms of economies, China has become the second largest in the world, but it would be an 
exaggeration to describe it as a great economic power as it still has many problems to cope 
with, and indeed its GDP per capita is still at the level of a developing country. The EU is the 
biggest economy in the world and consists of developed states, its economic strength enables 
it to promote normative policies. 
 
Even though the type identity is relatively objective in the interactions between actors, it is 
conceived subjectively because it will be adapted by the subjective ideas of the actors so as to 
conform with their inner characteristics; therefore, role identity will be influenced by type 
identity, as will be analysed in the next chapter. 
 
                                                 
314 Nathalie Tocci, ed., Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global 
Partners, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008), 23-25. 
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4.3. Four Categories 
4.3.1 Political Regimes 
Both the EU and China have distinct political regimes. The EU is a supranational polity with 
multilevel democracy, whose model of governance is novel but also immature.  China, on the 
other hand, also claims to have a democratic regime with exceptional characteristics, and which 
is different from the concept of ‘Western democracy’. Studies of these two regimes are 
beneficial to the understand their processes of policy making, which consequently helps to 
uncover reasons behind these policies. 
 
4.3.1.1 China: ‘Democracy’ with Chinese characteristics 
China’s political regime has long been questioned, and is considered authoritarian315. But 
officially, China’s Constitution stipulates that ‘China is a socialist state under the people’s 
democratic dictatorship … [and] the state organs of the People’s Republic of China apply the 
principle of democratic centralism’316. Therefore, although this might be contrary to Western 
scholars’ observations, China’s political regime holds ‘democracy’ as its principle, and it 
perceives itself as democratic. 
 
To some extent, China’s understanding of the basic principle of democracy is not very much 
different from Western cognitions, but differs rather in how to apply democracy within the 
political regime. Unlike the widespread electoral democracy in the West, China has adopted 
the democratic centralism derived from Leninism, and is also associated with the leadership of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC). This regime is also known as ‘one party rule’ or the 
‘single party system’, which determines the transition and allocation of power in China’s 
political system. According to the Constitution, the single party system in China means that the 
CPC is the only legal ruling party, and thus does not share national administrative power with 
other parties, and does not allow for the existence of opposition parties. Multi-party cooperation 
                                                 
315 Jie Lu and Tianjian Shi, “The battle of ideas and discourses before democratic transition: Different 
democratic conceptions in authoritarian China”, International Political Science Review 36, no. 1 (2015): 20-41; 
Melanie Manion,  “Authoritarian parochialism: Local congressional representation in China”, China Quarterly 
218 (2014): 311-338.; Steve Hess, Authoritarian Landscapes: Popular Mobilization and the Institutional 
Sources of Resilience in Nondemocracies (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 80. 
316 Article 1 and 3, Constitutions of the People’s Republic of China, available at 
http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html, accessed 24 November 2014. 
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and political consultation are the only means by which other parties can participate in the 
political system.  
 
In terms of the relationship between the party and the state organs, under the principle of 
democratic centralism, all the state organs must follow the leadership of the CPC317, which 
implies that even at the same level (e.g., nation, local province government, etc.), the party 
institutions rank higher than the administrative institutions. In practice, the latter accepts the 
former’s lead in three dimensions: political leadership, ideological leadership and 
organisational leadership. Political leadership means that the CPC sets up the core political 
principles and takes control of the significant policy making. Ideological leadership refers to 
the political and ideological construction, where party institutions are built at every level of 
state organs and are responsible for illustrating ideological directions to the executives. 
Organisational leadership relates to the composition of every organ: the CPC has the right to 
recommend the nominations of officials, and in practice the organisation department takes any 
responsibility for such work. These three means of leadership ensure that the CPC has supreme 
power over every realm of the state, thereby strengthening the leading position of the party in 
China’s political system. 
 
Although the CPC has the exclusive power in administration, there are still eight political 
parties who have also been empowered by the Constitution to participate in China’s politics318. 
Only by accepting the leadership of the CPC and not competing with them for political power 
can they be legally recognised and their participation realised. Multi-party cooperation operates 
in the institution of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) under the 
basic principle of ‘lasting coexistence, mutual supervision, working together with open minds 
and sharing weal and woe’319. The way multi-party cooperation functions is that the CPC 
allows the various parties to participate in the process of legislation, administration and 
judiciary: in the People’s Congress, governments, courts and procuratorates at every level, it is 
                                                 
317 Canchu Lin and Yueh-Ting Lee, “The Constitutive Rhetoric of Democratic Centralism: A thematic analysis 
of Mao’s discourse on democracy”, Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 79 (2013): 148-165. 
318 The eight parties are respectively: Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, China Democratic League, 
China Democratic National Construction Association, China Association for Promoting Democracy, Chinese 
Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, China Party for Public Interest, September 3rd Society and Taiwan 
Democratic Self-Government League. 
319 Charter of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, available at 
http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2012/07/03/ARTI1341300912828101.shtml, accessed 26 November 2014. 
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guaranteed that at least one leader is a representative from the other parties. Furthermore, 
through the platform of the CPPCC, other parties can also participate in the political system in 
an advisory and supervisory capacity.  
 
But in practice, the CPPCC is not an organ of authority, but is basically an organisation for 
multiple parties to propose issues and consult political agendas, actually the final decision 
remains in the CPC’s hand. Moreover, the CPPCC regime is not exceptional but, as mentioned 
above, all the national organs are under the leadership of the CPC, which refers to so-called 
‘one party rule’. What concerns China studies scholars is that this party-state regime has limited 
legitimacy and therefore political reform will inevitably be demanded.320 It is true that China 
is on the way to promoting democratic development, but what ‘democracy’ means for China, 
or more specifically for the CPC, is different from what the scholars think of, as Breslin argues, 
for the CPC, ‘democratisation is seen as a means … to re-establish the relationship between 
the people and the Party and to re-legitimise one-party rule’321.  
 
Indeed, no matter what policies the CPC might implement, they could not undermine the 
principle of one-party rule. But on the other hand, China has also made efforts to theorizing its 
democratic regime and enhancing its legitimacy. After the 18th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, the CPC has increasingly emphasised the concept of ‘deliberative 
democracy’ (xie shang min zhu, 协商民主), the socialist deliberative democracy, in the Party’s 
dictionary, ‘is the exceptional form and distinct advantage of China’s socialism democratic 
politics’322.  
 
This definition of the deliberative democracy places this kind of democratic model in the 
Chinese national context, and attaches ‘Chinese characteristics’ to it, both politically and 
                                                 
320 Zheng Yongnian, Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Transition (Eastern Universities 
Press, 1998).; Thomas Heberer and Gunter  Schubert, “Political Reform and Regime Legitimacy in 
Contemporary China”, Asien 99, (2006), 9-28.  
321 Shaun Breslin, “Democratizing one-party rule in China,” in New Challenges to Democratization, eds., Peter 
J. Burnell and Richard Youngs, (New York: Routledge, 2010): 136-154. 
322 “习近平：在庆祝中国人民政治协商会议成立 65周年大会上的讲话 (Xi Jinping’s speech on the 
conference for celebrating the 65th anniversary of the foundation of the CPPCC)”, available at 
http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2014/10/09/ARTI1412841028191314.shtml, accessed 26 November 2014. 
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culturally. Politically, according to Chinese scholars’ argument, deliberative democracy meets 
the need of securing social stability in China’s process of industrialization, and can thus avoid 
the possibility of increasing the social conflict which comes with Western electoral 
democracy323. Therefore, this is more advanced than electoral democracy and more suitable for 
contemporary China 324 . Other arguments also indicate that deliberative democracy and 
electoral democracy are both equally important for democratic politics. The former exists in 
the CPPCC, whilst the latter exists in the People’s Congress, and both modes contribute to 
ensure the leadership of the CPC325. Culturally, scholars argue that deliberative democracy is 
not novel for Chinese political culture, for it can be found in Confucian political philosophy, 
and as this model has been implemented during the long history of Chinese politics, it is 
consequently rooted in Chinese ancient political thoughts and fits with the current status of 
China’s societal development326.  
 
The label of ‘Chinese characteristics’ is an instrument to enhance the CPC’s democratic 
accountability, and no matter what kind of democratic modes China applies, one of the most 
important purposes is to ensure that China is led by the CPC in a single party system. The 
assertion of Chinese characteristics, does not only differentiate China from the EU in terms of 
political principles, but also in terms of its practices. In the realm of the political regime, 
China’s system of one-party rule does not need to face the same competition among multiple 
parties as the EU does. Besides, compared to a supranational polity that consists of diverse 
member states who have their own competences in a certain realm, China, as a nation-state can 
organize its national resources more efficiently.  
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4.3.1.2 The EU: a Supranational Polity with Multilevel Democracy 
The EU is a supranational polity consisting of democratic member states. However, the EU’s 
own democratic legitimacy has long been questioned327, and the issue of ‘democratic deficit’ 
has generated a great deal of discussion.328 In general, the democratic deficit refers to ‘the idea 
that the transfer of policy-making power from the national level to the EU has not been 
accompanied by sufficient democratic control at the European level’329. This can be attributed 
to the EU’s particular political regime and its institutions of policy making. I have already 
discussed the complexities of the institutions and the competitions among member states in 
chapter 1; in this section, I will focus on the EU institutional framework and will invoke the 
democratic legitimacy debate along with it. 
 
How democratic legitimacy can be defined is the core topic of these debates. Scharpf’s 
concepts of ‘input-oriented’ legitimacy and ‘output-oriented’ legitimacy provides crucial 
concepts to understand the debate on the ‘democratic deficit’330. Input legitimacy focuses on 
citizen’s participation and the process of their involvement. The legitimacy of the authority is 
based on the principle that it is built ‘by the people’, the criterion is that the people who are 
governed have sufficiently participated in the process of decision making and their preferences 
could have a direct impact on any decision. Output legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to 
effective performance of the authority’s policies, and it focuses on the outcomes of decisions, 
and examines whether they can satisfy the people’s will and meet their needs, which means the 
legitimacy of the authority is based on the principle of ‘for the people’. Schmidt has also added 
the notion of ‘throughput’, where throughput legitimacy focuses on the political procedures 
between the citizens and decisions and refers to the ‘internal processes and practices of EU 
governance … and the EU’s interest consultation with the people’331. This emphasis on a 
                                                 
327 Giandomenico Majone, "Europe’s ‘democratic deficit’: The question of standards." European law journal 4, 
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‘middle area’ offers wider perspectives of the institutional framework among the Council, the 
Commission and the Parliament, and also enhances the importance of the EU’s governance, 
transparency and the involvement of civil society. 
 
Following the historical review of the evolution of the democratic legitimacy, we find how the 
EU has strived to improve its institutional framework. In the earlier phase of European 
Community, its legitimacy was labelled as being ‘permissive consensus’332, indicating that the 
Community’s policies were elite-oriented. Although the process of integration and decision 
making has gained the support of the people, the majority of them did not actually participate 
in, or care about, it333. Therefore, the regime was governed by the representatives of national 
governments and experts in the European institutions, it was designed to meet both national 
and Community needs, yet reflected little in the way of public interest. Consequently, we can 
assume that the Community has gained legitimacy on the basis of its policy outcomes, namely 
that of output-oriented legitimacy, but it is hardly convincing that the Community had complete 
democratic legitimacy if it failed to achieve input-oriented legitimacy. 
 
What was then the strategy for the EU to enhance its legitimacy, especially its input legitimacy? 
The key answer resides in the function of the parliamentary institutions, both at the European 
and national levels, because representation in parliament is the bridge that links the public and 
the government, and parliamentary control over the executive is the people’s instrument to 
wield their influence on institutional procedures. In order to tackle the issue of a ‘democratic 
deficit’, the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union has empowered the European Parliament 
by granting it a more active role in the Community in several ways. The introduction of the co-
decision procedure has given the Parliament legislative power334; the Maastricht Treaty, in 
1992, also gave the Parliament the right to be informed by, and give assent to, the Council and 
the Commission335. It also introduced a provision that the nomination of members of the 
Commission needed the ‘approval’ of the Parliament 336 , which makes the Parliament 
                                                 
332 Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Europe's would-be polity: patterns of change in the European 
community (Prentice-Hall, 1970), 22. 
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accountable in terms of wielding its power to determine the composition of the executive 
institution.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty confirmed the democratic principles of the EU by declaring that ‘the 
functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy’337, and after its entry 
into force the power of the Parliament was further strengthened 338 , which theoretically 
enhanced the democratic legitimacy of the EU. Although the Parliament, as a citizen-elected 
institution, has gained greater authority in the EU’s decision-making procedures, participation 
in parliamentary elections itself at the European level, however, has experienced a declining 
trend; the turnout percentage at the European Parliament election has dropped from around 62% 
in 1979 to 43% in 2009339. The level of citizen participation in European elections has become 
increasingly low, which also implies that the input democratic legitimacy of the EU is still 
under challenge.  
 
Some scholars tend to believe that the multilevel structure of European politics is the main 
reason why the citizens consider the European elections as being ‘second-order’ when 
compared with domestic elections.340 The initiatives of the elected parties lie in the domestic 
area, and the constituencies also see this as less important than the national elections, and 
therefore prefer to pay greater attention to the national elections, which can directly affect their 
domestic lives. To reduce the gap between the European and national levels, the EU declared 
its willingness to increase the involvement of the national parliaments at the European level by 
establishing more communications and adding parliamentary control over the national 
governments’ behaviour in the EU341. Other scholars argue that the deficit of legitimacy at the 
EU level can be attributed to the lack of a common identity of European citizens342. It is difficult 
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to combine diverse national identities into a common identity at the European level, and it is 
even harder to construct a collective interest which conforms to everyone’s interest. The EU 
has realised this shortcoming, and tried to improve its interactions with EU citizens. In the 
Maastricht Treaty, it adopted three means to interact with citizens: a Committee of Inquiry, 
petitions from citizens, and the appointment of an Ombudsman343. The Lisbon Treaty also 
reiterated the principles of giving citizens regular and direct involvement with the EU344. The 
initiatives of the citizens have now been gaining increasing influence at the EU level. 
 
4.3.1.3 Summary 
This section has demonstrated the EU and China’s characteristics as political regimes, and it 
has shown that both the EU and China have some kind of ‘democratic deficit’. But talking 
about democracy has different implications for each of these entities. For China, it is true that 
it has a distinct political regime that differs from the Western model, but what is more important 
here is that China believes that this is the right, or necessary form of governance, and it is 
legitimate and democratic in its particular context. It is this perception of its own political 
regime, in combination with its culture (which will be illustrated later in section 4.3.3.1) that 
makes China persist in this form of regime, and resist any intervention from the West, including 
from the EU.  
 
In terms of the EU, through exploring political regimes, this section has illustrated the 
complicated sources of initiatives and the complexity of its decision-making procedures. In 
examining the type identity of the EU, it must be realised that within it, the EU has composite 
identities, and therefore it has multilevel governances. When we analyse its policies, it is crucial 
to realise the EU’s complex initiatives and sophisticated decision-making procedures, as they 
can determine the formation of the EU’s final decision on certain issues, which in this thesis, 
refer to the arms embargo issue. The EU’s complex nature created a difficult situation in which 
China was unable to achieve its goals by simply convincing on member state or two. This will 
be further discussed in chapter 6.  
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4.3.2 Strategies 
In the reviewing of the past time, we can see China and Europe have had a long history of 
communication and encounters, and when we consider the contemporary relationship between 
these two actors, we still find that the theme has not dramatically changed, as cooperation and 
clashes remain in this bilateral relationship. For instance, on the one hand, the Silk Road had 
created the connection between the two sides of the Eurasian continent, and nowadays, China’s 
‘Belt and Road’ policy345 aims to re-build an even larger commercial network to connect the 
countries across Asia and Europe. On the other hand, in the 19th century, the European powers 
had partly colonized China, forcing it to open itself in both political and commercial sense and 
brought a century of humiliation to China, whilst in the 21st century, China’s rise has raised 
concerns of the West, with some media sources even claiming that China is becoming a new 
colonist.346  History has left numerous legacies for Europe and China to build a strategic 
partnership, but what is important is what their strategies are based on their identities and what 
impacts these might bring to the bilateral relationship. In this section, we will attempt to answer 
this question by exploring the two actors’ strategies and their related type identities. 
 
4.3.2.1 China: a Rising Power? 
China is increasingly considered as a rising power, but what does being a ‘rising power’ mean? 
Some scholars believe that China will be a challenger to the current global order, and clashes 
with the contemporary great power—specifically the US—is inevitable347. Others argue that 
despite its increasing economic strength, China remains a status-quo power because of the 
increased benefits it received from the trend of globalization348. Between these two streams of 
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argument, some scholars take a relatively objective and modest position, describing China as a 
‘dissatisfied responsible great power’349 or ‘a reform-minded status quo power’350.  
 
This section argues that China’s identity as a rising power involves two aspects: on the one 
hand, China is aiming to shape the global order into a fashion that is beneficial to itself, while 
in the meantime pursuing realistic interests as it sees fit by which China can gain material 
powers and build its muscles for its development; on the other hand, China does not intend to 
bring a revolutionary change to the global order, but seeks an innovative way to rise, through 
which it can spread its normative influences and construct a peaceful environment for its rise. 
This character of China has constituted a large part of China’s motivation in its campaign to 
lift the EU’s arms embargo. On the one hand, China expected that the EU would work with 
China as strategic partners and promote the multi-polarisation of the international system. On 
the other hand, and at a very least, lifting the embargo would show that China has respected 
international norms and would generate a more normative image of China. The connection 
between China’s strategic character and arms embargo issue will be further discussed in chapter 
6. 
 
In the last few decades, China’s foreign policies has mainly been based on two principles set 
by Deng Xiaoping: reform and open (gai ge kai fang 改革开放), and ‘hide brightness, nourish 
obscurity’ (tao guang yang hui 韬光养晦). The former policy enabled China to connect itself 
with the world, and benefit enormously from globalization, whilst the latter had drawn many 
suspicions on China’s genuine intension in dealing with the world order. In this regard, some 
Western observers believe that it is a deceptive slogan which hides its true ambitions.351 
Meanwhile, Chinese observers also advocate its replacement by the principle of ‘active conduct’ 
(you suo zuo wei 有所作为, or fen fa you wei 奋发有为, as updated), as China has gained a 
                                                 
349 Shaun Breslin, “China’s Emerging Global Role: Dissatisfied Responsible Great Power”, Politics 30, no. 
1_suppl (2010): 52-62. 
350 Xiao Ren, “A reform-minded status quo power? China, the G20, and changes in the international monetary 
system”, Indiana University Research Center for Chinese Politics and Business working paper, 2012, available 
at http://www.indiana.edu/~rccpb/pdf/Ren%2025%20G20%20DRAFT.pdf, accessed 3 December 2014, cited 
with permission. 
351 Susan Shirk, China: fragile superpower (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 105. 
 
 135 
 
large degree of power352. In fact, both ‘hide brightness, nourish obscurity’ and ‘active conduct’ 
have made logical sense in China’s development process. At the beginning of the 1990s, China 
was facing an unpredictable international environment, and its own capacity was limited in 
terms of supporting high-profile behaviours. 353  During that period, the logic of the ‘hide 
brightness, nourish obscurity’ principle was to focus on pursuing economic interests at home 
for the foreseeable future. ‘Active conduct’ focuses on pursuing political support354 in what is 
increasingly being called in China ‘a new era’. 
 
Therefore, as China’s power, especially its economic power, increased, it has been more 
actively involved in international affairs. This kind of proactiveness arises not only from its 
own demand, but is also needed by globalisation, as China has increasingly become an 
important actor in globalisation itself.355 And in practice, when the time came, China did not 
hesitate to seize the opportunity to realise its strategies. In 2003, China took the chance to go 
against the US’s unilateral movements in Afghanistan, and tried to ally the EU and its member 
states to oppose US’s unilateralism, a strategy that gained China credit in promoting a 
multipolar world. Indeed, at that time, China almost succeeded in its negotiations with the EU 
to lift the arms embargo, and their mutual relationship was closer than ever before. However, 
the momentum did not last long as the lifting of the embargo was postponed and the clashes 
over bilateral trade increased. Eventually, the EU did not actually oppose the US in the manner 
China had hoped indeed, nor did the EU come to adopt China’s stance. This situation was 
attributed to China’s misunderstanding of the EU’s identity, and indeed China’s own identity 
in international society. The EU’s identity relates to role identity, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter; here, however, what China’s own identity is in terms of its strategy and the world 
order in which it lives will be explored. 
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It is difficult to predict the future role of China in the ongoing transformation of the 
international order. Will it be an active power that conforms to the global order and accepts its 
responsibility to help maintain it, or an alternative power that articulates the difference and 
seeks to make reforms? China gained considerably from globalization, but it seems the more 
China has gained, the more suspicion has been placed on it, with one argument claiming that 
China will try to alter this kind of institution into another kind that more accurately reflects its 
own interests356. Another claims that China lacks responsibility, and is merely a ‘free rider’357 
that only seeks, and acts, in its own self-interest. However, it should be realised that ‘being 
responsible’ does not contradict ‘pursuing interests’, as the former does not necessarily mean 
that an actor should sacrifice its own interests to build common ones. From a liberal perspective, 
taking responsibility to create a multilateral institution is also beneficial for the actor itself in 
enriching its own interests. In this regard, China has created, or participated, in various 
international organisations and cooperation, in which it aims to build its multilateral network 
to enlarge its own scope of interests. 
 
China has benefited from participation in major organisations of global governance, such as 
the UN, WTO, IMF and the World Bank, and therefore there is no reason for China to even 
attempt any revolutionary change in these organisations, let alone have the capability to do so. 
Meanwhile, however, China has established innovative cooperation in other areas where it can 
make greater achievements. For instance, South-South cooperation and cooperation among the 
BRICS reveal China’s strategies towards developing countries and emerging powers. This kind 
of cooperation not only strengthens the economic ties among these countries, but also 
constructs a stronger group of power in its bargaining and negotiations with the Western, 
developed countries. China articulates the fact that the South-South cooperation does not mean 
the end or diminishing of North-South cooperation, and it also includes developed countries 
                                                 
356 Miles Kahler, “Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient status quo”, 
International Affairs 89, no. 3 (2013): 711-729; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”, 
International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5-56; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the challenge: China's grand strategy 
and international security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
357 See the video at http://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000003047788/china-as-a-free-rider.html, 
accessed 4 December 2014. 
 
 137 
 
and international organisations within the framework of ‘triangular cooperation’358. In spite of 
this, China has nonetheless played a leading, or at least a crucial, role in the group of developing 
countries, which places itself in a position that contrasts the Western developed countries’ bloc, 
if it is not a completely opposite one. As we have observed above, China has already taken a 
more active role in the international society, and associated itself with the global network. 
Within these relationships, China is a late-coming, an emerging power, among the developed 
countries, but also in the group of developing countries, China’s economic power enables it to 
act as a leader. Given this dichotomy, what, then, exactly is China’s identity? 
 
There is an ancient Chinese saying says that ‘it would be better to be a rooster’s crest, rather 
than an oxtail (ning wei ji shou, bu wei niu hou宁为鸡首, 不为牛后)’, meaning that one would 
prefer to be at the top of a weaker group, rather than at the bottom of a stronger one. China’s 
role in the developing group is like a ‘rooster’s crest’, as it is at the top, has initiatives and 
discourse power; but, in the developed bloc, China is more like the ‘oxtail’, as it is at the bottom, 
has to adapt to the existing order and learn the rules. Another view advocates a so-called ‘G2’359, 
which makes China an equal superpower to the US, or similar to that stated above, making 
them a pair of ‘ox horns’, though it seems that this idea does not have too many proponents360. 
However, China’s economic power cannot be neglected, and its initiatives to express its 
preferences in international affairs make it more confident in its dealings with the Western bloc. 
Therefore, despite China affirming that it would not seek world hegemony, what China would 
do after its rise to become a great power concerns the world, especially for those founders and 
supporters of the current global order. For them, the concern is not what China currently has, 
but what China has not yet revealed, or what China has not yet obtained. The uncertainty of 
China’s future role is a major source of the resistance against China’s rise.  
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At present, what can be seen is the momentum of China’s rise361, its aim to adapt some of the 
contents of the international institutions and export its own diplomatic principles, but also that 
it is too costly for China to attempt any revolutionary reform. It also proposes a ‘new model of 
major country relations (xin xing da guo guan xi新型大国关系)’ that will attempt to find a 
new way to sort out the dilemma between the rising powers and the existing great powers. The 
content of this new relationship is still under discussion362, but its spirit, as China’s foreign 
minister said, is to ‘replace the conflicts by cooperation, and replace monopolization by mutual 
wins’.363 In practice, China’s regional and inter-regional policies, such as the ‘one belt and one 
road’ project and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, also show that 
China is willing to provide common benefits and construct a multilateral framework for 
regional cooperation and economic integration.  China is on its way to taking greater 
responsibility, and also its leadership along with it. The process of its rise will bring a series of 
changes in identity to the global order; not only China’s, but also the relative transformations 
in other countries’ identities, especially the Western one, and this has become the source of 
their concerns about China’s rise  
 
What concerns China, on the other hand, is how to ease the West’s concerns. China needs a 
relatively friendly environment to realise its ‘Chinese dream’, therefore it is crucial to find a 
new way to prevent any ‘tragedies’364 in the transition of power. However, this will not be an 
easy process, for the clashes do not only exist in the competition for resources and powers but 
also in its values and discourses, in terms of which China holds a different perspective from 
that of the West. These different values originate from China’s own historical experiences and 
ideologies and, furthermore, attach palpable Chinese characteristics to its foreign policies, such 
as its non-conditionality and non-interference, which will be discussed in the next section. 
From the discussion above, we can see that while China is gathering resources to strengthen its 
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power, it has also realised the importance of exporting its international political norms, and that 
the content of the norms is as liberal as it proclaims——multilateral cooperation and 
international democracy——but that the purpose of the norms is, however, realistic, which 
serves to pave the way for its rise and consequently equips China with the soft power to become 
a great power. 
 
4.3.2.2 The EU: a Normative Power? 
The EU has long been regarded as a normative power, but also has been challenged on its 
capabilities to fulfil its expectations.365 Here we intend to explore its identity in terms of its 
strategy: besides its inability to be a genuine normative power, does it have other strategic 
orientations? In other words, except for its role as a normative power, what other kinds of 
power does it prefer to exercise? And what capacity does it have to support its strategies? 
 
The notion of ‘normative power EU’ was introduced by Manners in 2002366, but the academic 
debate over the EU’s characteristics had pre-existed over a relatively long period. Duchêne 
argued that the European Community is a ‘civilian power’ which has an advantage in 
economics, which it can use to build an ‘idée force’ that would influence others, rather than 
coercing them.367 Galtung also asserted that the EC’s ‘ideological power’ enables it to impact 
on others’ wills.368  Given the context of international politics in that period, these arguments 
made sense in terms of illustrating the EC’s capabilities in the Cold War. Since the Community 
did not acquire a strong military power, what it could do was to implement its economic and 
ideological power to shape world politics. Still, in order to explore the EU’s international 
identity, Manners argued that it is important to focus on what the EU is, rather than what it 
does.369 During the Cold War, the EC represented itself as a crucial actor in the Western bloc 
                                                 
365 Hill Christopher, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role”, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, (1993) 31(3), 305-28. 
366 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies 
31, no. 3 (1993): 305-328. 
367 Francois Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence”, in A Nation Writ 
Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the Community, eds., Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager 
(Macmillan, 1973). 
368 Johan Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), 
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369 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, 252. 
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of liberal economies and pluralist democracies. In a further step, the end of the Cold War and 
the triumph over Socialism reinforced the role of the normative power of the EC as a winner, 
legitimatizing the validity of its norms. Therefore, as Manners argued, even though the EC/EU 
does not wield its civilian instruments, its existence as a distinct power that upholds the 
principles of democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, has already 
empowered the EU to define what is ‘normal’ in world politics. 370  Undoubtedly, these 
normative principles have established the EU’s normative basis; however, the EU is not a 
normative idol that is good enough for people to worship, but is in fact a multifaceted entity 
that has diverse strategic needs in various respects. Promoting norms and enhancing its 
normative power is one of its strategic dimensions, but should not be all. 
 
To explore the EU’s multiple faces, scholars have listed various assertions about what kind of 
power the EU is. From a neo-realist perspective, the EU has been described as a collective 
instrument for the member states to shape the external milieu.371 Bailes also shows the EU’s 
increasing demands on improving its military power through ESDP, by which its behaviour 
contradicts its normative principles.372 In terms of its economic might and market size, the EU 
has been regarded as a trade power that enjoys a dominant position in the global political 
economy and also plays a major role in trade negotiations.373 Other scholars have claimed that 
the EU is a realist power in trade power which emphasises ‘geoeconomic and mercantilist 
considerations’.374 In the sphere of environmental issues, the EU is a world leader in dealing 
with climate change.375 When examining its internal institutions and diplomatic preferences, 
                                                 
370 Ibid 60, 242 and 253. 
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the EU can be characterized as an ‘incipient civilian power’,376 which reaffirms Duchêne’s 
definition of ‘civilian power EC’ after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
There is a large group of diverse research on the EU’s characteristic as a power, and these 
arguments show that the content of the EU’s power is more than a single aspect of normative 
power, but a multi-layered entity that depends on specific issues and different regions.377 
Furthermore, these debates also reflect the absence of explicit criteria to define what kind of 
power the EU is, and thereby challenge the legitimacy of the notion of ‘normative power 
EU’.378 To find the answer to this question, Erikson applied a cosmopolitanism approach to 
assess whether the EU’s foreign policies is conducted in the ‘constraints of a higher ranking 
law’.379 The point of this argument conforms to, but also goes beyond, Duchêne’s idea that 
civilian power should democratize international contractual politics380, it raises the analysis to 
a supranational level. The finding was two-sided, the EU’s diplomatic actions are not always 
consistent with its normative values, but do have a promising future.  
 
Among the efforts to set the criteria for assessing the normative legitimacy of the EU’s foreign 
policy, Tocci’s research was relatively comprehensive. She set three dimensions of ‘normative 
goals’, ‘normative means’ and ‘normative impact’, and by using these parameters and applying 
eight case studies, she managed to assess the EU’s identities as ‘normative’, ‘realpolitik’, 
‘imperialistic’ and ‘status quo’.381 Her work reveals that the EU is a ‘multifaceted foreign 
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policy actor’, and thus if we intend to follow Manners’ question and explore ‘what the EU is’, 
we might find that the EU is not as simple as a huge ‘elephant’, as Emerson portrays382, but 
rather a hydra with many heads. The EU plans to be an active actor in a multipolar world, 
especially when it deals with powers like the US, China, Russia and other emerging powers; it 
has to tackle the crises in the Ukraine and Syria, and also threats of terrorism; it needs to 
enhance job opportunities, economic growth and investment, as well as deepening the internal 
market and the Economic and Monetary Union; it aims to establish free trade agreements with 
the US and strengthen commercial ties with other economies; it also has initiatives regarding 
migration, climate change and energy security, etc.383  
 
Manners also realised the multifaceted nature of the EU and suggests a reflexive dimension of 
the EU’s international identity384, and also updated the connotation of ‘normative power’ along 
with the evolution of the world politics385. But the ‘difference engine’ is not sufficient to 
explicitly illustrate the EU’s strategic identities. When we examine this hybrid entity, it is clear 
that norms such as the respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights386 lie at the core of its foreign policies, and we can also discover 
the different, or even competitive, initiatives among the institutions and member states.387 It is 
necessary to be aware that the EU can gain an advanced position in world politics when it 
wields its normative power, but it cannot be separated from its other initiatives and demands. 
How, then, can these diverse dimensions be associated or coordinated? Youngs suggests that 
‘constructivist and rationalist explanations might be combined to account for the way in which 
instrumental choices are made within a range of common normative understandings… [and 
therefore] normative and instrumentalist dynamics can be seen to set parameters for each 
other’.388 
                                                 
382 Michael Emerson, “Introduction”. In The Elephant and the Bear Try Again: Options for a New Agreement 
Between the EU and Russia, ed. Michael Emerson (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006), 1. 
383 Specific initiatives see “Commission Work Programme 2015: a new start”, Strasbourg, 16.12.2014, 
COM(2014) 910 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2015_en.pdf, accessed 2 February 2015. 
384 Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, “The 'difference engine': Constructing and representing the international 
identity of the European union”, Journal of European Public Policy 10, no. 3 (2003): 380-404. 
385 Ian Manners, “Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in World Politics”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 48, no. 1 (2010): 67-87. 
386 Article 2, Article 21, TEU. 
387 That as discussed in Chapter 1. 
388 Richard Youngs, “Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 42, no. 2 (2004): 415-435. 
 143 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Summary 
Comparing China and the EU’s strategic type identities, we find a commonality between them: 
China is not simply a ‘realist’ power that seeks the next global hegemony and ignores the 
existing order, but it endeavours to adapt itself to international society. The EU, on the other 
hand, cannot merely be regarded as a normative power, as it also has multifaceted strategies. 
Therefore, it is possible for both sides to promote their strategic partnership to a higher level. 
However, in the meantime, the diverse content of their strategies has different weights. For 
instance, while both actors value economies and norms, China may emphasise economic 
development, whist the EU takes the norms more seriously. This kind of asymmetry means that 
they lack ‘shared knowledge’ in terms of strategy, which will affect the compatibility of their 
role identities, which will be analysed in the next chapter. Moreover, the asymmetry in role 
identities will generate obstacles in the negotiation for lifting the EU’s arms embargo on China, 
which will be discussed in chapter 6. 
 
4.3.3 Values 
We have discussed the differences between the Chinese and the EU political regimes and 
strategies, to some extent, these differences are attributed to their different values in their 
perception of international politics. These conceptual gaps originate from their own historical 
development and cultural traditions, and thereby construct different type identities. This section 
aims to explore their type identities in terms of values and analyse how they would shape their 
foreign policies. However, the range of values can be diverse, so the discussion below focuses 
on sovereignty, human rights and democracy as concepts to illustrate the biggest differences 
between China and the EU. 
 
4.3.3.1 China: An Eastern Culture with Westphalian Norms 
The reason for describing China as an Eastern culture with Westphalian norms is that China 
has its own civilization and distinct perceptions of international principles, and it uses 
sovereignty and nationalism—notions that originated from Westphalian treaties—to defend its 
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culture and perceptions. By reviewing the cotemporary history of the PRC, it is noticeable that 
the foundation of this country is at least partly based on principles and norms that were learned 
from the West: China used nationalism to go against feudalism and imperialism, and it used 
sovereignty to go against colonialism. These two norms, which have been once developed by 
the Western nations, have now become strong instruments for China to resist the Western 
powers in the revolutionary time from 1911 to 1949, and the defence of its sovereignty is a way 
to legitimate its state governance. Sovereignty, therefore, is a concept that was invented by the 
West, and has now become a defensive instrument for China to keep Western powers from 
interfering in its domestic governance and challenging its core interests. 
 
Surprisingly, the reference to the Eastern culture was an instrument that China (re)began to use 
quite recently. Since China has been forced by the Western powers to open its gates, for decades 
the Chinese nationalists have turned to the West to seek governance models to apply in 
reforming China. Confucius, along with many other Chinese traditional cultural aspects, had 
been harshly criticized and abandoned by Chinese elites, especially in the New Culture 
Movement of the 1910s and 1920s, and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. After being 
abandoned for many decades, it was not till 2004 before the Confucius culture was re-evaluated 
at the national level,389 and China’s efforts to construct its identity as an Eastern country began. 
In the post-Cold War era, the influence of socialist ideology has decreased, whilst in the 
meantime Confucius, as an important symbol along with other Chinese traditional culture, has 
given the government considerable ideational resources with which to consolidate a mass 
ideology and reorganise its societal norms. 
 
Moreover, in the external dimension, this transformation could be used to build its exceptional 
characteristics as a distinct civilization, which has reason to explain and defend its different 
political regime and international behaviour when they are criticized or doubted by the Western 
powers——the divergences in politics can be attributed to the differences in cultures. It would 
be easier to understand this by noting that China links the Confucian culture to the diversities 
                                                 
389 Cases such as the establishment of the Confucius Institute around the world and the Confucius statue in 
Tiananmen Square in 2011. Although the statue has been removed, the revaluation of the Confucius has become 
a new principle to develop the national cultural strategy. See Xi Jinping’s speech at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-09/24/c_1112612018.htm, accessed 25 February 2015. 
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of world culture. It advocates respect for different cultures, and it argues that there are no 
universal rules, each country has its own rights and reasons to build its regime, and its choice 
should be respected by others. Furthermore, exporting Eastern culture is a relatively more 
acceptable and civil way to increase its soft power, rather than exporting a socialist ideology. 
390 Explaining the spirit of ‘peace’ and ‘equality’ in China’s traditional culture could also be 
considered as designed to ease the concerns and suspicions about China’s rise. 
 
The reason that we consider sovereignty within the discussion is because it reflects a huge 
difference between the EU and China’s perceptions. The EU is a supranational polity that pools 
sovereignty together. On the other hand, China is an adherent of traditional sovereignty, and 
views the notion of sovereignty very differently from the EU. In China’s interpretation, the 
content of sovereignty is that of ‘territorial integrity, non-interference, independence and 
equality’, China highly values the principle of sovereignty and takes it as the core guideline for 
its diplomatic policies. 391  Particularly with regards to the non-interference principle, the 
Chinese government has invoked it to reject the West’s criticism of China’s status of human 
rights. 
 
It is true that in an interdependent world, one country cannot fully exclude external interference; 
in spite of this, China takes external interference as an erosion of the government’s legitimacy. 
This belief originates from ‘the centure of humiliation’, when China was partly colonized by 
the Western powers and lost the control over its own domestic affairs. This period of history 
forced the Chinese to accept the notion of sovereignty and to use it to defend its autonomy. 
Along with the establishment of the PRC, the Communist Party takes defending China’s 
autonomy as one of the resources of its legitimacy. However, it still could not exclude external 
interference as the Soviet Union maintained its pressure on China’s domestic and external 
affairs. Even after the Cold War, its identity as a socialist country still draws criticisms from 
the West, as they hold different values. Therefore, although modern China was founded more 
                                                 
390 Although some overseas Confucius Institutes do have been closed for different political reasons. 
391 Pan Zhongqi, “Managing the Conceptual Gap on Sovereignty in China-EU Relations”, Asia Europe Journal, 
8, no. 2 (2010): 227-243; Ayse Kaya, “The EU's China problem: A battle over norms”, International Politics, 
51, no. 2 (2014): 214-233; Allen Carlson, “Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China's Recent 
Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention”, Pacific Affairs 77, no.1 (2004): 9-27; Men Jing, “The EU 
and China: mismatched partners?”, Journal of Contemporary China, 21, no. 74 (2012): 333-349. 
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than 60 years ago, it still remains in a stage of defending its sovereignty, rather than sharing or 
pooling it. The duty to maintain the integrity of its sovereignty is not merely a necessary task 
for the Chinese government, but also a historical burden. As a Chinese scholar observed, this 
is just because of the fact that China’s sovereignty has been undermined for a long time, and 
now China is an adherent to its traditional sovereignty.392 
For China, sovereignty and human rights are related, or more specifically, while China is 
engaging other polities on the issue of human rights, it is related to the non-interference 
principle of sovereignty. Moreover, China has its own interpretation of the content of human 
rights that is considerably different from that of the West. Since 1997, China’s State Council 
Information Office has issued nine white papers about the Progress in China’s human rights. 
Those papers show how human rights has been interpreted in Chinese discourse (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Content of the White Papers on Progress in China’s Human Rights in Nine Years 
Year Content 
1996 Rights to Subsistence and Development; Democratic Rights; Judicial Protection; 
Rights of Labors; Educational Rights; Rights of Woman and Children; Rights of 
Ethnic Minorities. 
 
1998 Rights to Subsistence and Development; Political Rights; Judicial Protection; 
Economic, Societal and Cultural Rights; Rights of Woman and Children; Rights 
of Ethnic Minorities; Foreign Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Human 
Rights. 
 
2000 Rights to Subsistence and Development; Political Rights; Judicial Protection; 
Economic, Societal and Cultural Rights; Rights of Woman and Children; Rights 
of Ethnic Minorities; Foreign Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Human 
Rights. 
 
2003 Rights to Subsistence and Development; Civil and Political Rights; Judicial 
Protection; Economic, Societal and Cultural Rights; Rights of Woman and 
                                                 
392 Dai Bingran. “Rethinking the issue of sovereignty”, Chinese Journal of European Studies 5, (2003): 33-35. 
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Children; Rights of Ethnic Minorities; Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Foreign 
Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. 
 
2004 Rights to Subsistence and Development; Civil and Political Rights; Judicial 
Protection; Economic, Societal and Cultural Rights; Rights of Ethnic Minorities; 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Foreign Exchanges and Cooperation in the 
Field of Human Rights. 
 
2009 Rights to Subsistence and Development; Civil and Political Rights; Judicial 
Protection; Economic, Societal and Cultural Rights; Rights of Ethnic Minorities; 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Foreign Exchanges and Cooperation in the 
Field of Human Rights. 
 
2012 Protection of Human Rights in Economic Construction, Political Construction, 
Cultural Services, Social Development and Ecological Progress; Foreign 
Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. 
 
2013 Rights to Development; Rights to Social Security; Democratic Rights; Rights to 
Freedom of Speech; Rights of the Person; Rights of Ethnic Minorities; Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities; Rights to a Clean and Healthy Environment; Foreign 
Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. 
 
2014 Rights to Development; Rights of the Person; Democratic Rights; Rights of 
Impartial Trial; Rights of Ethnic Minorities; Rights of Woman, Children and 
Senior Citizens; Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Rights to a Clean and Healthy 
Environment; Foreign Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. 
Source: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, available at 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/rqbps/index.htm, accessed 9 June 2015. 
 
From the table, two important findings emerge: first, the rights to subsistence and development 
have always been of main importance. The specific content of the rights to subsistence and 
development encompasses economic development, an improvement of consumption and the 
rise of people’s living standards (including civil income increase, poverty reduction and the 
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improvement in health, medical care and so forth). This content can be found in each of these 
papers. China’s first human rights white paper was issued in 1991, in which it is stated that the 
rights to subsistence is a prior human right that the Chinese people have been fighting for.393 
After more than two decades of development, the word ‘subsistence’ has not been used since 
2013, but the right to development remains the priority in the list of China’s human rights. 
These kinds of human rights have been clearly attached to Chinese characteristics, whose 
emphasis on social/collective rights is different from the EU’s emphasis on fundamental 
individual rights.394 
 
Second, these papers did not consider sensitive topics—such as democracy or political rights— 
as taboos, but interpreted them with Chinese characteristics. In the specific articles of political 
rights and democratic rights, China emphases its institutionalization of the National People’s 
Congress and the People’s Political Consultative Conference, and the promotion of the 
communitarian democracy, which does not conform to the Western model.  
 
These are the findings and differences that white papers highlight, but what the underlying 
divergences of the perceptions of human rights between the EU and China actually are? Why 
do Chinese discourses emphasise rights to subsistence and development? And why does China 
also claim that it has successfully established political and democratic rights? Answers to those 
questions can be found in the different understanding of human rights between China and the 
EU. Scholars have pointed out several differences in these understandings,395 among which the 
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major differences in the Chinese understanding can be summarised as hierarchy in human 
rights, and an insistence on relativism. 
 
The hierarchy in Chinese human rights discourse implies that China prioritizes collective rights 
over individual rights, and this explains the superiority of the rights to subsistence and 
development over other civil rights: Promoting the rights to subsistence and development is 
actually the promotion of social and economic rights, which represent the collective rights of 
society. In China, the word ‘ren 人’ (human) in ren quan 人权 (human rights) refers to ren min 
人民 (people of the community), rather than ge ren 个人 (individual citizens). Therefore, 
human rights in Chinese discourse refers to the collective rights of people in the community. 
 
This logic can be found in traditional Chinese culture. In Confucian philosophy, a ‘human’s 
intrinsic essence is not their biological quality, but the social characteristic’396, which is also to 
say, in order to make the humanity meaningful, that it must have a social identity (role identity), 
or membership of the community. Within the community, which could be a family, society, or 
a country, individuals are obliged to serve the collective good, and there are a series of 
moralities to discipline individuals’ behaviour. For instance, filial piety (xiao孝) requires the 
individuals not only to respect their parents, but also think of their family interests first; 
benevolence (ren仁) and righteousness (yi义) encourage individuals not only to love and help 
others, but even to go as far as to sacrifice their own rights to defend the ‘greater good’; loyalty 
(zhong忠) demands that individuals not only love their country, but also to prioritize national 
interests over their own personal interests and rights. Individuals do not only have their rights, 
but also have the obligation to serve the community, and at the moral level, when individual 
rights clash with the obligations for the collective good, prioritizing collective obligations is 
both encouraged and honoured. 
 
Moral considerations are not the only reasons; a pragmatic consideration also matters in 
explaining why collective rights take precedence over individual rights. It is believed that 
                                                 
396 Hu Weixi. “On Confucian Communitarianism”, Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy 2, no.4 
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without the preservation of collective rights, individual rights cannot be guaranteed. 397  In 
contrast to the Western belief that a community/nation/state is based on individuals, Chinese 
philosophy believes that collective rights are a prerequisite for individuals. As an ancient 
Chinese saying claims, ‘no eggs survive when the nest is ruined (fu chao zhi xia, an you wan 
luan覆巢之下, 安有完卵)’. The logic is as follows: firstly, a human being must have a social 
identity, and to this end the individual needs to have a family, which is the basic element of a 
society; then, this individual has to preserve the integrity of the family, because if the family 
does not exist, the individual’s own existence would be meaningless. The next step is to a larger 
society or a nation, the family is obliged to defend societal or national rights in order to preserve 
familial rights, because the family rights will not be safe without the protection of the nation. 
As implied in the Chinese word of nation-state (guo jia 国家, guo 国 means nation, and jia 家 
means family), the nation comes first. This has also been corroborated by history, especially 
when the Song Dynasty was conquered by the Mongolians, when the Ming Dynasty was ended 
by the Manchurians, and when China was invaded by other major powers in the late modern 
period. In those events, along with the collapse of the nation, even the right to life became 
problematic, let alone respecting other rights such as dignity or freedom of speech. 
 
Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, in order to protect human rights, China needs to first 
guarantee its collective rights, namely the rights to subsistence and development, and those 
specific citizen’s rights advocated by the West cannot be well protected if the rights to 
subsistence and development have not first been secured. This is the reason why, in the past 
few decades, the Chinese government has focused on economic development and lifting 
people’s living standards. Based on this strategy, China has been successful in helping 
hundreds of millions of people shake off poverty, and it has been seen as its biggest 
achievement in terms of human rights.398 Compared to its circumstances prior to 1949, China 
has good reasons to be proud of its achievements in this regard. At the societal level, the rapid 
improvement of material life standards in only a few decades has allowed the people to be able 
to enjoy a dramatic change within a relatively short time. This enjoyment of material benefits 
                                                 
397 Robert Weatherley, The Discourse of Human Rights in China: Historical and Ideological Perspectives, 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 105-106; Li Yiping and Lv Feiyun. “The connotation and Dialectical 
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398 Fifty Years of Progress in China’s Human Rights, issued by The State Council Information Office of the 
People’s Republic of China, February 2000, available at 
 http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/rqbps/Document/1452559/1452559.htm, accessed 11 June 2015. 
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makes people happy with their current situation, and show reduced inclination to stop such a 
trend.  
 
Meanwhile, China also has reasons to complain about Europe’s ignorance on this achievement 
and its criticism on individual cases399——they are not focusing on the same area as China 
does, and this explains different understandings of China and the EU on human rights exactly: 
collective rights versus individual rights, and social/economic rights versus civil/political rights. 
These gaps in understandings can be attributed to China’s different identity, namely, a country 
with Eastern values. But this is not to say that China has abandoned civil/political rights; indeed, 
as shown in the Table 4, China claims it has also improved its political rights, but just with its 
own characteristics. The differences in political regime were discussed in the previous sections, 
but why is China so ‘righteously’ insisting on its own regime and rejecting the thought of 
copying Western democracy?  
 
First, China believes in relativism, not so much as an excuse for its communist regime, but 
rather a genuine belief that stems from the history of revolution. From the perspective of 
modern democratic countries, China is still relatively young: it became a republic in 1912, but 
spent most of the initial years fighting wars, and suffered a ten-year chaos of Cultural 
Revolution in its middle age. Therefore, its political regime had been undermined many times, 
and was not stable. Since its founding in 1912, the republic did not stop learning from foreign 
regimes. Sun Yat-sen, the leading founder of the Republic of China, was inspired by French 
revolutionary thought and Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, and also studied European 
and American representative democracy, which constituted the basis of his design for China’s 
political regime. 400  Based on this kind of ideology and knowledge, he instructed the 
Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party) to build a democratic republic, but the country was 
torn by warlords and democracy was ruined. The country was reunified in 1928 whilst the 
regime was in a phase of political tutelage as Sun Yat-sen designed. However, the Nanking 
                                                 
399 Liu Jie. “Evaluating China’s Human Rights on the basic facts”, People’s Daily, page 4, 18th May 2012, 
available at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2012-05/18/content_1053245.htm, assessed 12 June 
2015. 
400 Edmund S. K. Fung “The Dictatorial Regime”, in In Search of Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in 
Nationalist China, 1929–1949, ed., Edmund S. K. Fung (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 32; Zhang Lei. 
“On Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of People’s Rights”, Historical Research 1, (1980): 5. 
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regime was not as democratic as expected, turning into a ‘military-authoritarian regime’ under 
the command of Chiang Kai-shek.401  
 
The Communist Party of China, in another way, learned from Marxism and the Leninism, and 
took instructions from the Communist International. But due to a lack of knowledge about 
China’s local situation, the instructions from Communist International led the Chinese 
Communist Party to massive failure, both in a political and military sense. After the Zunyi 
Conference (遵义会议), the Communist Party abandoned following the lead of the Communist 
International, and started to associate the Communist theory with China’s own condition, 
which ultimately allowed the CPC to survive. Thus what Chinese revolutionaries have learned 
from ‘learning from the West’ is to associate Western theories with China’s own condition. 
Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping have emphasised the principles required to adapt 
Marxism, Leninism and Soviet Model to China’s context, learn the theories dialectically and 
build the regime with China’s own characteristics.402 After a decade of ‘Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1967)’, the country finally established a relatively stable regime on the basis of the 
Soviet Model, but one that still has its own unique characteristics.403 For a country that has 
experimented with both capitalism and socialism, and finally found its own way to keep society 
stable and developing, it is reasonable for China to value the conditions of its own country. 
Full acceptance of Western norms without critique would be considered naive and might very 
well lead to failure. Therefore, this is the reason why the Chinese government keep asserting 
the importance of relativism, emphasising the need to respect China’s conditions, and resisting 
the transplantation of Western democracy into its regime. 
 
Second, from the perspective of class nature, the CPC would not accept the multi-party system, 
because the CPC claims that it represents the people, and that it is just the people who rule the 
country. Therefore, if other parties gained the ability to govern, this would not only mean the 
                                                 
401 Lloyd. E. Eastman “Nationalist China during the Nanking Decade, 1927-1937,” in The Nationalist Era in 
China, 1927-1949, eds., Lloyd. E. Eastman, Jerome Chen, Suzanne Pepper and Lyman P. Van Slyke 
(Cambridge University Press, 1991), 21. 
402 Specific speech and ideas of the leaders can be found in Liu, Shulin. “Soviet Model Socialism and Socialism 
with Chinese Characteristics”, Leading Journal of Ideological and Theoretical Education, 2009, Vol. 3, online 
resource available at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/41038/9168611.html, accessed 19 June 2015. 
403 For the differences between the Soviet Model and Chinese characteristics, see Huang, Zongliang. “From 
Soviet Model to Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, CPC History Studies, 2010, Vol. 7, p.38. 
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loss of the governing position, but also the loss of the CPC’s class nature. As stated in the 
constitution, China is ‘a socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the 
working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants’.404 The people’s democratic 
dictatorship originated from the Leninism ‘Dictatorship of the proletariat’, but is somehow 
different from it, as in the ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’, it is not only the working class 
who have the dictatorship, but also other classes. In addressing the ‘people’s democratic 
dictatorship’, Mao indicated that this dictatorship was to dictate ‘squirearchy’ and ‘bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie’, and that ‘people’ constitutes ‘the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty 
bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie’. 405  Furthermore, the ‘Three Represents’ thoughts 
theoretically expanded the class nature of the CPC, making it represent not just the four classes, 
but the majority of the people as a whole. As a consequence of this party theory, there was no 
need for another party to represent other interest groups, and there is no room for another 
competing party. Hence, a multi-party system is not an option that China, or its communist 
government, can accept. 
 
4.3.3.2 The EU: a Western entity with post-modern characteristics 
To say the EU is a Western entity is to indicate that it has different understandings of certain 
norms compared to China. These norms include, but are not confined to, human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and so forth. Human rights and democracy have multiple definitions 
and forms in the Western context, but this section does not intend to go through the entirety of 
its types and dimensions, but rather underline the differing elements between the EU and China.  
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union lists the content of the human rights 
that are recognised by the EU.406 As analysed above, the major difference in the principles of 
human rights is that the EU focuses on individual and civil rights, whist China emphasises 
collective and economic rights. It is argued that human rights are naturally inherent to life, thus 
they are primary to the rights that are generated in a society or state, and consequently take 
                                                 
404 The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm, accessed 26 June 2015. 
405 Mao Zedong. “On the People's Democratic Dictatorship”, June 3, 1949, in Selected works of Mao Zedong, 
Vol.4, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64185/66618/4488978.html, assessed 24 June 2015. 
406 European Commission, “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, 18 December 2000, C 364/01. 
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precedence over collective rights.407 Furthermore, given the nature of human beings and the 
liberalist philosophy, it has been suggested that human rights are universal, and the promotion 
of human rights should be applied on a global level.408 This universalism differs from China’s 
belief in relativism, which emphasises the conditions of a specific country. 
 
These divergences also exist in the EU’s perception of democracy. We have introduced China’s 
political regime in section 4.3.1.1, which showed that China has its own distinctive perception 
of democracy. Within the scope of the EU, the types of democracy vary from semi-presidential 
democracy to parliamentary democracy, within which there are forms of parliamentary 
republic and constitutional monarchies. Despite the diversity, what matters in this Chapter are 
the major differences compared to China’s perception of democracy or, in other words, those 
principles that the Chinese government refuses to accept. The Chinese official media, People’s 
Daily (Renmin Ribao 人民日报), has had a series of debates on the political institutions, and 
the conclusion clearly stated that multi-party system and the separation of the legislative, 
executive and judiciary powers are not suitable for China’s political environment.409 Therefore, 
the multi-party system and the separation of powers are the main characteristics that the 
Western political systems possess but that China does not. Chinese leaders such as Hu Jintao 
and Xi Jinping, have emphasised that China should not imitate the Western political model, 
and should instead remain committed to the Chinese political model.410 These statements, as 
observers indicate, imply that China considers political institutions as part of its own domestic 
affairs, and does not accept foreign intervention from the West.411 
                                                 
407 Jack Donnelly, “Human rights and human dignity: An analytic critique of non-Western conceptions of 
human rights,” American Political Science Review 76, no. 2 (1982): 303-316. 
408 Anthony Langlois, “Human Rights Universalism”, in The Ashgate research companion to ethics and 
international relations, ed., Patrick Hayden (Routledge 2009), 201-214; John Tasioulas, “Human rights, 
universality and the values of personhood: Retracing Griffin's steps”. European Journal of Philosophy, 10, no. 1 
(2002): 79-100; Jack Donnelly, Universal human rights in theory and practice (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2013), 7-39. 
409 See debates entitled “深入解答六个为什么 (In-depth explanation of the six whys)”, available at 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/145802/index.html, assessed 27 June 2015. 
410 Hu, Jintao. “正确认识和处理中国共产党和民主党派的关系 (Properly recognise and handle the 
relationship between the CPC and other democratic parties)”, available at http://www.rmzxb.com.cn/c/2014-02-
26/298115.shtml; Xinhua Net, “习近平在布鲁日欧洲学院的演讲 (Xi Jinping’s speech at College of Europe in 
Bruges)”, 1 April 2014, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-04/01/c_1110054309.htm, 
assessed 28 June 2015. 
411 Stefanie Weil and Yijia Jing, “The EU and China’s Perceptions of Democracy and Their Impact on China–
EU Relations”, in Conceptual Gaps in China–EU Relations: Global Governance, Human Rights and Strategic 
Partnerships, ed., Zhongqi Pan (London: Palgrave macmillan, 2012), 113-127. 
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On the contrary, however, the EU has a post-modern value in promoting human rights and 
democracy at the global scale. Here, the ‘post-modern value’ mainly refers to the EU’s 
understanding of sovereignty. As stated in the last section, sovereignty is a product of the Peace 
of Westphalia, which gives the sovereign state exclusive power to counter external 
interventions. As for the EU, during the process of its integration, member states transferred 
elements of their sovereignties to the EU, hence the sovereignty is not indivisible.412 Along 
with the reinforcement of the EU’s competences in various areas, the EU has impacting greater 
ability to impact on the member states’ policy making, particularly in terms of trade, thus the 
exclusive power of the traditional sovereignty has been declined. This supranational form of 
governance has been described as a ‘post-modern’ characteristic of the EU.413 Consequently, 
the EU views the concept of sovereignty differently in to other countries—China, for 
example—who still uphold Westphalian norms. 
 
This perception of sovereignty strongly influences the EU’s foreign policy, particularly in 
terms of intervention with human rights and the promotion of democracy. In practice, the EU 
has implemented a series of assistance programmes. For instance, the European Commission 
launched the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) 
programme, which was intended to help certain target countries in their transition to democratic, 
market-oriented economies. 414  A similar programme was applied in the Mediterranean 
countries under the framework of the MEDA programme.415 Both programmes have ultimately 
been integrated into the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). On a 
worldwide scale, the EU cooperates with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(ACP) within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (formerly known as the Lomé 
Convention, which was superseded by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000).416 
                                                 
412 Zhongqi Pan, Managing the conceptual gap on sovereignty in China–EU relations, 235. 
413 James A. Caporaso, The European Union and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory or post‐modern? 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 4, no. 1 (1996): 29-52. 
414 Details on Joint Research Centre, European Commission, available at 
https://nuclear.jrc.ec.europa.eu/tipins/programmes/tacis, assessed 29 June 2015. 
415 Details on EUR-Lex, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r15006, 
assessed 2 July 2015. 
416 Details on ACP - The Cotonou Agreement, International cooperation and development, European 
Commission, available at https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-acp-
region/cotonou-agreement_en, assessed 2 December 2015. 
 156 
 
 
The EU has promoted human rights and democracy in these recipient states, but meanwhile it 
also went beyond their sovereignties and intervened in their domestic policies. These 
programmes have shown the EU’s characteristics as a Western entity with post-modern 
characteristics, which inspire the EU in its pursuit of normative interests beyond borders and 
territories. Therefore, these characteristics as mentioned above, also conform to the EU’s type 
identity as a normative power. As will be illustrated in the next Chapter, the EU also attempted 
to promote human rights and political reform in China through constructive engagement, but 
the outcome was not as satisfactory as the EU had originally expected, the process and the 
reasons for which will be analysed in detail later. 
 
4.3.3.3 Summary 
As discussed above, we can see the differences between the EU and China in terms of their 
respective values and cultures. In its long history, China has nurtured its own civilization, 
which has influenced its society for thousands of years. It can adapt to the external environment, 
in a similar manner to how the revolutionaries learned from the West. However, it was because 
of the very process of learning from the West that made the revolutionaries believe that it was 
crucial to insist on relativism and building the country on its own terms. In order to fulfil this 
belief, and protect the right to build their own country, the authorities appealed to 
‘sovereignty’——a Westphalian principle innovated by the West——to prevent intervention 
from the outside powers. The history of the ‘humiliation century’ and the needs to maintain the 
government’s legitimacy have increased both the people’s and government’s willingness to 
uphold the principle of sovereignty. However, when the EU’s perspective is considered, it has 
largely divergent understandings in principles such as human rights and democracy. Moreover, 
the EU has gone beyond the phase of defending the national sovereignty, and has already begun 
pooling sovereignty and integrating it into a supranational polity. In contrast to China, the EU 
appeals to a post-modern value to conduct its international actions. So given its universal values 
and normative identity, it is not surprising to see the EU and China clash with each other in 
terms of human rights and democracy. 
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4.3.4 Economy 
China and the EU are two of the largest economies in the world. The EU consists of member 
states who are developed countries. China, on the other hand, despite its rapid growth, remains 
a developing country. Their economic identities can have a material, and also a fundamental, 
influence on the construction of diplomatic concepts and policy. 
 
4.3.4.1 China: A Skinny Giant 
China has two leading major figures in the economic area: GDP, and GDP growth. The former 
suggests China is the second biggest economy in the world; the latter shows how fast China’s 
economy has developed in the four decades since China established diplomatic relations with 
the European Community. Yet China still has a low GDP per capita, which implies that it 
remains a developing country. This makes China a complicated economy; on the one hand, it 
is a giant economy, but on the other its identity as a developing country leaves it a series of 
problems and at a certain disadvantage, as will be illustrated by the data below. In every figure, 
five economies are selected: China and the EU, as well as France, Germany and the UK as the 
troika of the EU’s economy. 
 
Figure 3 shows the GDP comparison among China, the EU and three European countries. In 
1975, when China and the European Community initially established diplomatic relations, 
China’s GDP was only 0.16 trillion US dollars. At that time, China was still in the chaos of 
Cultural Revolution, its GDP was low and its growth was unstable——the GDP growth was 
2.3% in 1974, 8.7% in 1975 and -1.6% in 1976, which demonstrates this economic 
instability.417 At the same time, the GDP was 0.36 trillion in France, 0.49 in Germany, 0.24 in 
the UK and, in total, it was 1.93 trillion for the whole European Community. Any one of these 
being larger than that of China. France’s economy was double China’s, and Germany’s was 
triple. After 40 years, China’s GDP reached 10.36 trillion US dollars in 2014, which is more 
than half of the EU’s combined GDP ($18.46 trillion), and more than the sum of Germany’s 
($3.85 trillion), the UK’s ($2.94 trillion) and France’s ($2.83 trillion). This dramatic change in 
GDP shows that China has now become a major economic power. 
                                                 
417 Data source: World Development Indicators, DataBank, the World Bank. And National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, assessed 4 December 2015. 
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Figure 3. GDP of China, the EU and EU member states in 1975 and 2014 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates how each of these economies’ GDP has changed since 1975, and the Figure 
5 below illustrates the annual rate of the GDP growth over the same period. Since the economic 
reform policies were implemented in 1978, China’s GDP has continued to increase; in 1984, 
the GDP growth rate peaked at 15.23%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 159 
 
Figure 4. GDP of China, the EU and EU member states from 1975 to 2014 
 
 
In 1990s, although the growth rate kept dropping, from 14.28% in 1992 to 7.62% in 1999, the 
GDP continued to increase. At the turn of the century, China almost caught up with France’s 
GDP. Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has enjoyed a golden age, with a boom 
in its economy. The growth rate increased year by year from 2001 to 2007, peaking at 14.20% 
at 2007. Meanwhile, its GDP has climbed to 3.52 trillion US dollars, which has transcended 
Germany’s 3.44 trillion to make China the third biggest economy in the world at that time. The 
global financial crisis has extended the GDP gap between China and the European countries. 
While the European economy was in recession, China’s GDP continued to grow. China became 
the second largest economy in 2009, with the sheer size of China’s GDP meaning that China 
shows a large amount of production, an active market, prosperous employment, an open 
investment environment, and that China has created a large amount of overall national wealth, 
which extricated China (as a whole) from its prior image as that of a poor country. Additionally, 
its success in terms of economic growth gives China greater confidence in dealing with other 
economies, no longer being perceived as a ‘backward’ country that needed economic aid from 
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the EU, but as a trade partner, a competitor, and even an investor, and consequently has been 
expected to take more responsibilities418——a quite multifaceted country. 
 
Figure 5. GDP growth of China, the EU and EU member states from 1975 to 2014 
 
 
But China is more sophisticated than this, as the content above is purely what GDP tells us, but 
this if far from the whole story. It has been argued that GDP growth does not equate with 
progress, 419 and China studies scholars also indicate that GDP growth and development are 
                                                 
418 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament—EU-China: Closing partners, growing responsibilities”, Brussels, 24.10.2006, 
COM(2006) 632 final. 
419 Costanza, Robert. Hart, Maureen. Posner, Stephen. and Talberth, John. “Beyond GDP: The Need for New 
Measures of Progress”, The Pardee Papers, No. 4, January 2009, available online at 
http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/documents/PP-004-GDP.pdf, assessed 19 December 2015. 
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not the same thing, China’s economic growth has been exaggerated, and many problems still 
exist beneath the myth of growth.420 
 
It should be noted that a high GDP growth can be achieved by a country whose GDP was 
initially at a low level. China only had a GDP of 0.16 trillion US dollars in 1975, which means 
even an increase of 0.08 trillion represents a 50% growth rate in 1976 (in fact China’s GDP 
decreased in 1976, as mentioned above, this example here is purely to illustrate that a relatively 
small absolute increase can result in a high growth rate). Therefore, China’s rapid growth might 
be praiseworthy, but its effects should not be exaggerated, as this ‘miracle’ does not only 
showcase China’s achievements, but also reminds us how poor China used to be. Furthermore, 
China’s population needs to be taken into account in relations to its GDP. The huge population 
endows China with demographic dividend: large labour resources, low labour costs and a vast 
market size. Meanwhile, its shortcomings are obvious too——the quality of labour resources 
is relatively low, China’s higher education and training index is ranked at only 68th in the 
world;421 low labour cost advantage has attracted foreign investments, but also caused China’s 
unbalanced dependence on exports from its manufacturing industry; despite its gigantic market 
size, China’s domestic expenditure is not particularly active, as its gross domestic saving ranks 
first in the world, and its household expenditure level is relatively low.422 
 
Moreover, the reason why the population is taken into account during this discussion is that 
despite the demographic dividend from the GDP boost, any figures that are divided across the 
large population number will become a small figure. GDP per capita is the point in case here. 
As an important index by which to measure the quality of an economy, GDP per capita shows 
that China might not be ‘poor’ at the national level as a country, but still ‘poor’ at the level of 
the citizenry. As illustrated in Figure 6, in both 1975 and 2014 China’s GDP per capita is 
relatively low in contrast with the developed states in Europe. China’s GDP per capita was 
175.9 US dollars in 1975 (its size is negligible in the figure) and 7590 US dollars in 2014; the 
                                                 
420 Shaun Breslin, “Why growth equals power - and why it shouldn't: Constructing Visions of China”, Journal of 
Asian Public Policy 1, no. 1 (2008): 3-17. 
421 See World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, the report on China is available at 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/economies/#economy=CHN, assessed 19 
December 2015 
422 Ibid. 
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growth is quite obvious, but still far behind the advanced states, or even behind many 
developing countries——China ranks 79th and lies below the world average line of 10721 US 
dollars. This is what the Atlas method illustrated, but the PPP method does not show any 
particularly significant difference; here, GDP per capita is 14956.7 international dollars, which 
still ranks 81st in the world.423 In terms of GDP per capita, China is not as rich as its GDP 
might suggest, the World Bank lists China as an upper-middle income country, but the gap 
between China and the European states, especially those high-income OECD members, is 
rather large. 
 
Figure 6. GDP per capita of China, the EU and EU member states in 1975 and 2014 
 
 
Despite the GDP scale, Chinese people’s living standards remains at a comparatively low level 
worldwide. Poverty is a huge and long-term problem for China to tackle with. According to 
                                                 
423 All data from World Development Indicators, DataBank, the World Bank. 
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the World Bank’s standard of $1.90 a day (2011 PPP), China’s poverty ratio is 11.2%, though 
the ratio would be 27.2% in terms of the $3.10 a day standard, which means there are a large 
number of people in China who live below the world poverty line. What, then, would the 
situation be at China’s national poverty line? China raised the line to 2300 yuan (rural per 
capita net income for one year) in 2011, which is 92.6% higher than the 1196 yuan line of 2009; 
this adjustment increased the proportion of the population living in poverty, but it should be 
noted that the 2300 yuan limit is still lower than the $1.90 line. According to exchange rate in 
2011(6.32), 2300 yuan equals 363.9 US dollars, so a Chinese citizen’s daily income would thus 
be 0.99 US dollars, which is still lower than the World Bank line (it was $1.25 a day at that 
time). This means that even though China raised its national poverty line, there is still a gap 
between its national line and the overall world line. China’s 2014 statistical bulletin states that 
the population living in poverty in rural areas was 70.17 million424, but by the world standard, 
there should be more poor people than the government’s own calculations. 
 
What, then, is the exact number of the whole population living in poverty in both rural and 
urban areas? Here, the major task is not knowing the number, but understanding what it means. 
When the number is used for domestic propaganda, it uses the national line as its basis so the 
population living in poverty appears to be relatively low, and any such bulletin would 
emphasise the decreasing trend of poverty; when the audiences are foreign states or institutes, 
China then usually refers to the World Bank line and emphasises the large proportion of the 
population still living in poverty, in order to demonstrate that China is still a developing 
country.425 
 
It is understandable that we should see the Chinese government playing this kind of double-
faced propaganda. Lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty is indeed a magnificent 
achievement in terms of poverty alleviation, and the government does not only take this as an 
                                                 
424 National Bureau of Statistics of China, “See the Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China 
on the 2014 National Economic and Social Development”, available on 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201502/t20150226_685799.html, assessed 20 December 2015. 
425 See Primer Minister Li Keqiang’s answer on the Press Conference for the Third Session of the 12th National 
People’s Congress on http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-03/16/content_1930128.htm. To put “usually” is 
because emphasizing the poverty situation is not always the case, when it concerns with China’s achievement on 
lifting the poverty, the standard usually is the national line. 
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economic success, but also the attainment of basic human rights as mentioned above. In other 
words, GDP growth and poverty alleviation have become one of the most significant sources 
of legitimacy for the CPC. On the other hand, China keeps reaffirming that it is still a 
developing country, its economic development is still at a primary stage and will likely remain 
so in the long term.426 There is no shame in discussing this at the international level, and to 
some extent, in fact, China can benefit from it: being a developing country means more benefits 
in trade and less responsibility in terms of environment protection. 
 
It seems contradictory for a political leadership to disseminate its success whilst reaffirming its 
disadvantages, but this makes sense for China. When it comes to ‘growth’ (both in terms of 
economic development and poverty alleviation), China is successful, and this is where the 
government should gain international respect and domestic support; when it concerns ‘status’, 
China is never good enough, so the government can avoid carrying over-weighted international 
responsibilities whilst also inspiring the populace: now, things are not good enough, but (given 
the success in growth) there is always hope! 
 
We can say that China’s own perception of its economy is complicated, but this kind of 
perception is just a reflection of the fact that China is indeed a complicated economy. Given 
the size of its GDP and market potential, it is a giant in the world economy, but a rather ‘skinny’ 
giant——its GDP per capita is low, its household income is below the world average, it has 
inequity in income, along with other problems like environment pollution, an unbalanced 
industrial structure and so forth, which cannot be fully discussed in a single section in this 
Chapter. China’s economy may be large, but not as strong as some might suggest, as it still has 
many domestic problems to deal with. This means that China is unable to take as much 
responsibility as international society expects. What China can do, as the former Chinese 
Premier said, is that ‘Managing China’s own business well is the biggest contribution to world 
development’.427 Nevertheless, China’s economic power cannot be overlooked, as it can still 
use it as a mean to attract others to build relationship and develop cooperation. 
                                                 
426 Hu Jintao, ‘Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 18th Party Congress’, Xinhua Net, 17 November 2012, the 
English version is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-
11/17/c_131981259.htm, assessed 22 December 2015.  
427 See Wen Jiabao’s comment on http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/16178563.html, and Li Keqiang’s 
comment on http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2015-03/16/content_1930128.htm, assessed 22 December 2015 
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4.3.4.2 The EU: a powerful economy 
Taken as a whole, the EU it has the largest GDP in the world. As shown in Figure 3, the EU’s 
GDP was 18.46 trillion US dollars in 2014, which accounted for 23.6% of world GDP. The 
remaining economies, such as the US, shared 22.1% of the world GDP in 2014, while China 
shared 13.3%, and Japan, 6.15%.428 In terms of its size, the EU is the biggest economy in the 
world. 
In terms of GDP per capita, it is also one of the most developed economies worldwide. The 
EU’s GDP per capita for 2014 was 36579.7 US dollars, though this figure might not be 
considered particularly spectacular because the enlargement of the EU lowered the average 
amount of its GDP per capita. However, this cannot disguise the fact that the EU consists of 
member states whose GDPs per capita is relatively high, especially in contrast to China. Many 
member states—for example, in 2014, Luxembourg ($119172.7), Denmark ($62425.5), 
Sweden ($59180.2) and Ireland ($55503.3)—were among the highest in the world.429 In terms 
of the Gross National Income, according to the World Bank’s classification, 25 EU member 
states (except Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) were listed as high-income countries in 2014.430  
 
The EU is a significant trade power in the world. As illustrated in Figure 7, the EU was the 
largest exporter ($3277.6 billion) and importer ($3038.5 billion) of merchandise and 
commercial services, and its trade volume ($6316.1 billion) was larger than any of the major 
powers (the US was $5212.9 billion, China was $4950.4 billion and Japan was $1852.2 billion). 
In total, the EU accounted for 13.1% of total global trade.431 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
428 All data calculated via the World Development Indicators, DataBank, the World Bank. 
429 Ibid. 
430 ‘How are the income group thresholds determined?’, The World Bank, available at 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378833-how-are-the-income-group-thresholds-
determined, assessed 23 December 2015 
431 WTO Statistics Database. Own calculation. 
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Figure 7. Trade in merchandise and commercial services in 2014 
 
Series: Trade volume (Billions of US dollars) 
Source: WTO Statistics Database. Own calculation  
 
Furthermore, the EU is a major actor in global direct investments. As shown in Figure 8 below, 
The EU held 31.33% of the world’s inbound investment stock, and 36.53% of the outbound 
stock. Whist the US accounted for 21.68% in inbound stock, and 25.22% in outbound stock, 
China accounted for only 4.32% and 3.58% respectively; Japan’s figures were 0.68% and 4.67% 
respectively. Meanwhile, the EU was the most popular destination for international 
investments, as it had 19.38% of the world’s inward investment flow, which was more than the 
US’s 12.96% and China’s 9.71%.432  
 
Moreover, the EU has an influential presence in international organisations governing the 
world economy. For instance, the EU has been a member of the WTO since 1995, it works 
through the WTO to promote multilateral trade and resolve commercial disputes. The EU is 
also a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in 
which it sits alongside 22 other member states. Additionally, the EU is a member of the G20, 
                                                 
432 This is not included in Figure 8, data accessed also from UNCTADstat, United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development. 
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it is represented by the Commission and actively participates in Summits alongside its four 
member states (France, Germany, Italy and the UK).   
 
Figure 8. Share of the world FDI stock in 2014 
 
Series: shared percentage (%)  
Sources: UNCTADstat, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
 
As a significant economy in the global arena, what the EU needs to do is to convert its economic 
capacity into economic power. As discussed in Chapter 1, in order to establish the legal and 
institutional basis for a convergent and consistent trade policy, the EU has implemented the 
Common Commercial Policy. Despite divergences and competition among institutions and 
member states, the CCP is still the EU’s most integrated policy. As mentioned previously in 
this chapter, the EU has normative characteristics, which are also reflected in its commercial 
policy. Therefore, in order to pursue its normative goals, trade and other forms of economic 
cooperation are used by the EU as civilian means: they could be incentives for accepting the 
EU’s norms, and could also be the punishment if a partner does not follow, or breaks, the rules. 
 
The EU’s economic strength has built a foundation to support its development policy. Based 
on the European Consensus on Development, the EU provides financial assistance and 
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economic cooperation to help developing countries eradicate poverty.433 Meanwhile, another 
major goal of this policy is to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the 
recipients.434 To some extent, the development aid is an instrument for diffusing the EU’s 
norms. In order to receive the EU’s assistance, a third-party country needs to accept the EU’s 
norms. In this sense, democracy, human rights and other norms are not only the objectives, but 
also the requirements for the EU’s development policies.435 
 
As mentioned in section 4.3.3.2, the EU has implemented a series of development programmes 
with third parties. Observation shows that the EU has been successful in its development policy, 
especially in its cooperation with African countries, and so the EU is an ideal partner to promote 
the interests of developing countries.436 Others argue that there is a gap between expectation 
and outcome, which calls the effectiveness of the development policy into some doubt. This 
argument is also evident in the relationship between the EU and China. The EU started 
providing financial and technological assistance to China since 1984, whose programmes have 
covered a range of aspects, such as poverty eradication, economic and social reform, scientific 
and technological cooperation, and climate issues. The assistance was implemented as a part 
of the EU’s constructive engagement policy with China.437 According to a Chinese government 
report, until the end of 2012, there have been 85 projects that were funded by 810 million 
euros.438 However, it has been criticized in that the constructive engagement underperformed 
as the progress in China was not sufficient to meet the EU’s criteria.439 This exposed the limits 
                                                 
433 The European Consensus on Development, (2006/C 46/01), Official Journal of the European Union, 
24.2.2006.  
434 ‘3.2. 'Mainstreaming' the promotion of human rights and democracy in EC assistance programmes’, 
European Commission. 2001a. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries 
(Brussels, 8 May 2001 COM(2001) 252 final). 
435 Carlos Santiso, “Promoting democracy by conditioning aid? Towards a more effective EU development 
assistance,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 3, (2002): 107-134; Richard Youngs, Democracy 
Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy. (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2001). 
436 Marjorie Lister, The European Union and the South: Relations with developing countries (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 6-41. 
437 European Commission, ‘A long term policy for China-Europe relations’, Brussels, 5 July 1995, COM(1995) 
279 final.  
438Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs, 欧盟对华无偿援助简况 (Brief on the EU’s 
assistance to China), Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, available at 
http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ar/as/201109/20110907733677.shtml, assessed 6 January 2016. 
439 John Fox and François Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, 32-37. 
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of the development policy when it faced the clash of values/cultures, as discussed in the last 
section.  
 
Suspension of assistances can be used as a means to punish the recipients who violate the norms 
of democracy and human rights. For example, the EU has suspended its cooperation with Niger, 
Haiti, Fiji and other countries when their democracy was undermined.440 In 1989, the EC also 
suspended cooperation with China as a response to the Tiananmen event, and even though most 
cooperation was resumed over the following few years, the arms embargo remained in place. 
The Chinese government urged the EU to lift this but failed to convince. This will be further 
discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
 
4.3.4.3 Summary 
This section has demonstrated the EU’s and China’s particular characteristics in terms of their 
economies. Despite the rapid economic growth and remarkable achievement in development, 
the Chinese government still perceives China to be a developing country. It emphasises that 
certain domestic problems remain to be solved, and believes that resolving domestic issues has 
priority over taking over-weighted international responsibilities. This kind of perception 
affected its attitude towards assisting the EU in tackling the European debt crisis, as will be 
seen in section 5.3.5.  
 
The EU is a significant economic presence in the international arena. It is capable of wielding 
its economic power as a civilian means to serve its other initiatives such as promoting certain 
norms. As mentioned in the previous sections, the EU is a normative power, and given its post-
modernist values, it not only enjoys the responsibility of spreading its norms across national 
borders, it also takes it as a way in which to realise its normative interests. However, its 
ambitions need to be built on the foundation of its economic strength; in other words, its 
economic clout empowers the EU in the pursuit of its normative interests.  
 
                                                 
440 Carlos Santiso, “Promoting democracy by conditioning aid? Towards a more effective EU development 
assistance,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 3, (2002): 107-134 
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4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the type identities of the EU and China. Type identity is 
generated by self-understanding and inner-construction, and reflects the intrinsic 
characteristics of the actor. These characteristics are attached to cultural elements, which 
explains the question of ‘what kind of actors are they’ in international society. Specifically, 
type identity has three functions in explaining actors’ behaviours. First, it socializes actors into 
certain categories in international society, and in the process of socialisation, actors follow 
corresponding norms and display relevant behaviour patterns. Second, type identity defines 
actors’ interests. Their genuine interests are shaped by actors’ cognition of their inner qualities, 
which are the values, norms and preferences that compose the contents of the type identity. 
Third, type identity does not only influence the process of self-cognition, but also the 
perception of others. Perceiving others is an inter-subjective process, thus the perception of 
others is attached to actors’ subjective values, which conform to the type identity and relevant 
characteristics. That being said, this chapter has explored the type identities of the EU and 
China from the perspectives of political regimes, strategies, values and economies, as they can 
contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the properties of the two actors.  
 
In terms of the political regimes, China has adopted a model of democratic centralism under 
the leadership of the CPC. Instead of debating the criticisms of this single party system, this 
section focused on China’s self-understanding of its ‘democracy’. This self-understanding 
shows that China, or specifically the CPC, believes that its regime is legitimately democratic, 
and it refuses the paradigm of other regimes (particularly Western multi-party democracy) that 
might undermine the leadership of the CPC. These ideas are considerably different from 
Western norms, and present a huge obstacle to the political identification between the two sides. 
Furthermore, it is one of the major areas where the EU wants to see the transition occur. In 
another way, the EU also faces the ‘democratic deficit’, and it reflects the complexity of the 
EU’s sources of initiative. In tackling this issue, it has gradually gained democratic legitimacy 
at the EU level. However, its supranational quality gives the EU a complicated policy-making 
procedure (as discussed in chapter 1), thus, it is not as efficient as nation states in constructing 
a coherent policy. 
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From a strategic perspective, China is a rising power, which means that China does not only 
pursue material interests to strengthen its hard power, but also seeks to adapt international 
norms into the shapes that it favours. This might cause the clash with the EU as it is a normative 
power that defends the norms that have been built by the West. But in the analysis, it is noted 
that while the EU emphasises its normative principles, it also has realistic needs, which are 
those of pursuing material interests. Therefore, it is possible for the two to cooperate. But, in 
their cooperation, it is important to distinguish which are material needs and which are 
normative interests. 
 
With regards to values, China is an Eastern culture with Westphalian norms. It has its own 
civilization and understanding of international norms, such as those associated with human 
rights. Moreover, in order to defend its sovereignty and exclude interference from others, it 
upholds the nationalist ideals that were developed from Westphalian treaties. In contrast, the 
EU sees human rights differently, and given its post-modern understanding of the notion of 
sovereignty, it believes it is legitimate to intervene in a third-party country’s domestic politics 
in order to protect human rights and promote democracy. Consequently, this is an aspect where 
the EU clashes with China. 
 
Economically, China is a fast-growing country, where the amount and the growth rate of the 
GDP shows how impressive China’s economic development has been. However, the GDP per 
capita indicates that China remains a developing country that still faces a number of domestic 
problems, and this results in the fact that China is not willing to carry too many international 
responsibilities, for example, dealing with climate issues and the euro crisis. The EU is the 
largest economy in the world, and a developed bloc. Its economic strength enables it to 
implement its development policy, which is to promote economic development and spread 
democracy and human rights in developing countries. This development policy has also been 
applied in the engagement with China, but was not as successful as the EU had otherwise 
expected; this will be further discussed in the next Chapter. 
 
The exploration of type identities has shown the inner characteristics of the two. Some of them 
have similarities; for example, in terms of strategies, they both pursue material and normative 
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interests. But, in the meantime, they have many differences, especially in their understandings 
of norms such as human rights and democracy. Therefore, their pursuit of normative interests 
will not have the same dimension, and may even clash with each other. In some regards, the 
two entities’ characteristics are not directly related or contradictory, but along with qualities in 
other aspects, they can still explain the preferences and behaviour patterns of these two actors. 
For example, China’s political regime is supported by its own values, and its legitimacy has 
been reinforced by its economic success. The EU’s normative interests partly originate from 
its values, and are supported by its economic powers. Moreover, the EU itself is a multifaceted 
actor with multiple interest channels, so it needs to be cautious when analysing where the EU’s 
interest is coming from.  
 
The analysis of the type identity has contributed to an understanding of the actors’ 
characteristics, preferences and behaviour patterns. Based on these understandings, it will also 
contribute to an explanation as to how the two construct their role identities, and particularly 
why they perceive each other in a particular way. The quality of an actor’s type identity is 
critical in shaping its perception of others, because the actor’s ability to know (in this thesis, 
perceive) is based on its inner characteristics, which constitute its type identities. The two 
actors’ perceptions are significant factors that will be analysed in the following chapters, as it 
impacts the nature of their role identities and their interactions in the negotiation on arms 
embargo. The demonstration of these two actors’ type identity in chapter will contribute to 
explain why they perceive each other in a particular way, and thereby, construct their role 
identities. 
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Chapter 5. Role identities of the EU and China: Relations in Five 
Phases 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the EU’s and China’s crucial inner characteristics, on which 
they have built their type identities as members of international society. This chapter focuses 
on role identity, which refers to a pair of roles that are constructed in the interaction between 
two (or multiple) actors. It explains the actors’ perceptions of each other, and defines their 
needs from each other, thereby, shapes the nature of their relationship. 
 
This chapter begins with an introduction into the concept of ‘role identity’, and then establishes 
two key elements that can influence the construction of role identity: the external environment 
and perceptions. Furthermore, these two key elements’ relationship to more conventional 
theories of roles, perceptions and images, such as the role theory and image theory in Foreign 
Policy Analysis will be clarified respectively in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.3. Additionally, section 
5.2.3 will discuss the concept and function of ‘shared knowledge’, and further clarify its links 
to concepts of perception and social learning.  
 
This chapter will then follow with a historical review, which covers nearly 40 years since 1975 
when the EU-China bilateral relationship was established. Building on different role identities, 
I have divided this period into five phases; in 1975-1989, the EU perceived China as a primary 
actor in international society, and itself as ‘new partner’ of China. In 1989-1994, China was 
perceived as a conservative Communist country, and the EU played a role of ‘punisher’. 
Between 1995-2005, they were ‘maturing partners’. From 2006-2008, the relationship was 
further complicated, and their identities could be defined as ‘critical friends’. Between 2008-
2012, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the two parties became ‘reluctant partners’, and 
behaved in a pragmatic way. In reviewing the historical development, there seems to be a 
regular pattern: the relationship started well in the first phase, but then was affected by tensions 
in the second; the ties were tight in the third phase, but then became strained again in the next 
phase. However, I do not suggest a cycle in the transition of relationship that inevitably leads 
from closeness to tension and then back to closeness again (and then to tension and so on). The 
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only salient factor is the transformation of role identities, as the qualities of the relationship are 
not observed as given, but rather reflect the nature of the role identities and the extent of their 
shared knowledge, which will be further discussed in section 5.2. 
 
In the historical review section, I will first demonstrate the context of that phase in order to 
introduce the external environment and its impact on the construction of identity. Then follows 
the section on ‘role identities’ and ‘corresponding interactions’, where the former section will 
explore their role identities and the relevant interests, and the latter will show the corresponding 
interactions that can be attributed to the identities and interests. In the process of this review, 
official documents and significant affairs will be taken as crucial factors by which to measure 
the changes over the several stages mentioned above. This review as a whole can be considered 
as a long-term based case study that tests my main hypothesis, namely that role identity plays 
a decisive role in influencing the EU-China relationship. 
 
5.2. Role Identity 
Before reviewing the historical process, it is necessary to clarify the concept of ‘role identity’. 
This section aims to a) define ‘role identity’ on the basis of constructivist theory, and explain 
its relationship with roles and images of conventional theories; b) to demonstrate its application 
in the analysis of EU-China relations; and c) to apply the notion of ‘perception’ to analyse the 
conceptual interaction between actors, to connect role identity with type identity and the 
external environment, and to clarify the links between ‘shared knowledge’ and ‘social learning’. 
This discussion of role identity is designed to give a theoretical framework to the historical 
review. 
 
5.2.1 Definition of role identity 
Role identity represents a mutual relationship that is generated in social interactions. In the last 
chapter, I explained the nature of type identity, which represents the intrinsic characteristics 
and answers the question ‘what am I’. Role identity, however, is constructed in the engagement 
with others, and answers the question of ‘who am I’. Specifically, when two actors engage with 
each other, they construct a pair of roles. This pair of roles frames their relationship, and 
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outlines their perceptions towards each other, which in turn then define the needs each party 
has from the other, and also sketches a behavioural pattern that conforms to these needs.  
 
‘Role’, ‘identity’ and ‘Role identity’ are widely used concepts in various disciplines, not only 
in IR Constructivism, but also in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Social Psychology, and so 
forth. In the context of Social Psychology, ‘role identity’ is a consequence of ‘self-
conceptualization’ and an orientation of ‘role performance’. ‘Self-conceptualization’, depends 
on different theories and context, could be self-categorization or identification.441 Nevertheless, 
altogether, its purpose is to recognise the concept of ‘self’, which reflects both social structure 
and individual personalities as a whole.442 ‘Role performance’ studies how one’s behaviour is 
affected by the expectations of ‘others’ and the properties that are attached to the ‘self’.443 
Social psychologists have provided an analytical model that can recognize one’s role salience, 
by which they can then analyse one’s behaviour. 
 
This model has been employed by FPA scholars within the framework of ‘role theory’, which 
is designed to analyse national role or state identity and its effect on foreign policy.444 While 
being applied both by Foreign Policy analysts and constructivists, role theory in FPA differs 
from identity in Constructivism. Role theorists emphasise at the national level with a cognitive 
approach, whist Constructivists take a systematic perspective with an agent-structure 
approach.445  
 
                                                 
441 Jan E. Stets and Peter Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory”, Social Psychology Quarterly 63, 
no.3 (2000): 224-237. 
442 George Herbert Mead, “Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social behaviorist (Works of 
George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1),” (1967), 162. 
443 Sheldon Stryker, “Identity Salience and Role Performance: The Relevance of Symbolic Interaction Theory 
for Family Research”, Journal of Marriage and Family 30, no.4 (1968): 558-564; Sheldon Stryker, “Toward an 
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Donald C.Reitzes, “The Link between Identity and Role Performance”, Social Psychology Quarterly 44, no.2 
(1981): 83-92. 
444 Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, International Studies 
Quarterly, 14, no. 3 (1970): 233-309; Stephen G. Walker, eds., Role theory and foreign policy analysis, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1987); Naomi Bailin Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role 
Conceptions”, International Studies Quarterly 24, no. 4 (1980): 532-554. 
445 Cameron G Thies, “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory”, 
Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 1 (2012): 1-4. 
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This has resulted in a gap between these two disciplines. Wendt criticised the role theorists’ 
assumption that ‘states’ foreign policy roles are entirely a function of policy makers’ beliefs 
and domestic politics, rather than their relations to Others.’446 On the other hand, Banchoff 
made the accusation that Constructivists have yet to develop ‘an explanatory framework 
applicable to a wide range of cases’, and their neglect of national level politics makes them 
incapable of analysing national actions.447 
 
To be fair, Wendt is not truly correct. In Holsti’s article, the author did not ‘entirely’ give credit 
to individuals’ beliefs and domestic politics, but also acknowledged the influence of alter’s448 
prescriptions, which have their origin in system, structure and world opinion. What Holsti 
argued is that in the policy-making process, there is a primacy of influence of self-conceptions 
and domestic needs over alter’s prescriptions. The externally constructed norms usually give 
way to internally generated needs.449 
 
It is true that external influence needs to be internalised by the actor’s perception, and in this 
sense the FPA cognitive approach is valid. But there are two points that should be noted, and 
these points are important in understanding the differences between the constructivist approach 
and conventional theories. First, domestic needs are not given by nature, but constructed both 
domestically and internationally. To some extent, the international environment could have a 
significant impact on the construction of domestic needs. This is where the constructivist 
approach is different from the FPA approach, instead of taking any interests as given, it asks 
how these interests are constructed.450 Second, how does one actor perceive the world, and how 
it internalises external influences into its own conception should be questioned. In a socialized 
environment, one’s conception could be affected by others or the whole culture of the 
environment, and therefore its perception of the world might be pre-influenced by the world at 
                                                 
446 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 227. 
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the first place. This shows another distinctive feature of the constructivist approach. It has an 
inter-subjective way in analysing relations between agents and the structure. In terms of this, 
constructivists proposed three cultures of anarchy, that an agent/actor could have specific 
behaviour/perception modes in different cultures of anarchy;451 this will be explained below in 
section 5.2.2.1.  
 
Some scholars argue that the gap between IR and FPA is not that great, and it is possible that 
it can be synthesized.452 There is also an increasing number of researchers who have tried to 
close the gap and applied role theory in various cases.453 Within these literatures, ‘role’ is 
categorized as ‘role-conception’ and ‘role-expectation’, where the former refers to the self-
conceptualization process, which distinguishes the self from others, and the latter refers to the 
influence from others. This categorization, to some extent, conforms to the constructivist 
definition of ‘identity’. Within the concept of identity, type identity could be considered as a 
process of ‘self-conception’, which reflects the inner characteristics of the ‘self’, while role 
identity refers to the relationship with others and the position in the structural society. However, 
Constructivists do not pay sufficient attention to the analysis of how external factors can 
influence an actor’s conception and behaviour, which means the connection between type 
identity and role identity is absent, which is also the point that role theorists criticised. 
 
With the awareness of both theories’ limits, this chapter aims to close the gap by demonstrating 
how type identity shapes the way that the parties perceive each other, and it will also show how 
the actors’ behaviours are decisively influenced by the combination of type identity and role 
identity. The type identity outlines the actors’ general behavioural modes, and the role identity 
                                                 
451 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 246-312. 
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determines their actions in specific situations. The function of type identity is seen as a factor 
here, but the main theme of this chapter is to explore the role identities of the EU and China. 
 
5.2.2 Function of role identity 
This section aims to explain the impact of the external environment on the construction of 
identity, the relationships between identity, interest and behaviour, and the function of 
perception in the ‘identity-interest-behaviour’ relationship. This section, meanwhile, also 
establishes the analytical structure of this thesis. 
 
5.2.2.1 External environment 
As mentioned above, role theorists believe that alter' prescriptions, such as ‘international legal 
norms or world opinion explain few aspects of national behaviour’. Because of the ‘fact of 
sovereignty’ and the structure of anarchy, those prescriptions are too ‘weak compared to those 
that exist in an integrated society and particularly with formal organisations’.454 However, this 
is not entirely true. First, as Wendt argues, ‘anarchy is what states make of it’455, the recognition 
of sovereignty itself has made ‘sovereignty’ a ‘world norm’, and thus, as argued above, the 
needs within the confine of sovereignty have actually been pre-influenced by world opinion in 
the first place. 
 
Second, the initiatives of domestic needs are strong indeed, but this is not because international 
society is ‘flexible’ or not as ‘integrated’ as a formal organisation456. Even within an integrated 
organisation, it is also common to see member states prioritizing their domestic initiatives over 
the EU’s norms. If we follow sociological role theory back to the societal level, again it is 
common to see individuals thinking of their own interests first. Thus the degree of flexibility 
or integration is not the crucial factor with which to judge the efficacy of the external 
environment. Moreover, we cannot deny the fact that the external environment has the power 
to influence individuals, organisations, or sovereign states, especially in the modern global 
agenda. Cooperation in peace-keeping, combating transnational crime and coping with climate 
                                                 
454 Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, p.243. 
455 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, 391-425. 
456 Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, 243. 
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change shows that there are common international opinions to share and common norms to 
conform to, even though some of them might undermine the sovereignty of states. 
 
Then how does the external environment influence role identity and thereby behaviour? Wendt 
proposed three cultures of anarchy——Hobbesian culture, Lockean culture and Kantian 
culture——to explain the role identities of states in international society.457 In Hobbesian 
culture, the dominant logic is ‘kill or be killed’, and such a violent environment constitutes an 
‘enmity’ role relationship, where actors are each other’s enemies. In Lockean culture, the 
dominant logic has been replaced by ‘live and let live’, state sovereignty has been recognised 
and the rights of ‘life and liberty’ have been acknowledged. In this environment, ‘rivalry’ is 
the character of the role relationship. Rivals allow others to live but still compete with each 
other, and if it comes to conflict, force is used with limits and constraints. Wendt believes 
international politics lives in the Lockean culture in the post-Westphalian era. Kantian culture 
is based on the logic of ‘pluralistic security communities and collective security’. ‘Friendship’ 
represents the relationship in this environment, which is constituted by two rules of ‘non-
violence’ and ‘team play’. Wendt noticed this phenomenon in the operation of NATO, and 
nowadays the EU could be regarded as another model. 
 
Constructivists do not agree with structural-realists’ argument that international structure 
determines the allocation of powers, and thereby determines the function of states. The nature 
of the structure comes with certain cultural elements attached, which is based on states’ shared 
knowledge. And this shared knowledge, in turn, helps states internalise exogenous cultures and 
construct their role identities. It should be noted that the three cultures above are the examples 
that have been summarised by Wendt, but there could be ‘middle place’ between the three, in 
which the cultural atmosphere is in a mixed status which is compounded by two of those 
cultures. For instance, the external environment could be harsh, hence global culture would be 
somewhat between Hobbesian and Lockean culture, or even slightly lean towards Hobbesian 
culture. Therefore, the culture of the external environment is more diverse than only these three 
ideal types would suggest. The function of external environment is important in the sense that 
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it helps in understanding how EU-China relations change along with the atmosphere of 
international society. This will be explicitly demonstrated in the first three sections of 5.3. 
 
5.2.2.2 Identity-Interest-behaviour 
Neorealists believe that in the anarchic world, states are egocentric. The behaviours of states 
are directed by interests which are shaped by the distribution of powers458. In this condition, 
national interests have a material basis, and their behaviours are a mixed result of anarchy and 
material interests. This argument overemphasises the function of the material, whilst neglecting 
that of ideas. Constructivists argue that identity is the prerequisite of interests, without which 
interests cannot be constituted. 
 
When we look at the relationships between identity, interest and behaviour, they are concerned 
with three primary questions: ‘who am I’, ‘what do I want?’ and ‘what should I do?’ Identity 
represents the properties and international roles of the actor, which answers the question of 
‘who am I?’ Interest explains the actor’s needs, while it also consists of the motivations to 
realise identity, and therefore this answers the question of ‘what do I want?’ Behaviour refers 
to the policies and the actions required to implement the policies that are projected for interests, 
and it answers the question of ‘what can I do?’ Based on these concepts, the logic is that an 
actor 1) conceptualizes who it is (understanding the identity), 2) then it can know what it needs 
(shaping the interest), finally 3) it can decide what to do (conducting the behaviour). 
Consequently, if we say behaviour is motivated by interest, more precisely it is the interest that 
has been realised—the interest in the scope defined by identity. We can try to understand this 
at two levels. At the micro level, the actor, for instance, a country, is a ‘group-self’, every ‘self’ 
within the actor, which for example, could be the local government within the country, has its 
own identity, thereby having its own interest. But not all the interests can be included within 
the actor’s interests. It is only if the actor conceptualizes the identity of certain groups of ‘self’, 
then the interests of these ‘selves’ can become the actor’s interests. At the macro level, the 
actor may have various identities in international society, but not all of them can be internalised 
by the actor, who will need to internalise these identities first and can then shape its 
international interests so as to match with its identities. 
                                                 
458 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of international politics, 126. 
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National role identities are various and variable, and may change in the interaction with others. 
Similarly, the relations of identity, interest and behaviour are also dynamic459. When the actor’s 
identity changes, its belief as to what it needs varies accordingly, hence the behaviour model 
will be different. It should be noted that interest—as the link between identity and behaviour—
does not merely refer to material interests such as commercial profit or military power, but also 
to normative interests like the willingness to promote democracy, human rights or a new model 
of great power relations. Furthermore, although ‘interest’ is used as a functional factor in this 
research, it does not mean that the dimension of this research is interest-oriented. ‘Interest’ is 
not the exclusive factor of realism, rather, the crucial question is how ‘interest’ is 
constructed.460 
 
Following from the discussion above, a question arises. It seems that the subject of the relations 
of identity, interest and action is one single actor—one actor constructs its identity, shapes its 
interest and then conducts its behaviour. Then how can an analytical model fit into the 
interaction between two actors, namely, the EU and China? How can a connection be 
established between the two actors? 
 
If an actor has a role identity, it is because there is a kind of identity of ‘other’ that exists. In 
the process of an interaction the two actors have their own identities, and both can perceive the 
identity of the others, and the perceived identity can generate feedback and construct a 
corresponding identity. In the process of shaping interest and behaviour, the actor’s identity is 
connected with the other’s role identity, but is also branded with its own characteristics. The 
pattern of this relationship is shown below: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
459 Peter Katzenstein, (eds.). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, 61. 
460 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 144. 
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Figure 9. The relationships of identity, interest and behaviour in the interaction 
 
 
In this figure, if we take the EU as the subject and China as the object, then 1) the EU engages 
with China and perceives China’s national identity, 2) the EU obtains feedback and constructs 
its corresponding identity, 3) the EU defines its interest towards China, and 4) the EU makes 
policy and practices diplomatic action with China. 
 
5.2.3 Perceptions 
As might be noticed in the discussion above, there is a hidden but critical factor in the self and 
external environment relationship and the identity-interest-behaviour framework——it is that 
of perception. Perception affects the way in which the external environment is internalised, and 
it also functions in the process of ‘constructing corresponding identity’, and influences the way 
in which the other’s role identity is perceived. This point requires further discussion. 
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Perception is a concept initially applied in Image theory in FPA. Image theorists argue that ‘it 
is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behaviour’.461 
The world has an objective existence, but is revealed in a subjective image as we perceive it, 
where our perception reflects the ‘patterns or configurations of…the out-group’462, and this 
perception will be reflected in our behaviour. In this sense, Image theory takes a similar 
cognitive approach to the constructivist approach, as they both emphasise subjectivity. Another 
similarity between Image theory and the constructivist approach is that they both believe that 
perceiving others is not always a process of revealing ‘fact’. At the societal level, due to the 
early (family, primary, and so forth) education and historical traditions that have been 
implanted into the culture, one’s perception of the world could be ‘a perspective distortion of 
the truth’463. At the international level, it is reasonable to draw an analogy. Due to the diverse 
characteristics of nations — political regimes, material powers, cultures, historical experiences, 
geopolitical conditions and so on — their perceptions of the world could be different. For 
instance, North Korea and Sweden will each feel a different level of hostility from the outside 
world, and they might have different understandings of the world’s atmosphere.  
 
With that said, the constructivist approach applied in this thesis is somehow different from the 
Image theory. Despite their acknowledgement on subjectivity, role identity explicitly emphases 
the inter-subjectivity. It does not only explore one actor’s perception of the other, but also asks 
how one’s perception shapes the formation of the other’s perception. Moreover, role identity 
goes further to study that, to what extent would their perceptions be compliant to each other, 
thereby shaping the nature of the relationship. This feature of the role identity involves the 
concept of ‘shared knowledge’, which will be discussed below. Similarly, it is not guaranteed 
that the perceptions among international actors reflect each other’s true characteristics. In fact, 
due to the existence of sovereignty and the necessary concerns of national security, there could 
be many ‘blind spots’, which prevent one nation from clearly understanding another’s 
intentions, motivations, strategies and requirements, and consequently leave them to guess and 
indulge in game playing, and thereby leading to misunderstandings. 
                                                 
461 Kenneth E. Boulding, “National Images and International Systems”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 3, 
no. 2 (1959): 120-131. 
462 Michele G. Alexander, Marilynn B. Brewer and Robert W. Livingston, “Putting stereotype content in 
context: Image theory and interethnic stereotypes”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31, no. 6 (2005): 
781-794. 
463 Kenneth E. Boulding, “National Images and International Systems”, 122. 
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Perception of 
A 
 
Due to these potential misunderstandings and different characteristics, role identity could be 
asymmetrical in the process of construction. For instance, if one side mistakenly takes the other 
as a friend, but the other side does not have a similar impression and thus remains as a rival (or 
even worse an enemy), then this asymmetrical structure of role identities could lead to 
disappointments, conflicts or in a worst-case scenario, even wars. 
 
These misunderstandings and asymmetries attribute to the lack of shared knowledge, which 
has its origins in perceptions of each other and the external environment. In the process of 
perceiving each other, as shown in Figure 10, A and B would generate their own perceptions, 
and the overlapping section is their shared knowledge. This shared knowledge consists of the 
two actors’ perceptions, ideas and preferences, which generate motivations for actors to 
perform interactions that benefit both of them. Moreover, sharing common knowledge implies 
that actors have similar behavioural norms, and this kind of conformities contributes to 
maintain the nature of the relationship. Therefore, the more shared knowledge they have, the 
less asymmetrical the role identities, and the more solid the relationship can be. If the shared 
knowledge breaks, then the relationship would become unstable and the cooperation would be 
undermined. 
 
Figure 10. Perception and shared knowledge 
 
 
 
 
    
 
                                              
This figure is produced by the author. 
A B 
                         Perception of B 
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Then what is the source of the perceptions? The answer is type identity. Just like education and 
cultural traditions impact individual’s perception of society, these inner characteristics 
influence ways of thinking. Perception is based on the actor’s knowledge and their capability 
to know. Thus, the result of perceiving is inevitably attached to the actor’s own knowledge and 
conceptions, which reflect its inner characteristics. In the processes 1) and 2) in Figure 9, if the 
way of perceiving is affected, then the content of China’s identity would be attached to the 
EU’s own knowledge, and the corresponding identity would actually correspond to the 
‘perceived identity’— China’s objective identity is the ‘raw material’, and will be processed in 
the EU’s ‘mind factory’. 
 
The way they perceive each other involves a concept of ‘social learning’. It suggests that one 
actor engages others with fragmentary knowledge and provisional perceptions. Through the 
process of engagement, the actor obtains updated information and thus adapts its strategies 
towards the others.464 Whilst social learning provides an excellent approach in explaining 
actors’ interactions and their compliance with international norms, 465  it is argued that it 
sometimes takes a rationalistic stance: a) it assumes that the actor naturally accepts the 
international norms as given, 466  and b) it assumes that the actor is capable of fully 
understanding the information it acquired through interactions with others, and internalising it 
into its own preferences. However, with a constructivist value added, it is believed that social 
learning is a dynamic process, hence, either international norms or actors’ preferences may 
change in their interactions. Accordingly, actors need to adapt to these changes rather than 
sticking to the initial norms. Furthermore, it is debateable whether the actor can perceive the 
                                                 
464 Arild Underdal, "Explaining compliance and defection: three models." European Journal of International 
Relations 4, no. 1 (1998): 21.  
465 Randall Calvert. "The rational choice theory of social institutions: Cooperation, coordination, and 
communication." Modern political economy: Old topics, new directions 216 (1995): 244; Jeffrey T. Checkel, 
"Why comply? Social learning and European identity change." International organization 55, no. 3 (2001): 553-
588. Social learning has also been applied in studies of the EU affairs. For instance, Tanja A. Börzel, and Risse 
Thomas "Conceptualizing the domestic impact of Europe." The politics of Europeanization (2003): 57-80; 
Frank Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier Ulrich. "Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe." Journal of European public policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 661-679; Richard 
Youngs. "Normative dynamics and strategic interests in the EU's external identity." JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 42, no. 2 (2004): 415-435.   
466 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Why comply? Social learning and European identity change", 560-561. 
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others in an objective way. As argued above, the actor’s perception could be very subjective 
due to the confines of its knowledge and preferences.  
 
Therefore, in order to understand what, and how much the actor would have learned from the 
interaction with others, it is crucial to understand the actors’ type identities, and this is the 
reason that a large amount of work has been included in chapter 4 that illustrates the EU and 
China’s type identities. In the analysis of their role identities, the understanding of their inner 
characteristics would help to determine how the role identities are constructed, why they vary 
in different phases, and whether they are based on fact or illusion. Furthermore, in international 
interactions, the external environment produces a general atmosphere for the role identity of 
actors, and the way they perceive each other determines their specific role identities. This being 
said, the specific role identities would not suddenly emerge out of the boundaries of the general 
structure, just as it would be extremely rare for two countries to abruptly become enemies in 
peace time. 
 
This research argues that identity (which consists of type identity and role identity) is the key 
factor in understanding relations. It has to be perceived (otherwise it does not exist in the 
interaction of two actors) and be able to generate a corresponding identity. It can only influence 
behaviour by defining the scope of interest. The identity itself and the process of perceiving 
can be influenced by the external environment and its own type identity; but, after all, role 
identity is the ‘crux’ of interaction, the internal and external influence can only be functional 
while it is understood and internalised by identity. 
 
5.3. Relations in Five Phases 
Given that perceiving is a dynamic progress with variations, the role identities of the EU and 
China therefore have been transformed over time. One identity at a time represents a temporary 
perception, which is a fragment that constitutes the whole process. The objective standards 
used to divide the phases could be commercial status or political relations, but it should be 
noted that these objective standards are not the main influential factors; originally, role 
identities are the key factors to the transformation of a relationship. 
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How, then, to define the content of role identities in each phase? There could be more than one 
role identity at a time. For instance, when the diplomatic relationship was originally built in 
1975, although the property of their role structure had become friendlier, they still belonged to 
two opposed ‘camps’. In the first decade of the millennium, the general atmosphere of the EU-
China relationship was both harmonious and competitive — more cooperation has been 
undertaken, but also more conflicts have occurred. However, in a different time, the detailed 
atmosphere was not always as simple as the general image. In some phases, it was complicated 
as the nature of the role identities could be multifaceted. In this latter case, I will demonstrate 
the complex attributes of the atmosphere, and grasp the dominant essence of the identities. 
 
5.3.1 1975-1989: Primary Partners 
The first phase started with the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations in 1975, and 
ended in 1989 along with the subsequent effect of the Tiananmen events. During this period, 
the relationship between the European Economic Community (EEC) and China experienced a 
breakthrough, going from nothing to a set of considerable achievements. In the Cold War 
atmosphere, this bilateral relationship, as observers have illustrated, developed from a 
secondary relationship to an independent one.467 The barrier between the two bipolar blocs 
been lifted, and the role identities of the EEC and China transformed from ones of ‘enemies’ 
to ‘partners’. With these identities, substantial changes and progress was made between the 
two parties. 
 
5.3.1.1 Context 
In the Cold War era, the European-China relationship was generally derivative of the broader 
relationship of the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union.468 However, in the 1970s 
this tension was easing, and the atmosphere of ‘détente’ gave European countries a relatively 
relaxed period in which to pursue their independent foreign policies and develop creative 
                                                 
467 David Shambaugh, “China and Europe: the Development from a Secondary to an Independent Relationship”, 
in China and Europe towards 21st century, eds., Song Xinning and Zhang Xiaojin (The Social Science Press, 
1997). 
468 Nicola Casarini, “From secondary relationship to post-Cold War partnership”, in The evolution of the EU and 
China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership, 9; Wu Baiyi, “后冷战国际体系变
动与中欧关系 (The Post-Cold War System Change and the Sino-EU Relations)”, 1-16. 
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relationships with a number of countries in the Eastern bloc. Arguably the most famous cases 
was the ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ undertaken by the Federal Republic of Germany.  
 
Meanwhile on the other side of the Eurasian continent, under increasing pressure from the 
Soviet Union, Chinese leaders re-considered the environment of world politics and 
consequently proposed the ‘Three World Theory’469 with the aim of realigning the Western 
European powers and third world countries. This new perception of world politics led China to 
re-approach the US, and paved the way to establishing official diplomatic relations with other 
Western European countries. This turning point also meant that China has abandoned its 
overwhelming priority in its proletarian revolution, and started engaging with the world 
through a new identity——an independent ‘socialist country that belongs to the third world’470. 
Furthermore, three years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, China implemented 
the ‘reform and open’ policy, which reinforced China’s type identity as an open-minded 
international actor, and the market-oriented economic model was also welcomed by the 
Western market economies. To this extent, both Western European countries and China 
distanced themselves from the formula of superpower politics were been able to engage with 
each other on their own initiatives. 
 
5.3.1.2 Role Identities 
The main role identities of the EEC and China in this period were those of partners, both 
politically and economically. On China’s side, realignment with the Western European 
countries was a means to balance the influences of the superpowers. Chinese leaders 
emphasised the significance of forming the broadest united front for fighting against the 
superpowers’ hegemony.471 Therefore, as a member of the ‘Second World’, EEC’s identity has 
                                                 
469 “Three World Theory” was first raised by Mao Zedong, categorizing the US and the USSR as the first world, 
Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia and other developed countries as the second world, China and other 
developing countries as the third world. More details and analysis on this theory see Arif Dirlik, “Mao Zedong 
Thought and the Third World/Global South”, Interventions, 2014, 16:2, 233-256; An, Jiang. “Mao Zedong’s 
“Three Worlds” Theory: Political Considerations and Value for the Times”, Social Sciences in China 43, no.1 
(2013): 35-57; Herbert S. Yee, “The Three World Theory and Post-Mao China's Global Strategy”, International 
Affairs 59, no. 2 (1983): 239-249. 
470 Deng Xiaoping. The selected works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2, People’s Publishing House, July 1994, 
p.112, available online at http://cddx.ncu.edu.cn/docs/20110221170427698613.pdf. (accessed 2 February 2016) 
471 Zhou Enlai. “Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China”, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64562/65450/4429430.html. Other records of Chinese leaders’ (Mao 
Zedong, Deng Xiaoping) talking on this issue see Liao, Xinwen. “Strategic thoughts and policy-making to break 
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been perceived as a potential ally by China. To this end, building a formal relationship with the 
EEC was a strategic foreign policy for China and also a practice of its ‘Three World Theory’. 
 
On the European side, this realignment was praised in a political way as well. As Christopher 
Soames claimed, re-approaching China implied that the Europeans had become an active actor 
in international political arena, which gave the member states ‘greater weight’ to deal with the 
US,472 and was also seen as an acknowledgement of the significance of European integration.473 
This new momentum between China and Europe had been remarked upon a description that 
‘an entirely new factor has emerged in world politics…between the two great continuous 
centres of world civilization’474 
 
Besides the political discourse, trade and economy was the sphere where both parties can 
achieve considerable benefits. They were both needed by each other, which makes them a pair 
of reciprocal partners. After 1978, China’s central strategy switched to economic development, 
and in order to fulfil this strategy China needed foreign investment, advanced technology and 
managerial experience. Moreover, Western European countries could also be a new horizon to 
which to China’s raw material (such as mineral resources) exports could be expanded. For the 
EEC, the increasing size of China’s market implied a promising destination for its exports. 
China’s low-cost advantage was later to also become attractive to European investors. 
 
5.3.1.3 Corresponding Interactions 
With the partner identities, the two parties actualized mutual high-level visits. Christopher 
Soames, then Vice-President of the Commission, visited China in May 1975, followed by his 
successor, Wilhelm Haferkamp, who visited Beijing in 1978. In the next year, Emilio Colombo, 
the then President of the European Parliament, and Roy Jenkins, the then President of the 
                                                 
the Soviet encirclement in 1960s and 1970s”, available online at 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/138903/13236986.html. (accessed 2 February 2016). 
472 Christopher Soames, “The European community and its place in the world, 8 May 1975”, in China and the 
European Economic community: the new connection, ed., Harish Kapur (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1986), 111–118. 
473 Jörg Monar, “The establishment of EU-China relationship 40 years ago was then an affirmation to European 
integration”, speech on the opening ceremony for EU-China 40th anniversary, available at 
http://world.chinadaily.com.cn/2015-05/20/content_20773966.htm. (accessed 6 February 2016). 
474 Dick Wilson, “China and the European Community”, The China Quarterly 53, (1973): 666. 
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Commission, paid various official visits to China. Political dialogue, however, was not 
confined to the leaders’ level, but was open to the parliamentary and ministerial level as well. 
 
Political communication contributed to the institutionalization of economic cooperation. The 
first trade agreement between the EEC and China came into force in June 1978, whereby a 
Joint Committee from both parties was established to monitor the functioning of the agreement. 
The 1978 agreement resulted in a number of achievements, i.e., giving both parties most-
favoured nation treatment, implementing the liberalization of mutual trade, and expanding the 
exchange of economic delegations.475 Meanwhile, the EEC also provided economic assistance 
to China, including management training, technological cooperation and financial aid in 
agriculture and for the rural areas of China.476 A further comprehensive agreement was signed 
in 1985, which applied more sophisticated provisions to their trade and economic cooperation, 
and updating the 1978 cooperation framework to a more mature form for bilateral commercial 
interactions.477 Consequently, under this framework, mutual trade volume enjoyed a rapid 
increase during this period, as shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Trade between the European Community and China for 1975 and 1988 in 
Millions of ECU 
 Imports  Exports Total Volume 
1975 667 1153 1820 
1988 6999 5799 12798 
Growth  949% 403% 603% 
Source: EC-China: A Statistical Analysis of Foreign Trade 1970-1979, Eurostat, Statistical 
Office of the European Communities, 1981; EU trade since 1988 by SITC (DS-018995), 
Eurostat. Own calculations. 
                                                 
475 Trade Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China, Official 
Journal L 123 , 11/05/1978 P. 0002, available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.1978.123.01.0002.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:1978:123:TOC. (accessed 6 
February 2016). 
476 “Report on EU assistance to China”, Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs, Ministry of 
Commerce of China, see http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ar/as/201006/20100606985081.shtml. (accessed 15 
February 2016). 
477 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the 
People's Republic of China. 
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5.3.1.4 Summary 
Compatible political thoughts and reciprocal economic needs constituted the shared knowledge 
between China and the EEC, and consequently constructed the accompanying role identities of 
the two parties. This brought China and Europe closer, and also established a long-term 
framework for their relationship. 
 
However, given the normative characteristics of the EEC, which were analysed in the preceding 
chapter, it should be noticed that economic interactions were not just the way to acquire 
commercial profit, but also a civilian mean to promote a long-term transformation in political 
and societal areas. This foreshadowed the breach in the relationship in 1989, and continued to 
frame the EU’s China policy after 1998, which will be discussed below. 
 
5.3.2 1989-1992: China as a Conservative Communist Country 
The second phase started in 1989, when the European Communities (EC) reacted to the 
Tiananmen events, and ended in 1992 by which time EC-China relations had been largely 
resumed. The bilateral relationship broke down in 1989 due to the political incidents on 
Tiananmen Square. The EC imposed a series of sanctions against China as a response to 
Beijing’s decisions. One of these sanctions (the arms embargo) still remains in place today. 
The relationship was not frozen for long, however, as the EC re-approached China in 1990, 
and some sanctions were lifted at the time. 1992 was a turning point, as Deng Xiaoping’s 
southern tour conveyed a signal that China would maintain policies of reform and opening up. 
Meanwhile, the EC-China bilateral political dialogue was re-established in June 1992, and the 
relationship moved on to another phase. 
 
In the review of this period, it should be noted that the clash between the EC and China 
originated from their different identities, and the main explanation for their clash can be 
attributed to the different regimes in a special international context. On the surface, this clash 
was about human rights and using military force. But fundamentally, this clash was actually 
due to the different identities of a Communist country interacting with a democratic bloc. 
Furthermore, this clash had a subsequent impact on future bilateral policies. The EC officially 
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launched the ‘constructive engagement’ policy, and China considered lifting the embargo as 
one of the major purposes in its relationship with the EC/EU. 
 
5.3.2.1 Context 
1989 also marked the eve of the end of the Cold War. A pro-democracy reform momentum 
was impacting on the Communist bloc. First Poland and Hungary, then other Eastern European 
countries, abandoned the Communist regime and transformed into democracies. Meanwhile, 
similar public appeals for political reform also arose in China. However, what happened on 
Tiananmen Square showed that similar political appeals did not result in the same 
consequences, and political reform did not take place in Communist China. 
  
Western European countries condemned the Chinese government’s repressive actions. Britain, 
France, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain deplored the Beijing authorities’ decision, West 
Germany perceived the repression as a regression in China’s development, and urged China 
‘to return to its universally welcomed policies of reform and openness’.478  
 
These forceful statements mainly indicated that China had conducted human rights abuse. 
However, the worldwide responses to the Tiananmen events were diverse, depending on 
different identities and perspectives. For instance, Czechoslovakia was then still a Communist 
country, but the Communist party was struggling to hold the regime together. Given this 
identity, the government shared the same position as the Beijing authorities, and expressed its 
support for China’s suppression of ‘the counter-revolutionary rebellion’. But diplomatic 
contact was ended right after the reformist leader gained power;479 the previous policy was 
abandoned as soon as the identity of Czechoslovakia changed into a democratic country. 
Clearly, democracies and Communist regimes had diametrically opposing stances at that time, 
and their opposing responses to the Tiananmen events was dependent on their different 
                                                 
478 Robert D. McFadden, “The West Condemns the Crackdown”, The New York Times, June 5, 1989, available 
online at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/the-west-condemns-the-crackdown.html. (accessed 18 
February 2016). 
479 Frank. K. Columbus, ed., Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, Volume 1, (New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, 1998), 23.   
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identities. Therefore, the EC who represented democratic regimes and stood as a normative 
power, issued sanctions against China. 
 
5.3.2.2 Role Identities 
If what has been explored above are the divergent type identities of the EC and China, then 
what were their role identities in the bilateral relationship in that period? And why did their 
role identities change? The EC perceived China as a conservative Communist country, but in 
contrast the EC is a bloc of democracies, and therefore their role identities should have made 
them adversaries. Even though the relationship was not as negative that it could be described 
as hostile, the basis for cooperation had, however, collapsed. The reasons for this incident in 
bilateral relationship is because of the transformation of the international atmosphere, and the 
break of their shared knowledge. 
 
As mentioned above, 1989 was a year when political reform had become an unstoppable 
current in the Communist bloc. The ‘Sinatra Doctrine’ also granted Eastern European countries 
the freedom to choose their own regimes. The rise of democracy and the changes of ideology 
in these countries strengthened the West’s belief that its regime and ideology were more 
successful and attractive. In such an atmosphere, a pro-democratic movement in China was 
also be welcomed by the EC. However, the suppression of the movement in China’s capital 
showed that China refused to abandon its ideology and transplant Western ideology into 
Chinese society. Compared to those Eastern countries, Beijing’s hard-line attitude gave the 
impression of a China that was a relatively conservative Communist country to the EC.  
 
At the same time, as discussed in the last chapter, the EC was then considered as a normative 
power with civilian instruments. While it had successfully influenced its Eastern European 
neighbours, it did not succeed in affecting China in the same way. As a civilian instrument, its 
economic assistance did not bring the anticipated reforms to China’s political regime. The EC 
clearly expressed its frustration over Beijing’s repression, and urged China to respect the norms 
on human rights, freedom and democracy, if China was to receive any support from the EC 
and its member states. 480With these uncompromising attitudes from both sides, the EC and 
                                                 
480 “Annex II Declaration on China”, The European Council: Madrid, 26-27 June, 1989. 
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China constructed opposing identities, each holding a contrary stance. These opposed identities 
were so overwhelming that, consequently, the EC imposed forceful sanctions on China, and 
the bilateral relationship fell to its lowest point. 
 
5.3.2.3 Corresponding Interactions 
Initially, it was the member states who condemned Chinese authorities, then on 27 June 1989, 
the European Council issued a declaration on China and exercised a series of sanctions, 
including an arms embargo, suspension of military cooperation and ministerial level contacts, 
reduction of cooperation in cultural, scientific and technical areas, and postponement of any 
other new cooperative projects. Meanwhile, the Community also decided to raise the issue of 
China’s human rights abuse in international fora such as the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights, where annual resolutions were adopted to criticise China’s human rights 
record.481 This range of actions effectively froze the bilateral relationship. 
 
But this ‘frozen’ status did not last long. After the incident, China made a few changes to its 
human rights legislation, and enhanced the value of human rights in its political agenda. The 
State Council Information Office also started issuing reports on human rights in China.482 
Beijing’s changes on human rights sent the signal that, to some extent, it had begun to build 
some shared knowledge with Western politics. The signal was slight, but still well received by 
the EC as ‘justification’ to see China as a less conservative country483, and rather more as a 
prospective actor which could be transformed into a Western-like democracy by civilian means. 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s south tour convinced Western observers that reformists were in the 
ascendance over the conservative forces, and the government was determined to continue the 
momentum of reform and open policies.484 This was a significant dynamic, which conveyed 
the commitment of China’s marketization and engagement with the international society. 
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482 See the reports on The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, available at 
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1992 was also an important year for China in terms of reconstructing its own perception of the 
EC. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy inspired Chinese observers to imagine a functional role of the European Union 
in a putative multipolar world. Perhaps the EU could become a new pole that could balance the 
US.485 Therefore, China stopped criticising the EU and sought to embrace the bloc as a new 
partner in a multipolar world.  
 
In these circumstances, the bilateral relationship became rather warmer, and relatively close 
again at the beginning of 1990s. On 22 October 1990, EC foreign ministers decided to re-
establish bilateral relations step by step, including economic cooperation and high-level 
contact.486 In the following month, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernandez-Ordonez was 
dispatched as an emissary to visit Beijing and to deliver this message.487 As a response, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Deputy Premier Zhu Rongji visited some EC member states 
and Brussels in 1991.488 The contacts at the ministerial level accelerated the resumption of the 
relationship, and as a result, economic cooperation and commercial trade had been restored by 
1991. By 1992, the bilateral relations had been largely reinstated, and new environmental and 
political dialogues had been launched. The arms embargo, however, remained in effect.489 
 
5.3.2.4 Summary 
What happened to EC-China relations in 1989 was an incident in a special context. From the 
EC’s perspective, Beijing’s repression was a regression of what they expected from China’s 
development. On the other hand, the sanctions and condemnation from the EC was also 
unacceptable for China. Therefore, their shared knowledge was broken and their role identities 
became opposed. After 1989, the internal and external changes enabled the two parties to 
                                                 
485 For instance, see Dingli Shen, “Why China sees the EU as a counterweight to American?”, 48-53; Zhimin 
Chen, “China-EU relations in a new multi-polar and multi-partnership world”, 1-16; Yi Wang, “EU Integration 
and World Multipolarity”, International Studies 6, (2002): 39-64; Hu Jin. “The position of the European Union 
in Europe and the World”, Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy 2, (1998): 110-115;. 
486 European University Institute, European Political Cooperation Bulletin, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1990, Vol. 6, p. 322. 
487 Anja Feege, Internationale Reaktionen auf den 4. Juni 1989 in der VR China, Zwischen Solidarisierung, 
Schweigen und Sanktionen (International Responses to June 4 1989 in the PRC, Between Solidarity, Silence, 
and Sanctions), Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1992, as quoted in Möller, Kay. “Diplomatic Relations and 
Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union”. The China Quarterly, 2002, Vol. 169, p. 17. 
488 Ibid. p.18. 
489 EU-China Relations: Chronology, European Union External Action Service, available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/chronology__2014_en.pdf (accessed 1 March 2016). 
 196 
 
reconstruct their shared knowledge, among which economic interest was undoubtedly 
paramount. But, in relevance to the strategic identities in the last chapter, the EU also had 
normative interests, which meant the EU intended to use economic instruments to encourage 
China towards a transformation into some Western-favoured form. China, on the other hand, 
was a rising power in a dynamic international system, imagining the EU could act as a strategic 
partner against US hegemony. Their strategic purposes were thus asymmetrical, and both sides 
held merely one-way expectations that were not shared by the other. Whist the economic ties 
could perform as the a priori shared knowledge and contribute towards a maturation in partner 
identities, those asymmetrical expectations could also be the unstable factors that could 
generate conflict. 
 
5.3.3 1993-2004: Maturing Partners 
EU-China relations experienced a boom in this phase. For example, bilateral trade rose from 
31.0 billion ECU in 1993 to €175.7 billion in 2004,490 which, even taking into account the new 
EU members, still represented an impressive increase. Economic interests, in this sense, have 
become the primary basis for the shared knowledge that dominated the agenda of bilateral 
relations. Benefiting from the economic prosperity, the bilateral relationship developed rapidly, 
and was marked with considerable achievements. The EU issued five Communications/Policy 
Papers on China,491 with China responding by issuing a Policy Paper on the EU in 2003. The 
two parties agreed to build a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and valued the bilateral 
relations in 2003 as being ‘better than at any time in history’.492  
 
Above all, the EU’s status of not being the US shaped China’s perception of the EU. For 
example, the EU’s approach to China was different from the US’s in dealing with human rights, 
WTO accession, technological collaboration and arms sales. This perception was further 
reinforced by the European states’ opposing attitudes towards the US’s action in the Iraq War. 
Not being the US enabled the EU to give China a more intimate perception of the EU, which 
was constructive towards shaping a ‘partner’ identity. In short, this was indeed a golden age 
for EU-China relations, in that they identified each other as partners in economic cooperation, 
                                                 
490 EU trade since 1988 by SITC (DS-018995), Eurostat. ECU was replaced by Euro at a ratio of 1:1 in 1999. 
491 They are respectively the Communications in 1995, 1998, 2000, 2001 and a Policy Paper in 2003, which will 
be discussed later. All available at http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/index_en.htm  
492 “China’s policy paper on EU”, 13 October 2003. 
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and shared more knowledge in their relations with a third party (the US), which helped to 
construct a stronger identity of maturing partners and to maintain intensifying the relationship 
in a stable way. 
 
5.3.3.1 Context 
Transformation in the culture of international relations is critical to fostering a friendly 
environment within which actors can cooperate. As discussed in section 5.2.2.1, the external 
environment is influential in the construction of role identities. In contrast to the bipolar era 
during the Cold War, the post-Cold War culture was less Hobbesian, and even further evolved 
from Lockean to Kantian: on the basis of acknowledging the others’ rights of life (sovereignty), 
actors also pursued collective interests through cooperation. In such a culture, role identities 
between/among actors could be either ‘partners’ or ‘rivals’, depending on shared knowledge. 
When both acknowledged certain common knowledge, they can then prefer to maintain their 
‘partner’ identities; contrarily, when they do not share the same knowledge, or the knowledge 
is misunderstood or changed, then rival identities emerge and a conflict of some kind becomes 
almost inevitable. 
 
Increasing globalization has provided a worldwide context for economic cooperation. As two 
of the major actors in the world economy, the EU and China, had realised the importance of 
concentrating on economic development. Since the implementation of reform and open policies, 
China had taken economic construction as its key national strategy. The EU, on the other hand, 
takes economic cooperation as its most convergent competence, using economic achievement 
as the leverage by which to promote integration. 
 
In geopolitical terms, the Iraq War in 2003 provided a perspective through which China could 
view the EU differently. France and Germany opposed the US’s military actions in the Iraq 
War, 493  and in opposition to the US’s unilateralism, the EU expressed its support for a 
multilateral approach in resolving that particular crisis.494 Taking an opposing stance to the 
US’s unilateralism helped create further shared knowledge between China and the EU. In some 
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respects, simply not being the US or simply following Washington’s lead helped shape China’s 
perception of the EU as an actor in global politics. 
 
5.3.3.2 Role identities 
The role identities between the EU and China in this phase were those of maturing partners. 
This kind of role identity was based on the shared knowledge concerning economic cooperation 
and a common stance against unilateralism. However, it should be noticed that this shared 
knowledge came with certain kinds of expectations attached. The EU hoped that economic 
cooperation could promote the diffusion of norms, which would lead to political reform in 
China, whilst China’s perception of the EU led to expectations that the EU would become a 
pole to constrain the US’s hegemonic power. While the shared knowledge contributed to 
cooperation during this period, the associated expectations also presented risks that would 
undermine the cooperation. 
 
The EU’s Perception and Expectations of China 
 
The EU’s perception of China can be read in its Communications/Policy Papers on the country. 
In the 1995 Communication on China, ‘A long term policy for China-Europe relations’, it 
described China as an emerging power ‘in both the military-political and the economic 
sphere’,495 and a potentially active and influential actor that the EU should engage with. Thus, 
developing a long-term relationship with China had been seen as crucial for the EU in pursuing 
its goals in economic, security, and environmental domains. This had also helped to raise the 
EU’s profile in China, and therefore enhance the EU’s competitiveness in the international 
arena. What was conveyed from this Communication was an optimistic expectation for China’s 
future development. The EU was ‘eager’ to see that China could play a ‘responsible and 
constructive role’ in its involvement with the international community, and ‘believe (d)’ that it 
is best for China to promote reform in line with international norms.496 This expectation was 
manifest in a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ in the political sphere, which aimed to 
encourage China to cooperate in the normative spheres of non-proliferation, civil society, the 
                                                 
495 Communication of the Commission, “A long term policy for China-Europe relations”, Brussels, 05.07.1995, 
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rule of law, human rights and freedoms, and so on. These optimistic expectations 
notwithstanding, there was a possibility that the EU overestimated China’s willingness, and 
capability, to cooperate in those normative areas. In other words, the EU’s one-way expectation, 
might not have been shared by the Chinese. Nevertheless, this was the EU’s first 
Communication on China; bilateral interaction is a dynamic process, as illustrated in Figure 9, 
and any interaction needs feedback and readjustment. Thus it is understandable that one side 
attached high valuation and expectation in the first instance, and observers need track the 
subsequent variations.  
 
The following Communications were dynamic, related to domestic transitions and external 
changes. In the 1998 Communication, the EU highly valued the progress of China’s reform 
and open policy, and also considered China as a more assertive and responsible actor on the 
regional and global stage497——China positively conformed to the EU’s expectation that was 
outlined in the Communication of 1995. The EU was satisfied with its constructive engagement 
with China and decided to promote cooperation in all regards, and upgrade to a far more 
comprehensive partnership. In 2000, The Commission also issued the Report on the 
Communication of 1998, which confirmed the achievements in this comprehensive partnership, 
and committed the EU to further strengthen it. The Communication in 2001 showed a little 
difference to the previous two. Despite the mainstream acknowledgement of the achievements 
and the need to develop bilateral relations, it also pointed out certain difficulties, namely 
different political systems and human rights concerns, in its engagement with China. 
Nonetheless, the Commission noted that ‘China is both part of the problem and the solution to 
all major issues’498, and thus that positive engagement remained a necessity. 
 
The EU’s 2003 Policy Paper presented a highly positive perception of China as being an 
increasingly ‘proactive and constructive’499 player in international affairs, and also one of being 
more energetic and influential in the global economy. In China’s domestic concerns, the EU 
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recognised the significant progress it had made in strengthening civil society and the rule of 
law, and also gave credit to China’s efforts to abide by its commitments as a WTO member. In 
the paper, the EU and China were seen as sharing ‘ever-greater interests’ in bilateral trade and 
global governance, while also facing the common challenges of terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, international crime and global health concerns. All of these shared interests and 
challenges were included in the shared knowledge in bilateral interactions, and defined a 
mutually beneficial partnership.  
 
In accordance with previous Communications, this Policy Paper also stated concerns over 
human rights. Despite these concerns, all these five Communications and Policy Paper 
expressed a positive attitude towards China, insisting that no matter what the problems, it was 
still necessary, and beneficial for, both parties to develop their relationship to the strategic level.  
 
It should be noted that ever since the first Communication in 1995, what was attached to these 
documents were optimistic expectations that China would transform to an EU-favoured country 
that could ‘fully embrace democracy, free market principles and the rule of law’ (plus human 
rights),500 but without genuinely exploring the degree to which the Chinese government would 
share these expectations, and how far the EU’s intervention would be accepted.  
 
China’s Perception and Expectations of the EU 
 
Beijing perceived the EU’s policy papers constructively and presented positive feedback in its 
first Policy Paper towards the EU. China affirmed the EU’s significant role at the regional level 
and on the global stage, and emphasised that ‘there is no fundamental conflict of interest 
between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other’501 . This was an 
assessment based on a realist perspective, and reflected how China viewed the EU as being 
different from the US. Not being opponents in a power transition game, the EU did not have 
the same degree of geopolitical and strategic concerns with China as the US, therefore it was 
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easier for the EU and China to maintain a stable relationship. Not being the US might also have 
impacted on the EU’s own views of itself. For instance, it did not see its security as being 
challenged by China’s rise in East Asia (or at least not in the way the US perceived this rise). 
As a result, the EU had a welcoming attitude towards China’s integration into the international 
community, and it was not as worried as the US about lifting the arms embargo, a case that will 
be studied in detail in the next chapter.  
 
The perception that the EU was not the US had been reinforced by the transatlantic rift over 
the Iraq Crisis. The opposing stance against US unilateralism was welcomed by China, but 
might also have been exaggerated by China in the sense that China expected the EU to oppose 
the unipolar system and constrain the US’s hegemonic power. China perceived that the EU was 
not the US, but had not fully understood what the EU really was: anti-unilateralism did not, in 
reality, equate to pro-multipolarity. Just like the EU’s over-optimistic expectations, this was 
the expectation that China mistakenly made of the EU (and will be further discussed in the 
following section). 
 
In terms of the EU’s expectations, China frankly pointed out that there were different views 
and disagreements between them. Although the paper did not explain what, specifically, these 
disagreements were, it did mention bilateral ‘differences in historical background, cultural 
heritage, political system and economic development level(s)’502. It is reasonable to deduce 
that it had concerns with human rights, democracy and trade disputes. China tried to convince 
the EU that given these differences in qualities, it would be natural to have these disagreements, 
and thus implied that the EU should not regard such narratives in a particularly harsh manner. 
These words, as alluded to by China, could also be considered an overly optimistic expectation. 
 
These disagreements notwithstanding, China assessed the common good weighted more, and 
committed to cooperating with the EU in various spheres (e.g., combating international 
terrorism, sustainable development, environmental protection), many of which were in line 
with the EU’s strategies. This assessment reflected both parties’ preferences in that period, 
namely the common good outweighed disputes, and constructed the appropriate shared 
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knowledge to strengthen the partner identities, which was ultimately the theme of this phase. 
However, besides their common stances, each side had neglected their counterpart’s additional 
needs (e.g., the EU’s demands on human rights, democracy, etc.; China’s principle of 
sovereignty and non-interference). Therefore, both sides were actually over-optimistic in 
holding the one-way expectation that the other would finally comply with their wishes. 
Moreover, neither party had a clear estimate as to the other’s boundaries in these disputes, 
giving rise to a potential reason for a break in the shared knowledge. 
 
5.3.3.3 Corresponding Interactions 
The most remarkable phenomenon in this phase was the boost of bilateral economic activities. 
Trade rose from €31.0 billion in 1993 to €175.7 billion in 2004—a 466.8% increase, 
contributed to partly by the enlargement of the EU, but most importantly from the intensified 
bilateral trade (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. EU trade volume with China from 1993 to 2004 
 
Series: Trade volume (Billions of euros) 
Source: EU trade since 1988 by SITC (DS-018995), Eurostat. Own calculations. 
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The share of trade with China of the EU’s total international trade also grew steadily (see Figure 
12). China had a 3.18% share in the EU’s international trade in 1993, a figure which had more 
than doubled, to 8.78%, by 2003, showing the importance of enhancing China’s partnership in 
the EU’s trade pattern. China had become the EU’s second-largest trading partner by 2003.503 
On the other hand, the EU had become China’s largest trading partner by 2004, and achieved 
a 15.4% share of China’s trade volume.504 Bilateral trade was on a high-speed track, and 
continued towards an even larger scale. Direct investment also expanded in this period. The 
EU’s direct investment towards China increased from €787 million in 1995 to €3865 million 
in 2004,505 thus reinforcing China’s role as a key investment destination. China’s investment 
in the EU remained at a relatively low level at that time, but has increased dramatically since 
the crisis in 2008, which will be discussed in later sections. 
Figure 12. Share of trade with China as a percentage of the EU’s total international trade 
 
Series: shared percentage (%) 
Source: EU trade since 1988 by SITC (DS-018995), Eurostat. Own calculations. 
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The boom in economic cooperation reflected the concomitant political atmosphere. Political 
relations had been supported by systematic dialogues and meetings. Bilateral political dialogue 
was established in 1994, and had been upgraded to annual summits at the highest level in 1998. 
Additionally, the Ministerial Troika was designed to coordinate the allocation of power and 
resources for cooperation, with assistance from Political Directors and Geographical Directors 
Troika. At the lower level, sectoral dialogue and expert dialogue was intended to address 
specific issues, and the EC-China joint Committee that was established in 1978 still functions 
to monitor the process of cooperation. The institutionalization of political dialogues built the 
legal framework for bilateral communication, and served as ‘a device for mutual learning and 
the transfer of knowledge’506. Furthermore, on the basis of deepening and strengthening the 
existing cooperation, this could stimulate the development of policies and the initiation of 
sensitive topics, 507  which could help to enhance mutual understanding and facilitate the 
translation of both sides’ expectations of each other into reality. 
 
This period witnessed various achievements in bilateral relations. The EU and China signed a 
series of agreements after 1998 including the Agreement on Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation, the Agreement on Maritime Transport, the Tourism Agreement, and so forth. The 
Agreement on China’s WTO accession and the Agreement on Cooperation in the Galileo 
Satellite Navigation Program were the two most remarkable achievements in that period. The 
EU and China also reached a compromise in terms of human rights. China accepted a specific 
dialogue on human rights in 1995 (interrupted in 1996 and resumed in 1997). The EU and 
member states also realised the sensitivity of this topic for China’s political agenda, and 
therefore the member states ceased tabling resolutions against China’s human rights record in 
UNCHR in 1997. Even though the EU continued to express its concern in this regard, but in a 
much more low key way compared to the US approach, this was a proof that the EU was taking 
a different approach to China than the US. 
 
Furthermore, with regards to the US, the Iraq War of 2003 brought the EU and China closer in 
terms of strategy. Major EU member states (i.e., France and Germany) opposed US military 
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actions, and their voices were taken by China as a signal to align with the EU against US 
unilateralism. In the Joint Statement for the 7th EU-China Summit (2004), China advocated 
‘promoting the multilateralism and the democratization of international relations’.508 Chinese 
observers viewed the EU as a counterweight to the US, and a strategic partner to facilitate the 
construction of a multipolar world in which US power could be contained.509 The EU also 
implied that there was a strategic convergence, as then High Representative Javier Solana 
welcomed Chinese comments that ‘there was too much unilateralism in 2003’, and commented 
that ‘the EU will match China’s efforts in…multilateral diplomacy’.510 This tendency was seen 
by other analysts as heralding an emerging ‘EU-China axis’ that would present a serious 
challenge to US hegemony. 511  Scholars debated the genuine nature of this ‘strategic 
partnership’. They argued that despite the maturing relationship, the wording ‘axis’ was 
somewhat exaggerated as the EU had no intention of breaking its transatlantic alliance, nor did 
it want to challenge US hegemony.512 In fact, the EU was rather cautious about the use of the 
word ‘multipolar’ or ‘democratization of international relations’, neither of which were 
contained in the EU version of the Joint Statement for the 7th EU-China Summit, 2004.513  
 
Whereas they agreed to build on the discourse of a ‘strategic partnership’, there were two 
misunderstandings concerning their grand strategies on world order. Firstly, although the EU 
and China had common ground to oppose US unilateralism, they had no shared knowledge on 
how to deal with it, nor that of the US hegemony. Secondly, they both endorsed multilateralism. 
But what the EU meant was to engage in a multilateral approach, which could enhance its profit 
in the global stage, rather than challenge the US; this is not what China had planned for a 
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multipolar world, in which both China and the EU could be a pole to restrain US power——
similar in means, distinct in goals. 
 
This close relationship led to proposals to lift the arms embargo against China. This proposal 
was seen by China as a proof of the effectiveness of the strategic relationship, but it did not 
eventually succeed. This case started in 2003, but it would be more appropriate to discuss it 
further in the next section. 
 
5.3.3.4 Summary 
In this period, both sides perceived each other as increasingly important partners, and the 
relevant role identities defined a mutually beneficial relationship in which the ties between the 
two parties largely intensified. In turn, the improved mutual understanding and the various and 
considerable achievements contributed to the promotion of the relationship to the 
comprehensive strategic level which, as China’s then Premier Minister Wen Jiabao interpreted, 
was a multifaceted and multileveled cooperation, aiming for long-term, mutual beneficial 
interests on the basis of reciprocal respect and trust.514Despite the existing disagreements and 
misunderstandings discussed above, ultimately, they did not affect the reality that mutual 
benefits and the common good were the dominant shared knowledge during that period. 
However, with the deepening and extension of this harmonious relationship, more expectations 
would be raised. These expectations of each other would gradually and finally accelerate the 
emergence of disputes and damage the content of shared knowledge. 
 
5.3.4 2005-2008: critical friends 
The atmosphere in this phase was complicated; on the one hand, relations were becoming even 
closer building on the result in the last phase. On the other hand, more conflicts had appeared 
in the spheres of politics and trade. Accordingly, the role identities between the two parties 
were complex as well. Were they partners? Were they competitors? Or maybe both? As a 
former EU official described, they were ‘critical friends’.515 They were firstly friends, but being 
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critical of each other. As they became closer, and the deeper their engagement went, the more 
feedback they were receiving from each other. This feedback—either positive or negative—
had presented more information for each to evaluate their counterpart. Positive feedback 
maintained the momentum of being friends, and negative ones resulted in critique. Yet another 
reason is that the closer relations between the two parties generated more expectations on each 
other. These expectations—if they could be met—would become shared knowledge for the 
partner identities; if not, they could become reasons for criticism.  
 
5.3.4.1 Context 
Not much changed during this period at the global level. Globalization continued, and the 
culture of the world remained between the Lockean and Kantian. But numerous changes took 
place at the bilateral level. In 2005, China was the fifth largest economy, the third largest 
exporter, the fourth largest importer in the world,516  and the third biggest Foreign Direct 
Investment destination.517 China, in other words, was playing an increasingly decisive role in 
the world economy.  
 
The EU was experiencing a significant change at the same time. Enlargement in 2004 and 2007 
had expanded the scale of the EU, both geographically and economically. The number of 
member states increased to 27 in 2007, along with GDP which grew from €10002.3 billion in 
2003 to €13054.0 billion in 2008, and the growth rate had peaked at 3.3% in 2006.518 The EU 
was the largest economy and market in the world, and also represented an influential regional 
power in dealing with international affairs. 
 
At the bilateral level, given China’s sheer size and rapid growth rate, the EU believed that 
China had huge potential to play an even larger role in the future.519 This belief, as Breslin 
indicated, created an exaggerated image of China, and empowered China ‘by the way in which 
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others think about it’.520 Consequently, this imagination changed the EU’s perception of China 
as an elementary partner, into one of being more like a competitor. This variation of perception 
partly originated from the deduction of the tendency of China’s dramatic developments, and 
partly because the EU was disappointed with China (and, indeed, vice-versa). 
 
The reason for defining this period as ‘disappointing’ is that the shared knowledge between 
two parties had cracked somewhat in this phase. As mentioned in the last section, whist the 
relationship was intensifying, each party placed greater expectations of what the other could 
shoulder. These expectations, however, had either originated from one-way misunderstandings, 
or were beyond the counterpart’s willingness, or capability, to address, and thus could not be 
implemented. The disillusion of these expectations led to the cracking of the shared knowledge, 
and thereby brought a certain level of conflict to the relationship, a subject that will be 
discussed further below. 
 
5.3.4.2 Role identities 
There were three areas of shared knowledge that constructed the partner role identities in the 
last phase. As previously mentioned, these are multipolarity/multilateralism, economic 
cooperation and political coordination. In this phase, the reason that the role identities became 
more competitive is that these three shared areas of knowledge became partly cracked. The 
EU-China relationship had become closer in the last phase, but did it necessarily follow that 
closer relations should naturally bring more conflict? Certainly not. It is not the relations that 
generate conflicts, but the actors’ expectations that do. As discussed above, closer relations 
brought higher expectations. These expectations, which originated from one actor’s type 
identity, would be placed on the shoulders of the other actor. However, the actors’ type 
identities could be quite different, thus these expectations could not be met, and would thereby 
construct a negative feedback cycle, eventually shaking the basis of the shared knowledge.  
 
Consequently, all the three areas of shared knowledge that had been built in the previous phase 
were called into question during this period. After their honeymoon period, this ‘couple’ faced 
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a crisis in their relationship. Here we need to connect the shared knowledge with their type 
identities that were analysed in the last chapter, and explore why and how the shared knowledge 
became cracked. This could be read as evidence to explain how type identity influences role 
identity. 
 
Multipolarity and Multilateralism 
 
Firstly, multi-polarity/multilateralism was the reason the two parties were brought closer 
together in terms of strategy. As discussed above, however, this ‘strategic convergence’ was 
based on misunderstandings. Whist both parties opposed US unilateralism, their approaches 
were based on different perspectives. The Chinese appeal for multipolarity was to constrain 
US hegemony and balance the allocation of power. However, the EU’s preference for 
multilateralism was to shape an EU-favoured way in which global politics would be conducted. 
They might have been a rhetorical convergence at the beginning in general, but in their natures 
the Chinese discourse was instrumental and the EU discourse was rather normative.521 And, 
concerning the case of the US, it was clear this divergence would quickly be exposed.  
 
When China perceived that Europe opposed the Iraq War, and heard clearly the then French 
President Chirac’s stance on a multipolar world522, Beijing thought this could be an opportunity 
to pull the EU away from the US. However, Beijing underestimated the sophisticated nature of 
the EU as a supranational polity. Various member states had different preferences in foreign 
policies, and quite a number of them did not include China in their key diplomatic agendas.523 
In the case of the arms embargo, China aimed to use the strategic relationship to pursue its 
political interests. It also sought to test and intensify the strategic relationship by requesting the 
embargo be lifted. However, when the US opposed such an initiative, not many member states 
                                                 
521 David Scott, “Multipolarity, Multilateralism and Beyond …? EU-China Understandings of the International 
System”, International Relations 27, no. 1 (2013): 30-51. 
522 Reports on Mr Chirac’s position on “multipolar world” could be found at “Chirac urges fairer world order”, 
BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4024005.stm; Chirac's “Multipolar World”, The 
Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/02/04/chiracs-multipolar-
world/ba8beab0-d6d1-4027-8328-02a8beead252/; Chirac responds to Blair: “World is multipolar”, China Daily, 
http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2003/0501/cn9-2.html. (accessed 18 March 2016). 
523 For instance, Baltic countries, Central and Eastern European countries such as Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia 
who has higher priorities with the US and Russia, and South European countries such as Spain and Portugal 
who has higher priorities in Latin America.  
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were willing to sacrifice their transatlantic relations purely to intensify EU-China strategic 
relations.  
 
After all, the EU is a supranational entity, which did not have the internal shared knowledge to 
stand with China against US hegemony. The EU and China did not share the same type 
identities in terms of strategy and polity. China had high expectations in this regard, and whilst 
it might have been disappointing to be unable to achieve this result, it was better to realise this, 
than continuing with the false role identity of its strategic partners.524 
 
Economic Cooperation 
 
Economic cooperation is the core of the bilateral relationship, it functioned, and is still 
functioning, as a pole to carry further the development of the relationship. Despite the 
achievements in bilateral trade, China was becoming increasingly competitive with the EU, 
and the trade deficit on the EU side increased year by year. According to Eurostat, in 2005, the 
EU’s imports from China were €161.0 billion, and exports were €51.7 billion, resulting in a 
€109.3 billion trade deficit, which has expanded 9-fold from the same figure in 1995 (€11.6 
billion). Although the EU recognised that the deficit with China was due to the fact that Chinese 
exports had replaced exports from other Asian countries which had also enjoyed the surplus 
with the EU in the past,525 the large trade deficit still raised question on the EU’s commercial 
performance and raised public concern. The deficit was attributed to the structure of bilateral 
trade. Chinese low value-added goods (especially textiles, clothing and footwear) presented a 
direct challenge to a number of EU member states (e.g., Spain, Portugal, Italy and Slovenia), 
in which similar products accounted for a large proportion of exports. As a developing country, 
China had a low value chain and was in the process of upgrading. Thus China’s basic trade 
structure was exporting low valued-added products and importing high value-added products. 
As a result, while some member states whose exports were based on products with high added 
                                                 
524 Here “strategic” specifically means the strategies on global order, but in general it should also contain 
economic relations, civil communications, cooperation in other global affairs and etc. 
525 Commission working document, “Accompanying COM(2006) 631 final: Closer Partners, Growing 
Responsibilities, A policy paper on EU-China trade and investment: Competition and Partnership”, Brussels, 
24.10.2006, COM(2006) 632 final. 
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value (Germany for example) saw China as a partner and destination for exports, South 
European states saw China as a challenge. 
 
Moreover, the EU criticised China’s implementation of WTO obligations and economic 
environment for trade and investment. In particular, the issue of intellectual property rights 
concerned a number of states in the sectors of engineering and telecoms (Sweden), 
pharmaceuticals (the UK and Ireland) and luxury brands (France and Italy). This issue also 
presented China as a challenge to these member states. Here, China represented a double face 
to the EU; to some member states, the sheer size of the Chinese market and increasing Chinese 
investment represented an opportunity for them. To some others, Chinese products and 
behaviours were challenges. In fact, China was both an opportunity and a challenge to them, 
and indeed to the EU as a whole. In spite of the arguments, the two parties managed to keep 
the disputes at a controlled level as individual cases, and they ultimately did not affect the 
overall economic and commercial macro-level relationship. But for political relations, the 
conflicts exceeded the ability to control, and undermined the relationship. 
 
Political Coordination 
 
In each previous communication report towards China, the EU expressed its expectation of 
China’s improvement in human rights and political reforms through the civil engagement with 
the EU. However, an expectation cannot be held for long if it is not satisfied within a reasonable 
time. From the EU’s perspective, after the ‘constructive engagement’ policy been implemented 
for a decade after 1995, and China had still not meet the EU’s expectations in this regard.526 
Additionally, the EU Commission was criticised for prioritising economic interests over 
normative principles; but now even the commercial relationship were in tension, so the 
Commission had no excuse for not altering its policy. On the Chinese side, it enjoyed the 
atmosphere that resulted when both parties put aside their political disputes and concentrated 
                                                 
526 Observers also call it “unconditional engagement”, arguing that the EU “gives China access to all the 
economic and other benefits of cooperation with Europe while asking for little in return”, see John Fox and 
François Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, European Council on Foreign Relations (2009), p.2. 
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on economic cooperation. Therefore, it was difficult to either understand or accept the EU’s 
pressure and criticism on normative issues. 
 
This dispute regarding human rights and political reform should be understood from their type 
identities. On the one hand, the EU is a normative power, which has normative initiatives and 
values the principles of freedom, rule of law, the liberal market and democracy. Furthermore, 
as a supranational entity, its values went beyond the borders of its sovereignty, thus it believes 
in the legitimacy of transnational intervention on human rights. On the contrary, as an Eastern 
country that had recently freed itself (or was even yet to free itself) from poverty, China 
maintains a different discourse on human rights in which the rights to subsistence and 
development were prioritised over Western norms; and, as a sovereign nation state, it sees the 
EU’s behaviour as illegitimate intervention and a violation of sovereignty.  
 
The incompatibility of the respective type identities had existed since the establishment of the 
bilateral relationship, and the two parties had reached a compromise during the last phase. So 
why had this become a serious issue in this period in particular? One factor can be attributed 
to the change of leadership in several major states in Europe, resulting in new diplomatic 
principles enhancing the normative characteristic of the EU, and made it more integrated during 
this initiative. 
 
Another important reason was that of unfulfilled expectations. The EU expected its civilian 
instruments (economic assistance, civil engagement, people-to-people exchange and training, 
etc.) could help transform China’s economy, society, or even politics. But the result was 
disappointing from the EU’s perspective. Ten years is a long time from a certain perspective, 
yet is only a short time for a country to develop, especially in the spheres of society and culture. 
Consequently, the EU was disappointed at China’s improvement, and China was also 
disappointed (or even indignant) at the EU’s intervention; at this point, the role identities 
became adversarial with regards to human rights.  
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5.3.4.3 Corresponding Interactions 
With the rupture in the shared knowledge, so their partner identities changed, and the 
behaviours adjusted accordingly. China had proposed to lift the arms embargo in its 2003 
Policy Paper on the EU, and Chinese officials had repeatedly stressed that the embargo was a 
form of political discrimination which was not conducive to the strategic partnership.527 France 
and Germany were in favour of lifting the embargo528, and indicated this at the European 
Council. The EU debated the member states’ stances towards this proposal, which was 
supported by the UK, Italy and Spain, but opposed by the Nordic countries such as Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands. 529 The Parliament linked arms exports to China’s human rights 
record, and refused to give consent to lifting it.530 The strongest opposition came from the US, 
who argued that the EU’s suggestion to lift the arms embargo was ‘sending the wrong signals 
on China’s human rights record and military build-up that threatens a peaceful resolution of 
Taiwan and other Asian issues’.531  
 
The debate remained ongoing until March 2005, when Beijing passed the Anti-Secession Law 
against Taiwan. Many observers claimed that the issue of this law was the trigger to stop the 
European campaign to lift the embargo,532 whilst some analysts believe that the key factor was 
                                                 
527 “Wen Jiabao: Arm Sales Embargo against China Is a Legacy of the Cold War”, 2004/12/08, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/xos_664404/dqzzywt_664812/t173843.shtml.  
“EU Arms Embargo is “political discrimination”, says Chinese Ambassador”, 
https://euobserver.com/news/18891; “Restoring arms sales is to abolish political discrimination against China”, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_4320000/newsid_4324100/4324141.stm, accessed 26 March 
2016. 
528 “Arms Embargo on China Makes No More Sense: Chirac”, Xinhua News Agency, January 28, 2004, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/phfnt/85597.htm; “Schröder Calls for End to Arms Embargo against 
China”, Deutsche Welle, 2 December 2003, available at http://www.dw.com/en/schr%C3%B6der-calls-for-end-
to-arms-embargo-against-china/a-1047143. (accessed 9 April 2016). 
529 Terry Narramore, “China and Europe: engagement, multipolarity and strategy”, 100. 
530 Van Den Broeke, Press Officer, Foreign Affairs Committee, “Code on arms export must be binding”, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+IM-
PRESS+20051003IPR00966+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN; Elmar Brok, “Report on the annual report 
from the Council to the European Parliament (2005/2134(INI))”, 34, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A6-2005-
0389+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=bg, accessed 10 April 2016.   
531 Kristin Archick, Richard F. Grimmett and Shirley Kan, “European Union’s Arms Embargo on China: 
Implications and Options for U.S. Policy”, CRS Report for Congress, April 15, 2005.  
532 Shao Cheng Tang, “The EU's policy towards China and the arms embargo”, Asia Europe Journal, 3, no. 3 
(2005): 313-321; Bates Gill, “The United States and the China–Europe relationship”, in China-Europe 
Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects, eds. David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider, Zhou Hong 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 272. 
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the US pressure, which was too strong for the EU to ignore.533 Human rights was also a 
significant principle held by the Nordic countries and other normative groups against lifting 
the proposal. Also, as a Chinese consultant who was accessible to the Chinese policy circle 
argued, because there were member states with this normative stance, it was easier for the US 
to win over China. Because the vote on lifting the embargo needed to be unanimous, China 
needed to get the Union’s consent, but the US only needed to find one opposing voice, so it is 
perhaps no surprise that it succeeded. ‘It was all about the mechanism of the EU’, as the 
consultant said.534  
 
These reasons notwithstanding, the fundamental reason lies in the characteristics of the EU and 
China and their role identities. As a normative power, the EU cannot defy the principle of 
human rights; as a Western bloc with member states who share good relations with the US, it 
cannot take the risk of departing from its transatlantic partner on a ‘diverging path’.535 And, 
when these debates were tabled at the EU level, due to the unanimous mechanism on this topic, 
it would be more difficult for the Union to produce a ‘Yes’ than a ‘No’. On the other side, it 
was reasonable for China, as a rising power, to seek to intensify the strategic partnership by 
pursuing this specific case. But the very origin of the problem arose from the discourse of 
‘strategic partners’. This rhetorical role identity could not be fully supported by their 
asymmetrical motivations. In contrast, it gave the two parties an exaggerated sense of their 
relationship, which led them to impose over-weighted expectations on their counterparts, and 
ultimately left them disappointed with each other. 
 
However, divergent attitudes towards global order did not affect the economic relationship. 
From 2005 to 2008, EU-China trade volume increased from €209.9 billion to €322.7 billion,536 
the EU became China’s largest trading partner and China was the EU’s second largest trading 
                                                 
533 Nicola Casarini, “The International Politics of the Chinese Arms Embargo Issue”, International Spectator, 
42, no. 3 (2007): 371-389; Zhongping Feng “The new strategic triangle: China, Europe, USA”, Position Papers 
to the internatinal symposium, “The new strategic triangle: China, Europe and the United States in a changing 
international system” held in Beijing on November 2nd and 3rd, 2006.  
534 Interview in Renmin University of China, Beijing, March 2014. 
535 Bates Gilland Robin Niblett, “Diverging paths hurt U.S. and Europe”, Pacific Forum CSIS, September 12, 
2005.  
536 EU trade since 1988 by SITC (DS-018995), Eurostat. 
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partner. Bilateral trade had brought mutual benefits for each party,537 and had a significant 
impact on both sides’ economic security.538 Nevertheless, in spite of the positive dynamic, the 
trade deficit and the imports of low-value added manufactories brought disputes to the bilateral 
trade relations. The trade imbalance undermined the image of China as a reciprocal partner, 
and caused domestic pressure to make this an issue in member states’ political agendas. Textile 
imports from China, in particular, had led to serious dispute and the rise of protectionism in 
Europe. 
 
However, it should be noted that the member states’ attitudes on these two issues were 
divergent. Not all the member states with trade deficits were concerned. Member states such 
as Germany, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark—who exported high-value added 
products or services to China—did not share the same pressures as Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Slovakia. As a result, member states had divergent perceptions of China in terms of trade, with 
the former countries taking China as a trade partner and were in favour of free trade. On the 
contrary, the latter group—who relied on their textile industries and were facing direct 
challenge from China’s exports—consequently saw China as a competitor, and consequently 
took a protectionist stance to trade with China. Divergence also appeared in different 
professions. Manufacturers in southern European countries appealed for the protection of their 
textile industries, but retailers took an opposing stance as any restrictions on China’s exports 
would reduce their profits.539Nonetheless, the diverse needs in trade would eventually be 
integrated under the scheme of the Common Commercial Policy, where the Commission 
sought to force China to implement its WTO obligations, provide a level and transparent 
economic environment, and protect Intellectual Property Rights.540 To fulfil this objective, the 
two parties agreed to establish a High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue at the 10th Summit 
in 2007, and held the first dialogue in Beijing the following year. On trade, the role identities 
of the two remained that of partners; there was competitiveness in certain areas, but this was 
kept to a controlled level and both sides agreed to develop their relations in a more positive 
                                                 
537 For instance, it was beneficial for China to “develop its productive capacity”, and for the EU to “promote 
jobs and growth”, as stated in the EU trade policy paper towards China. 
538 Nicola Casarini, “The economic dimension”, in The evolution of the EU and China relationship: from 
constructive engagement to strategic partnership, 11-15. 
539 “Europe’s textile war with China—and itself”, The Economist, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/4314327, accessed 13 April 2016. 
540 “Accompanying COM(2006) 631 final: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities, A policy paper on EU-
China trade and investment: Competition and Partnership”, 24 October 2006. 
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direction. However, the dynamics of the political relations were more intense, and ultimately 
cast their shadow over the relationship. 
 
In particular, human rights are central to the EU-China political agenda. Ever since the first 
engagement between the two, the EU expressed its expectation of seeing an improvement in 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in China. In contrast to the US approach, which 
openly criticises China’s human rights record at the UNCHR, the EU adopts a rather more 
modest approach to engaging with China in this regard. The EU takes the Human Rights 
Dialogue as the main channel through which to discuss any related narratives, and the 
Commission initiates programmes to promote the expansion of awareness of human rights, 
democracy and good governance at the civil society level, such as the EU-China Village 
Governance Programme.541 Most importantly, the implementation of these normative projects 
has been accompanied by the coordination of the Chinese government, and thus could be 
accepted by Chinese authorities as a constructive approach to engage in human rights. But as 
time went on, more sceptical and critical voices emerged questioning the constructive 
engagement policy taken towards China.542In the evaluation of the human rights dialogue and 
its impact on China’s human rights situation, it became clear that China’s human rights record 
had still not met the EU’s benchmarks.543  
 
As a normative power, it is in the nature of the EU to pursue normative interests. From the 
EU’s position as an ‘investor’ in China’s human rights record, the EU has allocated 
considerable resources for its improvement, but has received little in return from the EU’s 
perspective. Subsequently, the EU seemed to have lost patience with China’s slow progress, 
and started adopting a result-oriented approach in its engagement with China, which targeted 
specific cases and aimed for short-term returns. This change in policy has broken the previous 
shared knowledge, based on which the two sides agreed to maintain the normative engagement 
                                                 
541 For the introduction of this programme, see Press Release Database, European Commission, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-96-994_en.htm?locale=en.  
542 Katinka Barysch, Charles Grant and Mark Leonard, Embracing the dragon: The EU’s partnership with 
China, 57-58; John Fox and François Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 61-63. 
543 General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC), Council Conclusions on the EU-China dialogue on 
human rights, 11 October 2004, cited in Nicola Casarini, The evolution of the EU and China relationship: from 
constructive engagement to strategic partnership, 20. 
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through the government, and with a ‘quiet’ approach.544Some EU member states adopted a 
more critical attitudes towards China’s human rights record and its Tibet and Xinjiang policies, 
even proposing to boycott the Beijing Olympics. Initially these critiques and protests caused 
tensions between China and individual countries, but not the EU overall. However, once France 
took the presidency of the Council in the second half of 2008, the meeting between the Dalai 
Lama and the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy finally provoked Beijing, resulting in the 
cancellation of the EU-China Summit in 2008. Political relations lost their coordinated dynamic, 
thus undermining the channels of communication and leading to the deterioration of the 
bilateral relationship. 
 
5.3.4.4 Summary 
As illustrated in Figure 9, one actor engages with the other and perceives the other’s identity; 
then, on the basis of this perception, it constructs a corresponding identity. The interests within 
this identity reflect the nature of this pair of role identities, and then directs each party’s 
behaviour towards the other. Based on the experience of its previous engagement, the EU 
sensed that China was increasingly competitive, or even a challenge of commercial trade. 
Therefore, the EU had to construct a corresponding identity as a competitor to some extent, so 
that it could play a level game and defend its own interests. As a result of this pair of competing 
identities, trade disputes occurred. 
 
Perception is significant in the construction of role identity, and is influenced by the actor’s 
inner characteristics, which is the type identity. As analysed in the last chapter, China is a rising 
power which aims to adapt the world order in favour of its own rise. Thus, when China 
perceived the EU’s stance towards multilateralism, it would rather see the EU shifting away 
from the US and towards the establishment of a multipolar world. Similarly, the EU is a 
normative power with civilian means, hence when it witnessed China’s reform and open policy 
and its repaid development, it designed a ‘constructive engagement’ with China, with the wish 
of seeing dramatic changes at China’s political, economic and societal levels. However, due to 
the fact that these perceptions are based on the actor’s own type identity, rather than on the 
genuine nature of their counterpart, misunderstandings are inevitable. These 
                                                 
544 Katrin Kinzelbach, The EU's Human Rights Dialogue with China: quiet diplomacy and its limits, (London: 
Routledge, 2015), 95-148. 
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misunderstandings undermine the shared knowledge, thus the two parties’ perceptions could 
not match, and the role identities based on these perceptions had been easy to be damaged. As 
a consequence, China did not succeed in pulling the EU away from the influence of the US, 
and neither did the EU enforce China’s accelerated improvement of its standards of human 
rights and democratic norms. Even though the crack in the shared knowledge did not entirely 
undermine the relationship, it made both sides extremely critical of each other. The cancellation 
of the 2008 EU-China Summit seemed to indicate that the bilateral relationship was seriously 
undermined. However, the change in the external environment—the financial crisis—altered 
the pattern of the two actors’ identities, and created a new element in the relationship. 
 
5.3.5 2009-2012: Reluctant Partners 
In the wake of the financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent debt crisis in Europe, the external 
environment for the EU and China changed considerably. In order to tackle the economic 
recession, the EU had to put aside the disputes of the previous phase, and work together with 
China to extricate itself from of the financial quagmire and regulate the financial governance. 
In spite of the need to cooperate as partners, there was a certain reluctance in forming this 
cooperation. Firstly, the EU members were sceptical about China’s financial assistance, fearing 
that China might use its clout to influence their political agendas. Besides, even though the EU 
was calling on China to take greater international responsibilities, China was reluctant to take 
on new responsibilities to help the Europeans. Secondly, in terms of regulating financial 
governance, the shared knowledge of how to operate was limited. Because, ultimately, China 
represented a different model of political economy, with regards to which China does not share 
the same type identity as the EU. Hence the role identities between them would not be fully 
compatible. 
 
5.3.5.1 Context 
The onset of the global financial crisis caused a severe deterioration in the EU economy. GDP 
dropped from €13.1 billion to €12.3 billion, while the growth rate fell to 0.4% in 2008 and even 
-4.4% in 2009.545 The recession also increased unemployment rates, which kept growing in 
this phase—from 6.76% (first quarter of 2008) to 10.68% (fourth quarter of 2012). 546 
                                                 
545 GDP and main components (nama_10_gdp), Eurostat. 
546 Unemployment rate, total, % of labour force, OECD data. 
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Meanwhile, the capacity for consumption expenditure declined by 0.6% in 2009 and 2012, and 
maintained a low rate of growth during the remaining years (0.9% in 2008 and 2010, and 0.2% 
in 2011).547 For international trade, 2009 was the worst year for the EU: imports dropped by 
22.1% and exports dropped by 16.4%, in total, and volume dropped sharply by 19.5%.548 As 
China’s most important export destination, the decline of the EU’s purchasing capacity partly 
resulted in the drop of China’s export amount, which decreased by 10.2% from 2008 ($1.50 
trillion) to 2009 ($1.25 trillion).549 Given the weight of exports in China’s GDP,550 the growth 
of its economy was affected and consequently slowed down, with a fourth quarter 2008 GDP 
growth (year-on-year basis) of only 6.8%, with the same figure in the first quarter of 2009 of 
6.1%, which was the slowest quarterly growth in that decade.551  
 
Clearly, the crisis created a contradictory atmosphere across the globe. On the one hand, the 
difficulties of these circumstances were threatening the survival of local industries and 
employment. Hence a protectionist trend emerged in the governments’ policies for stimulating 
exports and accelerating the recovery. 552  As discussed in section 5.2.2.1, the external 
environment has a significant impact on the construction of identities. This atmosphere had 
partly contributed to inculcating a Hobbesian culture, in which actors tend to pursue their own 
interests alone, and do not care much for the cooperation, nor the sacrifice, of others. On the 
other hand, analysts argued that protectionism was not constructive in terms of long-term 
economic prospects;553 moreover, a common stance had been agreed among world leaders 
towards an open and anti-protectionist economic environment.554 To this extent, the external 
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environment seemed less Hobbesian and, the existence of competition notwithstanding, it still 
seemed to favour liberalism and cooperation. It was this contradictory atmosphere that shaped 
the intermingled ideas and identities of global actors: countries wished to see investment and 
assistance from others, but meanwhile set up barriers to protect their domestic economies. 
 
The crisis also brought another important tendency that would affect their identities in 
international society. Observers demonstrated a shift in the world order, not only a relative 
increase and decrease in material capacity, but more importantly a shift of the consensus and 
paradigm.555 The Chinese government’s performance in resisting the global crisis enhanced 
Chinese confidence in its political economic model,556 which represented a different paradigm 
in contrast to Western norms.557 Along with the success of the ‘China model’, the decline of 
Western economic power made many Chinese observers believe that this was the opportunity 
for China to rise from a subordinate role to that of a more powerful actor.558  
 
5.3.5.2 Role identities 
Given the discussion above, this shift in power asymmetries and paradigms (or merely the 
discourse of these paradigms) encouraged China to play a more active role and take on more 
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Governance?”, International Affairs 87, no. 6 (2011): 1323-1343; Suisheng Zhao, “The China Model: can it 
replace the Western model of modernization?”, Journal of contemporary China, (2010) 19(65), 419-436. 
558 Examples see, Zhongqi Pan, “从”随势”到”谋势”——有关中国进一步和平发展的战略思考 (China’s New 
Strategy for Peaceful Development:From Tide-Surfing to Tide-Making)”, World Economics and Politics, (2010) 
2, 4-18; Kejin Zhao, “中国崛起与对外战略调整 (China’s Rise and Its Foreign Strategic Readjustment)”, 
Journal of Social Sciences, (2010) 9,3-11; Yonghui Li, “金融危机、国际新秩序与中国的选择 (Financial 
Crisis, New International order and the choice of China)”, Contemporary International Relation, (2009) 4,37-
38. 
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responsibilities.559 At the EU-China level, there were good reasons for China to bail out EU 
members who were suffering amid the crisis. As China’s largest export partner, the EU market 
was significant enough for China to restore its export capability. Moreover, China was seeking 
alternative currency reserves to US dollars, and clearly buying euro bonds would achieve this 
purpose560 and enhance its profile as a ‘responsible long-term investor in European financial 
market’561. On the other hand, China hesitated in making a full commitment to aiding the EU.562 
Beijing seemed to prioritize the promotion of its domestic development, rather than offering 
large-scale projects to rescue Europe. As the then Premier Wen Jiabao said, as a ‘developing 
country, the good governance of China’s own business would be the biggest contribution to 
the world’.563 This inward looking approach was based on the fact that China still had many 
domestic economic issues (as discussed in section 4.3.4.1). Moreover, despite the emphasis on 
the successes of the China Model, the crisis actually exposed the shortcomings of the Chinese 
system, and highlighted the urgent need to shift to a new growth paradigm.564 Consequently, 
China was caught in a certain dilemma: it was aware of the necessity to assist Europe, whist 
facing the need to deal with its own domestic concerns. 
 
The EU was also facing a dilemma. On the one hand, it needed China’s aid to escape the crisis, 
according to Klaus Regling, the head of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), who 
was sent to Beijing to lobby the Chinese government to contribute to the bail-out fund.565 For 
the EU, China was no longer seen as just a market and a producer, but now also as a key source 
                                                 
559 Xuetong Yan, Hanxi Chen, Li Deng, “当前国际形势与中国外交的调整 (The Current International 
Situation and the Adjustment of Chinese Diplomacy)”, Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making, (2010) 2,3-17; 
Kaiyin Liang, “论后国际金融危机时期的国际关系与中国的应对之策 (Discuss on the International Relations 
and China’s Countermeasures during the Late Stage of Global Financial Crisis)”, Journal of Hunan 
University(Social Sciences), (2010) 5, 107-112. 
560 Xinhua, “China backs Europe amid debt crisis”, reposted on China Daily, 2011-05-10, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-05/10/content_12479687.htm.  
561 “Promising buying European bond for long-term financial investment, Wen Jiabao showed confidence in 
European economy”, International Financial News, People’s Daily, available at 
http://finance.people.com.cn/forex/GB/15000967.html.  
562 David Pierson and Don Lee, “China appears unlikely to come to Eurozone's rescue”, Los Angeles Times, 
November 06, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/06/business/la-fi-china-europe-20111107.  
563 Xinhua, “Wen Jiabao introducing the domestic and international economic circumstance to the diplomats”, 
Xinhua Net, November 08, 2011, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-11/08/c_111153914.htm.  
564 Shaun Breslin, “The ‘China Model’ and the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese Mode of 
Governance?”, p.1326; see also Shaun Breslin, “China and the crisis: global power, domestic caution and local 
initiative”, Contemporary Politics, (2011) 17 (2),185-200. 
565 Simon Rabinovitch, “EFSF head optimistic of China’s support”, Financial Times, October 28, 2011, 
available at https://www.ft.com/content/0fe3e0c4-012e-11e1-ae24-00144feabdc0.  
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of finance and investment. On the other hand, the media and financial observers worried that 
Chinese financial assistance would come with certain political demands attached566, to silence 
the EU’s normative voices567, undermine the EU’s (and its member states’) independence, and 
manipulate certain member states in regards to others568. As a result, part of the EU was 
cautious and reluctant to accept Chinese capital.  
These worries were reinforced by the discussion of the ‘China model’, or ‘Beijing consensus’, 
which implied an alternative to the Western model of development. What the ‘China model’ 
meant exactly came under intense discussion,569 and there was considerable scepticism as to 
the definition of its genuine content, but what was clear, and more importantly—as Breslin 
demonstrated—is ‘what China is not and what China does not stand for: 
it is not big bang reform and shock therapy; it is not a process where 
economic liberalization necessarily leads to democratization; it is not 
jettisoning state control over key sectors; it is not full (neo-) liberalization 
(particularly in financial sectors); it is not the western way of doing things; 
it is not following a model or a prescription; it is not being told what to do 
by others; and it is not telling others what to do'.570 
In short, there were many divergent elements that were not constructive in building intimate 
role identities; yet, perhaps, there was no need to build such intimate identities. As previously 
demonstrated in the last two phases, a rhetorically intimate relationship was vulnerable. What 
is important is that the two parties be able to recognise each other’s pragmatic needs and then 
cooperate as ‘business partners’ to tackle any concrete issues. 
                                                 
566 Júlia Mező and Beáta Udvari, “Effects of the debt crisis on the EU-China relations”, 2012,440-55, available 
at http://www.eco.u-szeged.hu/download.php?docID=40617.  
567 Jason Groves, “Silence on human rights...the price Europe must pay for China's billions”, Daily Mail, 29 
October, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2054929/EU-debt-deal-China-buys-Europes-silence-
human-rights.html#ixzz1kYPVYdHH.  
568 François Godement, “Saving the euro: what’s China’s price?”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 
Policy Memo, 29th November, 2011, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR45_CHINA_MEMO_AW.pdf.  
569 Suisheng Zhao, “The China Model: can it replace the Western model of modernization?” Journal of 
Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 419-436; Barry Naughton, “China’s Distinctive System: can it be a 
model for others?” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 437-460; Thomas Ambrosio, “The rise of 
the “China Model” and “Beijing Consensus”: evidence of authoritarian diffusion?” Contemporary Politics, 18, 
no. 4 (2012): 381-399; Matt Ferchen, “Whose China Model is it anyway? The contentious search for 
consensus,” Review of International Political Economy 20, no. 2 (2013): 390-420. 
570 Shaun Breslin, “The ‘China Model’ and the Global Crisis: from Friedrich list to a Chinese mode of 
governance, 1338-39. 
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5.3.5.3 Corresponding Interactions 
The theme of the ‘reluctant partners’ was that actors cooperate as they see necessary, but they 
also have their own concerns and initiatives, thus their behaviour can never fully match their 
counterpart’s expectations. After October 2010, China had been continuously committed to 
buying the debt of Greece, Spain and Portugal, who were the EU members most affected by 
the debt crisis.571 In the first four months of 2011, observers estimated that the proportion of 
euros in China’s total foreign reserve had raised to 26-28%. 572  Instead of putting all its 
resources into buying the bonds, China took the opportunity to invest in European assets. For 
example, the Chinese shipping group COSCO invested in the Greek port of Piraeus, and the 
Geely Holding Group bought Volvo. The crisis has changed the roles between China and the 
EU in terms of investment. Before the crisis, the EU was the larger investor in China, as shown 
in Figure 13 below. But, after the crisis, China increased its investment in the EU; the scale of 
the increase was dramatic, and China became the larger investor. In 2009, Chinese investment 
in the EU jumped from 467 million US dollars to 2967 million, exceeding the EU’s investment 
in China in 2010 by 394 million dollars. China’s preference towards assets rather than bonds 
was not what the EU had expected, and the vast scale of buying raised concerns over the 
investments themselves,573 as it was feared that in the change in investment strategy, the EU 
members would lose their stances in normative narratives and the coherence in their political 
agendas.574  
 
 
 
                                                 
571 “China's Wen offers to buy Greek debt”, Reuters, October 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-china-idUSTRE69112L20101002; “China to buy 6 billion euros of 
Spanish debt: report”, Reuters, January 6, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-debt-
idUSTRE7051NE20110106; “China buys Portuguese sovereign debt”, Portugal Resident, January 14, 2011, 
available at http://portugalresident.com/china-buys-portuguese-sovereign-debt.  
572 Nicola Casarini, “How the debt crisis can advance Sino-European relations”, European Union Institution for 
Security Studies, 27 September 2011, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/how-the-
debt-crisis-can-advance-sino-european-relations/.  
573 François Godement, Jonas Parello-Plesner and Alice Richard, “The Scramble for Europe”, European Council 
on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, July 2011, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR37_Scramble_For_Europe_AW_v4.pdf.  
574 Odd Arne Westad, “China and Europe: Opportunities or Dangers?” available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR013/SR013-Eu-westad.pdf.  
 224 
 
Figure 13. Bilateral direct investment flows between the EU and China from 2003 to 2012 
 
Series: direct investment flows (Millions of US dollars) 
Source: Bilateral FDI Statistics, United Nations conference on Trade and Development. 
 
Clearly, the two parties’ attitudes towards investment was different. China had committed itself 
to contribute to bailing out the EU, but had no intention of merely putting their capital into a 
vague financial market. The EU had various reasons to be reluctant about Chinese investment, 
but nonetheless accepting it was the rational option. To be fair, despite the reluctance and 
concerns, at least both sides obtained something they had wished for. 
 
In terms of financial governance, the EU and China shared common identities in regulating 
financial mechanisms at the global level, and enhancing the stability of the international 
financial regime. 575  However, different from the EU, which had a rules/norms-based 
orientation, China had greater ambition towards gaining a higher position and a more relevant 
role in the international institutions, so that it could better reflect its economic weight and its 
responsibilities. As discussed in 3.2.1, Chapter 3, China’s rising power identity implied that it 
felt the need to (re)shape the international order into a fashion that best suited its interests. 
                                                 
575 Ramon Pacheco Pardo, “EU–China relations in financial governance: cooperation, convergence or 
competition?” Asia Europe Journal, 12, no. 1-2 (2014): 63-77. 
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Meanwhile, instead of being a late-coming player which obeys the existing rules, China was 
being more proactive in building innovative institutions from an otherwise Western-dominated 
pattern. For instance, China, along with the other BRICS countries, proposed the establishment 
of the New Development Bank in 2012. Once again, convergence and divergence co-existed 
in the EU’s and China’s behaviour. These characteristics reflected the nature of their role 
identities as ‘reluctant partners’. Despite the respective diverging dimensions of their policies, 
they managed to find a compatible channel to program cooperation. 
 
5.3.5.4 Summary 
EU-China relations had further matured during this phase. Having gone through the last two 
phases, there was good evidence that intimate rhetoric would not help to maintain any long-
lasting cooperative relationship, but neither could the divergence undermine the foundations of 
such cooperation. Their previous engagements had equipped the two parties with a deeper 
understanding of each other’s qualities. Based on these understandings, they had constructed 
the role identity of ‘reluctant partners’. The nature of this pair of identities does not suggest to 
us to focus on what they did not want to do, but what they actually did (in spite of their 
reluctance). Furthermore, instead of instructing their counterparts as what they should do, they 
accepted the strategies of what they had to do, and what they could do. In this phase, the 
external environment aroused their realization of the need for cooperation, and reluctance 
prevented them from setting overly high expectations for each other. Both ultimately combined 
together to shape their relationship. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the historical development of the EU-China relationship. Firstly, it 
introduced the notion of ‘role identity’, which is the core concept that has been studied in this 
chapter. In addition, it has also demonstrated the relationship between role identity and other 
conventional theories, such as the role theory and image theory in Foreign Policy Analysis. 
Then, it outlined the analytical structure of identity-interest-interaction, within which the 
dynamics between actors would be analysed. Furthermore, ‘perception’ has been designated as 
a critical factor in testing the nature of the role identity, and the means to connect role identity 
with type identity. Moreover, this chapter has clarified the links between shared knowledge 
and concepts of perception and social learning. 
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The core argument in this chapter is that role identity is the key factor in influencing the 
development of the relationship. In the process of analysis, we can find various elements that 
could impose certain impacts on the relationship. For instance, the transformative nature of the 
external environment, the preferences of their domestic needs, interactive mechanisms, the 
modes of behaviours and so forth., but it would be extremely limited to study these elements 
separately. In contrast, role identity connects the nature of the external environment and the 
inner characteristics of the actors, and also reflects their perceptions of each other. Therefore, 
it provides an integrated approach to understand how the structure of the role identities 
determines the quality of the relationship. 
 
The reason for this historical review is that a bilateral relationship is a dynamic subject, thus 
the period of observation should be extended in order to gain a comprehensive understanding. 
As stated in the analysis frame (Figure 9), there is a process of feedback after the initial mutual 
engagement and, consequently, one phase is obviously not sufficient to understand the 
transformation of identities and relations. Moreover, it is the very feedback received from the 
above that encourages the transition of the relationship through the review of the combination 
of multiple phases. So one can gain a continuously updated picture of how and why the identity 
varies, as well as the relevant changes in relationship. In reviewing the five phases, one thing 
that should not be neglected is the function of type identity. Chapter 4 has demonstrated type 
identities of the EU and China, which includes their inner characteristics and shapes their 
patterns of perceiving others. In this chapter, type identity was shown to be influential in 
constructing role identities and shaping the preferences of actors. For instance, the 
compatibility in economic type identities shapes the foundation for the role identity as partners. 
At the same time, the different structure of the economy could also generate a competitive 
atmosphere. The type identity of a rising power encourages China to seek reforms in the global 
order, and thus approach the EU in terms of seeking the multipolarisation of the international 
society; further, the EU’s normative identity drives it to plate narratives of human rights and 
democracy on the bilateral agenda. However, due to the different type identities in political 
regimes and values, the two parties could not stand on the same side. To understand the EU-
China relationship, we need to consider the questions of ‘what they are’ and ‘what they are to 
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each other’, where the combination of Chapter 3 and 4 is designed to answer these questions, 
and to present a comprehensive picture of their relations. 
 
The following chapter provides a case study on the campaign surrounding the arms embargo. 
Even though a relatively long period is required to outline the transition of identities, there is a 
case within which we can witness the clash of the various identities involved. The arms 
embargo has been mentioned several times in this chapter, and this narrative will now be 
expanded into a detailed framework in order to explore how diverse identities function in a 
specific case. 
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Chapter 6. EU-China relations on the arms embargo: clash of 
identities  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have discussed the type identities and role identities of the EU and 
China. Type identities demonstrate the actors’ inner qualities, which explain their 
characteristics and preferences. Role identities outline the dynamics between actors, and 
illustrate their behavioural patterns within the relevant dynamics. With the combination of 
these two identities, we can understand what the EU and China ‘are’, and how they perceive 
each other. These two aspects in turn can reveal the characteristics of the EU-China relationship 
and show how it is influenced by identities. 
 
This previous discussion explained the mechanism by which the identities influence the actors’ 
interests and behaviours, and has therefore built a comprehensive foundation for the case study. 
Given the respective explorations of type identity and role identity, it is incumbent on us to 
integrate them in a single case. Instead of demonstrating the identities in different domains 
(chapter 3) and phases (chapter 4), this chapter aims to combine them in one specific case study. 
By analysing the actors’ identities, this case study is designed to explore the causal connections 
between identities and behaviours, and thereby explain how identity influences the EU-China 
relationship.  
 
In order to accomplish this purpose, this chapter will apply the case study of the EU-China 
arms embargo negotiation. The EU had placed a ban on military sales to China as a response 
to Tiananmen events in 1989. This sanction remained untouched until 2003 when China 
proposed it be lifted. This proposal became the subject of intensive discussion among the EU 
institutions, member states, and on the transatlantic stage. Finally, the negotiation was 
postponed in 2005, and the embargo remained in place.  
 
This case has provided various sources of identities to analyse. It does not only concern 
commercial trade (the identities of partners), but is also related to strategic aspects in terms of 
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the relationships with the US (triangle identities), and to the normative principles that are 
upheld by the EU and its member states (normative identities). Therefore, such a group of 
diverse identities constructs a stage where we can concentrate all kinds of identities into a single 
case for analysis. The clash of these identities reveals a comprehensive picture that aids our 
understanding how they influence actors’ behaviour.  
 
This chapter will firstly introduce the research methods, which aims to embody a quantitative 
analysis on 141 Chinese language sources, and to show how they contribute to understating of 
Chinese perceptions and motivations. Such a quantitative text analysis on abundant Chinese 
language literatures has not been done before and thus is a unique contribution to studies of 
EU-China relations. It will then give a chronology of the campaign for arms embargo, which 
aims to present a clear outline of this event. The main structure consists of three questions: 1) 
how did the proposal for lifting the embargo come about? 2) How was it discussed? 3) Why, 
ultimately, was the embargo was not lifted? These questions are designed to examine the 
connections between identities and behaviours—how did the identities trigger the proposal, 
how did they shape the form of discussion, and how did they result in the maintenance of the 
embargo. The findings of these questions will contribute to support this thesis’s argument that 
identity plays a decisive role in the interaction between actors. Meanwhile, at each key stages 
of the embargo debate, the analysis will give extra explanation to actors’ motivation in 
deploying new polices. For instance, why did China pass the Anti-Secession Law while the EU 
was trying to lift the embargo? 
 
The identities that will be analysed in this chapter consist of type identities and role identities. 
Despite the comprehensive illustration completed in chapter 3 and 4, not all the identities in 
the previous work will be incorporated in this chapter, but only those that are relevant to this 
case. For instance, the type identities that have been selected are the EU’s identity as a 
normative power and China’s identity as a rising power because they can serve to help 
understand the proposal and discussion. In addition, the context for analysing role identities 
has been broadened into a triangle context that involves the US, because the US played a critical 
role in this case, and it is important to examine what the EU and China’s identities are in 
relation to the US, and what their interests and behaviours would be. After the analysis of the 
embargo, this chapter will make a comparison between conventional theories and the 
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constructivist approach, which aims to provide a link back to the ideas discussed in chapter 3, 
and to show both the contribution of conventional theories and the value added by the 
Constructivist approach. 
 
6.2 Analytical methods 
 
Case Study 
As a social science methodology, case study is ideal for such a holistic and in-depth 
investigation.576 Yin summarised three purposes to case study—exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory.577 In this chapter, describing the process of the case is the mean but not the 
purpose; the purpose is to explain how and why an actor’s behaviour is determined by its 
identities and therefore, to some extent, this is an explanatory case study. Through this 
explanatory analysis, the final purpose was to confirm my argument that it is identity that plays 
a decisive role in the interactions between actors. 
 
To build a strong foundation for the case study, this chapter is rigorously informed by 
appropriate materials, including personal interviews, academic literatures, media news, official 
papers and figures from databases. These materials have served to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the arms embargo case. By collecting and integrating the plentiful sources 
available from the news, governmental reports and other online information about China, the 
EU and the US, this chapter describes a clear picture of the perceptions of each side. Special 
credit is given to WikiLeak, who revealed various information that were hidden by the 
governments and difficult to find from other online sources, and the acquisition of this 
information helped to build penetrating understandings of the thoughts of many actors in the 
arms embargo campaign.  
 
                                                 
576 Joe Feagin, Anthony Orum, and Gideon Sjoberg, eds., A Case for the Case Study (Chapel Hill and London: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 2. 
577 Robert Yin, Case study research: design and methods (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009), 7. 
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Quantitative analysis 
More importantly, different from previous remarkable studies of this case,578 which had access 
to extensive information describing the Western perspective, this chapter is based on the 
analysis of 141 (after filtering) Chinese language literatures that were collected from China 
National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), which is the largest database for Chinese academic 
resources. The author has mainly selected articles with title and key words of a) ‘EU-China 
relations’, b) ‘EU-US relations’, which also includes key words such as ‘US’, ‘EU/European 
Union’ and transatlantic relations579, and c) ‘China-US relations’580. In the process of collecting, 
the author has filtered out irrelevant articles which are non-academic materials,581 and which 
discuss specific topics that are not this chapter’s focus (e.g. details on trade negotiation and 
technological cooperation). 
 
In order to develop a clear understanding of Chinese perceptions of the EU and the US, this 
chapter will take a qualitative analysis of the content of these Chinese literatures which will 
show the extent to which China perceived the EU as a partner or something else. Furthermore, 
the extent to which these Chinese academic materials can represent China’s perception might 
be questioned. As discussed in section 2.2.3.3 regarding think tanks, Chinese academia has a 
special position in China’s foreign policy making: it does not only propose suggestions up to 
relevant ministries, but can also sense the atmosphere of the high-level policy-making circle, 
and accordingly works as advocates of such atmosphere or policies. Therefore, it is worth 
taking an in-depth investigation of these Chinese language literatures, which has not been seen 
in any other studies on the EU-China arms embargo before. This approach will provide a unique 
contribution to evidential illustration of the Chinese perceptions of the EU and the US. 
 
 
                                                 
578 For instance, Nicola Casarini, “The International Politics of the Chinese Arms Embargo Issue”; Terry 
Narramore, “China and Europe: engagement, multipolarity and strategy”; Tang Shao Cheng, “The EU's Policy 
towards China and the Arms Embargo”, 313-321. 
579 Articles refer to particular “transatlantic relations’ between the UK and US have been filtered out.  
580 There is a much larger number (about 2775) of articles under this search, but many of them are not relevant 
to the EU. Only 13 articles have been selected as they also have “EU” or “European Union” in their key words. 
581 They are, for example, conference reviews, non-academic magazine articles, and media reports. 
 232 
 
6.3 Chronology of the arms embargo negotiation 
It is necessary to introduce the timeline of the campaign the of arms embargo before proceeding 
to its analysis. In October 2003, China issued its first policy paper on the EU, and proposed to 
the EU that it lift the arms embargo on China. On their meeting of December 2003, the 
European Council agreed to investigate the feasibility of lifting the embargo. As a response, 
the US weighed in to oppose this action.  
 
During the process of the investigation, the European Parliament and various EU member states 
also opposed the lifting of the embargo, citing China’s human rights record. Until the 7th EU-
China Summit in December 2004, the EU still could not make a decision as to whether to lift 
the embargo, but confirmed its will to work towards lifting it. Meanwhile, the US imposed 
more intensive pressure on the EU to stop it lifting the embargo. In addition to the concerns 
over China’s human rights record, the US further argued that the elimination of the embargo 
would break the East Asian military balance and endanger the allies’ forces in that region. 
 
On 14 March 2005, China passed the Anti-Secession Law, which completely changed the 
dynamic in the campaign. In the next European Council meeting in June, the arms embargo 
issue was not even mentioned. The campaign was postponed, and the arms embargo remained 
in place. The details of the process are listed below and the events that happened during the 
process will be analysed in the following sections. 
 
Table 6. The Chronology of the EU-China arms embargo 
EU-China Arms Embargo Chronology 
2003 October China proposed the lifting of the arms embargo in its first policy paper 
on the EU.582 
2003 1 December German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, on his visit to Beijing, 
                                                 
582 Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, China’s policy paper on EU, 13 October 
2003, available at http://www.chinamission.be/eng/zywj/zywd/t1227623.htm (accessed 9 October 2016). 
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promised to push inside the EU for an end to the embargo.583 
2003 12 December In the European Council meeting, the European Council invites the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council to re-examine the 
question of the embargo on the sale of arms to China.584 
2003 18 December The European Parliament (EP) called on the Council and the Member 
States not to lift the arms embargo on China.585 
2004 26 January On the Council meeting for external relations, the Council responded 
to the European Council’s request above, and referred this issue to the 
Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper) and the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) for further investigation and discussion.586 
2004 28 January During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to France, French 
President Jacques Chirac admitted ‘the arms embargo on China makes 
no more sense today’, and urged the EU to lift the ban.587 
2004 31 January The US government formally protested to the EU and its members 
states in an attempt to prevent the lifting of the embargo.588 
2004 5 February The Chinese media reported that Javier Solana, the High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, said ‘the 
EU is ready to lift the arms embargo on China’.589 
2004 14 April Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, indicated 
that it is unlikely the embargo would be lifted in the immediate future, 
                                                 
583 Lisbeth Kirk, “Schröder wants to lift arms embargo against China”, EUobserver, 1 December 2003, available 
at https://euobserver.com/news/13742 (accessed 9 October 2016). 
584 European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, DOC/03/5, 12 December 2003, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-03-5_en.htm (accessed 16 October 2013). 
585 European Parliament, “Removal of the EU embargo on arms sales to China”, European Parliament resolution 
on arms sales to China, P5_TA(2003)0599, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P5-TA-2003-
0599+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (accessed 9 October 2016). 
586 European Commission, “2559th Council meeting - External Relations”, 5519/04 (Presse 26), Brussels, 26 
January 2004, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-04-26_en.htm (accessed 9 October 2016).  
587 China Internet Information Center, “Arms Embargo on China Makes No More Sense: Chirac”, Xinhua News 
Agency, January 28, 2004, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/phfnt/85597.htm (accessed 9 
October 2016). 
588 Philip Pan, “U.S. Pressing EU to Uphold Arms Embargo Against China; Rights Abuses, Security Cited; 
France, Germany Back Beijing”, The Washington Post via Factiva, WP00000020040131e01v0001o, 31 January 
2004, (accessed 10 October 2016). 
589 Agencies, “Solana: EU ready to lift China arms embargo”, China Daily, 5 February 2004, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-02/05/content_303405.htm (accessed 10 October 2016). 
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as China’s progress in terms of human rights was not satisfactory to 
the EU.590 
2004 26/27 April With the awareness of the current positive trend of EU-China 
relations, the Council insisted that arms embargo should be linked 
with the Chinese human rights record. The two Committees (Coreper 
and PSC) were instructed to continue their discussions on this issue.591 
2004 3 May Chinese Premier Minister Wen Jiabao called on the EU to lift the arms 
embargo during his visit to Europe.592 
2004 17/18 June In the European Council Meeting, the European Council invites the 
Council to continue its consideration of the arms embargo in the 
context of the EU’s overall relations with China.593 
2004 8 October French President Chirac repeated his position to lift the arms embargo 
before his visit to China.594 
2004 17 November The EP reaffirmed its stance that the arms embargo should be 
maintained unless China provided substantial evidence of the 
improvement in its human rights record.595 
2004 8 December In the 7th EU-China Summit, the EU confirmed its political will to 
continue to work towards lifting the embargo, the Chinese side 
welcomed this positive signal.596 
                                                 
590 Sharon Spiteri, “Prompt lifting of Chinese arms embargo improbable, says Prodi”, EUobserver, 14 April 
2004, available at https://euobserver.com/foreign/15145. (accessed 10 October 2016). 
591 European Commission, “2577th Council meeting - External Relations”, 8567/04 (Presse 116), Luxembourg, 
26 and 27 April 2004, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-04-116_en.htm?locale=en 
(assessed 10 October 2016)  
592 John Moylan, “China calls for end to arms ban”, BBC News, 7 May 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3688861.stm (assessed 10 October 2016). 
593 Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 17 and 18 June 2004 Presidency Conclusions, 
10679/2/04 REV 2, Brussels, 19 June 2004, available at http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
10679-2004-REV-2/en/pdf (assessed 10 October 2016)  
594 “France urges lifting of EU arms embargo against China”, Euractive, 8 October 2004, available at 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/security/news/france-urges-lifting-of-eu-arms-embargo-against-china/ 
(assessed 10 October 2016). 
595 European Parliament, “Arms Exports, European Parliament resolution on the Council's Fifth Annual Report 
according to Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
(2004/2103(INI))”, P6_TA(2004)0058, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2004-0058+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (assessed 10 October 2016). 
596 Council of the European Union, “Joint Statement, 7th EU-China Summit, The Hague”, 15065/04 (Presse 
337), 8 December 2004, available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/82998.pdf (assessed 10 October 2016). 
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2005 9 February US Secretary Condoleezza Rice warned that lifting the embargo 
would send the wrong signal to China in terms of human rights, and 
would break the military balance in East Asia.597  
2005 22 February US President George W. Bush raised US concerns during his visit to 
Europe, and reiterated the US opposition to lifting the embargo.598 
2005 14 March The EU sent a delegation led by Annalisa Giannella to Washington to 
explain the mechanism and assure the effectiveness of the Code of 
Conduct, in order to ease the US’s concern and ask for 
accommodation.599 
2005 14 March China passed the Anti-Secession Law, which implied the use of force 
if Taiwan went for independence. 
2005 21 March The EP called on the Council not to lift the embargo as there had been 
little progress made in terms of Chinese human rights and 
democracy.600 
2005 16/17 June The issue of the arms embargo did not appear in the agenda of the 
European Council meeting in June. 
 
6.4 How did the proposal come out? 
The arms embargo is one of the sanctions that was imposed on China in 1989 in the wake of 
the Tiananmen events. In that summer, West Europe was appalled by what happened in 
Tiananmen Square, and the subsequent response was fiercely condemnatory. As demonstrated 
in Section 4.3.2 in Chapter 4, the European Communities, including its member states, 
censured China for violating democracy and human rights. As a consequence, in the European 
Council meeting in Madrid held on 27 June 1989, the twelve member states issued a collective 
                                                 
597 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks With European Commission President Josi Manuel Barroso and 
European Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner After Their Meeting”, Berlaymount Building, Brussels, 
Belgium, 9 February 2005, Archive, U.S. Department of State, available at https://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/42072.htm (assessed 10 October 2016). 
598 “Bush Voices Concern on Plan to Lift China Arms Embargo”, The New York Times, 22 February 2005, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/22/international/europe/bush-voices-concern-on-plan-to-lift-
china-arms-embargo.html (assessed 10 October 2016). 
599 Guy Dinmore, “EU fails to sway US on China arms ban”, Financial Times, 15 March 2005, available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/6bc7f458-9582-11d9-bc72-00000e2511c8 (assessed 10 October 2016). 
600 Elmar Brok, “Report on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects 
and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European 
Communities – 2003 (8412/2004 - 2004/2172(INI))”, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, 
FINAL A6-0062/2005, 21 March 2005, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2005-0062+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (assessed 10 October 2016). 
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declaration condemning China, and imposed a series of sanctions on China.601 Most of the 
sanctions were lifted in the early 1990s, but the arms embargo remained in place. 
 
The EU-China relationship had been improving since the 1990s, as commercial trade enlarged, 
communication channels expanded, and the political ties intensified. The EU welcomed 
China’s reform and open policy, which changed its conservative image and allowed China to 
integrate itself into international society. China valued the EU’s role as an exports destination 
and a source of technology, and also the EU’s efforts to promote multilateralism. In the sense 
of mutual appreciation, in 2003, the relations between the EU and China peaked, when they 
both issued policy papers directed towards each other, and elevated their relationship to the 
level of ‘strategic partnership’, the EU calling China a maturing partner.602 
 
It is this ‘maturing partnership’ that defined the role identities between the EU and China (as 
described in Section 4.3.3, Chapter 4), and under the structure of these role identities, the two 
parties started the campaign to lift the arms embargo. 
 
In addition, the role of the identities of the EU and China in a triangle relationship including 
the US need to be examined. Why did China propose lifting the embargo at this time (2003)? 
Why did China proposed to the EU to lift the embargo, rather than the US? What qualities did 
China see in the EU that they decided to attempt this campaign? To sum up, exploring ‘what 
is the EU when it is connected to the US?’ is a crucial question to answer - and this crucial 
question will be asked repeatedly in every section of this chapter. 
 
6.4.1 Maturing Partners 
The proposal for lifting the arms embargo was a reasonable and logical action in the dynamic 
of ‘maturing partners’. As described in Section 4.3.3, Chapter 4, the role identities of the EU 
and China in 2003-2004 were those of ‘maturing partners’, which implies that the relationship 
                                                 
601 European Council, “Annex II Declaration on China”, Presidency Conclusion, SN254/2/89, Madrid, 26-27 
June 1989. 
602 European Commission, “A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations 
(Updating the European Commission’s Communications on EU-China relations of 1998 and 2001)”, 10 
September 2003, COM/2003/ 533 final. 
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was ready, or about to be ready for ‘picking fruit’. Since the EU issued its first policy paper 
towards China in 1995, bilateral relations had experienced impressive progress. In 2003, the 
EU and China agreed to launch the ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ as both sides were 
satisfied with their cooperation and their achievements were being ‘fruitful’, 603  and the 
relationship was ‘rapidly maturing’ in this context.604 Therefore, it seemed that it was time for 
China and the EU to solve the arms embargo issue, the resolution of this problem being a 
logical result of the current state of development in the relationship, and also an opportunity to 
push the relationship forward. 
 
Commercial ties, among all the relations, have evidenced the most obvious and considerable 
achievements in the EU-China relationship. The trade volume was 136.2 billion Euros in 2003, 
and EU imports from China totalled 95.8 billion Euros, whilst exports reached 40.4 billion 
Euros. This scale of trade made China the EU’s second largest trading partner and source of 
imports in 2003, and similarly the EU was China’s third largest partner. Along with the 
improving dynamic of the relationship, bilateral trade enjoyed a bounce in 2004, the total trade 
amount rose by 29% to 175.7 billion Euros, while imports rose by 33.1% to 127.5 billion Euros 
and exports rose by 19.3% to 48.2 billion Euros. As a result, the EU has replaced the US as 
China’s biggest trading partner from 2004 onwards, and China also displaced the US as the 
EU’s most important source of imports in 2006.605 This atmosphere boosted bulk commercial 
agreements, particularly during the mutual state visits. For instance, China bought 21 Airbus 
series aircraft, when President Hu Jintao visited Paris606 and when French President Jacques 
Chirac visited Beijing, they signed 1.25 billion US dollars’ worth of contracts, including deals 
with Alstom and Airbus.607 These intensified economic ties provided a harmonious dynamic 
for the EU and China to promote cooperation in other realms. 
                                                 
603 Council of the European Union, “Sixth China-EU Summit, Beijing, 30 October 2003, Joint Press Statement”, 
Brussels, 30 October 2003, 13424/03 (Presse 298), available at 
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604 Council of the European Union, “7th EU-China Summit, The Hague, 8 December 2004, Joint Statement”, 
Brussels, 8 December 2004, 15065/04 (Presse 337), available at 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/82998.pdf (assessed 12 October 2016). 
605 EU trade since 1988 by SITC (DS-018995), Eurostat. 
606 Xinhua and Agencies, “President's state visit to France”, China Daily, 27 January 2004, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/27/content_301177.htm (assessed 12 October 2016). 
607 “Chirac welcomes China trade deals”, BBC News, 11 October 2004, available at 
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The EU and China signed diverse agreements that covered cooperation ranging from 
technology to maritime transport, from tourism to environment. A remarkable achievement 
was the cooperative research on the Galileo navigation program, which demonstrated a new 
sphere where the EU and China could achieve collaboration. This joint project was particularly 
significant in that the EU acquired access to China’s aerospace market, which was estimated 
by the EU as more demanding and promising than those of the US and EU.608 Moreover, such 
cooperation in a high-technology area reflected the well-built diplomatic relationship and the 
mutual trust at the political level,609 and contributed a ‘strategic component’ to the content of 
the comprehensive strategic relationship.610 
 
These agreements and cooperation conform to the EU’s strategy on China: the constructive 
engagement adopted since 1995 aimed to engage China in realms ranging from the economy, 
politics, and society to global and regional security, and even possibly to military channels. 
The EU planned to lead China towards increased involvement in international affairs and 
become a responsible actor who could also embrace the EU’s norms such as human rights and 
democracy. 611  In this context, China’s profile at the international stage since 1995 was 
supported and appreciated by the EU, which also encouraged the EU’s confidence in the 
constructive engagement policy.612  
 
                                                 
608 The European Advisory Group on Aerospace, STAR21 - Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century. 
Creating a coherent market and policy framework for a vital European industry, European Commission, 
Enterprise publications, July 2002, 19. 
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610 “Opening of EU-China negotiations on satellite navigation, Remarks by François Lamoureux, Director-
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As a result, it was reasonable for the EU to continue this constructive engagement with China, 
and given their role identities as ‘maturing partners’, it was also logical to expand and deepen 
the bilateral collaboration in other areas.  
 
The agreement on the joint Galileo program—a dual-use project that was suitable for both 
civilian and military purposes— implied that the security and military sector was not a 
forbidden zone. Consequently, the arms embargo became a topic that could be touched and 
would contribute to ‘give further meaning and content to this newly established strategic 
partnership’.613 For China, the arms embargo was political discrimination, but the harmonious 
dynamic presented an appropriate opportunity to resolve the problem. For the EU, lifting the 
embargo did not necessarily entail profits in arms sales, but implied a further, closer 
relationship with China that might contain potential large contracts, increased access to the 
Chinese market, and profits in other commercial spheres. This will be further discussed in the 
next section, but here it is only important to understand the reasonable logic behind the proposal 
for lifting. 
 
6.4.2 The EU was different from the US in China’s eyes 
China perceived the EU differently from the US in terms of its strategic outlook. This 
perception convinced China that the EU had similar understandings as China on the 
international order, and brought the EU closer to China in its national strategy. Furthermore, it 
also influenced China’s judgement on the EU’s willingness (but not the capability) to work 
together with China on certain issues such as lifting the embargo. 
 
The EU held a multilateralist stance, which was largely different from US unilateralism under 
George W. Bush (Jr)’s administration. This difference was exposed by the Iraq War, the 
European states, especially the major powers like France and Germany, publicly opposed the 
US unilateralist approach in this war.614 But there were also supportive voices expressed in the 
                                                 
613 Nicola Casarini, “The International Politics of the Chinese Arms Embargo Issue”, 372. 
614 “EU allies unite against Iraq war”, BBC News, 22 January 2003, available at 
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UK, Spain, Italy and Eastern European countries,615 and consequently Europe was divided—
as remarked by the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—into ‘old Europe’ such as France 
and Germany, and ‘new Europe’ such as Eastern European countries who were in accord with 
the US.616 This divergence among member states was reflected at the EU level and generated 
a blurred stance. The European Council held an extraordinary meeting to consider the Iraq 
issue in February 2003, with the presence of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the 
President of the European Parliament, Pat Cox. The conclusion of the meeting did not directly 
criticize the US’s military action, but reiterated its position to resolve the Iraq crisis under the 
UN’s framework and through multilateral collaboration with the Arab countries.617 Because of 
the existence of two sides in the meeting, the conclusion was more like a compromise of the 
two stances, but in the interview with the High Representative Javier Solana by the Chinese 
media, he agreed with the Chinese comment that too much unilateralism happened in 2003, 
and therefore he was glad to welcome the multilateral diplomacy.618 
 
The EU’s advocacy for multilateralism and France’s and Germany’s criticism on the US’s 
unilateralism has been perceived by China as an opportunity to attempt some form of 
breakthrough in the EU-China strategic relationship. In China’s diplomatic policy, European 
states had long been considered as forces that could be united with China to deal with the most 
threatening opponents. This strategy was first applied by Zhou Enlai at the Geneva Conference 
in 1954, when the Chinese delegation noticed the different stances within the West bloc, and 
used them to play the Western bloc off against the US.619 In 1970s, China’s foreign policy was 
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directed by the ‘Three World Theory’, hence the European states were perceived as potential 
allies to balance the Soviet Union’s power in Eurasia.620  
 
Figure 14. Perspectives in Studies of EU-China relations 
 
In the post-Cold War era, the EU’s development in regional integration and its principle of 
multilateralism were endorsed by a large amount of Chinese observers. Between 1992 and 
2004,621 there were 121 articles that studied EU-China relations, and 62 of them (51.2%) had 
analysed from a strategic perspective, whilst the others analysed from perspectives of trade 
(42.2%), ideology (2.5%) and others such as cooperation in technology and legislation (4.1%), 
as shown in Figure 14 above. This figure illustrates that strategic relationship was the most 
important perspective in studies of EU-China relations, and also that this was one of the EU’s 
biggest value when Chinese observers tried to place the EU in China’s grand strategy. These 
62 articles were identified because they emphasised the EU’s impact on the international 
system by using the narratives of ‘multipolarity’ or ‘multipolarisation’. It was widely believed 
                                                 
620 See 5.3.1.1 in chapter 5. 
621 It starts from 1992 as we explore the studies of EU-China relations in the post-Cold War era. It ends in 2004 
because the embargo was decided to remain in 2005, so the perceptions might change after that. 
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and expected that the EU had the potential to be an independent pole to promote multipolarity 
and thus constrain US power.622  
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The Iraq crisis had reinforced Chinese observers’ perception that the EU was a different actor 
from the US. There were 35 articles that studied the impact of the Iraq crisis on EU-US relations. 
Within them, 31 articles had used terms such as ‘contradiction’, ‘breach’ or even worse, ‘rift’ 
to describe the EU-US relationship at that time. Finally, all 31 articles arrived at a common 
conclusion that the Iraq crisis enlarged the gap between the EU and the US regarding their 
understandings of the international order. 623   Moreover, 7 articles made even stronger 
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conclusions that  the EU and the US had become competitors in terms of international order, 
and the EU would no longer be the followers of the US, but an independent actor. 624 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that not all scholars shared the same idea. There were 
arguments that the EU were consistent with the US in most areas, the divergence on the Iraq 
Crisis was real but not critical. Therefore, the transatlantic allies would remain, and they would 
continue collaboration in the process of Iraq’s reconstruction,625 
 
Based on the major observations above, Chinese observers had confidence in the EU’s 
willingness to adopt independent policies. In addition, the judgement that the EU was different 
from the US in terms of the international order had given observers a feeling of intimacy at the 
strategic level. Moreover, Some observers did not only detect the divergence between the EU 
and the US, but also believed that there was convergence and shared knowledge—opposing 
the US’s unilateralism—between China and the EU. In this case, China needed to exploit this 
divergence and use the advantage of the convergence to make further achievements in their 
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bilateral relationship.626  Consequently, China believed that it was good timing to place lifting 
the arms embargo on the agenda.  
 
However, what Chinese observers had perceived from the EU was a mistaken confidence. It 
was true that the EU had disputes with the US regarding the Iraq War, but it would be an 
exaggeration to so deduce that the EU would become a power to constrain the US hegemony. 
And, as stated in Section 4.3.3.3 in Chapter 4, China was mistaken when it confused 
multilateralism with multipolarity, as the EU was in favour of the former but not interested in 
the latter. In fact, not all Chinese scholars agreed with this mistaken confidence. In an interview 
with a European specialist in China, it was argued that this confidence was based on China’s 
misperception of the EU: China regarded the EU as a pole to constrain the US hegemony in 
the former’s promotion of a multipolar world. But, it was believed that the EU and its member 
states did not consider themselves as a pole, and the EU wanted to promote multilateralism, 
not to build any more polarity.627 However, at that time observers who worked on the global 
order or grand strategy perceived the EU in a general way, hence the rise of a strong power 
who had the potential to balance the US was what they expected to see, and it would be even 
better if this power had some divergences and disputes with the US, so that US power would 
be restrained by a multipolar world. For those Europeanists in China, they had a rather different 
observation (see the last few quotes in 44), but their voices were not as loud as the others.  
 
Furthermore, the EU’s oppositions to the US that had been perceived by China was mainly due 
to individual nations such as France and Germany. Consequently, China had placed the prior 
diplomatic resources on such individual states, hoping that it could change the EU’s policy on 
arms sales by engaging with these powerhouses, but at the same time it neglected the EU 
institutions and other less powerful states.628 To some extent, lifting the arms embargo was 
initially a political-commercial exchange at the bilateral level between China and certain EU 
member states. However, because this was a topic that needed a unanimous vote, it was still a 
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narrative that had to be processed under the European Union’s framework by all the member 
states. 
 
Focusing on specific states represented two serious mistakes. One was that this neglected the 
EU’s normative identity. As a whole, the EU undoubtedly has normative preferences/interests. 
The individual member states, on the other hand, do not necessarily evaluate normative 
interests as being as important as material interests. In addition, by wielding its economic 
attractiveness towards only some of its commercial partners, China probably underestimated a 
number of other states’ normative priorities, such as those of the Nordic countries.  
 
The second is that China’s biased efforts on the EU and the member states reflected its 
ignorance of the EU’s institutions. The unanimous approval process meant that China has put 
itself into an uneven campaign against the US——China had to get consent from all (then) 25 
member states, but the US just needed one veto. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 made 
China’s campaign even harder, as those ‘New Europe’ states—who were in favour of the 
transatlantic relations—joined the Union, this campaign has become a task that was easy for 
the US but extremely difficult for China.629 
 
This section has analysed why the proposal to lift the arms embargo was initiated. First, the 
role identities of ‘maturing partners’ have created the dynamic for the two parties to further 
develop their relationship by working on certain key issues, among which lifting the arms 
embargo was a case that would deepen mutual political trust and broaden the scope of 
cooperation, thus it was a rational and logical move to propose the lifting of the embargo. 
Second, China perceived the as EU different from the US in the wake of the Iraq crisis. China 
believed that the EU was divergent from the US in terms of the understanding of the 
international order, and therefore the EU was strategically close to China in promoting 
multilateralism and building multipolarity in international politics (but the latter was only 
China’s one-way expectation, the EU has not approved these ambitions). Furthermore, China 
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hoped—as based on different perceptions of the international order—that the EU would be 
independent of the US and be able to lift the arms embargo. 
 
6.5 How was it discussed? 
The proposal to lift the arms embargo drew significant attention from diverse parties, and 
initiated massive debate within the EU, between the EU and China, and between the EU and 
the US. This section will examine (1) China’s argument to lift the embargo, (2) the debate 
within the EU, and (3) the debate across the Atlantic on the basis of the triangle of role identities. 
 
6.5.1 China’s proposal: beyond the symbols 
China claimed that the arms embargo was a relic of the Cold War, which did not conform to 
the current reality.630 Besides, naming China on the arms embargo list with countries like 
Sudan, Zimbabwe and Myanmar was discriminatory against China, and a contradiction to the 
strategic partnership.631  China’s argument was backed by French and German leaders by 
describing the arms embargo as ‘anachronistic’ and ‘discriminatory’,632 Javier Solana, the High 
Representative for the CFSP, also recognised the improvement that China has made in terms 
of its human rights, therefore the embargo was no longer justified in being maintained.633 
Moreover, observers indicated that the nature of the arms embargo was merely a declaration, 
in which it suspended ‘military cooperation’ and banned the ‘trade in arms with China’.634 
However, the declaration did not define the implications of this ‘military cooperation’, nor did 
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it name the arms that should be included on the embargo list, therefore it had no legal bindings 
on the member states’ weapons exports to China.635  
 
Besides the embargo declaration, the EU adopted a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in 1998 
in order to lay down the standards of arms sales by the member states, but the effectiveness of 
this Code of Conduct largely depends on the interpretations of the member states and, in fact, 
several European states (mainly France, Italy and the United Kingdom) had sidestepped the 
embargo and sold a large amount of military equipment (mainly aircraft components, electronic 
equipment and countermeasure equipment) to China. According to the EU’s annual reports on 
this Code of Conduct, the value of licences issued for arms exports to China was 54.4 million 
Euros in 2001, the figure increasing to 209.8 million in 2002 and 415.8 million in 2003, 
respectively.636  
 
Since the arms embargo did not actually prevent the EU member states from selling arms to 
China, then lifting it should not affect the status of arms exports to China. Does this mean that 
the arms embargo, like the Chinese and European officials said, was just political 
discrimination? The fact is that lifting the embargo contained more meaning than merely 
eliminating political discrimination. In other words, if we say lifting the embargo was a 
symbolic move to clear the path for the development of EU-China relations, then we need to 
dig deeper to explore what consequences this could bring to the two parties. 
 
China advocated the EU’s reconsideration of the arms embargo on the basis of the overall 
strategic partnership,637 the European Council also advised the Council of the European Union 
to evaluate the arms embargo in the context of the EU’s overall relations with China.638 The 
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embargo was seen as an obstacle that blocked the further evolution of the EU-China 
relationship; the question was, in which realm?  
 
Commerce lies at the core of the EU-China relationship. For the EU, an evolving relationship 
entails increased accesses to the Chinese market, enhanced protection for the EU’s economic 
interests in China, and an improved macroeconomic environment for EU firms and investments 
to run a fairer competition with local companies. These kinds of appeals have been made by 
the EU on many occasions when engaging with China; for instance, in the 2003 Policy Paper 
on China, the EU expressed its expectations of China fulfilling the WTO commitment in market 
opening, enforcement of intellectual property rights, and improvement in financial services.639 
At the annual summits in 2003 and 2004, the EU reiterated its needs to strengthen the 
commercial ties in terms of macroeconomic policy, market openness, intellectual property 
rights and investment opportunities. 640  These demands were further reaffirmed and 
systematically summarised in the Policy Paper on EU-China trade and investment in 2006,641 
and they were expected to be met through an evolving EU-China relationship. 
 
In addition to these long-term demands, a harmonious relationship was also accompanied by a 
number of short-term boosts in commercial contracts.642 As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, bulk 
contracts were signed during the mutual state visits of China and France, and the 1.2 billion 
US dollar Airbus order from China was crucial for the French aircraft manufacturer to compete 
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with Boeing in the Chinese aeronautic market. During Chinese Premier Minister Wen Jiabao’s 
visit to Germany in 2004, Volkswagen and Siemens signed large contracts to extend their 
business in China.643 The harmonious relations generated a positive dynamic for these large 
deals, but a variation in the relationship, especially in the particular case of the arms embargo, 
could result in delays to those deals. It was reported that the Airbus contracts were postponed 
in December 2004 due to the fact that little progress had been made on the EU’s side to lift the 
embargo. 644  Although this report has been rejected by Chinese officials, it did convey a 
message, as Chinese officials said, that the arms embargo could ‘have some negative impact 
on China-EU relations’,645 and ‘without such discrimination no doubt the trade volume would 
be even bigger and we would have more benefits from the bilateral cooperation’.646 
 
Besides commercial relations, a certain significance in building strategic trust was attached to 
the lifting of the arms embargo. As discussed in 5.3.2, China’s assessment and expectation of 
the EU was that it could be an independent international actor, and lifting the arms embargo 
would confirm China’s judgement that the EU could exclude interference from the US and, in 
a further step, become a pole to constrain the US hegemony. From a strategic perspective, this 
was more significant than not politically discriminating against China, and this should be the 
genuine implication of the ‘strategic partnership’.  
 
Moreover, despite China’s rejection to link the arms embargo with human rights, 647  the 
embargo was actually imposed because of the West’s revulsion over China’s repression of its 
citizens in June 1989, and it has been gradually connected with China’s human rights record in 
general ever since. In turn, lifting the embargo would imply that the EU had recognised the 
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improvement of China’s human rights situation. This implication has not been confirmed in 
any way by any official Chinese source, but can be proved by the opposition from human rights 
organizations who voiced the notion that lifting the embargo would ‘sabotage human rights 
activists in China’.648 They feared that if the arms embargo were lifted, it would mean that the 
EU had recognised that China’s human rights record was significantly improved, and whilst 
this would certainly frustrate human rights activists, it would be a result that the Chinese 
government would like to see——it would improve China’s international profile in terms of 
human rights. 
 
To sum up, lifting the embargo was not merely a symbolic move but had significant 
implications for both the EU and China: it reflected China’s political needs in its international 
strategy and profile; and, also, it entailed a prosperous outlook for the EU’s future trade with 
China. For the two sides, this proposal to lift the embargo was an exchange of political support 
for commercial interests. 
 
6.5.2 Within the EU: the normative power 
While China was attempting to apply its commercial charm to persuade the EU (and its member 
states) to lift the embargo, it had neglected the EU’s identity as a normative power. Within the 
EU, there was a large amount of debate among member state and institutions in this regard, 
which demonstrated that not all the member states and institutional agents prioritized 
commercial interests over normative preferences. This reflected the EU’s characteristics as a 
normative power which takes normative interests as seriously as any others. China’s efforts 
have mostly concentrated on commercial aspects, but ultimately they did not meet this end. 
This was a critical factor that resulted in the failure of the campaign to lift the embargo. 
It was widely believed that the EU member states were divided into two factions on their stance 
towards the embargo.649  On the one side, France and Germany were enthusiastic in their 
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promotion of lifting of the embargo, and they were supported by Italy, Spain and Greece; on 
the other side, the Netherlands and Nordic countries—including Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland—strongly insisted that the embargo should be maintained due to China’s poor human 
rights record.  
 
However, this chapter’s investigation of the multiple stances within the EU revealed that the 
boundary was rather blurred between the member states who were ‘for’ or ‘against’ the 
embargo, and the statements made in this regard by the member states were quite ambiguous, 
and indeed kept changing. Instead, there was a clear boundary between the faction who 
prioritized normative demands and the faction who preferred to put norms aside and pursue 
material interests through an enhanced EU-China relationship. 
 
France was one of the most supportive actors in terms of favouring lifting the embargo. The 
then President Jacques Chirac repeatedly called on the EU to lift this ‘outdated’ embargo on 
China. 650  Meanwhile, the then Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin pushed his EU 
colleagues to end the embargo,651 and Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin reiterated the French 
government’s stance as he described the embargo as ‘anachronistic’ and ‘discriminatory’.652 In 
contrast to the enthusiasm of the government, however, French legislators were rather 
concerned with China’s human rights situation, as a large number of them boycotted Chinese 
President Hu’s speech at the French National Assembly, and joined human rights activists to 
protest against China.653  
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On his visit to Beijing in December 2003, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder gave China 
his support in terms of lifting the embargo.654  But he was more isolated than his French 
counterpart in the German domestic political atmosphere, as he was facing fierce challenges 
from his own party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the junior coalition party, the 
Greens. Immediately after Schröder’s visit to Beijing, a Greens leader, Winfried Nachtwei, 
stated that the embargo should be maintained in order to protect human rights.655 In October 
2004, the German Parliament (Bundestag) rejected ending the embargo as both the SDP and 
the Green parliamentarians voted against the Chancellor’s proposal.656 Even though Schröder 
claimed that the government has the final authority to make the foreign policy, regardless of 
the result of the vote in Parliament, this argument was opposed by the Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer in the defence of human rights,657 and met with the harsh rebuke of Christa Nickels, 
head of the human rights commission of the German parliament, that this would undermine 
democratic legitimacy.658 
 
The Netherlands, which were often identified as a supporter of maintaining the embargo, 
indicated that it would agree to lift the embargo if that was the will of the majority of EU 
member states.659 The Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende said that it would be injurious for 
‘political and diplomatic relations and for the Netherlands’ upcoming EU presidency’ if the 
Netherlands stood alone against the proposal to lift the embargo.660 This refers to the fact that 
the Netherlands was to take the EU presidency in the second half of 2004, and the 7th EU-China 
Summit was about to be held in December 2004. According to a US source, the desire for a 
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successful summit intervened with the Dutch government making such a statement. 661 
However, the Dutch Parliament had a strong position to maintain the embargo unless China 
could provide explicit and concrete evidence that its human rights record had improved 
‘significantly’.662 
 
Denmark was seen as an ally to the Netherlands in the campaign to maintain the embargo; 
however, Denmark was divided internally on this issue as well. The Danish Prime Minster 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, on his visit to Beijing in February 2004, was reported to say that 
Denmark would not oppose the lifting of the embargo. Immediately after his return to Denmark, 
Rasmussen was criticized for this remark, and met with demands to explain himself to the 
Foreign Policy Committee of the Parliament. Finally, a compromise was made to announce 
that Denmark would consider the removal of the embargo only on the basis of China’s 
commitment to improve its human rights record.663  
 
Similar dynamics were seen in Sweden, Finland and Belgium. Whilst they were ‘open minded’ 
to go along with any common stance within the EU to deal with the embargo, they declared 
that this issue must be linked with human rights, and would like to see China’s human rights 
situation improved first.664 
 
The UK was rather cautious and irresolute on this issue. In January 2004, its official stance was 
one of reluctance to give a direct answer to the question of the government’s position on the 
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embargo.665 In May 2004, British Prime Minister Tony Blair allegedly gave positive signals to 
his Chinese counterpart that the embargo would be lifted,666 but no more news followed. It was 
not until January 2005 that British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw for the first time told Beijing 
that the EU was ready to lift the embargo.667 However, his mind was changed a few weeks after 
China passed the Anti-Secession Law against the independence trends in Taiwan.668 Moreover, 
there were also strong opposition within the UK parliament to the government’s intention to 
lift the embargo. In 2004, 44 MPs signed a motion tabled by Labour’s Commons MP Harry 
Cohen to keep the arms embargo in place due to China’s abuse of human rights.669  
 
The debate went on among the EU institutions and the officials within them. Peter Mandelson, 
the Commissioner for Trade, during his visiting to Beijing in February 2005, was reported to 
say that it was unreasonable to maintain the embargo.670 On different occasions, EU High 
Representative Solana recognised China’s improvement in human rights, and was in favour of 
seeing the arms ban lifted.671 Similar opinions were voiced by Romano Prodi, the President of 
EU Commission, as he said it was time to reconsider the issue of lifting the embargo.672 But 
the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, who was also the last Governor of Hong 
Kong, disagreed with his colleges, as he expressed his concern over China’s still poor human 
rights situation and the inappropriateness to lift the ban at that moment; furthermore, he asked 
China to provide concrete evidence of its improvements in human rights if China wished to see 
further progress in the negotiation towards lifting the embargo.673 
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The European Parliament had an uncompromising stance against any lifting of the embargo. 
On 18 December 2003, the European Parliament passed a resolution that called on the Council 
and the member states not to lift the embargo on the trade of arms with China, citing China’s 
poor human rights record and the existent threat against Taiwan.674 On 17 November 2004, the 
EP reiterated its position to maintain the embargo until there were specific improvements in 
China’s human rights situation.675 EP members clearly stated that the member states must not 
sacrifice normative principles for economic interests, and should prioritize human rights in 
their political relations with China.676 This appeal was reflected on the EP’s report in 2005 in 
which it criticized that the EU’s ‘relations with China have made progress only in the trade and 
economic fields, without any substantial achievement as regards human rights and democracy 
issues’.677 In addition to its repeated avocation to maintain the embargo, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the EP further suggested that the adherence to the arms embargo against China 
should be included in negotiations about the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy and Partnership 
Agreements.678  
 
The narratives above drew a line between the two sides who were pro and against the lifting of 
the arms embargo. It has been clearly demonstrated that the boundary between these two 
stances did not lie between member states, for instance France versus the Netherlands, nor 
among the institutions within the EU, but between the campaigns who preferred material 
interests and those who prioritized normative needs. It entails that being committed to norms 
and promoting them has become a particular aspect of the EU’s diplomatic policy. In this case, 
normative interest has been appraised in the comparison with material interests such as 
commercial profit and economic benefits, and to some agents, such as the European and 
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National Parliaments, normative interests have been perceived as being superior to material 
interests. 
 
Pursuing normative interests is a natural characteristic of the EU as an international actor; as 
analysed in Section 3.3.2 in Chapter 3, the EU is a multifaceted entity which has diverse 
initiatives, but upholding normative values could empower the EU with distinctive advantages 
in world politics. In this case, the EU, as Manners has suggested, must not only be an actor that 
is ‘constructed on a normative basis’, but that has also demonstrated that it ‘predisposes to act 
in a normative way’.679 China attempted to get the EU’s political support in exchange for 
commercial benefits. Some agents within the EU were attracted by this proposal, but there were 
agents who persisted in championing normative interests in EU foreign policy. Their emphasis 
on normative values has constructed, and also reflected, the EU’s identity as a normative power. 
As a multifaceted actor, either pursuing material or normative interests is equally natural for 
the EU, but China’s ignorance or underestimation of the EU’s normative power was a critical 
reason for the failure of the embargo-lifting campaign. 
 
6.5.3 The EU was NOT the US 
The debate took place not only in Europe, but was also intensively debated on the transatlantic 
stage. The US’s reaction to the proposal to abolish the embargo was swift, who immediately 
exerted pressure on the EU to maintain the embargo. Shortly after the European Council 
requested a review of the embargo in December 2003, the US government lobbied the EU and 
its member states to retain the embargo, as the State Department spokesman Richard Boucher 
argued, the U.S. and Europe had complementary positions on the prohibition of arms sales.680 
It was also reported that the US Secretary of State Colin Powell raised US concerns with 
Brussels and other European capitals, and the US warned that the divergent attitudes towards 
the arms embargo on China could lead to a new transatlantic breach after the Iraq War.681 In 
February 2005, Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed that China’s human rights situation was not good 
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enough to justify lifting the embargo, and the military balance would be broken if advanced 
European technology were sold to China. Meanwhile, Rice urged the EU and its member states 
to take US concerns into consideration with regards to any decision they reached.682 This topic 
was raised at the highest level during US President Bush’s visit to Brussels. Bush spoke out 
regarding US concerns that ‘lifting the ban would be seen as a transfer of technology to China’, 
which would speed up China’s military modernization and thereby challenge the balance of 
power in East Asia.683 In addition, US officials threatened that the elimination of the embargo 
would put transatlantic military cooperation at risk, and result in a restriction on the sales of 
US military technologies to Europe.684  
 
The US opposition arose for two main reasons. First, the US believed that lifting the embargo 
on China would open the floodgate to EU arms sales to China. In a further step, the acquirement 
of the EU’s advanced technologies would enhance China’s military capability, and 
consequently break the regional military balance in East Asia and endanger US forces and their 
allies in that region.685 Second, the US insisted that the arms embargo was imposed for the 
purpose of respecting human rights and should remain linked to human rights records in China 
which, as the US official argued, had not evidenced any improvements, and even experienced 
some ‘negative developments’ after the incidents in 1989.686 Therefore the embargo should be 
maintained for the sake of human rights. 
 
The EU disagreed with the US arguments. First, the EU assured the US that lifting the embargo 
would not mean that there would be no restriction on arms exports to China, as the lax embargo 
would be replaced by a stringent Code of Conduct which would define explicit provisions for 
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the EU’s arms sales and prevent their increase in either quantitative or qualitative ways.687 
Therefore, the elimination of the embargo would be followed by the application of more 
effective regulation on this regard, and the arms sales to China would be under rigorous 
supervision, and thus the US should not be worried. Second, there were EU agents who 
recognised the improvements in China’s human rights situation. As mentioned above, High 
Representative Solana had made such acknowledgements. Moreover, during the meetings with 
US lobbyists, EU member state officials also stated that China’s improvement in human rights 
should not be ignored, even if they were not considered sufficient.688  
 
The divergences between the US and the EU in this regard are listed in Table 7 below. This 
table demonstrates why it is said that the EU was not the US. Because the EU did not share US 
concerns regarding East Asian security, it had its own initiatives to make judgements and 
policies, and it showed a tendency to act independently. 
 
The first divergence was the most straightforward argument between the two parties. The EU 
stated that an upgraded Code of Conduct should be able to address US concerns over the control 
of arms sales to China, therefore the US should have no reason to worry. The US, however, 
was suspicious of this claim, with President Bush stating ‘whether they can or not (develop a 
protocol that should not concern the US), we will see’.689 In spite of the EU’s assurance, the 
US was still concerned over the possibility that European technologies could be used by China 
against US forces in East Asia, and that China’s military modernization would result in threats 
to US allies in the region.690 The US’s attitude confused European officials, who asked their 
US counterparts why the US preferred the embargo to a stronger Code of Conduct.691 
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Table 7. The divergences between the US and the EU on the lifting of the arms embargo 
The US The EU 
1. Lifting the arms embargo on China 
       Large scale of arms exports to China 
          Break the military balance in East Asia 
                Endanger the regional security 
1. Lifting the arms embargo 
        The application of the Code of Conduct 
            No increase in arms sales to China 
              No challenge to the regional security 
2. Transatlantic breach: knowing the US 
concern but still intending to do it. 
2. ‘Symbolic gesture’ to China: improving 
EU-China relations should not necessarily 
harm transatlantic relations. 
3. No human rights improvements 3. Some improvements in human rights, but 
not enough. 
 
The discord was ultimately because the US was considering this issue from a strategic 
perspective, whilst the EU was considering it at the technical level. While the US was 
emphasising the potential strategic threats, the EU was claiming that their protocol should 
prevent any undesirable outcomes. Their signals were asymmetric and unmatched, so clearly 
no mutual understanding would be achieved. Then why did this asymmetry exist? Because the 
EU was not the US, it did not (could not) think in the way the US did. 
 
This asymmetric debate created unease on the US side; what worried the US further was a new 
potential breach in the transatlantic relationship—it seemed that the EU was leaning towards 
the Chinese market and leaving US strategies behind.692 In this regard, US officials expressed 
their discontent and could not understand why the Europeans were still considering lifting the 
embargo, even though they knew of US concerns.693 But knowing is not sharing; the EU was 
not in the US’s position that it had to worry about East Asian security, and the EU was not the 
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US in that it had to fully embrace the American strategies, but an international entity with its 
own initiatives. 
 
The EU’s insensitivity to US concerns provoked severe US criticism of the EU. Observers 
challenged the EU’s reasons for potentially lifting the embargo, and refuted them one after 
another, from the ‘outdated’ quality of the embargo to the improvements in China’s human 
rights record.694 Ultimately, Shambaugh asked a ‘simple question’: ‘why is it in Europe’s 
strategic interest to accelerate the modernization of China’s military’, a question which he 
answered himself: ‘It is not’.695 But Shambaugh is not a European, and he was asking this 
questions from an American perspective, and his question about China’s military 
modernization was not so much of a concern to the Europeans as it was to the Americans. After 
all, as Chris Patten noted, ‘it is America, not Europe, that guarantees stability in Asia’.696 Most 
importantly, the reason that the EU did not share the US’s concern was that the two had 
different identities in terms of security. As demonstrated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, the EU 
was a normative power with civilian means, but not a hard security power like the US and 
therefore, as its diplomatic dimension was not military-driven, it was natural for the EU to put 
other aspects of their relations with China (commercial interests, for instance) ahead of security. 
Furthermore, due to historical and geopolitical reasons, the European states had much fewer 
initiatives in East Asian security than the US at that time.697 Unlike the US, the European states 
did not represent a hegemonic power in global politics, and unlike China’s East Asian 
neighbours, the European states were quite distant in terms of geopolitics; therefore, the 
European states did not really have any direct security interests that were potentially challenged 
by a rise in China’s military prowess. These different identities created fundamentally 
divergent starting points for the EU and the US. 
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So, if Shambaugh had thrown his question open to East Asian actors such as Japan or Taiwan, 
who had the military competence and shared US regional security concerns regarding China, 
he might have gained a satisfactory answer. But when the EU states were considering their 
commercial interests and evolving relations with China, asking them to consider the 
geopolitical and military perspective only showed his ignorance of the identities of his 
audiences, which is the EU but not East Asian countries. 
 
For the EU, it was clear that building up China’s military muscle was not the purpose of lifting 
the embargo. Indeed, the European military industry has determined the value of the Chinese 
arms market, which could bring them considerable profit. But even if the embargo were to be 
lifted, they would still have to face fierce competition from Russian arms suppliers in the 
Chinese arms market.698  Therefore, strengthening China’s military power was neither the 
purpose nor the consequence of the removal of the embargo. For the EU, it was more of a 
symbolic signal, conveyed to China, which was aimed at constructing a positive dynamic to 
boost commercial relations. 699 However, this initiative was misperceived as having a different 
dimension by the US, and this resulted in the intense transatlantic debate. From an outsider’s 
perspective, it was understandable to see why the EU felt the need to lift the embargo, and why 
the US opposed this so strongly, but for the two actors who were in the debate, they were 
distinct actors who had their own initiatives; therefore, it was difficult to consider each other’s 
position and construct a consensus.  
 
6.5.4 Summary 
This section has analysed how China, the EU and the US discussed the proposal to lift the arms 
embargo. It has demonstrated that China’s proposal to lift the embargo was not merely a 
symbolic motion, but an initiative to seek political support and strategic trust in exchange for 
its economic charms. The proposal was also based on the Chinese perception of the EU as 
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being a different international actor to the US, and on the expectation that the EU could be able 
to form its foreign policy independently.  
 
To certain extent, the debate across the Atlantic demonstrated that the EU was prepared to act 
independently. The EU asserted the validity of the procedure to replace the embargo with an 
upgraded Code of Conduct, which would be applied to effectively control the export of arms 
to China. It also clarified that its intention was to intensify the strategic relationship—
specifically commercial relations—with China, rather than increasing arms sales to China. It 
even held a relatively modest perception—compared to the US’s complete negation—on 
China’s human rights records. All of these indicated that the EU was not the US, but an actor 
with its own initiatives to which it was willing to adhere. 
 
But the EU’s stance on this issue would never be simplified, as in contrast, it was complexly 
divided internally. As analysed in Chapter 3, the EU is a normative power, but nevertheless has 
multifaceted initiatives as well. Member states upgraded the commercial needs to the EU level, 
the EU executive institutions would also have established a positive relationship with China on 
the basis of the communication mechanisms, and therefore there were supporters who would 
have liked to see the embargo lifted and an evolving EU-China relationship. But the normative 
characteristics of the EU forced it to take the opposite stance in this campaign. Normative 
interests, as equally concrete as the commercial interests, ultimately took precedent at the EU 
level. 
 
Until February 2005, the EU’s opposition was mainly based on normative principles, and it 
was largely different from the US’s opposition which was mainly based on strategic concerns. 
This also showed that the EU was not the US, even when it was forced to adopt an opposing 
stance to China’s proposal. But the issue of the Chinese Anti-Secession Law changed the 
dynamic, in addition to the normative identities, the EU was reminded that it was/should be an 
actor related to the US, and the result of the arms embargo campaign was thereby determined. 
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6.6 Why it was not lifted? 
The campaign for lifting the embargo was postponed by the EU in mid-2005, and this topic 
was no longer included on the political agenda at the European Council meeting in June and 
December 2005. It was believed that increasing pressure from the US was the main reason for 
ending this campaign.700 Others indicated that the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) that was passed 
by China was the reason for the EU deferring its decision.701 There were also researchers who 
considered both to be the factors that resulted in the failure of the campaign.702  
 
Here it is necessary to explore China’s motivation in passing the ASL at the key stage of lifting 
the arms embargo. Because without the adoption of the ASL, there might be less oppositions 
in lifting the embargo. Then why did China have to approve the ASL at such a moment when 
it was trying to persuade the EU to end the embargo? As demonstrated in chapter 2, China is 
also a multifaceted actor in pursuing its national interests which originate from diverse 
dimensions. Within these national interests, China has defined some core interests, and ‘state 
sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification’ are considered 
one of the core interests.703 Even though the content of the core interests is very debatable,704 
one thing is sure that Taiwan lies in China’s core interests as it concerns the core interests 
mentioned above.705 After Chen Shui-bian had been elected again as the President of the 
Republic of China in 2004, the tension mounted across the Taiwan Strait. While China was 
trying to lift the embargo on the European side, it was also facing a great challenge from 
                                                 
700 Terry Narramore, “China and Europe: engagement, multipolarity and strategy”; Nicola Casarini, “The 
International Politics of the Chinese Arms Embargo Issue”. 
701 Tang Shao Cheng. “The EU”s Policy towards China and the Arms Embargo”; Dinmore, Guy. “EU fails to 
sway US on China arms ban”, 15 March 2005, Financial Times, available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/6bc7f458-9582-11d9-bc72-00000e2511c8. (accessed 15 February 2017). 
702 Bates Gill, “The United States and the China–Europe relationship”, 271-273; Vennesson, Pascal. “Lifting the 
EU Arms Embargo on China: Symbols and Strategy”. 
703 White Paper on China’s peaceful development (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, Sept. 2011), 
available at http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2011/Document/1000031/1000031_3.htm, accessed 13 
December 2018. 
704 Zeng Jinghan, Xiao Yuefan, and Shaun Breslin. "Securing China”s core interests: the state of the debate in 
China." International Affairs 91, no. 2 (2015): 245-266; Wang Gonglong, "国家核心利益及其界定 (Core 
National Interests and Their Definition).” Journal of Shanghai Administration Institute, 12:6 (2011): 75-82. 
705 Chinese leaders had asserted that Taiwan is one part of China’s core interests. For example, Hu Jintao, “建设
相互尊重、互利共赢的中美合作伙伴关系 (Building the Sino-US Partnership with mutual respects and 
reciprocal benefits)”, People’s Daily Online, available at http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/13784588.html, 
accessed 13 December 2018; Xi Jinping, “台湾问题是中国的内政, 不容任何外来干涉 (The Taiwan issue is 
China’s domestic politics, and does not allow any external intervention.)”, Xinhua Net, available at 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-01/02/c_1123937309.htm, accessed 3 January 2019. 
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Taiwan’s attempts towards independence. Under such conditions, either driven by nationalism 
or the needs to adopt an updated Taiwan policy,706 the necessity to enact the ASL had been 
prioritised over the intention to lift the embargo in that period. Quite simply, the Taiwan issue 
was deemed to be more pressing and more important than relations with Europe.  
 
However, this chapter argues that the US pressure and the ASL were not the immediate reasons 
that affected the EU’s decision: the US pressure had been imposed on the EU ever since the 
beginning of this campaign, but the EU still defended its stance with reasonable initiatives; 
moreover, the ASL did not directly concern the EU in terms of geopolitics. What mattered to 
the EU was its assessment of its own identity in the triangle relations with the US and China. 
The US side repeatedly emphasised the EU’s identity as allies of the US, but meanwhile 
China’s lobbying urged the EU to value its identity as a mutual ‘strategic partner’. While these 
two identities clashed with each other, the EU had to evaluate them and make a choice. This 
section will explore the clash between the EU’s identities, and the consequence of the EU’s 
choice—how China subsequently perceived the EU and how this would affect ongoing EU-
China relations. 
 
6.6.1 The clash of the EU’s identities 
While the EU tried to strengthen its identity as a strategic partner of China by attempting to lift 
the embargo, it also faced the risk of undermining its identity as a credible partner of the US, 
specifically in the regard to security. Consequently, despite the EU’s defence of its initiatives 
on China, it did not intend to provoke a new tension with the US in addition to the divisions 
over the Iraq War. The clash of these two identities constructed the main drive in the EU’s 
policy making, and the outcome of this competition of identities would decide the result of the 
arms embargo campaign. 
 
President Bush and Secretary Rice’s visit to Europe was seen as a ‘carefully choreographed 
act’ to demonstrate a willingness to repair the transatlantic rift after the Iraq crisis. The signal 
                                                 
706 Zhao Suisheng. "Conflict prevention across the Taiwan Strait and the making of China's anti-secession 
law." Asian Perspective (2006): 79-94; Ji You. "China's anti-secession law and the risk of war in the Taiwan 
Strait." Contemporary Security Policy 27, no. 2 (2006): 237-257. 
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was well received and welcomed by the EU, as some officials showed a ‘positive expectation’ 
to put the previous tensions behind them and rebuild the partnership.707 But to be fair, the EU 
were also vocal in promoting their partnership with China, so the enthusiasm towards the US 
could not solely explain the EU’s decision regarding the embargo.  
 
As discussed above, the EU has fewer geopolitical concerns with China in East Asia compared 
with the US. This is constructive for the EU and China to build a relationship without resulting 
in direct confrontation in the region. However, it also means that they lack a certain kind of 
link in their relationship. On the contrary, the EU has a deeper connection with the US in terms 
of security, which can be attributed to the overlapped identities of the EU member states who 
are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As member states of the 
EU, they were interested in the commercial advantages that could be gained through a 
strengthened EU-China relationship, but as NATO members they were reluctant to further 
weaken transatlantic ties by agreeing to lift the embargo. These two identities were clearly in 
direct conflict with each other during the decision-making process regarding the issue of the 
embargo. 
 
There were 21 European states who shared both identities in 2005,708 and even though some of 
these states still preferred to lift the embargo in favour of the EU-China relationship, there were 
indeed some countries who assured US officials that they would take US concerns into 
account.709 Because, while they were aware of the benefits of making favourable gestures to 
China, they were also risking the potential loss of the reliance of the US, and thereby faced 
restrictions in their transatlantic military and technological cooperation. From the US 
perspective, even though the European members had a few concrete interests of their own in 
East Asia, sharing US concerns in that region should be considered the most credible of such 
strong allies. Somehow this clash of identities became a zero-sum calculation for the European 
                                                 
707 Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright, “Europe Keen to Leave Tensions in the Past”, Washington Post, The, 2 
February 2005, n.d., Regional Business News, EBSCOhost, Accession Number: WPT041183519005. (assessed 
26 January 2017) 
708 They were Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and 
United Kingdom. Croatia joined the NATO in 2009 and the EU in 2013. 
709 For instance, “Netherlands/EU China arms embargo: briefing for Dutch officials”, WikiLeaks, 22 July 2004; 
“EU Arms embargo: Italy wearing poker face”, WikiLeaks, 5 April 2004, Canonical ID: 04ROME1342_a, 
available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ROME1342_a.html. (assessed 28 January 2017). 
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members (both of the EU and NATO), the enhancement of their profiles in China would mean 
the reduction of their credibility in the US.  
 
The clash of identities shifted the dynamic towards the US. While the EU still had the intention 
to lift the embargo, it had acknowledged that it was crucial to gain an ‘accommodation’ with 
the US before any decision was made.710 To this end, the EU dispatched a delegation to 
Washington in mid-March 2005 to mitigate US concerns by explaining the EU’s intensions 
and assuring them of the effectiveness of the Code of Conduct.711 However, this mission was 
interrupted by China’s adoption of the ‘Anti-Secession Law’, which declared that non-peaceful 
means could be employed as the final and extreme measure to prevent Taiwan from 
seceding.712  
 
The Anti-Secession Law accelerated the EU’s shift on its stance towards the US’s favoured 
outcome. Firstly, it stimulated the EU’s nerve as a normative power, which was the exact reason 
that prohibited the EU from lifting the embargo. Even though the EU has few geopolitical 
interests in terms of East Asian security, it should be noted that there is a subtle difference 
between the concepts of ‘military balance’ and ‘regional stability’ in the EU’s perception. The 
EU might not be as concerned as the US in terms of the regional military balance, but securing 
regional stability was considered part of the EU’s credibility as a responsible international actor, 
and this kind of credibility was regarded as one of its normative criteria as far as the EU was 
concerned. As a reaction to the ASL, in the EP’s report in March 2005, it made the accusation 
that the ASL had exacerbated the cross-strait situation in ‘an unjustified way’, and called on 
both parties across the strait to ‘promote stability, democracy, human rights and the rule of law 
in East Asia’.713 Public opposition had also been inflamed as a response to the ASL, as major 
                                                 
710 “Is the EU retreating on the China arms embargo?”, WikiLeaks, 24 March 2005, Canonical 
ID:05BRUSSELS1231_a, available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05BRUSSELS1231_a.html. (assessed 
28 January 2017). 
711 Dinmore, Guy. “EU fails to sway US on China arms ban”.  
712 Article 8, “Full text of Anti-Secession Law”, Xinhua Net, 14 March 2005, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-03/14/content_2694180.htm (assessed 5 February 2017) 
713 Article 33, “Report on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects 
and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European 
Communities – 2003 (8412/2004 - 2004/2172(INI))”, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, 21 
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also attached other norms in order to sell them in a full pack. This implied that “stability” was one of the EU”s 
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political editorial boards, think tanks and NGOs voiced their stances against lifting the 
embargo.714 Consequently, the EU would face fierce domestic and parliamentary pressure if it 
decided to lift the embargo in such circumstances; as British Foreign Secretary Straw said, the 
adoption of the ASL had ‘created quite a difficult political environment’.715  Furthermore, 
instructing China to integrate into the international society and be a responsible actor was the 
EU’s diplomatic strategy towards China, but the adoption of the ASL eroded China’s peaceful 
image in the EU’s eyes and, furthermore, it seemed to represent a retreat from the EU’s 
achievements in engaging China, thus the EU had to reconsider its approach.  
 
Secondly, the ASL reminded the EU members’ identities of their US allies by reinforcing the 
validity of US concerns about East Asian security. It is important here to clarify the identity of 
the US’s ally. The EU itself was not the US’s military ally, but the 21 member states of the EU 
who shared the identities of the US’s allies under the framework of NATO. However, with 
regards to the case of the arms embargo on China, it was the EU’s 12 member states who 
imposed the sanction on China in 1989 at Madrid under the framework of the European 
Communities. Therefore, to lift the embargo, this had to be ratified under the framework of the 
EU. Back then it was a sanction in the normative form, which was in order to criticize China’s 
human rights situation, but now the US had characterized it as having military and security 
implications. So, while this issue had to be resolved under the EU framework, it involved the 
member states’ military identities as US’s allies within NATO, and this is the reason to call it 
the ‘clash’ of the identities, it does not purely entail the involvement of the member states’ ‘EU 
identities’, but also their ‘NATO identities’. 
 
The ASL raised tensions in East Asia by illustrating a very extreme, but not impossible, 
scenario whereby the two sides across the Taiwan Strait could be drawn into a war, which is a 
war that would likely draw the US and its East Asian ally Japan in as well.716 Thus, the US’s 
                                                 
normative principles, because in fact the EU itself did not have the military power to incorporate regional 
stability as its security interest, and therefore the “stability” initiative could solely be a normative appeal. But do 
not misunderstand, this normative appeal indeed had implications in this issue, and effectively affected the EU”s 
decision in a normative way. 
714 “Is the EU retreating on the China arms embargo?”, WikiLeaks, 24 March 2005. 
715 Judy Dempsey. “EU feels the heat on China embargo”, International Herald Tribune, 23 March 2005, 
available at http://taiwandc.org/iht-2005-09.htm. (accessed 12 February 2017). 
716 Frans Paul Van der Putten, “The EU Arms Embargo against China: Should Europe Play a Role in East Asian 
Security?”, Social and Cultural Research, Occasional paper No. 7, 2009.  
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warning that lifting the embargo would harm the US and its East Asian allies’ military interests 
was suddenly demonstrated by this scenario—there might be a war in East Asia, and the 
reinforcement of China’s military power, as supplied by the Europeans, would cause direct 
damage to the US and its allies’ forces. Despite this being outside China’s intensions and 
expectations, the adoption of the ASL had somehow served to strengthen US opposition. In 
such an atmosphere, the US’s allies in Europe had to reconsider their stances on the embargo. 
Lifting it and ignoring its allies’ concerns would not only harm its credibility, but also the EU’s 
interests in terms of security cooperation with the US. 
 
The clash of the identities ended up with a ‘victory’ that belonged to the identities related to 
the US. The EU postponed the arms embargo campaign at the European Council meeting in 
June 2005, even though China persevered in raising the issue after this time;717 however, the 
issue has not been discussed as seriously as this time, and the arms embargo remained in place 
even since. In the next generation of Chinese government, the arms embargo has not been 
further raised as an issue in EU-China relations. 
 
6.6.2 The EU in China’s eyes: still something related to the US 
The outcome of the campaign for lifting the embargo had changed Chinese observers’ previous 
perception of the EU. Between 2005 and 2007, 20 articles analysed reasons why the embargo 
was not lifted, and 18 articles argued that US opposition was the decisive reason preventing 
the EU from lifting the embargo, as the US can impose a tight grip on the EU’s decision making 
(in terms of security).718 Some mentioned the impact of the adoption of the ASL, but only 
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considered it as a factor that strengthened the US opposing stance.719 To sum up the above 
ideas, Chinese observers emphasized the US influence and perceived the EU as something still 
related to the US. 
 
As mentioned above, at the beginning of the arms embargo campaign, Chinese observers 
expected the EU to act independently, and demonstrate its autonomy in decision making and, 
moreover, this could even be seen as a sign that the EU had the desire and capability to build a 
multipolar world. However, from the perspective of the outcome of this campaign, despite the 
EU’s differences with the US, and in its defence on its own initiatives, in the end the EU was 
still something related to the US. But to be cautiously precise on this conclusion, it was not the 
EU itself that was related to the US, but those of its member states who were allies of the US 
in through NATO. As discussed in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1, the EU’s competence in security 
is limited, therefore the member states have to rely on the US when it comes to such matters. 
And precisely because of the US efforts, the embargo campaign became inextricably combined 
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with security attributes, thus the member states had two identities to balance. Because this 
campaign was processed in the EU framework, it seemed that the EU was also bound to the 
US.  
 
Although the campaign to lift the embargo had been stopped through the involvement of the 
US, the outcome of this case changed Chinese understanding of EU-China relations: the 
perception of the EU’s identity had been enriched, and instead of focusing on its instrumental 
role of balancing the US hegemony, Chinese observers placed more attention on the EU itself, 
for instance, its ‘soft power’ in global governance, its integration experiences, its active role in 
multilateral organizations, and so forth. 720  The enrichment of the perception of the EU’s 
identities also expanded the EU-China relationship to a triangle relationship consisting of 
China, the EU and the US. The triangle relationship fostered a dynamic in which they interacted 
on the basis of competition and cooperation. In such a dynamic, China realised that the EU still 
shared common interests with the US in various areas, therefore it was not practical to expect 
that the EU could be a power to challenge the US hegemony. Moreover, none of the three 
would be isolated or constrained in this dynamic, because where there was competition in some 
areas, there was cooperation in others. 721 Consequently, in terms of the bilateral relationship 
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between the EU and China, they would play the roles of both competitors and partners in the 
future, and as mentioned in 4.3.4 of Chapter 4, this would be evidenced by their role identities 
of ‘critical friends’. 
 
Furthermore, the case of arms embargo gave China a clearer perception of the complexity of 
the EU’s identities. The EU is a multifaceted entity with diverse interests, it has demands for 
commercial profits, and also has the need to uphold normative principles; furthermore, it 
consists of member states who each have their own security concerns. Because of its 
supranational characteristics, all these national initiatives will be uploaded and calculated at 
the EU level, therefore, ignoring or one-sidedly emphasising a single initiative would 
inappropriately deploy diplomatic resources and fail to achieve the goal. For instance, China 
did not pay enough attention to the EU’s normative demands, as it did not ratify the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as the EU suggested. Instead, it expended 
considerable resources in pleasing individual powerhouses—such as France and Germany—
by signing large contracts, and hoping the associated commercial benefits would help to 
facilitate meeting China’s needs. But the efforts in this regard did not work out because the two 
sides’ demands were not completely matched. 
 
6.7 Comparison between different approaches 
After applying a Constructivist approach in analysing the arms embargo case, it is necessary 
to explore how other approaches, namely that Realist, Liberal and English School 
approaches, would produce the narratives of this issue. Through the comparison between 
different approaches, this section aims to provide a link back to the theoretical framework in 
chapter 3, and to show the contribution of conventional theories and the value added by the 
Constructivist approach.  
 
Neorealism dominated analyses of the arms embargo issue. As mentioned in section 6.6.2, 
almost 90% of Chinese analyses highlighted the US power in deterring the lifting of the 
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embargo. They argued that China’s purchase of European weapons would break the balance 
of power across the Taiwan Strait, and thereby damage the US security in that region.722 In 
terms of analysing the motivation for China to propose to lift the embargo, Chinese scholars 
also believed that it was the emerging multipolar system that drove China to build a closer 
relationship with the EU. Therefore, the lifting of the embargo was seen as a symbol to show 
that the EU was different from the US, and was an independent actor capable of making 
autonomous decisions.723 This approach was not only used by Chinese scholars, but also 
adopted by European scholars.724 By applying the Neorealist approach, scholars had 
successfully explained actors’ motivations in seeking power (China and the EU) and 
preventing the re-allocation of power (the US).  
 
Liberal and English School approaches have not been applied in the embargo case. But they 
had been widely used in analysing EU-China relations in many other respects. As discussed 
in section 3.2.3, liberal approaches were functional in analysing the commercial cooperation 
and norms diffusion in the bilateral relationship. With regard to the English School, it could 
contribute in demonstrating different understandings of norms (mainly human rights) 
between the EU and China, and then explain why these different ideas stopped the EU from 
lifting the embargo. 
 
While acknowledging the contribution of conventional theories, this thesis has applied a 
Constructivist approach. By taking an in-depth investigation of Chinese language literatures, 
this approach contributed in understanding the role identities of the EU and China. In contrast 
to the Neorealist emphasis on the function of the international system, the Constructivist 
believes that actors’ interests are based on their own perceptions of identities. Therefore, this 
approach has focused on actors’ perceptions, which explain what the actor really wants. It has 
laid out a process which explicitly shows how Chinese perceptions of the EU has changed. 
                                                 
722 Ibid 626. 
723 Ibid 532. 
724 Frans Paul Van der Putten, “The EU Arms Embargo against China: Should Europe Play a Role in East Asian 
Security?”, Social and Cultural Research, Occasional paper No. 7, 2009; Terry Narramore, “China and Europe: 
engagement, multipolarity and strategy”; Nicola Casarini, “The International Politics of the Chinese Arms 
Embargo Issue”; Shao Cheng Tang, “The EU's policy towards China and the arms embargo”, Asia Europe 
Journal, 313-321; 
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The change of perception has resulted in the alteration of identities and interests, and 
eventually the variation of the relationship.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the case of the Chinese arms embargo, and demonstrated how identity 
played a decisive role in the associated interaction between the EU, China and the US. It began 
by introducing the research methods, which is designed to embody a developed analysis on the 
Chinese language sources, and to show how they contribute to understanding Chinese 
perceptions and motivations. The analysis through out this chapter focused on the changing of 
perceptions, and it gave extra attention to changes at key stages of the embargo campaign, for 
example, what was China’s motivation behind introducing the ASL at a critical moment. On 
the basis that has been laid out by conventional theories, this chapter has applied a constructivist 
approach which helps to understand the actors’ perceptions and identities. 
 
The identities that were studied in this chapter consisted of type identities that were analysed 
in chapter 3 and role identities that were explored in chapter 4. Type identities revealed the 
actors’ inner qualities and explained their preferences towards certain interests, and which 
determined the way they perceived the outside world and others. Role identities outlined the 
dynamics among actors and shaped their behavioural patterns in these dynamics, as analysed 
in section 4.2.2.2. The actor’s behaviour is shaped by its interests, and its interests are defined 
by its identity. chapter 3 demonstrated the main type identities in EU-China relations, which 
would serve to explain the identities that were studied in this chapter. chapter 4 introduced role 
identity, and explained the mechanism by which it could influence interests and behaviours by 
reviewing the development of the bilateral relationship. These previous chapters have built a 
comprehensive foundation for this case study, and this case study has integrated these identities 
and used them to analyse how they have a considerable impact on the interactions 
between/among actors. 
 
Specifically, there were two type identities. One was China’s type identity as a rising power. 
As a rising power, China faced pressure from the US hegemony, and to some extent it felt the 
need to bring reforms to the international society (see 3.3.2.1 in Chapter 3). Therefore, as shown 
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by the investigation of the Chinese language literature, China expected that the EU could act 
as a pole to constrain US power, this perception and expectation of the EU originating from 
China’s type identity as a rising power, and lifting the arms embargo would undoubtedly have 
been a breakthrough to intensifying the ties between the EU and China and showing that the 
EU was, in fact, independent of the US. For the EU, China’s identity as a rising power was 
mainly economically oriented. Strengthening the relationship meant intensifying commercial 
ties and economic cooperation. Consequently, China’s type identity as a rising power was a 
decisive reason for both sides to initiate the lifting of the embargo. But, it should be noted, the 
two actors’ perceptions of each other in this regard were asymmetric; furthermore, China had 
a mistaken perception of the EU’s ‘willingness to be a pole to challenge the US hegemony’. 
Therefore, in all likelihood the factor that led to the failure of the campaign was present at its 
outset.  
 
The other type identity was the EU’s identity as a normative power. This identity was one of 
the reasons that the embargo was not lifted. The normative preferences arose from all over 
Europe, from member states to institutions. This normative identity clashed with the 
preferences that intended to lift the embargo to promote bilateral commercial ties. But, 
eventually, it played a critical role in prohibiting the policy makers from prioritizing their 
commercial interests over normative principles, thus it exactly explained how identity 
defined/redefined the actor’s interests and thereby shaped its behaviours. 
 
With regards to role identities, there were three dimensions: firstly, the EU and China were 
maturing partners. In such an atmosphere, eliminating obstacles to the relationship was a 
reasonable move to strengthen the ties between them. Besides, it is an instinct for international 
actors to pursue mutual economic/political interests. Through lifting the embargo, China could 
gain political support, and the EU could acquire increased commercial benefits in exchange; 
under these conditions, this was a logical proposal for both parties to process. 
 
Secondly, the EU was not the US. In China’s eyes, the EU was a different power from the US. 
This perception of the EU was based on China’s own type identity (as mentioned above), but 
also originated from the EU’s multilateralism. This perception was even reinforced in its 
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contrasting position to the US’s unilateralism in the War of Iraq, thus the dynamic in 2003 
provided the possibility for China to make the proposal to lift the embargo. For the EU itself, 
it did show its desire for pursuing its own initiatives independently. Solely from its own 
viewpoint, the EU was interested in negotiating the arms embargo for the sake of promoting 
EU-China relations. Moreover, unlike the US, the EU was not a military power, it had few 
geopolitical interests in East Asian’s regional security, and was not challenged by China’s rise 
in that region. This difference in terms of military identities has fundamentally shaped the 
different attitudes of the two parties. 
 
But its attitude and interests in this case were reshaped in a third dimension, because, after all, 
the EU was still related to the US. The increasing pressure from the US made the EU afraid of 
creating a new breach on the transatlantic relationship after that of the Iraq Crisis. 
Strengthening the relationship with China was a right thing to do, but if it undermined the 
transatlantic relationship, was pursuing this still worthwhile? This became a question for the 
EU at the end of the campaign. The result proved that the identities of transatlantic partners 
were still highly valuable in the EU’s calculations. The maintaining of the embargo was 
certainly not what China wished to see at the outset, but the realization that the EU was still 
related to the US did help China to build a clearer perception of the EU; Chinese observers 
realised the limitations to the EU’s capacity to act as a completely autonomous international 
actor,725 and also lowered any expectations that the EU would act as a pole to restrain US 
hegemony.  
 
This case study was constituted by three questions: (1) How did the proposal for lifting the 
embargo turn out? (2) How was it discussed? (3) And finally, why was the embargo not lifted? 
By summarizing the above, it was shown that identities critically influenced each process of 
the campaign: China’s type identity as a rising power, the EU-China role identities as maturing 
partners, and the EU’s different role from the US composed the reasons that triggered the 
generation of the proposal to lift the embargo. Furthermore, the EU’s different role from the 
US and its normative identity formed the discussion of this proposal. Finally, the EU’s role 
                                                 
725 Chen, Zhimin. “欧盟的有限战略行为主体特性与中欧战略伙伴关系——以解除对华军售禁令为例 (The 
Limits of EU as a Strategic Actor and EU-China Strategic Partnership: The Case of Ending EU’s Arms 
Embargo on China)”, International Review, (2006) 5: 1-10. 
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identity as a transatlantic partner led to the postponement of the proposal. In each process, 
identities functioned to define the actors’ interests and thereby shaped their behaviours and, on 
the whole, the findings of this case study strongly supported the argument of this thesis: identity 
plays a decisive role in the interaction between actors. 
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Conclusion 
 
Overview 
This thesis has explored, how and to what extent, identity influences EU-China relations. It has 
answered the questions that have been laid down in the introductory chapter. In doing so, the 
thesis has confirmed the hypothesis as correct in the sense that identity is indeed the decisive 
factor that influences the bilateral relationship between the EU and China. In order to 
summarise the connection between the case study and other Chapters, this section will make 
an overview of the Chapters and demonstrate their contributions to the core argument. 
 
In chapter 1, I have explored the EU’s mechanism and competences in the domains of foreign 
and security policies and commercial policies. In each domain, I have examined the 
competence of the institutions and the initiatives of member states. Specifically, this chapter 
has discussed the competences of the HR, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament by 
demonstrating to what extent they can wield their power. It has also singled out the diverse 
dimensions of interests among the member states. In summary, this chapter has shown the 
nature of the EU as a hybrid entity consisting of multiple actors, and has emphasised that we 
need to see clearly who (the institutions) can do what, and who (member states) wants what. It 
is important to notice these diversities in studying the EU as the case study in chapter 6 
demonstrated. Different attitudes towards the arms embargo draw a line between those who 
were in favour of commercial interests and those who insisted on normative principles.  
 
In order to match the previous discussion on the complex nature of the EU as an international 
actor, chapter 2 has focused on the nature of China as an international actor and an interlocutor 
for the EU in particular. It has shown the complex features of China’s foreign policy-making 
system by identifying various actors and their interests within it. Specifically, it studied the 
competences and preferences of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC, the Central 
Foreign Affairs Commission, major ministries, local governments and state-owned enterprises. 
Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated the relationship between thinks tanks and the 
foreign policy-making system, which has laid down the basis for consulting the Chinese 
language resources in chapter 6. Moreover, this chapter has also explored the evolving features 
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in China’s nature as an international actor, and addresses the challenges posed in analytical 
terms by the evolution of its nature. 
 
Chapter 3 has presented the theoretical framework for the thesis. This chapter has critiqued the 
dominant approaches, namely realism, liberalism and the English School, that have been 
applied in studies of EU-China relations. Whilst recognising the contributions of these 
conventional theories in this regard, this chapter has indicated their imperfections in 
understanding the EU and China’s perceptions and preferences. In light of this, this chapter has 
demonstrated the value added by a constructivist approach by clarifying the analytical logic of 
this thesis: 1) to analyse the relationship, we need to observe the actor’s behaviour (what does 
it do); 2) to know why it behaves in that way, we need to understand the actor’s interests (what 
does it want); and 3) to investigate what is the interest, we need to explore the actor’s identity 
(what it is). In this logic, identity is the target and the destination of the research. Specifically, 
the question of ‘what it is’ consists of two sub-questions. The first is ‘what sort of actor it is?’, 
and it refers to type identity. The second is ‘what it is in another’s eyes?’, and it refers to role 
identity.  
 
Following this logic, chapter 4 has explored the type identities of the EU and China from four 
dimensions. The exploration of type identities has answered the question of ‘what sort of actor 
it is?’ To sum up, in terms of political regimes, China is a nation-state with a ‘Chinese- 
characterised’ democracy, and the EU is a supranational polity with multilevel democracy. In 
terms of strategies, China is a rising power, which lives within the global order that is built by 
the West, but intends to bring some reforms to it. The EU is a normative power, which takes 
promoting normative principles as one of its core interests, but given its complicated nature, it 
also has materialistic requirements. The domain of values is the point where there are the most 
intensive clashes between the two. As an Eastern civilisation, Chinese values are different from 
the EU’s Western culture. China is a nation-state which believes in Westphalian norms, and it 
is determined to keep its sovereignty intact, and resist any kind of intervention. But the EU is 
a post-modern entity, which believes it is rightful to go beyond borders and promote norms. 
Finally, with regard to economies, both of them have large GDP and trade volume, but China 
still has a relatively low living standard, but the EU’s society has already been developed, and 
the EU’s economic strength enables it to promote normative programmes.  
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The findings of this chapter have laid down the foundation for analysing role identity and the 
case study of the arms embargo negotiation. For instance, China’s political regime was 
perceived by the EU as undemocratic, which led to the EU’s intention to promote political 
reform through ‘constructive engagement (which is supported by its type identity as economic 
power)’ with China. But due to China’s own values on democracy, the outcomes was not as 
satisfactory as the EU expected. Furthermore, China’s insistence on non-interventionism and 
the EU’s intention to promote norms clashed with each other, and led to the cooling down of 
the relationship in the 2005-08 period. This changed the role identities from that of maturing 
partners to that of critical friends. In terms of the arms embargo case, China’s strategic type 
identity encouraged it to move closer to the EU, so that they could build multipolarity and 
balance the US. Lifting the arms embargo was seen as sign to prove this strategic partnership. 
If it was not because of the EU’s normative identity, there was little reason for it (on the EU’s 
stance alone, excluding the US influences hypothetically) to refuse lifting the embargo, because 
the elimination of the embargo implied more commercial interests. Additionally, the EU’s 
political regime provided the platform for normative initiatives, therefore, the EU was able to 
show its normative identities in the arms embargo negotiation.  
 
Chapter 5 has taken a historical review of the EU-China relations. It has demonstrated the 
perceptions of each other, and also their role identities that were based on these perceptions. 
The whole chapter can be seen as a long-period based case study, as the argument has been 
made on the basis of empirical experiences. At the beginning of the chapter, I explicitly 
introduced the notion of role identity, and then I have established the relationship between 
identity, interest and behaviour in Figure 9. Furthermore, I explained the concept of ‘perception’ 
as the complementary factor to understand the function of role identity. On this basis, I then 
reviewed the five phases from 1975 to 2012. In each phase, there was a pair of role identities, 
based on the mutual perceptions. When the perceptions changed, the role identities were 
transformed, and then the status of the relations varied accordingly. These observations on the 
historical experiences have demonstrated the causality between role identities and the bilateral 
relationship. 
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Chapter 6 has revealed the clash of identities in the case of the arms embargo negotiation. It is 
not only concerned with the type identities that were mentioned above, but also the atmosphere 
of the role identities from 2003 to 2005. More importantly, it has been embedded into a broader 
triangle context. The involvement of the US has created a new role identity of the EU from 
China’s perspective. Instead of discussing what the EU is in the triangular relationship, this 
chapter has demonstrated what the EU is not. In 2003 and 2004, the EU was not the US in 
terms of its geopolitical reasoning and its endorsement of multilateralism. But eventually, given 
the complex nature of the EU, it still had multiple connections with the US, which made it not 
that different from the latter. These alterations in the EU’s role identities have not only changed 
the EU’s behaviour, but also China’s perception of it, and then changed China’s behaviour 
afterwards. After the arms embargo negotiations, the EU-China relations has entered into the 
phase of being critical friends.  
 
The case study, along with the discussion in previous chapters, has confirmed the hypothesis 
that identity plays a decisive role in EU-China relations. Furthermore, the investigation of the 
two actors’ identities has produced a multifaceted description of the EU and China. It has not 
simply demonstrated the qualities of the two, but also explained the implications of these 
qualities for the bilateral relationship. 
 
Methods Adopted and Sources Deployed 
This major method adopted in this thesis was a rigorous investigation and quantitative analysis 
on 176 Chinese language literatures on EU-China relations. After filtering out irrelevant 
articles in the CNKI, these sources were collected by mainly identifying their titles or key 
words of ‘EU-China relations’, ‘EU-US relations’, and ‘China-US relations’. A qualitative 
analysis was applied in investigating the content of these Chinese language articles. It 
highlighted the identified key words (e.g., ‘multipolarity’, ‘EU-US breach’, ‘US opposition’ 
and so on) and calculate their appearances in the narratives in the form of percentages, which 
contributed to showing the extent to which China perceived the EU as a partner or something 
else. Through such a qualitative analysis, this thesis has clearly demonstrated Chinese 
observers’ perception of the EU, and has also shown how these perceptions have influenced 
EU-China relations. 
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As a complementary method to acquire information that cannot be accessed from the method 
above, interviews have been conducted in Beijing, Brussels and the UK. Most of the Chinese 
interviewees are based in universities and research institutions that are funded and governed 
by Chinese governments, some of them even have access to China’s European policy-making 
circle. The European interviewees are not as many as Chinese ones, but both of them had taken 
critical positions in EU institutions, and had participated in the high-level dialogue with 
Chinese officials. Therefore, even though they accounted for few numbers in the list of 
interviewees, their contribution to forming the ideas of this thesis was not marginal.  
 
Responding to research questions 
In the Introductory chapter, I have laid down three research questions. The discussions in this 
thesis have answered them respectively. 
 
1. What is the EU? What is China? 
The best way to understand the EU’s nature is to become aware of its complexities. Therefore, 
chapter 1 has demonstrated that in the CFSP, the EU has been given more power by the Lisbon 
Treaty, but given the overlapped competences among institutions and positions, the complexity 
of the EU has not been reduced. Member states have retained most of the competences in this 
area, which made the EU less integrated in terms of foreign and security policies. Even in the 
CCP, the reinforcement of the competence of the Parliament meant that there would be more 
actors who could impact on the decision-making of the EU. Moreover, the diverse initiatives 
and interests of member states have increased the complexity of the EU. The exploration of the 
powerful member states has shown that they do not share the same strategies in the CFSP. 
Additionally, the photovoltaic case has demonstrated the divergences between the member 
states which have overwhelming retail sectors and those that are major manufactory powers 
are producers. To sum up, the EU is a complicated entity, to understand what it is, we need to 
see clearly who is speaking for the EU. 
 
With the awareness of the complexity, chapter 1 has given two reasons for arguing that it is 
still valid to analyse identity at the EU level. One is that EU’s legal personality has been widely 
recognised, the other is that the EU’s special qualities makes it different from any other 
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international actor, therefore it is valuable to analyse the EU in its own right. In addition, the 
case study has given an empirical reason. In the negotiation over arms embargo, China had 
mainly focused on building friendly relationships with individual powerful member states, but 
neglected the EU’s institutions and the veto mechanism in this case. However, the individual 
states did not successfully help China to lift the embargo. This lesson has shown the importance 
and necessity to look at the EU level. 
 
To counter the intuitive consideration of China as a unitary international actor, chapter 2 has 
examined multiple actors and their competences in China’s foreign policy-making system. It 
has shown that there are various actors within the system, and their interests are not always 
compatible while they are facing different issues. To some extent, their interests may compete, 
or even conflict. As demonstrated in the arms embargo case, its efforts to lift the embargo was 
challenged by the need to prevent Taiwan’s campaign for independence. To sum up, both China 
and the EU have complicated policy-making systems, within which there are various actors 
and diverse competences. Therefore, it is needed to understand who is speaking for them and 
what is its genuine interest. 
 
2. What is identity in the constructivist context? 
Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2 has explained the concept of identity. Identity is a concept borrowed 
from sociology, and it answers the question of ‘who am I’? In the IR context, it refers to the 
international actors’ qualities that define the actors’ interests and shape their behaviours. 
Constructivism indicates that identity can be influenced by the external environment, but in a 
way of self-realisation, which means the actor is not directly changed by international society. 
It must conceive the atmosphere of the society and then internalise the perception into the 
construction of identity. In the constructivist context, the question of ‘who am I’ is composed 
of two sub-questions. The first one refers to a kind of self-understanding, it means that the actor 
conceives itself and realises its own qualities. This process of self-understanding generates type 
identity. The second one refers to inter-subjective recognition. It involves two actors, and the 
perception of each other generates the role identities of them. Type identity and role identity 
have been the main objects that have been analysed in this thesis. 
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3. What are the functions of identities? 
The functions of identities have been explained respectively in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 
established three functions of type identity. Firstly, type identity is generated by self-
understanding in the process of socialisation, therefore the quality of type identity forms the 
actor’s behavioural patterns. Secondly, the process of self-understanding helps the actor define 
its interests. Thirdly, type identity shapes the way of recognising others, so it influences the 
construction of role identity. The EU and China’s type identities have been explored in 
accordance with these functions. 
 
Role identity emphasises the interactions between the actor and the external environment, and 
the interactions among actors. In the relations between the actor and the external environment, 
as stated above, the atmosphere of the external environment needs to be internalised by the 
actor, so that it can influence the construction of the role identities. In terms of the actor-actor 
relations, it has been illustrated in Figure 9. It has recognised that behaviour is influenced by 
interest, but what is critical in the figure is that it has argued that interest is not naturally born 
with the international society, but needs to be conceived by the actor, and the process of 
conceiving is influenced by the actor’s identity. As shown in Figure 9, the interactions between 
actors are dynamic and inter-subjective, therefore, the relationship between actors changes 
along with the transformation of role identities. The functions of type and role identity are not 
separated, as have been demonstrated in Chapter 5, they work together to influence the actors’ 
behaviour and the relations between them.  
 
Implications and outlooks for future research 
The intention of this thesis was to show the gaps between the perceptions both China and the 
EU have of each other. The case study of the arms embargo case and the historical review of 
EU-China relations have shown the two actors’ imperfect perceptions of the other’s qualities. 
For instance, China instrumentalised its economic attractiveness to try to persuade the EU to 
lift the arms embargo. But firstly, it ignored the influence of EU’s institutions and focused on 
that of individual states, and secondly, it knew that there were opposing voices, but it was over-
confident in the weight of its economic strength, and chose to ignore the normative powers and 
their needs. Eventually, it failed in that campaign by spending—if not wasting—substantial 
diplomatic resources. Even worse, it seemed that China did not learn its lesson. In 2012, the 
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then Premier Wen Jiabao was still working hard to make the EU lift the embargo.726 On the 
EU’s side, there is also mistakes that have been made. For example, the EU only saw China’s 
political regime and wanted to reform it, but because it did not pay attention to China’s history 
and culture, it did not understand why China believed in non-interventionism and why China 
persisted in applying different norms.  
 
Through the exploration of the EU and China’s identities, this thesis has illustrated their 
identities, especially the type identities in diverse areas. The demonstration of China’s political 
regime, strategy and values could help European observers to understand what China is in this 
domain. Conversely, the illustration of the EU’s institutions and its identity as a normative 
power would contribute to enhancing the Chinese understanding of the EU. The historical 
review and the case study have shown that China has perceived the EU’s strategy from a 
perspective of China’s own and assumed that the EU would be willing to constrain US power. 
So the implication of this thesis is to suggest that it is important to know what the others want, 
but not what you want others to do. 
 
Despite this thesis analysing various aspects of the EU-China relationship, it did not cover the 
full narratives of the human rights issues and the impact of the financial crisis on the 
relationship. This thesis did mention human rights in a couple of places, but did not integrate 
them altogether. Given the importance of this topic in EU-China relations, it certainly should 
be given more attention, or maybe there should be a case study that works on how identity 
influences the two actors’ policies on human rights. So is the financial crisis, it would be 
interesting to see how their identities switched in its wake, particularly in terms of foreign direct 
investment. Furthermore, the nature of the EU and China as international actors keep evolving 
in the world politics, hence their identities might change accordingly. For instance, the EU is 
facing the challenge brought by the Brexit (along with other scepticisms in member states such 
as Italy, the Netherlands and so on), so how will this event impact the EU’s identity as an 
integrated polity, and thereby impacting EU-China relations, would be a potential topic to be 
studies in the future. 
                                                 
726 “China premier Wen Jiabao urges end to EU arms embargo”, BBC News, September 20, 2012, [online] 
available at: < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19657940. > [accessed 23 May 2014]. 
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Appendix 
 
List of Interviews: 
Interviewee 1 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is an official that worked in the 
European Commission. The interview was conducted in the UK in October 2015. 
Interviewee 2 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is a professor in Renmin University of 
China. The interview was conducted in Beijing in March 2014. 
Interviewee 3 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is a professor in the China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations. The interview was conducted in Beijing in March 2014. 
Interviewee 4 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is a professor in the Institute of 
European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The interview was conducted 
in Beijing in March 2014. 
Interviewee 5 (as marked in the footnotes of the thesis) is a professor in the Institute of 
European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The interview was conducted 
in Beijing in March 2014. 
Interviewee 6 is a professor in the Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS). The interview was conducted in Beijing in March 2014. 
Interviewee 7 is a professor in Renmin University of China. The interview was conducted in 
Beijing in March 2014. 
Interviewee 8 is a professor in Tsinghua University. The interview was conducted in Beijing in 
March 2014. 
Interviewee 9 is a professor in China Institute of International Studies. The interview was 
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conducted in Beijing in March 2014. 
Interviewee 10 is an official who worked in the EEAS. The interview was conducted in 
Brussels in February 2015. 
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